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On October 3, 1990 Germany was formally reunified through an extension of the 
legal, political and economic structures of West Germany into the former GDR. For 
East Germans this transformation represented a challenging process. Former values, 
orientations and standards were subject to severe scrutiny which affected virtually 
every realm of an individual’s life.
The thesis analyses the development from the divided to the unified Germany and 
asks to what extent East Germans have adopted a collective orientation in line with 
that of the western part. Such identity markers are conceptualized into five distinct 
categories consisting of orientations in the realm of territory, economics, ethnicity, 
mass culture, as well as in the civic-political sphere. The study relies to some extent 
on public opinion surveys and on qualitative data including media sources, literature 
and impressionistic accounts. Political-historical analyses of the identities of the 
Federal and the German Democratic Republic are followed by interrogations into the 
state of the East German identity as it evolved between 1990 and 1996.
The study provides a deeper understanding of those processes and determinants 
which brought continuity or change to the German political system. Although 
interrogations into national identities are neither able to determine the precise 
moment of change, nor the precise scope and direction of political action they offer 
well-defined tracks along which political decisions are received in a supportive or 
oppositional manner. The study of national identity therefore does not represent the 
universal remedy for the explanation of complex political phenomena. Nonetheless, 
it is indispensable in enhancing the explanatory power and predictive capacity of 
political analyses since it broadens understanding and enriches political sensitivity. 
The thesis identifies a significant range of commonalties, as well as striking features 
of mutually exclusive areas which prevent the establishment of a common national 
identity shared by east and west.
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One has to ask whether it's really right 
that we've basically taken a different system 
and forced it on these people.
I  don’t know how the 'Wessis ’ would have reacted 
whether they would have been able to show as much 
let's call it endurance 
as some o f the 'Ossis' have had to have.
It's as if the Japanese had invaded West Germany and 
announced 
from tomorrow you are under Japanese law 
everything you have been doing up until now is irrelevant 
whether it's traffic regulations or tax law 
even the constitution 
forget it!
From tomorrow everything’s Japanese 
Klaus Pohl: Waiting Room Germany, 1995
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Following a year of intense public debate and rapid political developments, the 
German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany, adopting its 
legal, political, economic and social structures. On October 3, 1990, Germany was 
formally re-unified; the culmination of a process which had lasted merely one year 
since the decisive public upheavals in the autumn of 1989. Never before in world 
history have two countries been merged in this way. The unification of two societies 
which had been separated for four decades and had symbolised the systemic 
antagonisms of the Cold War marked a historically unparalleled cultural and political 
experiment. In rapid succession, the totalitarian system of the GDR was abolished, 
absorbed into the democratic FRG and taken into the European Community.
The pace of political developments indeed had been breathtaking. On October 18, 
1989 Egon Krenz succeeded Erich Honecker as General Secretary of the East 
German Communist party SED. On November 9, the Berlin Wall opened its gates to 
the west. Four days later, the Communist reformer Hans Modrow became Minister 
President. On March 18, 1990, free elections to the Volkskammer were held, 
followed by the monetary, economic and social union with the Federal Republic on 
July 1. The political and state union on October 3, resulted in the first all-German 
federal elections to the Bundestag on December 2.
Proposals for reforming the Socialist system of the GDR, a federalist union with the 
western part, or a third alternative between Capitalism and Socialism along the 
Scandinavian model were not able to generate sufficient public support. Chancellor 
Kohl’s promise of ‘blossoming landscapes in the East’ combined with the prospect 
of repeating the Federal Republic’s post-war success resulted in widespread approval 
for a swift Anschlufi. Popular support, the Chancellor’s energetic drive to seize the 
unique historic opportunity for unification, as well as Gorbachev’s willingness to co­
operate ended in the speedy integration of the former GDR into the western 
federalist structure.
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As with the transition processes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the 
collapse of Communism in the GDR and the integration into the stable democratic 
society of the Federal Republic attracted widespread scholarly attention. The 
diplomatic history of the demise of the SED regime, the subsequent negotiations 
between East and West German governmental officials, or the ‘Two-Plus-Four’ 
consultations between the two Germanys and France, Great Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union stood at the centre of much political analysis, as did 
structural interrogations on expanding the West German political, economic, social 
and legal systems onto the former GDR.
However this study intends to shed a different light on German unification; the 
starting point being the obvious recognition that virtually every aspect of the lives of 
East Germans were affected by the transition processes. For the new democratic 
citizens of eastern Germany, unification bore the challenge of a profound re­
orientation within a markedly different environment. They had to bid farewell to the 
former all-encompassing welfare state as new regulations, pension schemes, medical 
care and health coverage spread to the East. At work, old routines broke down. For 
many the former constitutional right of work turned into the fear, prospect and 
experience of unemployment, while the new market economy introduced new 
notions of initiative, individuality, performance and competitiveness. Administration 
and bureaucracy operated under western guidelines and principles. Features of the 
West German political system were rapidly implemented. Elections were held 
according to western rules, the western party system expanded onto the eastern 
Lander and federalism was re-introduced. The former monolithic power of the SED 
and its affiliated mass organisations and block parties gave way to a complex system 
of political plurality for interest representation and participation. New laws and 
regulations governed the lives of East Germans in their relationship to the state. 
Western mass-cultural phenomena conquered the east. Commercialisation, 
communication, consumerism, leisure and lifestyles spilled over to eastern Germany
which stood in stark contrast to the former grey Socialist reality of suppressed 
demands. These new legal, political, economic, social and mass-cultural standards 
and rules of a new society had to be grasped and internalised. Former values and 
standards which had developed under forty years of Communist rule were now 
subject to severe scrutiny and re-consideration.
The phenomenon of a gap between the organisational principles of a society and 
their feedback from the population was not unique to German history. Within a 
period of merely 120 years, Germany has had to face the problems of continuity and 
change of political structure and corresponding orientations of its citizens on a 
number of occasions. The country had experienced several fundamental ruptures of 
the political system which were hardly matched by any other nation in modem 
history. The first German unification of 1871 established Germany as a late-comer to 
the European league of major nation states. Hierarchical in principle, the Second 
Reich represented an absolutist monarchy which survived until the end of the first 
World War. After 1918, the progressive Weimar Republic failed against economic, 
social and political pressures, while alienating opposing factions of Nationalists, 
Monarchists, Communists and Democrats which ultimately culminated in Hitler’s 
rise to power. Out of the ruins of World War II, the emerging Cold War forced the 
division of the country into a stable and successful liberal democracy and a 
totalitarian Stalinist regime. Obviously, the structural changes during this period 
were radical. The relationship between the ruling elite and the population, between 
standards and demands of the political structure and the individual’s perceptions of 
them, between the structural requisites and political orientations of the citizens 
changed drastically each time a new political system appeared on the agenda of 
German history.
10
Approaching Subjectivity: Political Culture and German Unification
All these structural transformations - from Monarchy to Democracy to Fascism and 
to Democracy/Communism - were rapid and abrupt. Cognitive re-orientations to 
structural changes however, require time. A structural revolution was always 
followed by the individual’s evolutionary adaptation to new political rules and 
standards. It therefore came as little surprise that the first study on orientations of a 
population towards their political system included the West German case. Almond 
and Verba’s Civic Culture (1963) advanced conventional institutional considerations 
with the postulate that a congruence between the structure and the culture of a 
political system was elementary in guaranteeing system stability. After conducting 
five national surveys, Almond and Verba confirmed distributions of three types: the 
parochial or traditional culture, the participant or rational-activist culture, and the 
subject or deferential culture. The development of a stable democratic society was 
therefore only complete with the establishment of a democratic culture - termed by 
Almond and Verba as the civic culture - which represented an appropriate blend and 
balance of subject and participant elements by combining trust and deference to 
authority with positive attitudes to the goods of active participation. Hence, the 
concept of political culture employed orientations of a population towards their 
political system as an analytical tool, suggesting that subjectivity gives meaning to, 
as well as influences the political system. As noted by Glenda Patrick (1984:279), 
political culture represents
‘the set of fundamental beliefs, values and attitudes that characterise the 
nature of the political system and regulate the political interactions 
among its members.’
Political culture forms a reservoir of collective experiences of individuals within a 
functioning political system and develops into a collective memory which alters 
according to new experiences. It is therefore fluid, since new experiences contribute 
and old experiences vanish from the collective reservoir. Because of the differing
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experiences of political individuals within the political system, political culture is 
expressed in varying facets which consist of various sub-cultures along social, 
economic, cultural or generational lines.
However the complicated relationship of subjectivity and objectivity within a 
political system resulted in little agreement on the definition and theories of, 
methods for and paradigms of political culture.1 Nonetheless, all approaches address 
a fundamental concern: the micro-macro relationship between the political individual 
and the overarching political system he or she lives in. After a fierce debate on the 
causal relationship between structure, culture and the political system, Arend 
Lijphart (1989) offered a compromise, arguing that structure and culture are 
mutually interdependent and reinforcing by forming a reciprocal causality with both 
being cause or effect of the other. Hence, change or stability of the political system 
as the dependent variable are the direct effects of an interplay of structure and 
culture, whereas either alternately represent the independent or the intermediate 
variable. A stable democratic system is hereby guaranteed by a coherent democratic 
culture with democratic values, attitudes and behaviour and a democratic structure 
consisting of the social, political, legal and economic organisation of the society.
Without any doubt the East German transformation after 1989 represented a 
formidable case for the application of the concept of political culture and the
1 Apart from Almond and Verba, a psychological account which stressed individual orientations to 
political objects had been offered by Parsons and Shils (1951). Sociological definitions which 
included individual orientations, as well as behaviours that carry orientations were given by Fagan 
(1969), Tucker (1973) and Geertz (1983). Emile Durkheim (1933) regarded culture as an objective 
composite of values and norms which are prevalent in society. Ideal-type constructs were applied by 
Weber (1968), Bell (1964) and Lipset (1960). Ronald Inglehart’s ‘Silent Revolution’ (1977) analysed 
societies in light of fundamental changes in values, political behaviour and support for political parties 
towards the development of postmaterial attitudes, such as new political movements, lifestyle and 
consumerism.
2 For a more thorough discussion of methodology, theoretical shortcomings and failures of political 
culture see for example Street (1993), Almond (1989), Gibbins (1989) or Iwand (1985).
3 The relationship between structure and culture, between cause and effect is argued in more detail in 
Barry (1970), Lijphart (1989) or Pateman (1989).
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prospect of democratic stability. The political system of the GDR was radically 
transformed from a Communist dictatorship to a liberal democracy. Former beliefs, 
values and attitudes which developed under four decades of totalitarian rule clashed 
with a fundamentally different set of thought and behaviour that were introduced 
through the unification with the Federal Republic. While the extension of the 
western political, economic and social structures onto the eastern Lander certainly 
provided a stabilising impact, the same cannot be said about the citizens’ subjective 
orientations. Democratic stability could only be achieved if East Germans were 
capable of mustering a profound cognitive, affective and behavioural re-orientation 
which approved of the new political structures.
Expanding Subjectivity: Identity and Political Culture
However this study does not intend to produce a re-interpretation of Almond and 
Verba’s Civic Culture (1989) after their last ‘visit’ to Germany in 1980. On the 
contrary, the extent and depth of unification and its impact on the population renders 
a classical political culture approach difficult. As argued above, unification in East 
Germany affected virtually every aspect of an individual’s life. East Germans 
experienced a radical break and discontinuity from their former life in the 
Communist GDR. In contrast to other Eastern European post-Communist states, East 
Germans joined an already well-established society and adopted its rules and 
regulations. The transition was not internal but external - designed to follow rather 
than to create.
For such sudden and colossal changes, the concept of political culture does not seem 
suited. For East Germans, the subjective re-orientations caused by unification go far 
beyond beliefs, attitudes and values towards the characteristics of the political 
system. Against the backdrop of these massive systemic transformations, questions 
such as ‘who am I?’, ‘where do I belong?’ and ‘where am I going to?’ automatically
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arise. Hence, for many the establishment of a democratic civic culture amongst East 
Germans was superseded by the necessity of finding and developing a new identity 
in a new and largely unfamiliar environment. While the state is a political, rational 
and objective construct, the nation is a political-cultural phenomenon - emotional 
and an ‘attitude rather than a fact’ (Connor 1978:381). The establishment of a civic 
culture merely reflects on the development of formal participation patterns and 
cognitive support towards the new political realities.
On its own however, democracy is not capable of forging emotional ties to the new 
environment. It only addresses a particular aspect of the individual’s new 
experiences - that of the political individual within a new political system. The full 
depth and extent of present economic, social, or cultural experiences, as well as of 
past experiences under Communist rule however, are left largely untouched. An 
investigation into the subjective dimension of German unification therefore has to 
broaden its scope. While a civic culture sustains the political stability of a state and 
addresses orientations towards political institutions, the task of establishing new 
identities in Eastern Germany corresponds to the unity of the nation and to a new­
found sense of identity with formerly separated compatriots.
Conceptualising National Identity
Identity reflects the state of mind of an individual towards his or her social 
community. It represents a process of discovering and generating a consciousness 
towards one’s environment, a social assertion of the self as being somebody in the 
world. Through such an identity the individual locates and defines him or herself in 
the world, acquiring a collective personality based on shared values, experiences and 
orientations. As with political culture, subjective orientations of the population give 
meaning to the overarching structural setting. Images of nations, of one’s own as 
well as of foreign nations are common and widespread in society and politics. The
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national community has been described as the indispensable link between the general 
mass of human beings and familiar local and regional environments (Wuthe 
1987:203). The nation represents a prominent object for people’s emotional 
attachment and provides the scope for the individual’s search for definition and 
location within the world. National identity levels individuality and emphasises 
communality, whereas the nation forges common loyalties and emotional 
attachments out of a heterogeneous mass of individuals. National identity rests on 
common values which are bom out of a shared past and a shared vision of the future. 
As such, the nation blends two fundamentally different sets of principles (Smith 
1991:11). Ethnically, the nation corresponds to shared cultural and genealogical 
traits, such as customs, traditions, language, religion, or descent. On the civic level, 
the nation encompasses orientations towards a particular set of political ideas, 
towards legal rights and civic duties, towards a common mass culture, as well as 
towards the nation’s historic territory. Hence, national identity reflects the emotional 
attachment and degree of loyalty of an individual towards these ethnic and civic 
characteristics.
Following Anthony Smith’s taxonomy, the thesis organises national identity into 
several sub-categories which consist of orientations towards five distinct elements. 
They include the civic-political sphere, a common mass culture, economics, 
ethnicity, as well as the historical territory or the homeland (Smith 1991:15). Within 
these elements, the study addresses those issues which gained particular importance 
for East Germans in the immediate period before and after the revolution of 
November 1989. The underlying rationale is cogent. For East Germans, unification 
represented the ultimate vehicle for the formation of a national identity. Unification 
had such a drastic and overwhelming impact on the individual’s life that orientations 
towards the recently unified nation were dominated and fundamentally generated by 
the individual’s experiences and perceptions of the transformation processes. The
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formation of a national identity was in reality a response to unification - a testimony 
of the process of self-definition within a new environment.
Table 1.1. Conceptualising National Identity in Eastern Germany
Chapter Two Territory the fact of the division 
the prospect of unification 
perceptions of the homeland








Chapter Five Mass Culture consumerism 
leisure and life-style 
media
Chapter Six Ethnicity German ethnicity 
legacy of the Third Reich 
ethno-centrism
Chapter Two on territory addresses the division of the nation after World War II 
which generated contrasting territorial orientations in East and West Germany 
towards the stretch of land to which people feel attached to. The FRG found a new 
spiritual home within the community of western states, while the cold-war 
antagonism pushed the awareness of the loss of the eastern territory further and 
further out of the public psyche. In contrast, efforts by the SED to instil an artificial 
identity as a German Socialist nation state were not convincingly adopted by the 
population. The notion of the divided nation and the prospect of eventual unification 
continued to dominate the minds of East Germans.
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In the economic analysis of Chapter Three, the discussion centers on how Easterners 
had to adjust to fierce job competition and the prospect of unemployment. The 
market economy emphasised such formerly neglected principles as self­
responsibility and initiative, while the sophisticated, all-encompassing welfare 
system of the GDR which provided social security from cradle to grave faded into a 
notion of the past.
Chapter Four focuses on the relation between state and citizen, between rights and 
responsibilities of ruler and ruled. With unification, East Germans had to depart from 
the GDR’s streamlined and hierarchical form of political participation. The functions 
of new institutions and new forms of interest representation had to be internalised. 
The collective goal of establishing the Communist society under the unchallenged 
ideological and practical auspices of the SED was replaced by the Federal Republic’s 
emphasis on individuality and plurality.
On the mass-cultural agenda of Chapter Five, East Germans were thrown into the 
postmodern age without the gradual development that West Germany had 
experienced after World War II. Consumerism, advertising, choice of leisure 
activities, as well as a quantitative increase and qualitative change in media 
consumption washed over the new Lander in a gigantic wave that tried to make up 
for four lost decades of Communist parsimony.
Chapter Six on ethnicity addresses the question of birth and common descent which 
was problematised by markedly diverging experiences in east and west. The gradual 
confrontation of the Federal Republic with the traumatic Nazi-past left the country’s 
identity virtually bare of ethnic elements. In contrast, the Communist elite 
conveniently regarded the Third Reich’s genocide and moral barbarism as a western 
problem and responsibility. Furthermore, the Bonn Republic had never officially 
recognised itself as a country of immigration but nonetheless carried out a policy of
17
integration which incorporated vast numbers of ‘guest workers’ and ethnic Germans 
from East European territories. Although foreigners were by no means fully 
assimilated, increasing exposure to foreign ethnicities allowed for growing multi­
cultural experiences. In the GDR, the SED’s official rhetoric promulgated 
internationalism and Communist solidarity. Multi-cultural experiences however, 
were highly limited because of severe travel restrictions and the very low numbers of 
foreigners living in the GDR.
Methodology
How can political science analyse and measure the feelings, beliefs and attitudes of a 
population? How can the ‘black box’ be opened to screen the mind-sets of numerous 
individuals and hence, is it possible to develop a coherent orientation for the united 
Germany in its quest for establishing a common national identity?
Identity and political structure form a two-way symbiosis. Individuals accommodate, 
absorb and respond to structural requisites and shape them in the process. With 
unification, the political, social and economic structures of the Federal Republic 
extended to the new Lander. Over forty years these had formed, as well as were 
being formed by a distinctive West German national identity in a process of mutual 
interdependence of subjective orientations and objective structures. After 1989, the 
superimposed structures of West Germany generated emotional responses from East 
Germans towards the unified nation. These were juxtaposed against orientations 
towards the now defunct GDR. Past and present collided, while the individual tried 
to accommodate the new experiences of unification to former values, standards and 
beliefs. As a response, a particular set of thought and behaviour developed which 
ultimately affected - either changed or stabilised - the structural setting. The post­
unification developments in eastern Germany are therefore analysed against the 
backdrop of both the West and East German identities as they evolved throughout
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the post-war era. Consequently, each chapter covers four distinct areas of 
investigation. Conceptualising remarks about the individual subcategories of 
national identity are followed by political-historical analyses of the identities of the 
GDR and FRG. Out of these, the fourth part draws conclusions and addresses post­
unification developments regarding the question of the contemporary identity in 
eastern Germany and its status as a separated or unified identity with the western 
part.
Since national identity consists of several layers, it is vital to realise that the 
categorised orientations towards territory, economics, citizenship, mass culture and 
ethnicity do not and cannot exist or develop separately. As argued by Smith 
(1991:14), national identity is ‘fundamentally multi-dimensional’. Elements overlap, 
merge and mutually reinforce each other. For instance, mass-cultural behaviour and 
attitudes towards consumerism certainly depict an economic element, since a 
satisfactory participation in the new consumer society requires a certain level of 
material prosperity and financial stability. Given the presence of such soft borders, 
the thesis organises such multiple facets under the category in which where they 
exert the most decisive impact. Nonetheless, cross-references to other categories 
hopefully avoid a rigid fragmentation of national identity into five sub-groupings, 
while the final conclusion intends to place the analytical results of the preceding 
chapters into a summarising perspective.
According to Fredrik Barth (1969) aggregates of people share a common culture 
which develops interconnected differences that distinguish the group from other 
cultures. Out of social interaction, cultural traits emerge which construct boundaries 
for a community and ascribe an individual as a member or a non-member of the 
group. To maintain its integrity the community possesses two fundamental functions. 
On the one hand internal boundaries are created which define the member of a group 
as ‘one-of-us’, whereas the individual adopts particular patterns of behaviour and
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thought and shares the group’s values, symbols and traditions. Based on this 
behavioural, affective and cognitive reservoir, social bonds are established which 
guide the interaction and socialisation of the group members. On the other hand, 
external boundaries establish and define the community against other communities. 
In light of Barth’s typology, identity can be understood as ‘sameness’ (Smith 
1991:75), whereas members of a particular group define membership characteristics 
which mark them off from non-members. Within internal boundaries, individuals 
interact and socialise, while external boundaries serve as identity markers which 
distinguish and separate the group from other communities.
The problem of boundary creation and maintenance becomes more transparent in the 
context of German unification. During the post-war division, the two German states 
developed distinctly different sets of boundaries. Internally, the different economic, 
political and social organisation of the GDR and the FRG provided for different sets 
of thought and behaviour. Externally, the antagonistic concepts of democracy and 
Communism, market economy and Socialism, liberty and dictatorship, as well as the 
territorial separation offered numerous mutually exclusive definitions which marked 
one Germany off from the other.
With unification these boundaries had to be re-defined. The West German political, 
economic, social and legal structures were expanded on to the east accompanied by 
corresponding sets of thought and behaviour. The former external boundaries of 
West Germany were now transformed into normative internal boundaries for East 
Germans. With the introduction of western structures, Easterners were expected to 
adopt western standards and values, while the former patterns which constituted and 
maintained the East German community were fundamentally disrupted. The East 
German ‘collective destiny’ (Smith 1991:25) was dispersed and swallowed by the 
western part. Again, as with the radical system transformations of Weimar, National 
Socialism, as well as with the Federal and the Democratic Republic, national
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identities had to be re-established in direct response to the vast structural changes of 
the political system.
For East Germans, three distinctly different choices were available. First, over time, 
Easterners had approved of the western set of structure, thought and behaviour and 
had accommodated the internal boundaries set by the western system which 
ultimately resulted in a common national identity. Secondly, Easterners partly 
accepted the western set of thought and behaviour. Despite the persistence of 
mutually exclusive boundaries, this scenario allowed for the co-existence of identity 
markers shared by both Easterners and Westerners. Thirdly, East Germans did not 
accept the western set resulting in dual identities of east and west. Such an outcome 
had been prompted by two causes. On the one hand, Easterners had been denied 
access, whereas West Germans continued to maintain external boundaries which 
excluded their fellow countrymen and denied them recognition as members of their 
community. Out of rejection, the East subsequently disapproved of the western set of 
behaviour and thought. On the other hand, Easterners had chosen to reject them, 
since the prospect of crossing the internal boundaries by adopting western principles 
did not seem appealing. Both of these scenarios resulted in a split national identity. 
The vacuum left by the demise of the GDR could not have been filled by the west. 
Subsequently, East Germans re-established external boundaries to mark themselves 
off from the west in a move that stressed eastern elements.
The study relies to a considerable extent on public opinion surveys. For West 
Germany and for post-1989 eastern Germany, polls by the Allensbacher Institut fur 
Demoskopie, Emnid, or the ‘Politbarometer ’ of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen are 
consulted. Apart from contemporary ad-hoc surveys, the thesis tries to incorporate 
survey questions which were continuously collected over longer periods of time to 
demonstrate changing orientations. In the absence of quantitative material or to 
analyse certain phenomena further, qualitative data, such as literature or media
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sources and impressionistic accounts are used which play a particular importance in 
the case of the GDR, where surveys were hardly conducted or published.
In 1978, the SED closed down its sole research organisation on public opinion, the 
Institut fur Meinungsforschung (Forster and Roski 1990:15). The gap between the 
official dogmatism and rhetoric of state and party and the actual attitudes of the 
population caused widespread irritation amongst the political elite who feared that 
the strictly confidential results could eventually trickle down to the public. Instead, 
the SED increasingly relied on the Ministry of State Security - the surveillance 
apparatus of spies and unofficial informants which was nicknamed the Stasi - to 
monitor its citizens. In addition, the state-controlled media occasionally held public 
surveys. However politically sensitive issues were never allowed to be publicised. 
The Zentralinstitut fur Jugendforschung (Institute for Youth Research) was 
confronted with similar problems of censorship and tutelage. Focusing on young 
adults aged 14 to 25, the institute’s research depended on the permission of state or 
party officials. As usual, results were strictly confidential and were not disclosed to 
the public.
By 1990, surveys by the Institut fur Meinungsforschung, as well as the 
Zentralinstitut fur Jugendforschung which were not destroyed by state and party 
agencies became accessible to scholars and were subsequently published (Niemann 
1993, Forster and Roski 1990). Both institutes guaranteed anonymity to their 
respondents, while safeguarding such research imperatives as standardised 
questionnaires or representative samples. The data collection was therefore 
legitimate. However data interpretation was occasionally complicated by the biased 
ideological nature of some survey questions. The study therefore excludes such overt 
distortion of public attitudes. Quite often however, questions hardly possessed a 
political-ideological undertone. Although questions unfortunately were not asked
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continuously over longer time spells these results undoubtedly offered valid 
contemporary assessments of public opinion in East Germany.
Structure Versus Culture: The Predictive Power of National Identity
How then can the symbiosis of structure and culture, of objectivity and subjectivity, 
be analysed - not only for explanatory and descriptive reasons but furthermore for 
predictive purposes? Anthony Smith (1991:91) argues that ‘nationalism is a form of 
culture - an ideology, a language, mythology, symbolism and consciousness’ - and 
‘the nation is a type of identity whose meaning and priority is presupposed by this 
form of culture’. In a similar vein, Benedict Anderson (1983:15) defined the nation 
as
‘an imagined political community... It is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion.’
Both approaches suggest that culture plays a crucial role in the subjective orientation 
towards one’s environment, towards one’s imagined community. But while the 
importance of a coherent identity for a nation seems relatively undisputed, it remains 
problematic to evaluate and explain the causal relationship between identity and 
political action. How do national identities trigger change or sustain stability within 
a particular political order and how do national identities drive political action?
All scholarly efforts so far have failed in establishing the ‘crucial link’ that explains 
why and which elements of a national identity are conducive or respectively opposed
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to structural changes.4 However national identity offered a convincing explanation 
for instance, for the tacit approval or even rejection of ‘Maastricht’ by the peoples of 
various EU-member states. As George Schopflin (1995:44) correctly noted, post-war 
European integration represented an economic, technological and administrative 
process. The political elite simply assumed that once those structures were in place, 
the importance of national-cultural differences, of nationhood and of nationalism 
would lose their relevance. Close-call referenda and considerable public discontent 
showed that this ‘attempt to divorce the political community from its cultural- 
affective elements’ was not met by adequate public enthusiasm. Commentators 
pointed towards a feeling of colonisation by Brussels, anticipated cultural 
streamlining, perceived loss of political authority or economic insecurity. In short, 
the identity of a common Europe based on integration and co-operation had not yet 
replaced the nation as the object for one’s primary loyalties.
In this respect, national identity provided a deeper understanding of those processes 
and determinants which brought continuity or change to a political system. Since 
national identity is able to give early warning signs of potential dissatisfaction with 
policies, politics and polities, political life becomes more transparent by integrating 
analytic results other than those offered by structural or institutional considerations. 
Nonetheless, national identity is neither able to determine the precise moment in 
time nor the precise scope and direction of political action. National identity does not
4 Sidney Verba (1965:529) noted that identity with the nation legitimises the activities of political 
elites which in return makes it possible for them to mobilise the commitment and support of their 
followers. Such a commitment would enable a political system to survive in times of crises. Stephen 
Welch (1993:131,135) argued that national identity not only emerged as ‘a response to social 
conditions’ but also changes those circumstances, while John Street (1993:113) concluded that culture 
is something which both shapes and is shaped by political interests. David Easton’s ‘Systems Analysis 
of Political Life’ (1965) differentiates between three distinct recipients of political support: the regime 
or the political order with its three components of values (goals and principles) norms and the 
structure of authority, followed by the authorities (the occupants of authority roles) and finally the 
political community, defined as ‘a group of persons who share a division of labor for the settlement of 
political problems’. Easton argues that dissatisfaction with the authorities can be neutralised by an 
identification with the regime and the political community which could provide for a buffer of support 
in times of a declining cohesion of the common political framework.
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offer the definite trigger which prompts individuals to seek political change. Instead, 
national identity has to be mobilised to generate political action. Agents who are 
capable of initiating such processes are wide-ranging - from political leaders to 
journalists or to international sport events, such as the Olympic Games or 
international football championships - as long as they touch on emotions that 
catalyse an understanding of belonging to the national commune. National identity 
clearly offers well-defined tracks along which political decisions will be received in 
a supportive or rejecting manner. National identity therefore does not offer the 
universal remedy for the explanation of complex political phenomena. It is however, 
indispensable for enhancing the explanatory power and predictive capacity of 
political analyses since it broadens our understanding and enriches our political 




Territorial identities represent emotional orientations ‘to a stretch of land to which 
people feel attached to’ (Smith 1991:9). The homeland - or to use the German term the 
Heimat - constitutes the space where members of a community live and work, where 
generations respond to the changes and challenges of history and where people have 
their formative experiences which bind them to the nation. Thoughts and behaviour 
towards the nation that are generated by citizenship, ethnicity, mass culture and 
economics are complemented by a territorial or spatial repository to a clear-defined 
stretch of land.
How then can territorial identities in unified Germany be operationalised? An analysis 
of German territorial identities which encompass the Tost’ pre-war territories of East 
Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia and the Sudetenland represents a complex study in its own 
right. It could further include orientations towards Austria, German-speaking 
Switzerland, Alsace, Eupen-Malmedy or the Schleswig province in Denmark. However 
the unification treaty of 1990, as well as parallel provisions in the ‘Two-Plus-Four’ 
treaty between the FRG, the GDR, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and 
Great Britain acknowledged the Oder-Neisse line (the post-war demarcation between 
Poland and East Germany) as the permanent western Polish border (Kommers 
1995:190). The issue subsequently lost its remaining political edge. Also, for the
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purpose of this study considerations regarding the lost German territories hardly bore 
any significance. As argued in Chapter One, the establishment of new identities in the 
aftermath of 1989 were triggered by the vast transformation processes. As such, 
orientations towards the pre-war territories outside the FRG and the GDR hardly 
possessed an impact on the establishment of new identities towards the unified nation. 
Although these territories might have remained in the public consciousness of both east 
and west, there was no significant political movement to call for their re-integration into 
Germany. They were pushed aside against the backdrop of establishing territorial 
orientations that now had to incorporate the respective ‘other’ Germany across the 
former Iron Curtain. Orientations towards the pre-war territories were a phenomenon 
that did not affect the establishment of identities in their response to the structural 
changes brought about by unification. They are therefore left untouched.
A further approach is to ask respondents about the territorial unit to which they feel 
most loyal and attached to. Bettina Westle (1994:471) subdivided territorial identities in 
unified Germany into three categories: only the old or the new Lander respectively, the 
unified Germany, as well as double identities towards unified Germany and towards the 
old/new Lander. However such identity markers hardly lead to significant conclusions. 
Such loyal attachments were influenced by other identity markers which made it hard to 
detect the substance of territorial orientations. For instance, someone who possessed 
strong emotional attachments to the old Lander might have wanted the two Germanys to 
stay separate out of the significant tax burden which were imposed on West Germans to 
finance the massive transfer payments to the east. Likewise, loyal orientations towards 
eastern Germany might have been prompted by perceptions of a political take-over of 
western parties or an economic colonisation of the new Lander by western businesses 
which had resulted in a sense of defiance and exaggerated regional pride against the 
super-imposed western structures. Additionally, Germans were confronted with 
unification issues on a daily basis through massive media coverage. Although emotional
27
attachments to the ‘other’ German part might have been weak or even non-existent, the 
fact that Germany and hence the German territory was now united was an obvious 
political reality. This could have prompted positive responses towards feeling loyal to 
the German territory of both east and west. Hence by merely asking about loyalties to 
particular territories the explanatory power is limited because of implicit economic, 
political, cultural or social connotations.
A closer look at the fundamental historical prerogative of German territorial identities in 
east and west however, offered more rewarding analytical results. The post-war division 
of Germany resulted in two antagonistic political systems which stood at the front-line 
of two opposing ideological camps. Market economics versus Socialism, Democracy 
versus Communism, civic liberty versus totalitarianism separated east from west. The 
most obvious signs of the division however, were the tightly secured border, barbed 
wires, patrol guards and since 1961 the Berlin Wall. For East Germans, regular contacts 
between east and west were complicated by severe travel restrictions.1 When applying 
for a visa to visit the FRG, East Germans were confronted with intimidating 
interrogations by the Communist authorities within a lengthy bureaucratic procedure 
that could last several months. An almost impenetrable border, tight security and limited 
travel opportunities to the west resulted in the effective territorial division into two 
separate entities.
How did Germans in east and west accommodate the fact of the division? How did they 
perceive the prospects of unification? One scenario would have implied that the political 
reality of a divided territory and the improbability of unification gradually trickled down
1 In 1964, the SED allowed its pensioners to cross the border to West Germany. By 1984 and in return for 
substantial hard currency loans from the FRG, the party eased travel restrictions and in 1986, some 
570,000 people (excluding pensioners) visited the Federal Republic (Weber 1993:97). Further exceptions 
included occasional tourist visits by Westerners which significantly increased as a result of Chancellor 
Brandt’s detente policy with the Communist bloc.
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to people’s perceptions, resulting in orientations that regarded the ‘other Germany’ as a 
territory to which one did not feel an emotional attachment to; a territory which no 
longer represented part of one’s spatial repository of emotions. Such attitudes would 
have profound implications on the establishment of national identities in the aftermath 
of 1989. Such emotional blockades which perceived the other Germany as an alien 
territory outside of one’s loyalties would have severely hindered the unification of 
Easterners and Westerners as members of one national community. On the other hand, 
perceptions of a shared common territory of the German nation would have been able to 
persist despite the existence of two separated states with clearly marked borders. These 
would have acted as buffers of tolerance against the backdrop of significant economic, 
political and social pressures caused by the transformation processes. An understanding 
would have emerged that despite all the hardship at least the divided people were finally 
re-united.
In short, this chapter addresses territorial identities in east and west by examining 
orientations towards the fact of the division and the prospect of unification which had 
developed prior to 1989. They will offer important insights into whether Westerners and 
Easterners perceived German unification as a welcomed and long-awaited historic 
opportunity which re-unites the German national community or whether unification was 
regarded as a gift from world politics to which one merely felt indifference.
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2.2. The Federal Republic
In West Germany, over a period of 35 years people became accustomed to the division 
and largely began to accept the post-war status quo. Surveys by the Allensbacher Institut 
fur Demoskopie (see Table 2.1.) demonstrated that the number of respondents who 
supported to press for unification nearly halved between 1956 and 1983, while the 
percentages who sensed that unification should be left to the course of time more than 
doubled.
Table 2.1. West Germans and the Prospect of Unification (percentages)
Question: Should West Germany continue to press for unification or should it be left to the course o f time?
September 1956 October 1964 October 1983 November 1989 
press for 65 69 33 19
time 25 21 55 72
do not know 10 10 12 9
Source: Noelle-Neumann and KOcher 1993:430
Although between 1979 and 1989, 75 to 79 per cent were in favour of unification and 
only between 4.5 and twelve per cent were against it (Politbarometer), the systemic 
antagonism of the Cold War left little hope for unification. Table 2.2 shows that the 
number of respondents who believed that it would surely or probably happen dropped 
from 27 per cent in 1951 to a marginal seven per cent in 1983. Correspondingly, the 
share of pessimists who thought that the nation’s division was an irreversible fact 
increased from 29 to sixty per cent.
In addition, knowledge of and interest in the other Germany were limited. In 1979, a 
staggering 74.3 per cent had never visited the GDR since the building of the Wall in 
1961 (Politbarometer). By the beginning of 1989, eighty per cent had not visited the 
other Germany in the last ten years (Noelle-Neumann and Kocher 1993:411). Even for
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those with relatives on the other side of the Iron Curtain, where family ties provided for 
a particular interest, time took its natural toll since the number of respondents who had 
friends or relatives in the GDR decreased from 44 per cent in 1953 to 32 per cent in 
1989. Thus prior to unification in 1989, two-thirds of West German respondents did not 
have any close social relations to East Germans (Noelle-Neumann and Kocher 
1993:411). For those who still had relatives in the east, the severe obstacles for keeping 
in contact contributed to the gradual deterioration of family ties. Eventually, the 
descendants of the brothers and sisters of the immediate post-war generation mustered 
only a modest interest for their distant cousins.
Table 2.2. West Germans and the Likelihood of Unification (percentages)
Question: Do you think that the division o f Germany will eventually disappear and a unified Germany will 
emerge?
1951 1973 1983
yes, surely 10 2 2
yes, probably 17 7 5
uncertain 36 32 33
no 29 53 60
no answer 9 6 -
Source: Emnid Informationen 8/9-1983:15.
It therefore came as little surprise that the political fact of the divided nation had only a 
subordinate importance in the minds of most West Germans. While in 1965, German 
unification was regarded by 69 per cent and European integration by 24 per cent as the 
more pressing political problem, attitudes had been reversed by 1983 with 36 per cent 
and sixty per cent respectively (Emnid Informationen 5/6-1989:13). When asked what 
Germany actually implied, 57.2 per cent in 1979 named the Federal Republic and only 
27.4 per cent referred to the FRG and the GDR (Politbarometer). In addition, the 
willingness to permanently accept the Oder-Neisse line which marked the border 
between Poland and East Germany since the end of World War II increased from a mere
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eight per cent in 1951 to 61 per cent in 1972 (Institut fur Demoskopie 1974:525). The 
territorial identity of West Germans could therefore be labelled as minimalist. The pre­
war territories east of the GDR gradually disappeared from the public’s perceptions as 
belonging to the German nation. More importantly however, even the separated GDR 
did not represent a marker for the West German territorial identity. The Heimat was 
simply the Federal Republic as the clearly defined stretch of land for one’s emotional 
orientations.
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2.3. The German Democratic Republic
In correspondence to the west, the Cold War antagonism could not erase the East 
Germans’ will for unity. The western-based Infratest2 reported that support for 
unification was even stronger than the already high numbers of the Federal Republic. In 
1984, 89 per cent of respondents were in favour of unification (Kohler 1992:77). 
Despite decades of separate political, economic, social and cultural experiences, the idea 
prevailed in east and west that the divided nation should eventually reunite.
However attitudes towards the territorial division of the German nation were 
fundamentally different in the GDR. A survey by the East German Institut fur 
Meinungsforschung in 1968 revealed that only 55 per cent regarded the GDR as their 
‘fatherland’, while 42 per cent attributed this notion to the whole of Germany (Niemann 
1993:310). Immediately after the fall of the Wall, a survey held in late November 1989 
(Forster and Roski 1990:94) showed that 76 per had strong feelings towards being 
German, while the exact percentage also felt strongly about being a citizen of the GDR. 
Clearly, loyalties which encompassed both the GDR and the divided German nation 
continued to exist side by side. Furthermore, Infratest showed that although 85 per cent 
of responses perceived the FRG and the GDR as two separate states and 31 per cent 
regarded the respective other Germany as a foreign country, a strikingly high eighty per 
cent continued to uphold the notion of one common people (Kohler 1992:76).
With gradually increasing material prosperity, political stability and a firm anchoring in 
the west which was guaranteed by NATO and the Common Market, West Germans 
could live quite satisfactorily without the separated eastern part. Life was more
2 Since 1968, Infratest had conducted surveys by combining participant observations and indirect 
questioning of western visitors to the GDR. Respondents were asked to answer questionnaires in 
representation of a person ‘X’ whom they had just visited (KOhler 1992:60).
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prosperous, stable, free and secure than ever before in German history. Against such 
pleasing conditions, the situation of the compatriots across the Iron Curtain fell more 
and more into oblivion. This was clearly not the case in the GDR. A simple look at the 
data on migration to the FRG served as telling indicators for East Germans’ 
dissatisfaction with the SED regime.3 Between 1949 and 1988, 3.3 million people left 
the GDR and escaped, moved or were expelled to the Federal Republic which 
represented an annual average of 82,500.
The people of the GDR remained ‘fixated’ (Weber 1993:108) on the more prosperous, 
more democratic and freer Federal Republic. Without anticipating analytical results of 
the subsequent chapters, the staggering migration statistics alone revealed that 
Easterners persistently perceived West Germany as the land of dreams which was far 
superior to one’s own state. Fostered by gradually growing cross border traffic4 and 
foremost by western television which was widely received in the east,5 images of a 
better life across the Iron Curtain permeated the eastern public psyche. Despite the 
considerable danger that was involved when attempting to cross the border illegally and 
despite political harassment when applying for emigration, the possibility of improving 
one’s situation by moving or escaping to the FRG,6 kept the western Lander as 
territorial identity markers in the minds of East Germans.
3 The number of total emigrants (refugees and authorised emigration) averaged around 200,000 per year 
between 1949 and 1961 with a high point of 330,000 in 1953; the year of the workers’ uprising. In the first 
five years following the building of the Wall, some 32,000 per year left the GDR. Thereafter, total 
emigration dropped gradually to some 15,000 in the 1970’s. In 1984, the flow increased significantly to 
40,000, since large numbers of long-time applicants were granted permission to leave. Between 1985 and 
1988 emigration averaged 27,000 (Ammer 1989:1207).
4 Prior to 1986, only two per cent of Easterners aged 14 to 29 had visited the FRG. For people aged 30 to 
49, figures totalled 18 per cent and 80 per cent of East Germans over the age of fifty had the opportunity 
to visit the other Germany. In 1988 however, percentages had changed significantly: 14 per cent for 
people aged 14 to 29, 33 per cent for the middle generation and 54 per cent for the over fifty year-olds 
(KOhler 1992:75).
5 A notable exception represented the low-lying area around Dresden which East Germans therefore 
referred to as the ‘valley of those who do not know’.
6 On the concepts of exit and voice in the GDR see: Hirschmann 1995:9-44.
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The attractiveness of the Federal Republic was further helped by common cultural 
attributes, such as language and history, which eased the identification with West 
Germany as a part of one’s territorial repository of emotional attachments. Also, the 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law or constitution) of the Federal Republic automatically gave 
East Germans citizenship of the FRG. As such, Easterners were entitled to the social 
services and welfare benefits of West Germany. Hence, the real emigration of friends 
and family members, the continuing hope for emigration, sporadic visits by Westerners, 
as well as western television pictures kept the Federal Republic in the public psyche of 
East Germany. The experienced deficiencies of the SED state including the provision of 
consumer goods, civic liberties or inadequate material standards further manifested 
perceptions of West Germany as a normative proposal of freedom and prosperity. In 
contrast to the Federal Republic, territorial identities in East Germany were not clear- 
cut. Instead, they were double sided. On the one hand stood the real experiences of the 
GDR, where one grew up and had his or her formative life experiences. On the other 
hand however, the illusory Federal Republic stood as a reminder of the potential of 
one’s existence which all too often was in sharp contrast to reality.
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2 . 4 .  Conclusion
With the fall of the Wall and the opening of several border crossings in the autumn of 
1989, the collective fixation on the west, accumulated interest and curiosity resulted in a 
rush across the border. By November 1992, only seven per cent of Easterners had not 
paid a visit to the western Lander (Politbarometer). This high level of interest however, 
was not met by western compatriots. In 1990, the share of main holidays of West 
Germans (usually in the summer) which had the new Lander as their destination totalled 
only 2.5. per cent. In contrast, 32 per cent of all East German holidays were spent in the 
old Federal Republic. By 1991, the western figures had increased only marginally to 2.7 
per cent, while the old Lander continued to be equally attractive to Easterners with a 
share of 33 per cent of all main holidays (Deutscher Reisebiiro-Verband 1995). 
Although the data did not include any short-term visits, the figures nonetheless indicated 
the remarkable low level of interest amongst West Germans in the new Lander. When 
visiting the former GDR in the aftermath of 1989, the limited numbers of western cars 
and western visitors, even in regions bordering the old Lander were a surprising - yet 
obvious feature. Although the tourist infrastructure was still rudimentary at the outset of 
unification, Westerners nonetheless disregarded the attractiveness of eastern towns and 
countryside and did not consider the opportunity to experience first-hand and without 
travel restrictions the state of political, economic and social affairs across the former 
border. The strikingly low ratio of holidays spent in the east pointed towards a lack of 
curiosity and interest amongst West Germans. The East German pent-up curiosity and 
eagerness to see the west had no emotional equivalent in the old Lander.
It is against this imperative that one has to judge the transformation processes in the 
aftermath of 1989. East Germans perceived the west as the promised land and regarded 
the unified nation as an eventual political goal which would give them political freedom, 
human rights and material prosperity. A look at the changing momentum of the October
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and November demonstrations of 1989 served as a telling indicator. Calls for reforming 
Socialism within the GDR gradually gave way to an overwhelming support for joining 
the political, economic and social structures of the Federal Republic (Zwahr 1993) and 
choruses proclaiming ‘we are the people’ were gradually superseded by ‘we are one 
people’. Attitudes towards unification were fundamentally positive in both east and 
west. For West Germans however, the historic chance to unite the nation did not 
represent the unfulfilled and desperately pursued political dream which finally came 
true. While West Germans had conveniently accommodated the fact of the division, East 
Germans had lamented over it. From the beginning, unification therefore started on an 
uneven footing, perfectly exemplified by the satirical joke on a prominent slogan of the 
eastern revolution. The Easterners’ call for ‘Wir sind ein Volk’ (we are one people) was 
merely answered by Westerners with a cynical ‘so are we’.
One has to ask what made West Germans pass off their territorial identity of the divided 
nation and what elements compensated for the lacking loyalty to the German territory 
consisting of both eastern and western Lander? In return, why were East Germans so 
eager to maintain and develop loyalties towards the Federal Republic? It is against this 
ambivalence that the study turns to the analyses of economics, citizenship, mass culture 




A decisive cause for the peaceful revolution of 1989 was the aspiration to buy 
material goods, to enjoy consumer choice and to achieve better living standards. In 
the early autumn of 1989, banners and chants of the mass demonstrations called for 
freedom, democracy and reformed Socialism (Zwahr 1993). Such slogans were 
gradually superseded and eventually replaced by material matters. A survey taken in 
March 1990 asked East Germans about their expectations from unification. Forty per 
cent were looking forward to better living standards and 25 per cent to economic 
recovery. Only three per cent however, mentioned democracy (Roth 1991:115-138).
People followed the call of the Deutschmark hoping for levels of affluence that 
would match those of their western neighbours. For years, East Germans watched 
enviously the standard of prosperity that was displayed on West German television 
and in East German so-called ‘intershops’ which sold western products for hard 
currency. In return, these experiences drastically revealed the economic and material 
shortcomings of the Communist system. They were further highlighted by rare trips 
across the Iron Curtain or by western friends, family members or tourists who visited 
the GDR. They heightened public discontent since the Federal Republic progressed 
from one economic boom to another which persistently widened the gap between the 
two Germanys. Although the GDR generated the highest living standards amongst 
all Communist countries, the permanent orientation towards the affluent western part
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proved to be a powerful cognitive standard for East Germans which eventually 
contributed to the growing scepticism of the population towards their own system.
Unification offered the unique opportunity to make up for decades of lost chances 
and material deprivation. In the eyes of Easterners, the market economy was the land 
of dreams. For many, the economic miracle that transformed the Federal Republic 
after 1949 was just waiting to repeat itself in the eastern Lander. In the run-up to the 
first federal elections of unified Germany, high expectations were further fuelled by 
Chancellor Kohl's promise o f ‘blossoming landscapes’ within the near future.
In order to establish an affirmative national identity, these hopes generated by the 
arrival of capitalism had to be fulfilled. The improvement of one’s economic 
situation was one of the decisive raisons d’etre which sparked the revolution. After 
unification, Easterners eventually had to come to the conclusion that the risky and 
brave effort of bringing down the totalitarian SED regime - quite literally - had paid 
off. The market economy had to offer equal chances and opportunities for both 
Westerners and Easterners regarding financial security and social status. For those 
who did not benefit from the economic transformation, lower levels of affluence and 
fewer opportunities for material success could not have developed into coherent 
points of orientation for one’s loyalty and emotional attachment. Of course, 
inequalities which resulted from the significant gaps in the provision of material 
standards between the FRG and the GDR could not disappear overnight. But they 
could only be tolerated if Easterners at least were given the prospect of improving 
their economic and social status. Otherwise, frustration and disappointment would 
have arisen which severely hampered people’s emotional commitment and 
attachment to a unified Germany.
The economic identity of unified Germany addressed those characteristics of the 
market economy that generated material security. Hence, the sphere of work as the
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basic means of securing financial competence and participation in the consumer 
society possessed a central position. In general, work represents a potential realm for 
individual self-realisation and social recognition. Work, its ethic, value and status 
however, are determined by structural characteristics of the respective economic 
system. Here, the GDR possessed fundamentally different features than the Federal 
Republic. In East Germany, state and party organised the individual’s life. The East 
German worker was given a job and he or she had to fulfil targets which were set by 
a centralised apparatus. The nationalisation of most of the economic production, as 
well as the ideologically streamlined education system oppressed initiative, self­
responsibility and independence. The collective goal of establishing the Communist 
society was paramount to individual ambitions regarding professional, social or 
material status. In contrast, the market economy of the Federal Republic emphasised 
individuality. Affirmative orientations towards the market economy developed out of 
career opportunities and material possessions and merely the prospect of achieving 
higher levels of financial, social and professional status generated supportive 
economic identities. To benefit from the economic transition in the aftermath of 
1989, Easterners were asked to change completely their former Communist 
mentality. Market economics depends on innovative individuals. Innovation and 
individualism however, were neglected for forty years.
In addition, provision and cost of social services affect the individual’s material 
existence. Here, East Germans got used to a tight social net with progressive services 
that were supplied by the state and offered comprehensive coverage. Although still a 
sophisticated welfare state, this level of security was not provided in unified 
Germany. Certain social services were dismantled and costs for housing, living and 
medical care increased. Quite logically, people had severe problems in adjusting to 
these abrupt changes. In particular, the reorientation regarding employment 
represented a crucial issue. In the GDR, work constituted the nucleus of one’s social 
existence. Contacts to colleagues extended into private spheres. The collective was
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responsible for social services, such as day care centres for children, leisure or 
holidays. In the aftermath of unification, the constitutional right of work of the GDR 
turned into fierce competition for a limited number of jobs. Suddenly and for the first 
time in their lives, East Germans were confronted with unemployment that affected 
not only the individual’s financial security but above all his or her self-esteem. A 
life-time guarantee turned into the need for personal effort.
In short, this chapter intends to explain the economic identity of post-unification 
eastern Germany by analysing the historical currents and fundamental structural 
characteristics of the economic system of the GDR and the FRG. From this point of 
departure, it investigates the individual’s work ethic, the value of work and 
employment, as well as standards towards the provision of social services.
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3.2. The German Democratic Republic
The Economic Structure
After the collapse of the Third Reich, the industrialisation of the GDR was rendered 
difficult by the consequences of war-destruction and Soviet occupation. Industrial 
plants and the transport system lay in ruins. Substantial reparations to the USSR 
further hampered post-war economic development. Until 1946 over 1000 industrial 
plants were dismantled, as were the second tracks of the rail network. In certain 
branches, productivity dropped significantly: 80 per cent in iron, 35 per cent in 
cement and paper. Additionally, the Soviet Union took reparations from the current 
production, mounting to 25 per cent of the overall industrial output and transformed 
them into two hundred USSR-owned ‘Soviet Limited Companies’ (Weber 1993:11). 
Most notably, a Communist ‘Marshall plan’ did not exist. The GDR had to develop 
her industrial base and production entirely by herself without any foreign assistance.
From early on, the GDR followed the Soviet conception of a Socialist economy. 
Despite lacking mineral resources and industrial plants, the SED authorities created 
an industrial structure that relied on heavy industry, in particular coal and steel, 
while neglecting consumer products and services. Industrial policies therefore did 
not pay attention to the particular skills of the work force and the present industrial 
infra-structure. The opportunity to build up competitive structures in the realm of 
chemistry, fine mechanics and optics with the prospect of the development of an 
advanced, high-tech oriented industry was lost and rendered to a reliance on ageing 
industrial concepts and policies and a ‘simple imitation of the Soviet track’ (Weber 
1993:37).
Lacking mineral resources made the GDR largely dependent on foreign imports. 
Since foreign exchange reserves were constantly low, the regime tried to keep such 
imports as minimal as possible. Mineral oil was largely substituted by brown coal.
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Although the GDR was able to provide the highest living standard of all Comecon 
countries, the economic decline became evident by the 1970’s. The VIII. Party 
congress of 1971 confidently pronounced an economic expansion, as well as an 
envisaged growth in living standards. The strategy was to invest heavily during the 
next five years in technology predominantly through western imports. The 
subsequent financial liability should be cleared during the second half of the decade 
with increased exports.
By 1980, it became clear that the strategy had completely and utterly failed 
(Haendcke-Hoppe-Arndt 1995:591). The economic crisis of 1973 sent oil prices to 
unexpected heights which had to be compensated by increased exports. The second 
oil shock of 1979, the ambitious housing program and western imports of consumer 
goods resulted in severe debts. According to Gerhard Schiirer - Head of the Planning 
Commission - any attempts to warn Honecker and fellow members of the Politburo 
about the forthcoming financial catastrophe were in vain. On the contrary, the 
Politburo chose to ignore the writing on the wall despite the depressing monthly 
reports from Schiirer’s office (Hertle 1992: 123-145). Only after 1989 did the full 
extent of the financial malaise reach the public. Throughout the past twenty years, 
SED-officials (under the knowledge of Honecker and other Politburo members) had 
facelifted balance-sheets and therefore were able to give the impression that the 
financial situation was under control. However by as early as 1978, further loans 
were necessary to finance the already existing interest payments. By 1981/82, the 
GDR lost her credibility and international banks refused to give further loans 
(Haendcke-Hoppe-Arndt 1995:592). Only two substantial loans from the Federal 
Republic of one billion Deutschmark each in 1983 and 1984 prevented an early 
financial collapse. Nonetheless the authorities were forced to rely on a policy of 
autarky which subsequently resulted in severe economic and ecological problems 
(GlaeBner 1989:241). By 1989, fundamental mismanagement, lack of innovation and
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investment, as well as structural deficiencies deteriorated and brought the GDR on 
the verge of bankruptcy.
From early on, the SED pursued a rigid policy of nationalisation which extensively 
covered all economic spheres. In industry, the importance of the VEB - the 
volkseigener Betrieb (publicly-owned company) - grew steadily, from 1,764 in 1949 
to 5000 a year later. Within three years, the number of their employees doubled from 
900,000 in 1950 to 1.7 million in 1953. The USSR gradually passed the ownership 
of the ‘Soviet Limited companies’ to the GDR which further increased the number of 
VEB’s. By 1951, their share of the industrial production amounted to 79 per cent 
(Weber 1993:35). The 1980’s saw a further concentration process. Smaller VEB’s 
merged and combinates were introduced. Combinates were designed to place the 
various VEB’s under one unified administrative structure. Subsequently, the number 
of enterprises dropped from 20,000 to 4,000 within the last 25 years of the GDR’s 
existence (Glaefiner 1989:245).
The first step towards agricultural nationalisation was represented in the land reform 
of 1945 which broke the power of the Prussian junkers and gave small plots of land 
to independent farmers. By the early 1960’s the regime vehemently enforced the 
collectivisation of the agrarian sector. Farmers who refused to join supposedly 
voluntary LPG’s - Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft (Agrarian 
Production Co-operatives) - were jailed. Propaganda and agitation coerced the 
remaining doubters. By 1961, few independent farmers were left. Co-operatives 
totalled 19,000 and cultivated 85 per cent of the land, while a further six per cent 
was owned by publicly-owned estates (Weber 1993:54).
As for craft, in 1958 still 93 per cent of the total output was produced privately. 
However privately-owned businesses were regarded as counterproductive to the 
implementation of a Socialist economy. Subsequently the number of private craft
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businesses dropped to 65 per cent in 1961. In retail, the private share decreased even 
further, to below 10 per cent (Weber 1993:54). In 1976, the regime slightly reversed 
its policies and fostered the establishment of private enterprises in the realm of trade 
and retail through subsidies and tax reductions. The regime had to acknowledge that 
privately managed shops or restaurants were indispensable for the provision of goods 
and services (GlaeBner 1989:247). Hence, small private businesses maintained a 
vital position within the industrial sphere. For instance, the private share of output of 
craft businesses in 1985 accounted for roughly 60 per cent (Statistical Yearbook 
1986:174). The overall ratio of self-employed persons however, remained 
persistently low. In 1955, the share still totalled twenty per cent of the work force 
but subsequently fell to a mere 3.4 per cent in 1970 and to 2.2 per cent in 1989 
(Statistical Yearbook 1990:127).
The planning apparatus functioned under the principle of democratic centralism 
which covered three levels: first the central level, comprising of the Council of 
Ministers and the institutions with planning authority, such as the State Planning 
Commission, the State Inspectorate for Investment, the State Inspectorate for 
Balance, the Ministry for Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Office of Prices, the Secretariat for Work and Wages, as well as the Ministry for 
Material. In addition, for particular sectors of the economy, the respective ministries 
also possessed centralised planning authorities; second the regional level, consisting 
of councils from districts, counties and towns; third the company level with the 
VEB’s and combinates (GlaeBner 1989:255). Planning had a long-term perspective. 
‘Long-term prognoses’ covering the future twenty to thirty years were specified by 
‘long-term plans’ (ten to 15 years). These proposals were based on outlines by 
VEB’s and combinates and were crafted by various central planning institutions 
under the authority of the Council of Ministers which acted according to directives 
from the SED. Additionally, councils of districts, towns and regions provided 
territorial concepts. Based on these long-term analyses, five-year plans were
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developed in accordance to the intervals between party congresses. Directives for 
five-year plans were passed by the party congress and subsequently served as 
binding legislation for the entire economy. These five-year plans were then narrowed 
down into one-year targets by the various VEB’s, combinates and regional councils 
(GlaeBner 1989:262).
By the mid-1960’s the deficiencies in economic planning and co-ordination became 
all too obvious. A reform section within the SED introduced the ‘New Economic 
System of Planning and Management’ which gained the support of Ulbricht. Its aim 
was to integrate the VEB’s into the decision-making system of planning and co­
ordination. Increased self-administration and self-responsibility were supposed to 
enhance individual initiative down to shop-floor level. These reform tendencies 
however, were confronted with the dilemma of the totalitarian nature of the SED- 
state. Individual initiative and self-reliance ran counter to the centralised and 
hierarchical principles of the Communist dictatorship. They fundamentally 
questioned and challenged the political dogma of the Marxist-Leninist system. The 
hierarchical structure of state and society fostered a lack of imagination and 
flexibility. The strict top-down pattern of directives and orders made it extremely 
difficult for scientists, industrial executives and workers to participate in the 
decision-making process. Innovation and progressive concepts, as well as practice- 
oriented analyses were lost within the strict hierarchy of the SED state. Economic 
policies were consequently trapped between the experts’ demands for reform and the 
party-prerogative of absolute dominance and control of internal matters. 
Subsequently, reform tendencies were scrutinised and in 1965 reversed by returning 
to rigid centralised policies (Weber 1993:62), while the introduction of combinates 
in 1979 even further manifested the centralised nature of the GDR economy. This 
‘back-and-forth’ pattern of tame reform-tendencies and centralised counter-action, of 
experts’ advise and the party’s claim for leadership prevailed as a striking 
characteristic throughout the existence of the SED state.
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Given the complicated and complex nature of the planning system it came as no 
surprise that the GDR economy had to confront severe disruptions. Adaptation to the 
changing world-economic climate, to new innovation and to new technologies was 
limited. The correction of ill-perceived future trends and prognoses took a 
considerable amount of time, if it was at all possible. The principle of long-term 
planning was therefore in stark contradiction to economic success. While the latter 
demands long-term vision it always has to be complemented by the ability for short­
term reaction, correction and adaptation.
Work Mentality
The GDR had one of the highest percentages of employed persons in the world. The 
numbers consistently increased from 68 per cent in 1955 to eighty per cent in 1988. 
These figures do not even include trainees, those who worked for the armed forces, 
the police, prisons, or family members in agricultural enterprises (Statistical 
Yearbook 1990:390, 1980:346). To a large extent the number of employed women 
was responsible for this increase. From early on, the share of females amongst the 
work force was considerably high. In 1955, they already totalled 44 per cent and rose 
to 49 per cent in 1989 (Statistical Yearbook 1990:130). Unemployment was an 
unknown phenomenon. The regime proclaimed the right to work as a vital asset of 
Socialism over capitalism and gave it constitutional status. Thus, employment 
became a standard which was taken for granted by the population as a natural matter 
which goes without saying.
The official political culture of the SED envisaged the development of the Socialist 
and eventually Communist society, based on such values as optimism, solidarity, 
studiousness, freedom, equality and social justice, and created by the ‘new Socialist 
man’ who went through a life-long process of ideologically conditioned and state- 
organised education. This anthropological view of the SED - the optimistic belief in
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the possibility to educate man towards an utopian goal - resulted in extremely high 
demands and expectations in the economic sphere. They included the acceptance of 
the competence and responsibility of the state which was only limited by the 
acceptance of the normative leadership function of the SED. The citizen was 
expected to commit him or herself to economic growth and the enhancement of 
individual technical skills. These demands were complemented by the unanimous 
acceptance of the priority of collective and social matters over private and individual 
interests (Rytlewski 1989:22, Krisch 1988:158).
Theoretically, economic development therefore was dependent on the active and 
voluntary co-operation and engagement of self-sacrificing individuals. Not 
surprisingly, the regime gave this participatory role a strong legal status. The 
constitution of 1968 proposed a commanding moral commitment to every citizen by 
stating the principle of ‘contribute to working, planning and governing’. The SED 
demanded not only an active but furthermore an affirmative participation in the 
development of the Communist society. The new Socialist citizen, educated and 
guided by ideologically sound agents should willingly contribute. His or her efforts 
should not be based on coercion but instead on reason and understanding for one’s 
individual responsibility for the general development of society.
Traditional German virtues, such as discipline, sense of duty, diligence, as well as a 
certain desire for order and thoroughness corresponded to the SED’s view of work as 
a space for personal ambition and self-realisation. They were useful in the attempt to 
develop an industrially and technologically advanced society. The GDR’s 
ideological propagation of economic development and success tackled a traditionally 
high-ranking German enthusiasm towards performance and efficiency (Sontheimer 
1990:65). Hence, in the aftermath of World War II, the economic policy of the GDR 
initially benefited from the traditional German working ethos and morale in 
advancing and developing agrarian and industrial structures. The mentality towards
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work and production had been described as generally positive regarding 
performance, division of labour, time efficiency and time management, and 
professionalism (Rytlewski 1989:17). In this respect, such grounding principles were 
fundamentally similar to the market economy of the Federal Republic.
Nonetheless the East German work mentality was conditioned by a variety of 
structural prerogatives which slackened individual work performances. Although the 
GDR offered full employment, it could only do so by splitting jobs and spreading the 
work load onto more individuals. This significantly reduced the amount of work 
which one had to fulfil. Deficiencies in planning and a chronic shortage of parts and 
goods further affected the industrial process. The economy was characterised by a 
permanent go-slow (Scherer 1991:309) which contributed to reduced demands to the 
individual employee who simply did not and could not work to his or her full 
potential.
Furthermore, incentives for the individual to improve his or her work performance 
were limited. Material stimulation hardly existed because of streamlined wage levels 
and a restricted choice of consumer products (Belwe 1989:101). Sanctions which 
could have encouraged better work performances were hardly enforced. With a 
guaranteed job there was no fear of unemployment and no existentialist coercion to 
perform. Working under one’s potential, laziness, dawdling and slackness did not 
result in significant material or professional disadvantages. The outdated reliance on 
heavy industries prompted a lack of innovation and modernisation.
The centralised nature of the economy had a severe impact on the individual. 
Interdiction and control, the permanent task of fulfilling hierarchically-designed, 
often unrealistic plans conditioned a lack of imagination, flexibility and 
participation. Individualism and private initiative were oppressed. Self-responsibility 
was missing, since it was all too easy to blame an abstract party apparatus for
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productivity failures. The chronic weakness and shortage in innovation demonstrated 
the system’s lack of creativity and problem-solving capacity. The GDR faced the 
prototypical Communist dilemma: the political-ideological indoctrination generated 
a monocausal, uniformed view of life which was in sharp contrast to the necessary 
requirements of autonomy, individuality, as well as independent and responsible 
decision-making in order to modernise an economy.
The economic identity of East Germans was highly ambivalent. Regarding economic 
achievements, Easterners undoubtedly showed a certain and well-justified pride. 
Asked by the East German Institut fur Meinungsforschung in 1970, respondents gave 
an overall positive approval for the GDR economy. 53 per cent sensed that the GDR 
had achieved ‘great success’ in her economic development. 25 per cent attributed a 
‘moderate success’, while only 4 per cent saw ‘no success’ at all (Niemann 1993:46). 
In contrast, the western-based Infratest revealed in 1973 that East Germans 
perceived the provision of consumer goods, as well as economic performance as the 
strongest disadvantages of the GDR in comparison to the FRG (Kohler 1992:73). 
Moreover, in 1967, the Institut fur Meinungsforschung asked workers from ten East 
Berlin enterprises about economic and political problems. 52 per cent were 
dissatisfied with their general working conditions. Asked about areas of 
improvement, 56 per cent mentioned organisation and continuity in production. 53 
per cent criticised the provision of material and spare parts, while 46 per cent blamed 
lacking financial incentives (Niemann 1993:134,135). Only 25 per cent believed that 
the produced goods possessed a world-class standard regarding quality (Niemann 
1993:136,137).
At first glance, these perceptions did not correspond to each other. Around 1970, 
when the GDR’s economic performance was promising (Weber 1993:82), East 
Germans possessed both affirmative and highly critical economic orientations. A 
double standard became evident. Since the fixation on the more prosperous western
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counterpart was a common and predominant feature of the GDR psyche, a possible 
positive perception of the East German economy could only develop by looking at 
the other countries of the Communist hemisphere. Here, the GDR had every reason 
for pride. It was an obvious fact to every traveller to Eastern Europe that East 
Germany had achieved the most prosperous living standards and even produced 
goods which were competitive on the western markets, for instance in optics. 
Easterners were proud of their economic productivity and material living standards 
as compared to other Comecon countries. This achievement gained an additional 
importance since the GDR was forced to rebuild her industrial structure without any 
foreign support. Permanent reparations, as well as the almost complete destruction of 
the industrial base by the Soviet Union further handicapped post-war development. 
Against these achievements, pride and a sense of togetherness amongst the 
population were therefore quite justified.
Nonetheless in comparison to the west, the deficiencies in the provision of consumer 
goods and the standards of living were all too obvious. Pride in the economic 
achievements therefore displayed a classic phenomenon of human nature: the ego- 
enhancing comparison of one’s situation with those of the less advanced. This self- 
deceit was able to generate into a double-standard source of pride. By the 1980’s 
however, the widening gap to the west and the persistent organisational and 
structural deficiencies which hardly showed any signs of improvement caused 
increasing irritation. Progress was slow and there was little hope that performance 
and productivity would result in better standards of living. Economics increasingly 
had a disillusioning and depressing connotation.
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The Social System
Educational policies prescribed to the ideal that the Socialist society should offer 
every individual equal chances to acquire training and qualifications. From early 
childhood, East Germans passed through a complex web of educational agencies. 
They included kindergartens, the ten-grade general polytechnic secondary school, 
vocational training, the extended secondary school leading to university entry- 
qualifications, engineering and other specialised schools, universities, continuous 
education (Glaeflner 1989:284), as well as the East German army NVA {Rationale 
Volksarmee). The system was unanimously in state hands. Private agencies were 
non-existent.
Benefits and achievements were impressive. Education was generally free. The 
percentage of secondary school leavers rose significantly from 54 per cent in 1965 to 
87 per cent in 1985 (Statistical Yearbook 1986:297). Equally impressive was the 
growth in the number of university students. In 1960, 5.8 per cent of the total 
population were registered at one of the 44 universities. By 1975, the numbers had 
risen to 8.1 per cent and 54 respectively and remained at this level until 1989. In 
comparison, in 1989, university students in the FRG represented only 1.6 per cent of 
the population (Statistical Yearbook 1990:364).
Education in the GDR was guided by two fundamental principles. On the one hand it 
had to provide the skills, necessary for the development of the economic sector. 
Every child attended the mandatory ten-grade polytechnic school. To support the 
advancement of the regime’s proclaimed ‘technical revolution’ the curricula 
consisted to seventy per cent of such courses as science, mathematics, technology 
and economics. This practical orientation found its continuation in the university 
system which aimed at training to high technical and scientific standards. Teaching 
and research were closely oriented towards practical relevance in the realms of 
industry and agriculture (Weber 1993:52). On the other hand, ideological
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prerogatives accompanied students throughout education. The regime not only raised 
the expert but furthermore disciplined the loyal Socialist citizen. Education was 
understood as the acquisition of Marxist-Leninist principles which should guide the 
individual through his or her professional life and provide the ideological base for 
one’s place in society. Educational standards presented the individual with a 
uniformed view of life through Communist spectacles. Such monocausality however, 
stood in sharp contrast to the complex nature of reality (Lemke 1989:87). 
Reductionism and simplicity left the student ill-prepared for modem requirements of 
change and adaptability.
Additionally, through the selective granting of apprenticeships, student admission 
and jobs, the SED was able to actively control career patterns. Compliance with and 
adaptation to the political and ideological norms were rewarded by enhanced career 
opportunities. Hence, the regime determined the socio-structural development of the 
society. Social and professional status were ultimately dependent on party directives, 
while the urge to conform and accommodate within the general totalitarian system 
ran counter to the development of individuality and motivation to change (Lemke 
1989:87).
In 1971, Erich Honecker announced the unity of economic and social policies. 
Ulbricht’s successor envisaged increased social service financed through economic 
growth. In Honecker’s own terms, ‘the happiness of the people’ (Weber 1993:77) 
stood at the core of the considerations of state and party. The GDR’s social system 
was complex and extensive. For minimal contributions, East Germans enjoyed 
health care, child care facilities, training and education, as well as pensions. 
Employment was guaranteed. Rents, energy costs, as well as certain food products 
and clothing were heavily subsidised. To some extent, the subsidy system had 
bizarre consequences, as exemplified by some LPG’s who fed pigs with bread, for it 
was considerably cheaper than the usual hog diet.
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The social system was characterised by a high degree of paternalism. From cradle to 
grave, the state inhibited the position of the sole provider in all spheres of life. 
Income, consumption, social and physical security, leisure, health and education 
were organised by a complex bureaucratic apparatus which determined the social 
and economic wants of the population. Ambitions, needs and desires were 
streamlined and categorised by apparatschiks. Life followed a beaten centrally 
planned track designed and presented by the top-down hierarchy of party and state. 
The citizen was placed in the position of a permanent and eternal beneficiary. This 
protection however, created dependence and complacency while hampering self­
responsibility. The individual was solely dependant on the bureaucracy and on state 
measures. Self-reliance was absent. According to the poet Irene Bohme the state 
infantilised the citizen (Meyer 1989:45). Social security acquired a given, obvious 
and natural standard. With no space for individual initiative and independence, the 
citizen developed into a dependant and obedient recipient.
Nevertheless the social system acquired a high ranking status amongst the 
population. In the autumn of 1990, respondents had been asked to evaluate the 
particular strengths of the FRG and the GDR (Kohler 1992:78). In the social realm, 
East Germany was given a considerably better vote. 91 per cent of respondents 
regarded child care in the GDR as superior to that of the FRG. Similarly 72 per cent 
praised the GDR’s social security (26 per cent FRG), and 43 per cent the public 
welfare work for the individual (22 per cent FRG). The school system was judged by 
46 per cent as an advantage of the GDR (39 per cent FRG), while provision of 
housing (30 per cent GDR, 34 per cent FRG), as well as social justice (35 per cent 
GDR, 33 per cent FRG) had roughly equal support for both east and west.
Nonetheless particular programmes of the GDR’s welfare conception were subject to 
criticism. In a survey taken in February 1990, only 12 per cent perceived the care for
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elder people as an advantage of the GDR, while the overwhelming majority (64 per 
cent) mentioned the FRG (Forster and Roski 1990:125). The same applied to the 
quality of medical care (15 per cent GDR, 62 per cent FRG) and to decent housing 
conditions (18 per cent GDR, 48 per cent FRG). It seemed that East Germans 
generally appreciated the comprehensive nature of the social system. Social services 
provided a secure life which safeguarded against illness and age and offered 
educational and professional opportunities to every member of society, albeit within 
established ideological tracks. Despite its care from cradle to grave however, certain 
services, such as medical care or housing were seen as more efficient and 
sophisticated in the FRG. The comprehensive design was highly welcomed, while 
practical operation displayed deficiencies. Quantity was appreciated but quality 
criticised.
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3.3. The Federal Republic
The development of the West German economy after the collapse of the Third Reich 
had been described widely as an economic miracle. Already by the 1950's the 
Wirtschaftswunder was well under way. Growth rates of ten per cent were no 
exception, while the generated wealth benefited broad segments of society. 
Gradually, the degree of financial stability, social security, industrial harmony, living 
standards and material prosperity became the envy of Europe.
Work Structure and Work Mentality
The strong economic performance contributed immensely to the stabilisation of the 
young Republic. Amidst the Cold War antagonism, the division of the nation and the 
shameful legacy of the Third Reich, the economic realm provided a formative focus 
and a source for self esteem and pride. The economic slogan of the 1950's ‘Es geht 
wieder aufwarts ’ (things are looking up) became a general motto for West Germans, 
who trusted their new system in generating constant and formerly unsurpassed levels 
of prosperity. Until the mid 1960’s full employment, low inflation, export surpluses, 
increasing incomes, expanding social services, and growing public investment in 
schools, universities, hospitals and the highway system became a given standard 
(Schmid 1990:228). Table 3.1. demonstrates the ever-growing satisfaction with the 
market economy. While in 1951, a planning system was favoured by nearly half of 
respondents and only one third supported a free market, the figures had already 
reversed by 1953. Twenty years onward, market economics enjoyed almost 
unanimous approval.
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Table 3.1. Approval of the Market Economy in West Germany (percentages)
Question: You have the choice between market economy and planned economy. Which do you prefer?
1951 1953 1961 1974
planned 47 31 27 19
market 37 54 60 70
do not know 16 15 13 11
Source: Noelle-Neumann 1981:300
The concentration on the economic recovery served as a strong integrative factor. 
The general striving for material success was a cognitive point of orientation for the 
millions of refugees who tried to establish themselves in a new environment. The 
same applied to the masses of Nazi-followers who mostly managed to slip through 
the loose nets of de-nazification measures (see Chapter Four). Because of the 
economic success, formerly anti-democratic forces saw no reason for political 
opposition to democracy (Fulbrook 1994:217). The widespread and consistent 
satisfaction with the economy prompted the philosopher Jurgen Habermas to refer to 
this new-found pride as ‘Deutschmarknationalismus ’ (Habermas 1990).
The positive orientation towards the economy had its roots in the progressive 
concept of Ludwig Erhard’s Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy). 
Adenauer’s Minister for Economic Affairs argued that market capitalism had to 
benefit both business and employees, while economic profits should partly be used 
to craft and finance an extensive social net. Soziale Marktwirtschaft meant the 
reconciliation and parallel importance of a competitive economy, accompanied by 
social justice, shorter working hours and wage increases. In addition, labour relations 
were characterised by Friedenspflicht (roughly translated as obligation for peace) 
which implied that negotiated terms within the process of collective bargaining 
between trade unions and employers associations were absolutely binding. In case of 
disagreement over wages, working hours or redundant workers, a mediation through 
a third and neutral party was required by law. Also, Mitbestimmung (co-
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determination) of the work force which was initially designed to weaken the powers 
of heavy industry through union control, was a further piece of the social market 
economy. Trade-union representatives were granted seats on company-boards which 
safeguarded their influence on such matters as recruitment, promotion, dismissal or 
working conditions. These structural requisites proved to be highly successful since 
labour conflicts, strikes and lock-outs remained remarkably rare.
Despite these labour-friendly features, the Soziale Marktwirtschaft nevertheless 
displayed the typical characteristics of a market economy. Competition and 
competitiveness represented the bases for innovation and the striving for 
technological perfectionism accompanied by increasing prosperity. Higher salaries 
and promotion constituted the incentives for the individual’s work performance. 
Social status was largely determined by one’s professional status, income and 
prestigious job. Work was regarded as a sphere for self-realisation. Table 3.2 shows 
that such active attitudes to work as fun, commitment, challenge and ambition were 
more widespread than the passive notions of duty, routine or delegation.
Table 3.2. Attitudes Towards Work in West Germany, 1990 (percentages)
response category
Work has to be fun and should interest me 
I am committed to my work 
I like new challenges 
I have ambitious goals in my career 
Work is primarily duty 
Work is routine
I like being told exactly what I have to do 
n: 5518


















The sphere of work was regarded as a source for self esteem, fuelled by a craving for 
recognition and a striving for material and social prestige. A further incentive for 
improved work performances was represented in the prospect of dismissal although 
it was significantly softened by a complex labour legislation that offered the 
employee protection against unfair and disproportionate removal.
The Social System
The proportion of GDP allocated to social expenditure was persistently high in the 
Federal Republic. Between 1960 and 1981 the share rose from 20.5 per cent to 31.5 
per cent which established the FRG in the top group of western nations. In 1981 it 
was only surpassed by Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, but ahead 
of the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and significantly ahead of the Socialist 
countries (OECD 1985:81,21). West Germany followed the model of a conservative- 
reformist welfare state, holding a position between the social democratic concept of, 
for instance Sweden, and the liberal selective version of Japan and the US (Schmidt 
1990:126 ). The social system of the Federal Republic offered security against such 
standard risks as age, invalidity, accident, sickness, unemployment and other loss of 
income, as well as further support schemes, such as children’s allowance or rent 
subsidies. The booming economy, absence of recessions, low inflation and full 
employment (since the end of the 1950’s) constituted the bases for increasing 
prosperity that safeguarded the development and further advancement of the social 
state. The expanding number of employees and growing wages increased tax 
revenues as well as the income of social insurance.
However the FRG did not offer total public assistance. Social policies paid reference 
to the utmost principle of the Federal Republic - currency stability - on which social 
security was ultimately based (Schmidt 1990:130). Also, the extent of social reforms 
was tied to the increase of productivity and competitiveness (Mertes 1994:11). A
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further threshold for the state’s social intervention was guided by the subsidiary 
principle. Based on the Catholic social doctrine, responsibility rested with the 
smallest social circle that is capable of solving arising problems (Rudzio 1991:133). 
Hence, public social measures came into effect only in those cases where social 
security could not be safeguarded by private, non-state measures such as gainful 
employment or family support. The state therefore functioned as a final source and 
not as the automatic guarantor of security.
Throughout the existence of the Bonn Republic, the commitment to the welfare state 
did not evaporate. Despite the economic recessions of 1966/67, 1974/75, 1981/82, 
and despite changing governmental coalitions the fundamental security measures 
remained intact. Based on the traumatic experiences of Weimar and the Nazi-era, a 
broad political consensus prevailed which perceived a wide social safety net as the 
safeguard for inner political stability (Schmidt 1990:130). Thus, social reforms were 
not the exclusive agenda of Social Democrats but instead transcended party 
boundaries. All democratic parties acknowledged their central importance within the 
establishment of the new democratic society. In contrast to the hegemony of the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Federal Republic was in this respect 
characterised by a rigid party competition. Both Social and Christian Democrats 
were reform-oriented and committed to the advancement of the welfare state, while 
the social agenda became a battleground for the voter’s support. Furthermore, with 
the emerging Cold War social policies were perceived as an essential field of 
competition between Capitalism and Socialism in general, and between the GDR and 
the FRG in particular (Schmidt 1990:141), which fostered the establishment of ever 
more comprehensive welfare measures.
Although the welfare state was gradually taken for granted, it was not a right ‘per 
se’. The Basic Law gave only limited attention to social justice, while social rights, 
such as the right of work, of education, of housing, etc. were missing. Instead, the
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constitutional principle of the Sozialstaat (social state) only referred to the legislative 
obligation to foster social balance, as well as to guarantee a minimum of social 
security. The prerogative of the Sozialstaat merely constituted a normative focus for 
the state. However it was not a social guarantee or a factual claim for the individual 
(Degenhardt 1988:303-315). In contrast to the GDR, a constitutional right to work 
did not exist. The state provided the social boundary which offered security against 
standard risks. Within these however, the individual had a high degree of self­
responsibility for his or her financial and social security.
However vague the constitutional formulations were, they nevertheless generated a 
standard amongst the West German population regarding the social responsibilities 
of the state. The Sozialstaat was in reality a coercing principle for political parties, as 
well as for trade and business unions. West Germans could only enjoy these 
progressive social reforms in return for high tax burdens and significant health care 
contributions. The public expectation of a continuous provision of welfare measures 
was therefore expected out of considerable individual contributions. People paid a 
high price for their welfare state and thus sensed that the state was obliged to give 
social programmes in return. This notion was market-oriented in the sense of 
‘service-for-money’. With the country’s increasing prosperity, people sensed that the 
state was even more obliged to offer comprehensive and extensive social measures in 
return. Nonetheless the Sozialstaat was not an automatic prerogative.
During the 1960’s and with the exception of 1966/67, the Federal Republic enjoyed 
full employment. At the end of the 1960’s and during the early 1970’s there was 
even a shortage of workers which was compensated by inviting 2.5 million foreign 
Gastarbeiter (guest workers). The first recession of 1966/67 came as a sudden shock 
and temporarily brought the economic miracle to an end. For the first time, the 
Federal Republic was facing severe unemployment problems with numbers growing 
to over one million. The two subsequent economic crises of 1974/75 and 1980/81
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further manifested unemployment on the political agenda. Although in the aftermath 
of the crises, inflation, productivity and balance of payments were kept under 
control, unemployment remained a staggering problem.
Table 3.3. Unemployment in West Germany (1980-1989)




Source: Statistical Yearbook FRG, 1990:130
The average rate of unemployment rose from one per cent between 1963 and 1973 to 
3.2 per cent between 1974 and 1979 and to six per cent between 1980 and 1985 
(Schmid 1990: 230). A further stress on the job market was prevented by sending 
around one million Gastarbeiter back to their countries of origin. For West German 
employees between 60 and 64, social policies offered early retirement which 
subsequently reduced their employment rate from 75 per cent in 1970 to 33 per cent 
in 1985.
Between 1974 and 1983 one third of the work force had at one stage experienced 
unemployment. For a significant number of West Germans the experience - or at 
least the prospect - of unemployment became a familiar feature of life. The number 
of long-term cases with little employment prospects grew steadily. In 1970 only ten 
per cent of the unemployed could not find a job for more than one year. By 1985 the 
number increased to one third (Schmid 1990:233).
Unemployment amongst the young was kept under control. Although in 1982, the 
unemployment rate of under 20-year olds was 10.7 per cent, by 1989 the figures had
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dropped to 3.9 per cent. These relatively low percentages were in part the effect of 
the unique apprenticeship system of the Federal Republic.1 Still, the integration of 
post-trainees remained difficult. In 1982,19.6 per cent of young adults aged 20 to 25 
were without a job against the backdrop of an average unemployment rate of 7.5 per 
cent. In 1989, the amount of 13.4 per cent was still significantly above the overall 
rate of 7.9 per cent (Statistical Yearbook 1990:110,111; 1983:109). Still, in 
international comparison to other countries like France, Italy or the US 
unemployment amongst the young was relatively moderate (Schmid 1990:234).
The Federal Republic never followed a policy of full employment, as for instance 
Sweden or Austria had done. By the end of the 1980’s Bonn had to confront even 
further stress on the labour market because of growing automation and technological 
advancement. Government, industry and unions discussed proposals of job-sharing, 
time-sharing or a four-day working week. The aim was to reduce the working hours 
of broad segments of the work force which could compensate for the total loss of 
employment of a few. Various institutional measures tried to counter the malaise. 
Unemployment insurance was financed through equal contributions by employer and 
employee, whereas both parties paid two per cent each of the latter’s gross income.
The Federal Office for Employment (Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit - BfA) offered 
training and vocational rehabilitation and possessed a monopoly on mediating vacant 
positions. Most participants in these courses significantly increased their chances of 
employment and found work relatively soon (Schmid 1990:240). Training measures 
significantly relieved stress on the job market which was estimated to amount to
100,000 people (Schmid 1990:240). Publicly funded projects 
(Arbeitsbeschaffungsmafinahmen - ABM) created further jobs, while advancing the
1 The publicly regulated and supervised German Internship scheme represents a dual education 
process. Over a two-year or three-year period, participants devote around half of their studies to 
practical training. The remaining part consists of various courses to be taken at public training 
academies designed for the various professions.
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qualification levels of the participants. By the end of the 1980’s around 100,000 
unemployed were engaged in such projects (Schmid 1990:242). The Federal Office 
also granted financial support to those enterprises which for economic reasons were 
forced to reduce the working hours of their labour force by compensating for the 
employees’ loss of income (Kurzarbeitergeld). Governmental policies and measures 
however, could only to some extent improve the precarious situation. By the mid 
1980’s, education and training, part-time work and public projects relieved 
unemployment figures by around 400,000, which constituted between 1.5 and two 
per cent of the total work force (Schmid 1990:245).
To summarise, unemployment established itself as a social phenomenon. Broad 
segments of society had to familiarise themselves with the experience or prospect of 
being laid off. Various measures by the state prevented the overwhelming majority 
from facing existentialist crises. Unemployment benefits provided for a certain 
financial back-up. Publicly-funded projects and employment mediation fostered a re­
integration into the labour force. The results of these measures were largely positive, 
although a considerable number could not find a job on a long-term basis which 
caused bitterness, disillusionment, social and financial hardship. For the large 
majority however, unemployment represented an albeit problematic but manageable 
and temporary phase in their lives. Aided by public institutions and programmes, 
one’s own initiative and eagerness to regain the former social and material status 
provided for a certain flexibility and adaptability in pursuing higher qualification 
levels or seeking different jobs in different economic sectors. Most significantly and 
in contrast to other western nations, adulthood did not start on a sour note, since the 
FRG managed to integrate most of her young work force. An affirmative experience 
towards the country’s economic system was therefore granted from the beginning of 
an individual’s working phase in life.
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3.5. The New Lander
The Economic Structure
The currency reform of July 1990 integrated eastern Germany within the economic 
structure of the Federal Republic. The legal framework, the Deutschmark and the 
free market were abruptly introduced to the eastern Lander. The decision by Bonn to 
pursue a shock therapy did not fail to produce an immediate impact. When revisiting 
the former GDR after the first years of transition one was struck by the vast changes 
in the economic sphere. Between 1991 and 1995 the net transfer of public funds 
from west to east rose from an annual 110 to over 150 billion Deutschmark. Roads, 
rail tracks, airports, motorways and the telephone system had been modernised or 
newly built. Western consumer outlets were offering their goods and services 
throughout the region. Entire economic sectors had to be established from scratch, 
such as banking, insurance or retail. Until the end of 1993, the overall investment of 
private industries totalled 340 billion Deutschmark (Asche 1994:233). New 
businesses opened and former state-owned firms were reorganised under new 
ownership. Small enterprises sprung up, creating a Mittelstand, a formerly missing 
class of small and medium-sized independent businesses. In the four years following 
the currency reform, some 870,000 new businesses had been registered, while
450,000 were forced to close down (see Table 3.4.).













Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995:129.
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Privatisation proceeded much faster in comparison to other former Communist 
countries. The Treuhandanstalt, the public but highly independent trustee agency 
was responsible for privatising the former state-owned enterprises of the GDR 
aiming to restructure, rationalise and refinance them in order to compete within a 
market environment. At the time of unification, the Treuhand administered around
14,000 companies. Only small businesses such as pubs, restaurants and pharmacies 
were excluded. With the agency, Bonn had established overnight the world’s biggest 
industrial conglomerate. At the end of 1994 the Treuhand had fulfilled its core task 
of privatisation and all but 60 firms had been sold (Eisenhammer 1995:7).2
Wages increased continuously. Between 1991 and 1994, basic wages in the East rose 
by 53 per cent. Although western levels have yet to be equalled, trade unions 
equipped with experienced western staff were able to negotiate highly advantageous 
contracts. The financial situation for East German employees improved significantly. 
The choice of goods quickly approached western standards and people had the 
money surplus to purchase them. In mid-1994 the purchasing power had already 
reached between 70 and 80 per cent of the west which more than outweighed the 35 
per cent rise in living costs (Asche 1994:234). The percentage of respondents who 
claimed that they could afford more since unification rose from 27 per cent in 
August 1990 to 47 per cent in April 1994 (Gensicke 1994:807).3
Financial means increased significantly. Prior to unification, the Ostmark had a 
market exchange rate of approximately 4.50 to 1 to the Deutschmark. Chancellor 
Kohl's decision to introduce an average 1.8 conversion rate turned the sizeable East 
German savings into a respectable financial surplus. In 1993, the sum of private
2 The agency is still in operation albeit on a much smaller scale. One of its successor organisations, the 
Bundesanstalt fur vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben is responsible for supervising contractual 
obligations made by purchasers of sold businesses. As a second successor, the Beteiliungs- 
Management Gesellschaft supervises the remaining un-privatised enterprises (Eckart 1995:585).
3 During the same period the percentage who could afford equal standards dropped from 57 per cent to 
37 per cent, while the number of people who could spent less stayed at 16 per cent.
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financial capital doubled in comparison to 1992 and reached DM 35 billion (Asche 
1994:235). In this respect, the market economy provided for exciting prospects of 
prosperity and participation in the consumer society.
However these clear indicators of a successful and rapid economic transformation 
were overshadowed by the state of the eastern German economy. During the initial 
unification euphoria unrealistic parallels were drawn to the successful post-war 
transformation of the West German economy after World War II which lead to a 
fundamental misjudgement of the extent of the structural deficiencies. In 1991, 
Detlev Rohwedder, the first head of the Treuhand, who was later assassinated by 
Red Army Faction terrorists estimated that the sell-off of the GDR’s state-owned 
enterprises would result in revenues of 600 billion DM. In the end, the Treuhand 
recorded losses of 265 billion DM.
After unification, productivity fell by more than half, down to 35 per cent of the 
western standard. Production costs were twenty per cent above the already high 
levels of the old Lander. Industrial production rapidly declined. By 1991 it had 
reached a mere one-third of that of 1989. Many enterprises without any hope of 
reaching profitable standards in the future closed down. Analysts were quick to offer 
cogent explanations. The 1.8 conversion of the Ostmark was regarded as 
economically unwise. Political necessities however, superseded economical 
rationality. Against a growing tide of emigration from the east, the government was 
forced to provide a generous financial package which was able to convince 
Easterners not to move to the prosperous west. It also served as a welcoming gesture, 
expressing the spirit of uniting the nation, not only in territorial but moreover in 
social and financial terms.
Although the GDR claimed to be the 10th industrial power in the world, economic 
deficiencies were revealed drastically in open competition. Infrastructure had been
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neglected for years. Capital stock was worthless. State-owned firms of the GDR 
were highly overstaffed. The constitutional right of work resulted in astonishingly 
high labour forces in enterprises, as well as in the administrative sector. They stood 
in no relation to the degree of productivity. With the introduction of the free market, 
managers did not hesitate to reduce labour capacities. These efforts towards better 
efficiency and competitiveness were undertaken in a climate of disadvantageous 
economic circumstances. Despite massive public subsidies to improve infrastructure 
and communication systems, eastern firms had to confront rising labour costs, legal 
obstacles over ownership questions and administrative inefficiencies. The 
breakdown of the formerly important markets of Eastern Europe, as well as the 
general world-wide recession added to this precarious situation. Foreign business 
remained reluctant to invest in the new Lander. To secure the market in the east, 
companies preferred to ship supply from outside instead of investing directly in the 
region.
The issue of ownership represented a severe damper to economic activity. In the 
days of the GDR, people acquired land and property according to the contemporary 
status of law. This right was now questioned by former owners who were 
expropriated in the aftermath of World War II. Conflicting claims on confiscated 
property were the consequence. It made the Treuhand's ambition of selling and 
breaking up the vast state conglomerates a difficult task of utmost proportions. The 
government’s decision to favour restitution over compensation meant that every 
property claim had to be processed. Legal battles over ownership stretched over 
years. Consequently, notions of distrust, anger and hatred towards the new 
authorities and the new legal system emerged quickly. Legal controversies formed 
psychological barriers between east and west, between defendants and plaintiffs, 
between winners and losers in the post-unification battle of property.
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The Treuhand attracted western opportunistic businesses people, eager to take 
advantage of the agency’s requirement to proceed rapidly with selling and 
restructuring. According to one official of the Treuhand
‘the jackals were everywhere, people looking to snap up companies and flog 
them for the real estate...In those first two years there was never time to check 
out investors properly. It was a mass business and everything had to go’ 
(Eisenhammer 1995:7).
This gold-digging mentality caused further resentment amongst Easterners. The 
massive take-over of eastern firms by western managers accompanied by lacking 
commitment to local matters, job losses and cases of bribery brought harsh feelings 
of anger and disgust - of a colonisation of the east by the prosperous and scrupulous 
west. Gold digging was further encouraged by Treuhand policies. The agency was 
hard pressed to sell off unattractive units. Quite often, it attracted only one bidder. It 
therefore came as no surprise that governmental inducements regularly totalled forty 
per cent of the costs (Eisenhammer 1995:7).
Until 1992, the government pursued a policy of moderate tax increases (tobacco, 
insurance, petrol, telephone). A solidarity token of 3.75 per cent of one’s income tax 
had to be paid by all employees in 1991 and 1992. By 1992 it became clear that 
these revenues amounted to only 23 per cent of the required transfer payments to the 
east (fier Spiegel, April 27, 1992:20). Subsequently, the political rhetoric evolved 
around mutual accusations of responsibility between the respective economic actors. 
Employers argued for cuts in wages, trade unions for increased taxes on business 
profits, while federal, state and local authorities blamed each other for excessive 
spending. It became obvious that the unforeseeable extent of the costs of unification 
and of the reorganisation of the eastern economy caught political and economic 
elites by surprise. By 1995, the government had re-introduced the solidarity token 
with a rate of 7.5 per cent with an envisaged reduction to 5.5 per cent by 1998.
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In contrast to governmental authorities and economic analysts, East Germans 
initially were more realistic as to the amount of time it would require to approximate 
living conditions between east and west. In the spring of 1990, Easterners sensed 
that it would take an average of seven years in order to reach the western level of 
affluence (Forster and Roski 1990:67).4 Hence, only a small proportion of East 
Germans had the illusion that prosperity would come within a short period of time. 
From early on in the unification process people had already realised that the 
economic gap between east and west was far too wide to allow for a rapid 
approximation.
However in the early days of unification, the political rhetoric gave the impression of 
an albeit historic and challenging but nevertheless manageable task. In the run-up to 
the federal elections in December 1990, Chancellor Kohl’s promise of blossoming 
landscapes earned him considerable support in the new Lander and was taken as a 
promise. The political rhetoric that the market economy single-handedly could 
finance the colossal transformation processes fostered a mixture of naivete and 
optimism. Political decisions were determined by political pressure to seize the 
historical opportunity of unification. Thus decisive measures, such as the 
approximation of wages and the conversion of the Ostmark were made hastily, 
regardless of their economic consequences. This initial positive outlook on the 
manageability of unification left the public in both east and west ill-prepared for the 
enormous task of unification, including economic restructuring, unemployment and 
financial burdens.
Expectations regarding the speed and practicability of unification were increasingly 
out of proportion. Impatience in the east was accompanied by ignorance in the west. 
The aversion against unification grew steadily. In 1991, two-thirds of all Westerners 
sensed that the limit of acceptable financial burdens had been reached (Der Spiegel,
4 The responses differed only slightly according to age or party allegiances with the margin of answers 
lying between 6.5 and eight years.
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January 18,1993:53). Although West Germans regarded the collapse of Communism 
as a unique chance in history, they were not willing to confront the upcoming and 
foreseeable financial and economic burden.
Table 3.5. East Germans and the Approximation of Living Standards (cumulated data, percentages) 




not satisfied 72.3 63.6
no answer 0.5 0.5
n 8587 4297
Source: Politbarometer.
As shown in Table 3.5., in 1992, 72 per cent of East German respondents were 
dissatisfied with the approximation of living conditions. By the end of 1994, the 
figures were still considerably high and amounted to 64 per cent. Supporters for the 
PDS, as well as the middle generation between 25 and 40 year-olds were particularly 
critical.5 This widespread dissatisfaction can be explained by the prevalent notion of 
comparing the current economic situation with the much higher level of prosperity in 
western Germany, but not with the status quo of the old GDR or of other ex- 
Communist countries.
5 In October 1994, for instance, dissatisfaction amongst PDS supporters amounted to 82 per cent. For 
those between 25 and 40, disapproval rates rose to 70 per cent (age 25 to 29) and 68 per cent (age 30 
to 39).
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Table 3.6. Evaluation of Economic Situation in Comparison to GDR (cumulated data, percentages) 
Question: In comparison to the days o f the GDR, in economical terms do you now fare better, worse 
or is there no difference at all?
1992 1993 1994
better 46.8 49.1 53.5
worse 21.7 22.6 19.0
no difference 31.1 27.5 26.8
no answer 0.4 0.8 0.7
n 1080 2062 1068
Source: Politbarometer.
In reality however, people realised that their personal situation had improved. Table 
3.6. shows that in 1992 47 per cent evaluated their economic standard as better in 
comparison to the old days of the GDR. By 1994, the figures had increased to a solid 
54 per cent. This notion seemed rather logical, since the FRG represented a blueprint 
of life for the people in the former GDR. For decades, East Germans watched 
enviously the increasing material wealth as expressed on western TV and as 
displayed by western visitors. By the 1980's, the growing number of tourist visas 
issued by the state provided for an additional hands-on experience of life in the west. 
West German standards and images of prosperity had already penetrated East 
Germany prior to the revolution and served as a normative focal point. Since the 
orientation towards western levels of affluence was one of the contributing factors 
that brought down the SED regime, the continuous comparison and evaluation in the 
aftermath of 1989 seemed only logical in particular since the political and economic 
principles which created the western material wealth were now introduced to the 
east. Thus, the salary gap between east and west caused widespread bewilderment 
and dissatisfaction. Over a period of 31 months, the figures of disapproval hardly 
changed. In February 1991, 85 per cent and still 79 per cent in November 1993 
thought of the wage difference as being unjust (Politbarometer).
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The blame for the economic malaise was directed against the economic and political 
elites which orchestrated the change. Table 3.7. demonstrates that the overwhelming 
majority of eastern respondents thought that Bonn was not doing enough for the 
approximation of living conditions between east and west. The figures only changed 
slightly between 1992 and 1994. PDS supporters and respondents between age 25 to 
50 were particularly critical.6 The same applied to west German managers, where 88 
per cent agreed that measures by western industries were not sufficient 
(Politbarometer).
Table 3.7. East German Attitudes Towards the Federal Government (cumulated data, percentages) 
Question: Is Bonn doing enough for the approximation o f living standards between east and west?
1992 (*) 1993 1994
too much - 0.7 0.7
too little 81.3 77.8 74.8
just right 17.9 20.9 23.9
no answer 0.8 0.6 0.6
n 8587 4227 4297
*: in 1992 ‘too little’ and ‘just right’ were replaced by ‘not enough’ and ‘enough’.
Source: Politbarometer.
The work of the Treuhand was perceived even more critically. In 1992, 92 per cent 
held the opinion, that the Treuhand did not fulfil its task properly. A year later, the 
figure rose to 94 per cent. In the east, the Treuhand became the symbol of merciless 
western capitalism, western arrogance and colonisation. Rohwedder’s successor 
Birgit Breuel acknowledged the scapegoat function of the agency and stated that ‘for 
four years we protected the backs of the politicians by taking unpopular decisions’ 
(Eisenhammer 1995:7).
6 In October 1994, for instance, dissatisfaction amongst PDS supporters totalled 91 per cent. For those 
between age 25 and 50, disapproval rates amounted to 82 per cent (age 25 to 29) and 81 per cent (age 
40 to 49).
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Table 3.8. East Germans’ Evaluation of the Treuhand (cumulated data, percentages) 
Question: Did the Treuhandfulfil its task...
1992 1993
rather well 6.5 4.7
not so good 92.1 93.8
no answer 1.4 1.5
n 4249 4165
Source: Politbarometer
Furthermore, Easterners developed the notion that they alone had to carry the burden 
of unification while the rich western neighbour showed a rather indifferent attitude. 
In January 1993, 68 per cent of the eastern population agreed that West Germans, 
despite their material wealth had not learned to share. Only 16 per cent 
acknowledged that unification represented a great burden to Westerners, while 33 
per cent sensed that the financial load for the West was minimal (Der Spiegel, 
January 18,1993:58).
Politbarometer further asked respondents to evaluate their personal economic 
situation. Whereas in May 1991, only 26 per cent regarded their economic situation 
as ‘good’, responses stabilised over the following three years with percentages 
between 34 per cent in 1992 and 39 per cent in 1994 (see Table 3.9.). In all, only a 
minority of under fifteen per cent was not satisfied with their economic situation.7
7 In 1994 and by age groups, young adults (age 21 to 24) particularly regarded their economic 
situation as bad (21 per cent). This does not seem surprising, since this age usually just enters or is 
about to enter employment. Also, over sixty year-olds were particularly satisfied, most likely caused 
by western pension schemes and early retirement.
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Table 3.9. East Germans’ Evaluation of Personal Situation and General Economic Situation in 


































The evaluation of one’s own personal situation differed sharply from perceptions 
about the general economic condition. East Germans regarded their own situation as 
profoundly better than the state of the economy in the new Lander. Between 1992 
and 1993, a constant proportion of around 60 per cent regarded the general economic 
situation as bad. During the same period however, a constant number of only around 
13 per cent perceived their own personal fortunes as bad. By 1994, eastern 
respondents were less fatalistic but still only four per cent regarded the eastern 
economy as ‘good’ in comparison to 39 per cent who were quite satisfied with their 
individual fortunes. Judging from experiences in the west, evaluative discrepancies 
between the personal and the general situation are common. This is largely 
attributable to a media effect. Media tends to dramatise and overemphasise ‘bad’ 
news which influences people’s perceptions towards the negative. This alone 
however, could not explain the dramatic gap in attitudes between individual and 
general economic conditions.
75
Although at first glance, the east presented a functioning economy, this was only 
achieved through massive transfer payments. The new Lander were the most 
subsidised region in the world. In 1993 alone, eastern Germany received between 
DM 150 and 180 billion DM (Gensicke 1994:806). The discrepancy was further 
documented by the striking difference between productivity of the eastern economy 
and personal spending. In 1994 domestic consumption exceeded production by DM 
150 billion (Eisenhammer 1995:7). With the approximation of wages and the 
advantageous Ostmark-conwersion Easterners benefited directly from unification. 
With this massive flow of public funds, it came as no surprise that East Germans 
positively evaluated their own economic situation. However the newly acquired 
standard of living was subsidised. East Germans were lulled into prosperity. 
Nonetheless the problematic restructuring of the eastern economy did not pass 
unnoticed by Easterners which explained the sizeable gap in perceptions of personal 
and general economic conditions.
Work Mentality
After decades of centralised, planned economics that fostered obedience and 
conditioned a lack of initiative, imagination and flexibility the new arrival of the 
market economy demanded a radical re-orientation for East German employees. 
Self-reliance, risk-taking, and individual decision-making often came as novel 
concepts. How did the individual adapt to these new requirements in the sphere of 
work?
In his play ‘Waiting Room Germany’ author Klaus Pohl interviewed a western 
insurance manager who was sent east to set up a new dependence. He complained 
bitterly about a traditional working ethos that persisted as a legacy of Communism. 
His colleagues went to the hair-dresser during working hours, showed severe
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deficiencies in the polite handling of customer relations and were in general 
overwhelmed by the new-found freedom and self-reliance.
By the same token, the ‘Federal Association of Independent Businesses’
(.Bundesverband mittelstandischer Wirtschaft) referred to a deficit in managerial 
qualities. In 1995, according to its bureau in Potsdam, entrepreneurial shortcomings 
lay in the realms of sales, internal organisation, as well as hortatory and contract 
proceedings. Moreover, a lack of knowledge about the 1200 sources of economic 
and financial assistance was widespread. The development of an entrepreneur culture 
still lagged drastically behind western standards. People were hesitant to take 
economic risks and to invest. The ability to ‘think big’ regarding horizontal and 
vertical expansion was pushed aside by a traditional, minimalist and safeguarding 
approach, perfectly exemplified in the old German proverb of ‘Schuster bleib bei 
Deinen Leisten ’ (stick to your last).
A study for the employment ministry of the state of Saxony-Anhalt by the eastern 
based Institut fur sozialwissenschaftliche Informationen und Studien (‘Isis’) largely 
substantiated such perceptions. The study of 2000 small and medium-sized 
businesses pointed towards managerial deficiencies of eastern business executives.8 
In 1995, ‘Isis’ showed the prevalence of traditional values as diligence, sense of 
duty, honesty and reliability (see Table 3.10.). Crucial entrepreneurial skills, such as 
creativity, flexibility, compromise and willingness to take risks however, were 
lacking. Proper market analyses were missing in two-thirds of the queried enterprises 
as were innovation and the emphasis on the development of future products. Only 
twenty per cent employed trainees which pointed towards a lack of commitment to 
vital investment in personnel and training. Co-operation with other businesses were 
hardly established. Instead of having recourse to former Socialist contacts in order to 
enhance regional economic structures, sixty per cent of the respondents simply had
8 Information according to Saxony-Anhalt's Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Health, Press 
Office, August 1995.
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no intentions to do so. Instead, the eastern manager was characterised by a high 
degree of social competence, who valued amiable social relations.





sense of duty 4 3
honesty 5 4
determination 6 6




establishing social contacts 11 8






willingness to compromise 18 20
flexibility 19 19
willingness to take risks 20 21
orderliness 21 14
Source: Press Office, Ministry for Employment, Social Affairs and Health, Saxony-Anhalt, Aug. 1995.
However the eastern work mentality was by no means as bleak as suggested by these 
accounts. Over the short period of merely five years since the currency reform, 
Easterners showed a remarkable potential to adopt to market economical standards.
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The high number of new-found businesses - 850,000 between 1991 and 1994 (see 
Table 3.4.) - furthermore indicated a strong dynamic to face the challenges of the 
transition, in particular the prospect of Unemployment. ‘Isis’ itself pointed towards 
the high degree of motivation of young entrepreneurs which was supported by a 
strong desire for self-responsibility and self-realisation. Moreover, the eastern 
manager was characterised by a preparedness to accept personal hardship, such as 
long working hours and low income in order to uphold their businesses.
Table 3.11. Working Morale in East and West (1994)
Respondents were presented with certain behavioural patterns at work Categories ranged from 1 (not




Longer breaks than allowed 3.6 4.1
stay away from work on the pretext of being ill 4.4 5.0
arrive late 4.1 4.7
work slowly 4.2 4.1
private phone calls 4.0 4.2
illicit work 4.4 4.8
n 1162 309
Source: Emnid Informationen 7/8:1994:72-76.
In an east-west comparison the eastern employee possessed an even higher working 
morale than his or her western counterpart. Table 3.11. demonstrates than the sense 
of duty and commitment of Easterners within their working environment not only 
met but more often exceeded western standards. Longer breaks, calling in sick and 
arriving late were particular attitudes which were more discredited by East Germans. 
Even if lack of initiative, self-reliance and flexibility - as criticised by ‘Isis’ and the 
Bundesverband mittelstandischer Wirtschaft - clouded work performances,
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commitment and sense of duty certainly represented valuable attitudes which no 
enterprise could do without.
Further massive adjustments to the new market economy were represented in the 
considerable numbers of commuters and migrants to the west. Faced with the 
prospect of unemployment, Easterners did not hesitate to seek their fortunes in the 
more prosperous and stable old Lander. Unemployment figures were given a 
significant relief because of the vast numbers of commuters. Up to 600,000 people 
worked in the old Lander or in the western part of Berlin (see Table 3.12.). In 1993, 
more than nine per cent of the total labour force of eastern Germany had a job in the 
west. An additional 15,000 found an apprenticeship outside eastern Germany (Asche 
1994:234). Migration further embellished the statistics. Since unemployment was a 
less pressing problem in the old Federal Republic, many East Germans chose to seek 
their fortunes there. In 1991,250,000 people moved away from eastern Germany and 
set up their home in the west or the western part of Berlin. By 1992, the figures had 
dropped by 20 per cent down to 200,000. A year later, a further decrease resulted in 
a still astonishingly high 170,000 people leaving the new Lander (Statistical 
Yearbook 1995:80,1994:88,1993:88).
Table 3.12. Commutes to Work (from East to West)







Sources: Press Office, Bundesanstalt filr Arbeit; Statistical Yearbook 1995:105.
80
Unemployment
Economic restructuring carried the heavy burden of a dramatic decrease in overall 
employment. Since the GDR had a job guarantee for every citizen, unification 
revealed formerly hidden unemployment of overstaffed enterprises. With unification, 
excessive manpower was drastically reduced. By sector, manufacturing was affected 
most with a decrease of 60 per cent. Mining and energy (39 per cent) and services 
(22 per cent) also had severe reductions. Only in construction did the number of jobs 
increase by 10 per cent (Kocka 1994:181). High profile investments by Elf, Siemens 
or Opel (the German subsidiary of General Motors) which were all supported by 
heavy governmental inducements could by no means compensate for such heavy 
reductions.
Between 1991 and 1994 the number of employees dropped from 9.3 to 6.6 million. 
The degree of unemployment occasionally reached higher levels than the depression 
of the late 1920's and early 193 O's. The disproportion of unemployment between 
east and west was striking. In 1994, figures reached 17 per cent in the new Lander 
and nine per cent in the old Federal Republic. Between forty and fifty per cent of all 
eastern employees had experienced unemployment at one stage since unification. 
These figures did not include migrants and commuters to the west, those who 
registered for public work schemes or retraining courses, and early pensioners who 
in 1993 alone totalled some 600,000 (Sakowsky 1994:118).







(*): excluding western Berlin
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995:105,124, Bundesanstalt filr Arbeit, Press Office.
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Table 3.14. ‘ABM’ and Part-Time Work in the New Lander






ABM: Arbeitsbeschaffungsmafinahme (public work scheme)
Sources: Statistical Yearbook 1995:123,125; 1993:131; Bundesanstalt fUr Arbeit, Press Office.
At the outset of unification, Easterners were largely positive about their material and 
social future. In April 1990 respondents were queried about their personal 
perspective for the next two to three years and were asked to place them into four 
categories from highly optimistic to highly pessimistic. Regarding employment, the 
two categories for optimism totalled 67 per cent. In addition, the responses for 
material situation (63 per cent) and social security (61 per cent) were also largely 
positive (Forster and Roski 1990:84). In contrast, unequivocal pessimism was 
expressed by only seven per cent (employment) and six per cent (material situation 
and social security).
Table 3.15. Perceived Security of Employment Amongst Easterners (cumulated data, percentages) 
1992 1993 1994
secure 55.4 59.4 59.8
in danger 43.6 39.3 39.4
no answer 1.0 1.3 1.8
n 5681 5214 5303
Source: Politbarometer
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Over the course of the year discomfort, in particular about the security of 
employment grew. In December 1990, 59 per cent sensed that their job was in 
danger. Only 40 per cent were sure about keeping their employment 
{Politbarometer). Two years later however, the proportion had reversed. Now 55 per 
cent perceived their job as secured and only 44 per cent feared unemployment (see 
Table 3.15.). Nonetheless between 1992 and 1994, figures did not improve. The 
percentage of East German respondents who were uncertain about their employment 
future remained at around forty per cent. According to age cohorts differences were 
marginal.9 Hence, a considerable proportion of the eastern work force perceived their 
employment prospects as worrying and as a leap into the dark. Not surprisingly, 
Easterners, confronted with the loss of jobs and with a sudden re-orientation towards 
more demanding and skilled work performances, as well as often towards an entirely 
different working environment became increasingly critical of ‘Capitalism’. Whereas 
support for ‘Socialism’ remained at constant levels,10 the approval of the market 
economy amongst East Germans dropped drastically, from 77 per cent in the spring 
of 1990 to only 44 per cent in the summer of 1992 (Eisel 1994:160).
For East Germans, still used to the tight social net of Socialism which provided for 
jobs and a steady income, the sudden confrontation with unemployment and 
financial insecurity was harsh and devastating. For those without jobs, a feeling of 
betrayal and exclusion from the material benefits and the increasing prosperity 
around them became prevalent. The sudden changes in the sphere of work, fear of 
unemployment and increasing competitiveness for jobs had drastic implications on 
the individual’s life and found their expression in a general perception that one’s 
social relations to friends or family were worse than in the days of the GDR. In 
1992, only five per cent of eastern respondents sensed that the relations within their 
social environment had improved since unification. On the contrary, 44 per cent held
9 50 to 59 year-olds were slightly less and people over sixty years slightly more secure.
10 The cumulated data of the Politbarometer for 1990 showed that 28 per cent of respondents thought 
‘much’ or ‘very much’ of Socialism. By 1994, the figure had increased slightly to thirty per cent.
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the opinion that things got worse (Politbarometer). As shown in Table 3.16., 
between sixty and 67 per cent regarded social safety as being worse since 
unification.
Table 3.16. Perceived Social Security in Eastern Germany (cumulated data, percentages)
Question: When thinking about your social safety do you fare better or worse as compared to the days 
o f the GDR?
1992 1993 1994
better 15.6 14.4 20.5
worse 60.5 66.5 59.7
no difference 23.7 18.7 19.0
no answer 0.2 0.4 0.8
n 1080 2062 1068
Source: Politbarometer.
The former stable and foreseeable circles of work, family and friends were now 
under pressure. Demographic statistics undermined the perceptions of change and 
uncertainty. Between 1989 and 1993 the birth-rate of eastern Germany had fallen by 
sixty per cent, the marriage rate by 62 per cent and the divorce rate by 63 per cent 
(Statistical Yearbook 1995:69,70,79). These drops can to some extent be explained 
by the reduction in certain social services. The comprehensive welfare state of the 
GDR was designed to enable women to combine work and family. Over ninety per 
cent of all women of working age were employed, as compared to fifty per cent in 
the FRG (Pittmann 1987:16). After unification, the alternative of choosing between 
housewife and mother versus employee which had virtually disappeared from the 
conscience of East German became again an option. With the loss of affordable child 
care facilities and day nurseries, accompanied by the abolition of the ‘Baby year’ 
(maternity leave granted to first-time mothers at full pay) or the monthly free 
household-day, women found it hard to combine motherhood and employment.
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In addition, women were disproportionally affected by unemployment. In 1990, 54 
per cent of unemployed in the east were female. By 1994, the figure had risen to 63 
per cent (Statistical Yearbook 1994:130). In the same year, the unemployment rate of 
women in eastern Germany stood at twenty per cent, in comparison to 11.5 per cent 
for men. Preferential treatment of male employees was obvious and widespread 
(Helwig 1995:342). Still, in times of financial insecurity women often had no choice 
but to look for jobs. Some also appreciated the social and material independence 
which comes with employment. Hence, family and marriage plans were often 
postponed. Still, such vast changes are extremely rare and find no comparable 
expression in western Germany or in any other western society. Instead, they 




Economics had an ambivalent connotation in the GDR. On the one hand, the 
country’s status as the champion of the Comecon represented a significant source of 
pride amongst East Germans. The establishment of an economy that generated the 
highest living standard amongst Communist countries was perceived as a 
tremendous effort. On close scrutiny however, economics was a source of 
continuous frustration. In comparison with the west and in particular with the other 
Germany, people all but ignored the fundamental deficiencies of their own system 
and the increasing wealth that prospered outside the Iron Curtain. At home, 
economic stagnation, mismanagement, the outdated reliance on heavy industry and 
growing ecological problems prompted resignation and embitterment. By the 1980’s 
the GDR was permanently on the verge of bankruptcy. Hence, economics possessed 
a distinctly negative undertone. Internal comparisons to other Communist societies 
merely functioned as temporary remedies for the battered collective self esteem 
which tried to restrain the thought that years of struggle and hard labour had resulted 
only in minor economic and material accomplishments.
In contrast, economics had a very positive connotation in the Federal Republic. The 
economic miracle brought widespread prosperity. West Germany was united under 
the principle of material reconstruction which safeguarded the integration of millions 
of refugees and silenced potential anti-democratic opponents. The social market 
economy benefited employers with increasing productivity and very low strike rates, 
while employees appreciated the general rise in living standards, the sophisticated 
system of social securities, as well as increasing wages and decreasing working 
hours. Despite some economic crises, in particular in the 1970's, peace, harmony and 
conciliation characterised the economic process. The continuous improvement of the 
national economy, as well as the increasing individual material standards turned 
from prerogatives into expected underlying currents which were taken for granted.
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The necessity to establish a formative focus after the catastrophe of the Third Reich 
resulted in a highly consensual economic system. Inevitably, it generated a good deal 
of conformism to the principles of economic success and general prosperity.
With unification, economics continued to posses a negative undertone for Easterners. 
The dead-beat state of the eastern economy rubbed further salt into the wounds that 
in retrospect decades of hard work constituted only a period of failure and under­
achievement. The eastern economy did not represent a contribution but a mere 
burden to the unified Germany. The introduction of market principles destroyed any 
remaining sources of pride. Production and productivity dropped, over-staffed 
enterprises were restructured and unemployment spread. The necessary investments 
in roads, railways, communication or housing further documented the discrepancy 
between western standards and eastern shortcomings. East Germans had to confront 
the bitter reality, that one’s past working life did not pass the western test of time. 
Instead, it was an utter failure.
There remained a solution however, in looking ahead and leaving the past behind. 
Here, unification provided for exciting and optimistic prospects. The choice and 
variety of goods grew dramatically. Houses were newly built or modernised. People 
had more money to spend because of the growth in wage levels and the 
advantageous currency conversion. Despite the persistent shortage of employment, 
for those with jobs, the financial situation improved and was evaluated in a positive 
manner. Moreover, in regard to the future people showed a certain supportive 
saturation with their financial existence. Only five years after unification, East 
Germans had already reached a level of considerable contentment with their material 
situation.
This new-found affluence however, was an automatic given from the political elites. 
East Germans were lulled into prosperity. The so called Aufschwung Ost (Progress
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East) changed the economic landscape of the new Lander. Public funds were 
allocated for governmental projects, investment and subsidies. Western trade unions 
which extended their network to the east negotiated successful wage terms, while the 
government introduced a generous conversion rate.
As with the former Communist regime, Easterners were passive recipients. The 
economy of the GDR with the principles of centralism, nationalisation and planning 
fostered lack of self-responsibility and independence. Initiative and self-reliance ran 
counter to the totalitarian hierarchy of the SED state. The individual was a 
streamlined underling, excluded from participation and responsibility in the 
economic process. Just as the Communist system was imposed on East Germany, so 
was the market. In each case, East Germans were the passive ‘victims’ without 
choice. This was bound to create a rather inactive economic identity. Prior to 
unification, the blame for general economic deficiencies was directed against an 
abstract and inefficient, centralised apparatus. Now, political elites, western 
industries and business people, and foremost the Treuhand had to bear the brunt of 
public discontent. This passive recipient-mentality was further evident in the 
dissatisfaction with the approximation of living standards. Although the majority 
recognised that they fared better as compared to the past, people were not content 
with increased wage levels and material standards. The mechanism remained the 
same: blaming distant authorities. As with the old days, the individual did not 
attribute responsibility to him or herself but to the apparatus, to the elites who 
organised and determined one’s working life.
Back in the GDR, work performance did not necessarily determine social and 
material status. Ideological compliance played as much a role. The absence of 
efficient incentives to work more and harder accounted for a lack of cognitive 
commitment to work. With the oppression of autonomy and individuality the worker 
obediently fulfilled prescribed tasks. Work was not a sphere for self-realisation but a
88
financial necessity and duty to the state. Initiative came from above and not out of 
personal ambition. The worker was a mere tool and means of production within the 
economic process, utilised by the totalitarian system.
These perceptions of the mechanisms of one’s working life lingered on in the new 
Lander. Again, economics was regarded as a utilisation of the individual by elites 
and authorities: opportunistic business people from the west bought eastern 
companies in search for the quick money while disregarding local needs, in 
particular employment. The post-unification battles over property further manifested 
people’s impression of a colonisation of the east by merciless western capitalism. 
Easterners were overwhelmed by market principles, their firms degraded to 
investment opportunities, their jobs made redundant, their social safety being 
threatened. People felt as though they were being left to carry the burden of 
unification alone, since the arrogant west was not willing to share or contribute.
Such attitudes were in sharp contrast to those generated during the successful 
economic miracle of the FRG. Work was an integrative factor for refugees and 
potential anti-democratic forces and represented a formative focus and an affirmative 
experience for the individual who was thriving for financial success and craving for 
social recognition. Responsibility lay with the individual, capable of determining his 
or her own life. In the new Lander, such inbred notions of democracy and capitalism 
as activity and self-realisation clashed with the conditioned passive and recipient 
mentality of the Communist years. The active compelling urge to perform collided 
with the passive notion of provision. Subsequently, the frustration and anger caused 
by the post-unification economic malaise was channelled into expressions of 
defiance and lamentation, such as perceptions of a colonisation and exploitation by 
the west, as well as the discomfort with the persisting gaps in wages and living 
standards.
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In addition, the nature of Socialist economics generated cognitive and behavioural 
patterns, which left East Germans ill-equipped for the upcoming transformation to a 
market economy. The strict hierarchy of the GDR’s economic structure with rigid 
top-down patterns of planning and target fulfilment severely hampered the 
individual’s capacity regarding imagination and flexibility. It nurtured apathy, 
lethargy and self-complacency, as well as tutelage and the readiness to obey and 
oblige. Also, deficiencies in planning and chronic shortages of parts and goods 
slackened the economic process, while the spreading of work loads onto several 
individuals further contributed to lower working demands. Furthermore, the GDR’s 
economy had considerable difficulties in the realms of innovation, as well as 
adaptation, correction and response to emerging economic trends and necessities.
These shortcomings were already conditioned under a streamlined educational 
apparatus. Despite emphasising technical skills and qualifications, educational 
facilities fostered an urge to conformity, compliance and accommodation within the 
totalitarian system. They suppressed individuality and motivation to change. Upon 
unification, such skills were badly missed in a market environment that thrived on 
competition and competitiveness and where initiative, individuality, independence 
and constant readjustment were paramount principles. The underdeveloped 
entrepreneur culture as well as the general difficulties of the labour force in adapting 
to new working environments and demands served as telling examples.
Nonetheless although market-oriented skills, such as initiative, flexibility, risk- 
taking or responsibility were still underdeveloped, East Germans showed remarkable 
signs of adaptation. The presence of an attitude to succeed within the free market - 
whether out of personal ambition or of financial necessity caused by the prospect of 
unemployment - was documented by the committed and conscientious work ethic 
and the readiness to commute or move to the west for better employment 
opportunities. Departing from a life on the beaten track of the Communist society,
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people left well-established social circles and re-adjusted to an unfamiliar 
environment. These were promising signs which indicated that Easterners would 
eventually muster the mental transition to market-economic standards. Skills are 
learned over time. They however, have to be preceded by the individual’s 
willingness to acquire them.
With unification, the value of work underwent a drastic reorientation. In the GDR, 
employment represented a constitutional right and a natural given that was 
automatically organised by the state. Under Communism, work had no particular 
value. Every citizen was entitled to it. Identities which were constructed around 
employment, such as self-realisation in the private sphere or social contacts with 
colleagues were not seen as arising out of any individual achievements at work. 
West Germany however, was the reverse. Individual work performances had an 
indisputable impact on one’s social and material status.
In addition, unemployment was a regular phenomenon in the Federal Republic which 
affected a considerable number of people at one stage in their working lives. Still, 
individual initiative offered the prospect of a re-integration within the labour force. 
Aided by governmental schemes and job mediation, people were able to join training 
programs or public work projects. For most of the jobless, unemployment therefore 
constituted only a temporary phase. For the overwhelming majority, unemployment 
in itself represented a huge incentive to look for work, since it considerably affected 
one’s material situation and social status.
The severe job cuts in eastern Germany therefore came as a shock. Unemployment 
was an entirely new experience which now affected up to half of the labour force. In 
1994 two-fifths still perceived their jobs as being in danger. Thus, it came as little 
wonder that the fear of unemployment remained the most important issue in life for 
Easterners. Approximately two-thirds of the eastern population regarded
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unemployment as the most important issue in their lives (Gensicke 1994:802). A 
life-time guarantee turned into a never before experienced feeling of existentialist 
uncertainty. Self-contentment and complacency about work were now replaced by 
demands to show initiative in finding new jobs, in acquiring new qualifications and 
in improving work performances. Disorientation and loss of self-esteem were the 
consequences.
In the realm of social services, the GDR citizen internalised an extensive system of 
comprehensive care at minimal costs. The welfare state which provided security 
from cradle to grave achieved a high standard amongst Easterners and was gradually 
taken for granted. As with work, people developed a recipient mentality. Although 
East Germans appreciated the comprehensive nature of the system, they criticised the 
lack of quality in certain fields which indicated an attitude of pretentious demands to 
the state. Accordingly, the welfare state of the Federal Republic represented a 
comprehensive and extensive system. However it was not an automatic guarantee 
against social misfortunes. The Sozialstaat constituted more of a normative focus for 
the state than a prerogative for people’s demands. Despite the ever increasing 
intensity of the services, they were nevertheless tied to currency stability, 
productivity and competitiveness of the economy and were financed by substantial 
contributions from the individual and the private sector.
It therefore came as no surprise, that Easterners perceived general living 
circumstances as harder now than in the days of the GDR. Progressive social 
services, such as subsidies for housing and food products, full health coverage, 
children nurseries or the right of work were abolished. Old routines broke down. The 
period of transition and uncertainty was documented by vast demographic pressures 
indicated by the drastic declines in marriages, birth rates and divorces. It showed that 
the collapse of the GDR was not merely the demise of a system but moreover the 
collapse of a particular form of life. Against the backdrop of such dramatic changes
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the growing criticism of capitalism and the persistent support for Socialism was 
inevitable. The transformation from secured and infantilised recipient to self- 
responsible individual was too harsh and too rapid. Faced with social and financial 
risks and uncertainties the retrospective attachment to a safe and secure past 
represented a logical emotional escape.
Nonetheless several positive developments allowed for cautious optimism. 
Satisfaction with one’s personal financial situation represented a vital systemic 
stabiliser. People realised that they benefited from the introduction of the market 
economy and that they fared far better in comparison to the days of the GDR. 
Despite some depressing economic facts, in particular unemployment, there was no 
major social unrest. The hardship caused by the decline in social services, 
unemployment, as well as new working requirements and environments seemed to 
have been outweighed by material gains for those who were able to secure jobs.
Furthermore, East Germans adapted remarkably to the gloomy reality of the 
economic transformation. Despite the euphoria at the outset of unification, 
Easterners initially showed a great deal of realism regarding their employment 
prospects and the approximation of living standards. Individual prognoses about 
one’s future were far more accurate than contemporary statements of political and 
economic experts (Wagner 1992:85). Such realism prevented against overambitious 
material demands from unification and provided a cognitive buffer of acceptance of 
the persistent gap in the approximation of living standards between east and west. 
Also despite the shock of encountering a hitherto unknown phenomenon, the early 
familiarisation with the possibility of unemployment psychologically prepared East 
Germans for the actual experience of it.
Still, the economic identity in unified Germany stood on shaky grounds. The 
transition from Socialist to market structures significantly contributed to the growing
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antagonism between east and west. The two-class society continued to exist and 
manifested itself. Despite some impressive advances, wages, living standards and 
employment opportunities in the east had not reached western levels. Such economic 
inequalities bore the dangerous potential to heighten psychological discontent (Stem 
1993:121). Anti-western sentiments emerged and did not fade, such as the perceived 
colonisation and exploitation, merciless capitalism and western indifference to 
eastern problems.
Positive evaluations of East Germans were largely attributable to the increase in the 
material well-being of the population, in comparison to the Communist period. This 
however, was only made possible through massive governmental subsidies. Before 
unification, Easterners followed the call of the Deutschmark. After unification, they 
were kept on the life-support by billions of transfer money. This approval of the 
western-imposed market economy could only be maintained through the continuous 
improvement of the individual’s material basis. Thus, the expectations of East 
Germans regarding material standards have to be met by increases in job 
opportunities and levels of affluence. Hence, the eastern economy has to progress 
from a subsidised case of illness to an economically sound region. People at least 
have to be given the prospect of advancing material standards to complete 
unification in economic terms. Only then are Easterners capable of developing a 
positive orientation towards economics which would equal that of the western part. 
Only then can recipient mentalities, passivity, frustration and embitterment turn into 
affirmative experiences in the sphere of work, including the development of notions 
of initiative, self-realisation and self-fulfilment. East Germans had already shown 
supportive attitudes towards market economics. The persistence of defiant notions 




Citizenship can be understood as the relationship between the individual and the 
political community he or she lives in. The citizen is entitled to a variety of rights 
and privileges in return for a set of duties and responsibilities. The state offers its 
citizens political, legal, civil and social rights, while the individual is expected to 
obey laws, pay taxes or fulfil military duties. This interdependence forms a vital 
anchor for the establishment of loyalties and emotions. What are the citizen’s 
attitudes, and emotions to his or her political community? Can the individual form 
an identity towards the state out of willingly-accepted responsibilities and 
confidently-claimed rights?
Rights and responsibilities within state-citizen relations were fundamentally 
different in the two Germanys. The official political culture of the GDR (Rytlewski 
1989:22, Krisch 1988:158) was derived from the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
which transcended and penetrated all spheres of life and society. At the core of this 
Zielkultur stood the development of a Socialist and eventually Communist society, 
based on such values as optimism, solidarity, studiousness, freedom, equality and 
social justice, and created by the ‘new Socialist man’, who went through a life-long 
process of ideologically-conditioned and state-organised education (Sontheimer 
1990:61).
This philanthropic view of the SED - the optimistic belief in the possibility to 
educate man towards an utopian goal - resulted in extremely high demands and
expectations from the citizens of the GDR. East Germans were forced to accept the 
state doctrine of Marxism-Leninism as the ideological basis of their political, social 
and economic lives. They were obliged to accept the leading role of the SED 
including its normative interpretations of all aspects of society. They had to accept 
the competence and responsibility of the state in all political, social and economic 
matters which were only limited by the leadership function of the SED. The citizen 
was expected to show interest and engage in political and social organisations under 
the dogmatic and practical guidance of the party. Demands also included a personal 
commitment to economic growth, the improvement of individual technical skills, as 
well as military duties. Collective matters possessed priority over private and 
individual interests. The supreme goal of the GDR was represented in the creation of 
a new and better society. The envisaged development of the Socialist towards the 
Communist society depended on the active and voluntary co-operation and 
engagement of self-sacrificing individuals which required a firm, rational and 
emotional commitment to the Communist cause.
Hence state-citizen relations in the GDR followed rigid top-down patterns. The 
individual was expected, even coerced, to participate. The Communist party’s 
monopoly on the interpretation and implementation of Marxist principles was 
justified by Lenin out of its ‘avant-garde’ position within society as the leader of the 
revolution. Only the party possessed the political conscience and scientific 
knowledge to lead society towards the logical end-point of historical development - 
the Communist society. In contrast, democracy and hence the Federal Republic, 
possessed fundamentally different values of citizenship. While the Communist 
society emphasised collectivity, democracy stresses individuality.
Greek philosophers paid particular attention to direct participation of the individual 
in the political process. Within the liberal tradition of Montesquieu, James Madison, 
Adam Smith or John Locke sovereignty lies within the people, circumscribing the 
power of the state. Rousseau argued for an enlightened citizenry, individual liberty
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and accountable governments. Even the elitist philosopher Schumpeter (1992:269) 
who viewed democracy as an ‘institutional arrangement where individuals acquire 
decision-making power in a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ cannot but 
emphasise the individual within the political process. Today, while neo-conservative 
thinkers point towards deferential and orderly behaviour, and liberal theorists stress 
active participation in public and community affairs, democracy in either conception 
offers the individual the opportunity for active engagement in political affairs.
Thus citizenship in unified Germany required the individual to pursue an active, 
informed and conscious interest in public affairs. As a normative standard, the ideal 
citizen had to be knowledgeable, concerned, supportive and participative to his or 
her social community.1 In reality however, the common citizen represents only an 
unsatisfactory approximation to this ideal. Societies have to accept that various 
circumstances remove the individual from such normative virtues. This perfect 
model is simply not a part of any political reality. Obstacles may include access to 
information, knowledge, time pressure, or differing intellectual capacities. Also, the 
demands of liberal democracy for the individual’s initiative and self-responsibility 
can be counteractive to the citizenship ideal in regard to the well-being of the whole 
society and the sublimation of selfishness.
But how do these deviations affect the stability of the political system? An answer 
can be given by analysing the causes which made a citizen pass off citizenship 
attributes. Someone who cheats on income-tax declarations does not necessarily 
want to abolish democracy. Danger occurs however, when the principles of 
citizenship are surrendered to anti-democratic ideological objectives and political 
party advantages or when loyalty and allegiance to a democratic community turn 
into destructive disobedience or antipathy.
1 For a more thorough discussion on the concept of citizenship see for example: Heater 1990, Janowitz 
1983, Oppenheim 1977.
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Here the question of legitimacy of the political system enters the agenda. In the 
GDR, Marxism-Leninism offered legitimacy to the SED regime since the party in its 
vanguard position possessed the Communist conscience and scientific knowledge to 
lead in the revolutionary process of establishing the Communist society. For the 
young Bonn Republic growing support for democratic institutions and 
parlamentarism, as well as high turn-outs at elections represented strong processes of 
legitimation for the recently established democracy. In both societies however, the 
quest for a stable political community became one of acceptance of the political 
system by the individual. As the SED had to realise in 1989 form of government and 
political organisation of society were only well-established as soon or as long as the 
political system enjoyed a certain degree of legitimacy amongst the citizens. Max 
Weber viewed legitimacy as equivalent to a belief in legitimacy. Legitimate power is 
simply the power that is regarded as legitimate by the people (1956:23,157,659; 
1958:493). Seymour Martin Lipset (1958:88) defined legitimacy as the ‘capacity of 
the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions 
are the most appropriate one’s for society’.
Weber and Lipset emphasised the ability of states or governments to persuade 
citizens of the legitimate nature of the political system in a top-down process. In 
contrast, David Beetham (1991:100) stressed the importance of a society’s values 
and rules. A government can only be successful if it represents a rightful source of 
authority, while its action meets consent within society and is based on established 
legal rules. Here the pattern is one of interaction between top and down, between 
ruler and ruled.
In either case the emphasis is on the positive and meaningful identification of the 
citizen with the rules and principles of the political community. This implies that the 
individual’s thought and behaviour should be guided by a constitutional consensus 
which, in unified Germany, included agreement on parlamentarism, acceptance of 
political institutions, as well as respect for human rights and civic liberties (dignity,
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equality, freedom of expression and belief). Additionally, in a democratic system a 
proper mediation between ruler and ruled holds centre stage. The citizen is entitled 
to an adequate aggregation and representation of interest. The governing elites ought 
to maintain reasonable contact with its subjects which provides for a mutual 
exchange of information, ideas and demands. Regarding the legitimacy of the 
system, it remains vital that the citizen possesses the capacity, or at least is given the 
prospect to influence the decision-making process.
In short, in the understanding of this chapter, participation and legitimacy represent 
the cornerstones of citizenship. In the context of unified Germany the public’s 
general knowledge of and interest in the political process are analysed. The chapter 
furthermore addresses participation patterns in east and west, including turn-outs at 
elections and membership of political parties, interest groups, or citizen-initiatives. 
The question of legitimacy of the new democratic system is analysed with the help 
of public attitudes towards the state, while asking whether East Germans had 
accepted the institutional setting of democracy and whether their thought and 
behaviour complied with the implicit values and rules of democracy. The chapter 
therefore addresses attitudes towards the bureaucracy, political actors and 
institutions. Mediation of power between ruler and ruled is analysed by looking at 
attitudes towards the system of interest representation, while trying to examine the 
extent to which East Germans at all felt represented.
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4.2. The German Democratic Republic
Marxism-Leninism understands politics as the relationship between various classes 
of society and the political power of the state. Generally speaking, the state serves 
the ruling class: the capital-owning bourgeoisie in the capitalist and the working 
class in the Socialist society. In a Marxist-Leninist state the individual has to submit 
all private ambitions to the paramount interest of society which is formulated 
through the avant-garde role of a Communist party. To define and redefine the 
proper needs and interests of a Socialist society, a constant and reverse exchange of 
ideas between party and citizens is necessary. Marxism-Leninism therefore requires 
the ‘new Socialist man’; an active participant in the political process with a 
permanent interest and eagerness in creating the Communist utopia.
The SED regime gave this participatory role of citizens strong legal status. The 
constitution of 1968 proposed a hefty moral commitment to every citizen by stating 
the principle of ‘contribution to working, planning and governing’. The SED 
demanded not only an active but furthermore an affirmative participation in the 
development of the Communist society. The new Socialist man, educated and guided 
by ideologically sound agents should willingly contribute. His or her efforts should 
not be based on coercion but on reason and understanding for the individual’s 
responsibility in the general development of society. But how did the theoretical and 
normative concept of the participative, informed and affirmative citizen correspond 
to the political reality of the GDR? What were the opportunities and chances of each 
individual to exert an influence on the political process?
4,2.1. Participation 
The SED
The SED had a strong base within society. In 1981, 17 per cent of all people over 
age 25 and even 42.5 per cent over age forty owned a party membership card. As of
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1986, the SED had 2.3 Million members which equalled to around one sixth of the 
total population of the GDR. Workers (employed in production) represented 38 per 
cent, followed by the ‘intelligentsia’ (22 per cent), white-collar employees (7.7 per 
cent), farmers (4.8 per cent), students (2.1 per cent) and housewives (0.9 per cent; 
Weber 1993:98). Hence, the membership base was broad and covered all segments 
of society. Apart from the significant share of workers, the economic, political and 
cultural elites, as well as the functionaries from mass organisations not only 
maintained but further manifested the power and stability of the regime.
Table 4.1. Membership Figures of the SED






Source: DDR Handbuch 1985:1185, Central Committee Report, XI. Party Conference 1986:84, 
Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus 1985:290; in Glaefiner 1989:127.
A political career within the SED hugely depended on an ideologically sound 
performance. A move towards influential political positions was manipulated and 
controlled by the hierarchical structures of the Communist party or its political and 
societal mass organisations and were only awarded after a certain period of SED 
membership. The demands of the party upon its members were striking. They had to 
be moral and professional role models, both at work and in the private sphere. The 
comrade was asked to represent the SED in all aspects of life, to forego private and 
uphold party interests. The SED did not accept members, but instead recruited them. 
It required two sponsors and a one-year probation period in which the candidate was 
instructed in his or her duties and responsibilities. The judgement of the party 
apparatus was ultimate. The way in which the party member performed within the
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SED structures affected his or her life, not only on the political level but also 
professionally and socially (Zimmermann 1988:237).
After achieving an influential position, the political participant was confronted with 
the next limitation to interest articulation. As a Leninist rule, the SED forbade any 
form of factionalisation which consequently severely limited the development of 
interest plurality. Directives, goals and programmes trickled down from the 
centralised party hierarchy to every party cell. The flow of information from base to 
top, however, was almost lacking. Any particular cell had to follow orders and 
directives from its superior level (Zimmermann 1988:230). The stream of 
information and interest aggregation was exclusively in the top-down direction.
Political nominations were also based on academic and professional qualifications 
(Zimmermann 1988:209). Access to universities was granted through evaluation 
reports by secondary schools, the collective, the FDJ youth organisation, or other 
SED-controlled institutions. Finally the individual seeking political influence, 
constantly had to improve and complete his or her political knowledge through 
continuous political-education courses, seminars or workshops. These were designed 
to further advance the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and to indoctrinate the 
politically interested according to the interpretation of the SED.
From early on the SED followed the example of the Soviet KP. In 1949, the 
Politburo was installed which crafted all political guidelines and basic principles and 
decided upon their implementation. It constituted the true government of the GDR. 
The scope of activities included decisions on various annual and five-year plans, 
foreign policy, security and defence, and central issues of domestic concern 
(GlaeBner 1989:143). In short, the Politburo addressed all aspects of life in East 
Germany, from the social and economic to the political and cultural realm. 
Resolutions made by its members had the character of laws (Weber 1993:73).
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The centralised power of the Politburo was complemented by the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee. This body was responsible for managing day-to-day affairs, such 
as control and implementation of party directives, or recruitment and promotion of 
personnel. The Secretariat represented the SED’s central organ to control both party 
and party members and secure their conformity with the guidelines set forth by the 
Politburo. Overlaps in personnel between Politburo and Secretariat ensured the 
proper implementation of the Politburo’s decisions. The Politburo and Secretariat 
assured the centralised and hierarchical structure of the party.
The SED further introduced the Soviet system of nomenclature which implied that 
the respective superior organisation was solely responsible for the appointment and 
promotion of the cadre (Weber 1993:20). Selection to posts followed strict 
qualification criteria, such as political knowledge, education, performance, as well as 
personal and practical skills (Zimmermann 1988:239-240). It guaranteed the 
recruitment of party-conforming individuals to the apparatus and further manifested 
the unchallenged position of the party within the state.
By eliminating any form of inner-party democracy and interest aggregation social, 
political and economic decisions were exclusively undertaken by the SED elite. With 
the help of the hierarchical party apparatus they were able to govern the GDR in a 
totalitarian, oligarchic fashion. The SED did not allow any form of power sharing. 
Instead, it oppressed pluralism and reached a position of comprehensive, all- 
embracing, dictatorial and uncontrolled rule (Weber 1993:98). The GDR gave a 
classic example of democratic centralism with a strict party discipline and a rigid 
hierarchy of all party organs. Control commissions safeguarded the ideological 
purity of all organisations which had to be in line with the principles set forth by the 
party. The vanguard role of the SED implied that the party and only the party had the 
right and knowledge to transfer and interpret Marxism-Leninism into practice. The 
SED derived its legitimation from an ideology which was deemed to be perfect. 
Inputs from below were therefore unnecessary and even damaging because the party
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was the sole guardian of the ideology. Thus politics and policies were grounded in 
the scientific knowledge and application of Marxism-Leninism which led the SED to 
the conclusion that ‘the party is always right’.
Such ‘monolithic unity’ (Weber 1993:32) was a fiercely safeguarded principle of the 
SED. Because of its central position in the political process, the party theoretically 
had to fulfil two opposing functions. On the one hand, it reflected the political 
spectrum of society. On the other hand, it brought together various strains and 
antagonisms within society. The SED escaped this functional ambivalence by 
denying open discourse and inter-party pluralism, while pursuing a path of purges 
and internal political clean-ups. In the period prior to Stalin’s death in 1953 the SED 
tried to assure its absolute supremacy not only through ideological indoctrination but 
foremost through repressive measures which were designed to discipline and 
intimidate party functionaries (Weber 1993:33). In 1950/51, 150,000 members were 
expelled from the SED, including the Politburo member Paul Merker.
The demise of the Soviet dictator sparked a reconsideration of Communist policies 
throughout the Eastern Bloc. In the GDR, prominent intellectuals, such as Ernst 
Bloch and Robert Havemann advocated a ‘third way’ which criticised both Stalinism 
and Capitalism. The discrepancies between theory and practice, between idealist 
notions of social justice, freedom and emancipation on the one hand and oppression 
and paternalism amongst the elites on the other, prompted the formation of an inner- 
party opposition. The political establishment around Ulbricht however, was keen to 
undermine any open discourse. Paranoid and power-obsessed, they perceived their 
authority as threatened. Subsequently, the judiciary and the Ministry for State 
Security - nicknamed the Stasi - were engaged in purges and trials. By 1958 the 
opposition movement lost momentum and the reactionary course manifested its 
superiority. The party ideologist Wolfgang Harich was imprisoned. Ulbricht’s 
deputy Karl Schirdewan and the Head of State Security Ernst Wollweber lost their 
political functions. The Secretary of the ZK, Gerhart Ziller, committed suicide
104
(Weber 1993:47). In the end the Stalinist faction managed to eliminate any form of 
opposition. Opponents from within the party chose internal exile, were expelled to 
the FRG or imprisoned. Until 1989, the hegemony of the SED and its Stalinist 
principles remained unchallenged.
Block Parties
Apart from membership in the SED, the citizen was able to join various so called 
‘block parties’. Closely watched by the Communist authorities, these parties had to 
submit themselves to the avant-garde role of the SED and its program as a 
compulsory guideline for their activities. The totalitarian regime established a new 
version of Communist rule in the form of a Socialist plural party system where block 
parties possessed an ‘alibi function’ (Weber 1993:33) by disguising the one-party 
rule of the SED. They represented valuable transmitting vehicles with the task of 
integrating ‘bourgeois’ and religious groups, as well as ‘capitalist’ classes into the 
Socialist society.
Table 4.2. Membership in Block Parties (in thousand)
Year CDU LDPD NDPD DBD
1987 137 104 110 115
1982 125 82 91 103
1977 115 75 85 92
Source: Weber 1993:93
As such, the Christian-Democratic CDU offered East German Christians a source of 
representation, although its commitment to the SED state and Communist principles 
was unanimous. The DBD (Democratic Farmers Party) was actively involved in the 
collectivisation of the 1950’s and 1960’s, and represented the interests of the 
agricultural and rural sectors. The LDPD (Liberal Democratic party) was geared
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towards white collar workers, the intelligentsia, and small independent businesses. 
Finally the NDPD (National Democratic Party) was founded under the active 
influence of the SED to integrate former members of Hitler’s NSDAP, as well as 
army officers of the Reichswehr (Glaefiner 1989:184-6). However formulating and 
advocating political alternatives were absent from the block parties’ political agenda. 
Again the SED did not allow any opposing interests or policies. In the end the role of 
the block parties was more social than political. They functioned as a structural part 
of the totalitarian regime with hardly any intellectual or practical independence 
(Zimmermann 1988:275).
Mass Organisations
Mass organisations functioned as further means of mediating Communist concepts 
and programmes to individual members and were utilised to educate ideologically 
and control the citizens. Theoretically, mass organisations were designed to 
represent the interests of their members and to form a consultative, informative and 
critical source of information. In practice however, interest articulation and 
aggregation again were dominated by top-down patterns, hierarchical structures and 
dogmatic biases.
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Since 1949, the SED determined the organisations’ political agenda, as well as the 
recruitment to key positions. As with the block parties, all mass organisations were 
forced to accept the vanguard position of the SED unanimously (Weber 1993:33).












Verein der gegenseitigen Bauemhilfe 14 2.8
total: 500 100
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1989:401
Mass organisations were vital components of the political system and were allocated 
seats in parliament (see Table 4.4.). Their mediating and controlling function in 
society completed the totalitarian hegemony of the SED. The FDGB (Freier 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) represented the uniformed and all-encompassing 
organisation for blue and white collar workers. The FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend) 
and its subsidiary, the pioneer organisation Ernst Thalmann were the only legal 
groups for younger people in the GDR. The DFD (Demokratischer Frauenbund 
Deutschlands) was founded to foster women’s Socialist conscience and encourage 
active political participation. The Kulturbund was designed to support the 
development of a Socialist national culture, as well as to broaden the cultural horizon 
of its members in such fields as history of the Heimat, preservation of monuments or
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nature and environment. The VdgB (Verein der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe) was the 
Socialist mass organisation for the collectivised farmer and gardener and promoted 
agricultural policies of the SED (Glaeftner 1989:187-8).
Mass organisations were caught between the interest of the party and the interest of 
their members. Influential positions were staffed with high-level functionaries from 
the SED. The SED however, expected ultimate obedience from its members. The 
interests of mass organisations were subordinated to those of the paramount party. 
Functionaries of mass organisations therefore struggled between party discipline and 
pressure from the organisation’s base. Although participation in mass organisations 
was voluntary, it nevertheless represented an elementary condition to advance 
politically and professionally, as well as to gain social status (Zimmermann 
1988:267). For instance, for school children and university students membership in 
the FDJ was almost a prerequisite for later professional success and university 
placements. The complete structuring of all aspect of life through the help of mass 
institutions imposed the totalitarian principle on every individual in every aspect of 
his or her existence and secured the unchallenged supremacy of the SED.
Elections
The election process in the GDR resembled a general mobilisation of the whole 
society rather than a conscious decision between political alternatives. The results 
were mostly predetermined. Political contents and procedures were controlled 
through directives of the Central Committee and the Politburo. Elections represented 
mere agitational propaganda to show consent to a centrally-designed program and 
unity amongst the population. The electorate had to cast its vote openly. Pressures 
not to abstain or invalidate the ballot were immense. Not surprisingly, the turnout 
reached absurdly high figures. Approval votes for the unity list amounted to little 
below 100 per cent. By simply looking at the vast number of refugees (see Chapter
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Two), the people’s dissatisfaction with the political reality became evident and cast 
doubts on the legitimacy of elected representatives (Weber 1993:31).
Hence elections in the GDR were symbolic actions. They did not guarantee but 
merely reflected participation. The hitherto ‘chosen’ candidates possessed a 
mediating function. As opposed to western democracies, where representatives are 
supposed to transform the interests of their constituents, the political representatives 
of the GDR instead were asked to encourage active participation and the fulfilment 
of party-directives. They furthermore informed the state apparatus on public opinion 
in their constituencies. The representatives tried to stay actively involved in their 
communities and generally kept their jobs to provide closer social contact. However 
suspicion against the party ‘big- shot’ who had a newer car and bigger house 
remained. Again, a reversal flow of information and interest was absent since top- 
down directives ruled over a discourse between base and elite.
The Church
With the establishment of the GDR in 1949, Christians had to confront severe 
pressure from the state. From the outset the SED attacked religion as a cultural trait 
and faith, as well as its institutions. Classic Marxism regarded the church as a 
representative of the ruling class with religion being the ‘opium for the people’. 
With oppressive measures and indoctrination in particular of the young the SED 
believed it was able to systematically push back the influence of the churches. They 
were the logical extension of the party’s ambition for total control of society and the 
elimination of independent organisations. Students were barred from attending 
universities. Petitions for badly needed repairs to church-owned buildings were 
postponed or rejected altogether. Religion was erased from school curricula. With 
the introduction of the Jugendweihe in 1954, the state further tried to undermine the 
churches position within society. This secular confirmation service for 14 year olds 
sought to supplant religious loyalties by an oath to Socialism, the GDR and the
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Soviet Union (Cordell 1990:49). Although not compulsory, refusal to participate in 
the Jugendweihe hampered educational and professional opportunities. The measure 
prompted harsh protests from clerical ranks. In return, the Evangelical church 
banned children who had received secular confirmation from the religious 
counterpart. In 1960 however, the church was forced to lift its ban because of a 
dramatic decrease in the number of communicants. Until the demise of the GDR up 
to 97 per cent of the children participated in the Jugendweihe (Cordell 1990:49).
In contrast issues of controversy between the Evangelical church and the authorities 
were represented most notably in the realm of peace and military affairs. In 1978, the 
SED added Wehrkunde (military science) as a compulsory subject for 15 and 16 year 
olds to school curricula. Apart from theoretical indoctrination children were taught 
practical skills relating to military preparation, including shooting exercises. The 
Evangelical church immediately issued protests since its own agenda increasingly 
included engagement in peace activities. In 1982, the ‘Dresden Peace Forum’ was 
given church sponsorship in order to avoid official cancellation. In the same year 
Pastor Rainer Eppelmann, who after the demise of the SED state became 
Disarmament Minister of the GDR, and the dissident Robert Havemann wrote the 
‘Berlin Appeal’. It called for a withdrawal of all occupying troops from both German 
states and issued a proposal for the establishment of a pacifist political order in the 
whole of Germany. Additionally the Evangelical church organised ‘peace weeks’ 
and ‘workshops’ which attracted thousands of young people (Cordell 1990:53).
Despite permanent pressures churches in East Germany therefore were able to 
establish themselves as the only legal autonomous organisation which was
2 The Catholic church never achieved a level of importance and influence comparable to that of its 
evangelical counterpart and largely refrained from politics altogether. Former officials of the Stasi 
department for church relations acknowledged that the apparatus regarded the Catholic church as a 
minority church which tried to maintain the highest possible distance from the state, while possessing 
a mostly apolitical attitude (Insider Komitee 1994:377). Hence, the goal of theStasi was to prevent 
the Catholic church from acquiring an equal status of political involvement and interest as the 
Evangelical one - a policy which undoubtedly succeeded.
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independent from state and party. Throughout the existence of the GDR they 
remained the sole institutions which were disentangled from the principles of 
democratic centralism, while their principles and programmes represented the only 
alternative to the SED-dominated political and cultural institutions. The churches 
acknowledged the leading role of the SED and did not engage in ideological 
competition with state and party. In 1957, Evangelical churches in the GDR issued a 
statement of loyalty to the regime. In return the state guaranteed religious toleration 
(Cordell 1990:50). Furthermore in 1969 the eastern Evangelical churches departed 
from the all-German umbrella organisation EKD (Evangelische Kirche 
Deutschlands; Evangelical Church of Germany) and founded their own 
organisational unit, the BEK (Bund der evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR; 
Association of Evangelical churches in the GDR). This move was welcomed by the 
SED since it recognised the political reality of two separate and independent 
Germanys. In 1971 the head of the BEK Bishop Schonherr further accepted the 
legitimacy of the SED state by declaring that ‘we do not want to be a church against, 
or alongside, but in Socialism’ (Krisch 1985:123). Finally in 1976 Honecker 
emphasised the common ground of church and state, such as third world issues, a 
humanitarian mission and the desire for peace.
Subsequently the SED granted significant concessions. The Evangelical church 
gained broader access to the media. It possessed its own mostly uncensored 
publishing house and news agency. Most importantly, Honecker reaffirmed the 
internal autonomy of the Evangelical church and stressed the continuation of the 
party’s policy of freedom to practise religion (Cordell 1990:54). The SED finally 
had to acknowledge that religious belief continued to persist in the GDR despite the 
secular and anti-clerical official rhetoric. Against this backdrop, the party gradually 
withdrew from a policy of aggressive atheism and concentrated on disentangling and 
eventually stopping all-German relations between eastern and western churches 
(GlaeBner 1989:215).
I l l
Prior to the revolution, the Evangelical church provided the protection necessary to 
establish the civic movement. Demokratie Jetzt (Democracy Now) was established 
during a meeting of the BEK synod in Eisenach in September 1989. Demokratischer 
Aufbruch (Democratic Awakening) was co-founded by Eppelmann. The Evangelical 
church provided the only realm where people could escape from state and party. It 
offered a ‘sanctuary’ (Cordell 1990:55) for political and individual expression in an 
otherwise streamlined and stifled society. Leading clerics publicly addressed 
political problems and shortcomings (Weber 1993:94), such as authoritative state- 
citizen relations, military training at school (Wehrkunde), propaganda or censorship. 
From this perspective, the Evangelical church provided the basis for a political 
potential that was capable of initiating a peaceful revolution.
Although the significant contributions by the Evangelical church in sparking the 
revolution should not be underestimated, the BEK remained an institution that was 
pulled into politics as a surrogate for absent interest representation for which it 
ultimately was not suited. Increasingly the Evangelical church had to confront 
enormous difficulties in incorporating the various political groups, such as peace 
movements, feminists, or human rights activists, as well as maintaining its mediating 
function between state and society. Not only were these particular interest groups 
dependant on the protection of the church against authoritative seizures, but the 
church also found it extremely difficult to maintain a modus vivendi with the regime 
that would guarantee its autonomy. Hence, the BEK was forced to walk along a 
tightrope between appeasement of state and party, as well as the incorporation of an 
opposition movement which was directed precisely against the same authorities.
As an autonomous body, East German churches encompassed a safety valve function 
to relieve frustration and anger caused by the lack of political freedom. Moreover as 
a protective umbrella they fostered the establishment of a widespread and organised 
opposition. However the churches were only able to survive by avoiding a direct 
challenge to the regime. The BEK neither issued a single official stance against the
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regime nor did it help formulate opposition (Lease 1992:269). Instead the churches 
were institutionalised within the political system. Their autonomy was safeguarded 
by state and party since both recognised their vital importance as a release for 
tension and frustration. Thus the churches did not constitute institutional outsiders of 
the system but were in fact an integral part of it.
Most importantly churches were crippled by a massive loss in membership. Judging 
from the rate of secularisation the SED had clearly won the battle between religion 
and Socialism. In 1946, around eighty per cent of the population in the eastern 
Lander were still Evangelical. By 1970, only 40 per cent of East Germans retained 
membership. In 1986, the number of Evangelical followers had dropped to 30 per 
cent of the populace. All religious denominations together, including around one 
million Catholics totalled only 38 per cent (Statistical Yearbook 1990:451).
The churches lacked popular appeal and eventually religious customs and beliefs 
were replaced by Socialist secularisation. The revolutionary upheavals of 1989 
undoubtedly originated within the environment of the Evangelical church. Clerics 
such as Eppelmann and Stolpe personally shaped the unification process. 
Organisationally opposition movements were founded under the protective shield of 
the BEK. However the role of the Evangelical church was limited to the - quite 
literally - provision of space, as a site for ‘pluralistic thought’ (Lease 1992:269). It 
functioned as a meeting place for political opponents to the regime who had nowhere 
else to convene but within the sphere of the only autonomous organisation of the 
GDR. Nonetheless the BEK did not call for the downfall of the regime. It merely 
provided a hollow protective shell whose contents were ultimately filled by 
programs and demands that did not have their cognitive origins within the church.
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4.2.2. State-Citizen Relations 
Distrust and Repression
The political process in the GDR was characterised by a strong distrust towards the 
political maturity of the masses. The failure and fatal experiences of other Eastern 
European countries in reforming their societies - the upheavals in Hungary and 
Poland in 1956, the end of the Prague spring in 1968, strikes and unravelling 
tendencies of the political system in Poland in the 1980's - as well as the paramount 
strategic position of the GDR and a vast presence of Soviet military forces further 
manifested the suspicion of the totalitarian elite towards a more participatory 
involvement of the population. Article six of the constitution of 1949 addressed the 
encouragement to boycott democratic institutions and organisations’ and declared it 
a felony. It provided the SED with a judicial base to persecute any form of 
opposition. With political freedom being severely curtailed, Article six further 
contributed to despotism and arbitrary rule of law (Weber 1993:28) to safeguard the 
status quo of the political system.
Throughout its forty-year long hegemony, the SED vigorously defended its position 
of monopoly. As the central means for surveying and controlling the population, the 
Ministry for State Security (Stasi) was established as early as 1950. As an 
independent body it was only responsible to the Politburo (Weber 1993:30). A far 
reaching web of informants and agents guaranteed an almost total observation of the 
entire society. The opening of the Stasi archives in the aftermath of 1989 revealed 
that the apparatus employed a full-time staff of 97,000 people with perhaps as many 
as 170,000 unofficial informants (Golz 1994a:344). From this source of sheer 
manpower, the Stasi was able to trace and eventually destroy any signs of 
opposition.
Further repression was exerted through direct intervention of the SED in the judicial 
process. Relying on the cadre principle the party recruited judges and lawyers 
according to their ideological conformity. By the 1970’s hardly any jurists came
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from outside the party ranks. Judicial independence was a myth. The Politburo and 
Central Committee were directly involved in the crafting of bills in an evident 
attempt to adjust the law and the constitution to political circumstances. Party 
officials, including Honecker or Mielke actively intervened in the jurisdiction by 
submitting their opinion on a particular case to the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
Additionally, criminal prosecution was mostly handled outside the realm of publicity 
to avoid repercussions on the growing international reputation of the GDR (Meyer- 
Seitz 1995:32-33).
Apart form these direct interventions, a variety of indirect measures restricted any 
notions of individuality. The strictly hierarchical organisation and bureaucratisation 
of society, the cycle of regulations, applications and permissions, as well as the cadre 
principle guaranteed that any activity within the GDR - whether official or not - was 
controlled and supervised by the regime. Educational agencies, mass organisations, 
work brigades and political parties safeguarded the principle of paternalism, as well 
as the conditioning and utilisation of conforming followers, subjects and obedient 
individuals. The party’s monopoly on information resulted in a selective view of life. 
Not only was the citizen brainwashed with one-dimensional, ideologically-filtered 
information but he or she was also excluded from certain information and ways to 
absorb them (see Chapter Five). Books and news were censored, travel granted only 
to ideologically sound citizens. Economic activity required the permission of state 
and party. Free choice of employment and profession were limited. In the GDR there 
was no public arena for discussion or discourse. Opportunities to express individual 
demands were absent. The individual could only comply or be silent. The party’s 
monopoly was total in qualitative and quantitative ways.
Protest and Discourse
Against the powerful and centralised state and party apparatus, the individual 
possessed limited options to protest against political decisions. Some bureaucratic
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procedures tolerated complaints as legal options for citizen action. The director of 
the office which was responsible for a particular measure, ruled if and when a 
complaint was justified. The involvement of a third and neutral party to oversee just 
or unjust causes was missing. A second option were simple petitions to be addressed 
to any institution of state or party. These merely represented comments on general 
problems for a community or an individual, caused by bureaucratic action, or 
prospects for the improvement of bureaucratic measures. Again, petitions were 
handled internally. No outside party was involved (Zimmermann 1988:276).
The SED state justified the oligarchic nature of the administrative process in an 
ideological manner. The Socialist state existed as a state for all people. It did not 
cater for special interests but realised the paramount interest of the whole Socialist 
society. Individual complaints could only be regarded as exceptions which justified 
an internal handling of the matter. Individualism and the individual right for justice 
were superseded by the general interest of the Socialist society. Therefore, the 
classic Marxist-Leninist system that was preserved in the GDR excluded the idea of 
neutral arbitration as inherently impossible.
For more than 35 years the upheavals of June 1953 represented the last occasion 
when East Germans took their frustration and disillusionment with the regime to the 
streets. By early 1953, conditions worsened for the population. Shortages in the 
provision of consumption goods became imminent accompanied by growing 
political oppression against farmers, independent businesses, intellectuals and 
members of the church, which at that stage had a following of eighty per cent of the 
population (Weber 1993:39). With the death of Stalin in March 1953, the KP of the 
Soviet Union embarked on a trail of modest reforms and directly criticised some of 
the policies of the SED. Subsequently, in June the East German regime announced 
the ‘New Course’ by promising better provision of consumption goods, while 
withdrawing price increases and critisising its own drastic repressive measures 
against the population. However the SED persisted with the recently introduced and
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demanding planning targets which caused widespread resentment amongst workers 
(Weber 1993:40). On June 17, strikes and demonstrations were held in more than 
300 towns and villages. In Halle-Merseburg and in Magdeburg, strike committees 
seized power and set prisoners free. Increasingly, economic demands were 
complemented by political calls for freedom and free general elections. For a short 
while, the SED elites lost control over their state until Soviet tanks crushed the 
uprising and restored order.
The events of 1953 fundamentally eroded the legitimacy of the worker-and-peasant 
state. It became obvious that the SED state had to rely on oppression and military 
strength, while Socialist idealism and the Communist utopia were disguised as 
myths. People realised that a transformation of the Stalinist system ultimately 
depended on Soviet policies and directives. The idea however, to actively participate 
in improving and designing one’s society was given a decisive blow.
In 1970 the visit of the Federal Republic’s chancellor Willy Brandt to Erfurt gave 
East Germans a welcomed opportunity for public expression. In front of the eyes of 
western cameras, the ovations for Brandt were interpreted as critical signs of 
condemnation of the SED state. The overwhelmingly positive reception for Brandt 
who was about to receive the Nobel prize for peace for his detente policy with the 
Communist bloc caught the SED elites by surprise. It indicated that the apparent 
stability which emerged in the 1960’s was not caused by supportive public attitudes 
towards the regime. Instead on rare occasions such as Brandt’s visit, the SED 
became to realise that they had mistaken tranquility in the GDR for system 
conformism. This merely reflected the nature of the Communist dictatorship. 
Conformism to the system was forced by oppression. The individual was infantilised 
in the political process and became indifferent. Brandt’s visit represented a rare 
break from the streamlined participation that was offered by the totalitarian regime.
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By the mid 1970’s, growing criticism within the Communist bloc against the Soviet 
way and the advocacy of Euro-Communist alternatives did not fail to produce an 
impact on the GDR. In June 1976, the SED organised a conference of 29 European 
Communist parties. Propagated notions of independence from the Soviet Union and 
of political and ideological pluralism (Weber 1993:90) found a strong echo in the 
GDR. However, the regime persisted on Stalinist politics and continued to crush any 
form of opposition, let alone criticism. Subsequently the intellectual scene in the 
GDR was subject to severe repression. Rudolf Bahro whose book Die Alternative 
was only published in the west was put on trial, imprisoned and later expelled to the 
FRG. Intellectuals, such as Wolf Biermann and Reiner Kunze were forced to follow 
him. Robert Havemann, who was ousted from the party in 1964 and lost his 
professorship at the Humboldt University in East Berlin continued to argue for 
democratisation and rule of law and was victim to persistent harassment by the Stasi. 
Even Christa Wolf, the world-known writer and former member of the Central 
Committee was criticised by the authorities. Eventually, the party re-established its 
‘monopoly on opinion’ (Weber 1993:90). Repression and expulsion demonstrated 
that the regime was not willing to share power and responsibilities practically, as 
well as ideologically. In the conflict between open discourse and power, the free 
mind was the ultimate loser.
Only on these few occasions - 1953, Brandt’s visit and ultimately 1989 - did public 
discontent caused a destabilising challenge to the regime. Indeed, the GDR did not 
have a prominent public figure of the stature of Vaclav Havel or Lech Walesa 
around whom a dissident movement could have developed. Oppression and 
surveillance in the GDR were driven to perfection. Dissidents and intellectuals were 
‘interviewed’ by the Stasi, indicted, imprisoned or more vigorously expelled to the 
FRG. A critical opposition therefore could never get off the ground. The coercive 
conformism deprived the SED of much needed feed-back and information. 
Imprisonment and expulsion to the west caused a ‘brain-drain’, while others chose or 
were forced to adopt internal exile. Moreover, the vast numbers of refugees who fled
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the GDR contributed to an ever decreasing potential for opposition. In the end, 
accommodation with and within the system, retreat into the private sphere and 
political indifference were the remaining solutions. The SED regime succeeded in 
silencing any form of dissent. The Orwellian web of surveillance and oppression had 
the country under firm control.
However by 1989 the discrepancy between the ideological notion of the Socialist 
society and the dictatorial reality became unbearable for the population. The 
dramatic series of events which lead to the downfall of the Democratic Republic 
were sparked by public discontent over local elections in May 1989. Although the 
authorities persistently forged election results over the past decades, East Germans 
were no longer willing to accept the distortion of their public will. Hundreds of 
citizens lay criminal charges against officials, accompanied by protests, most notably 
in Leipzig. For the regime, the downward spiral into defeat had begun. In June 
further protests emerged after the SED’s strong denouncement of the democracy 
movement in China and the party’s approval of the Tianmen Square massacre. The 
easing of border restrictions between Hungary and Austria lead to a mass emigration 
wave. Over the summer thousands of East Germans travelled south to escape 
through the first hole in the ‘Iron Curtain’ since the building of the Berlin Wall in 
1961. On its own territory the regime had to confront a growing number of protest 
groups, who decided against emigration but instead demanded reform. In August the 
social democratic party of the GDR (SDP) was founded. In September the civic 
movements Neues Forum and Demokratie Jetzt emerged on the scene. The Neues 
Forum demanded a democratic dialogue with the authorities. Demokratie Jetzt 
issued a proposal for the democratic reform of the GDR (Weber 1993:104).
The regime did not see the writing on the wall both at home and in other countries of 
the Communist bloc which followed Gorbachev in his pursuit of change. In an 
arrogant fashion they denounced any reform tendencies as counter-revolutionary. 
‘The party is always right’ still determined its dogmatic attitude. Consequently, the
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state responded with force. Mass arrests and imprisonment followed. These further 
heightened public discontent and aggravated even politically-neutral citizens. The 
indignation over the Stalinist dictatorship, its mis-interpretation of the sweeping 
changes within the Bloc and the all too obvious out-of touch state of their elites 
finally prompted East Germans to challenge the regime and - after 36 years - take 
their anger to the streets. But not only civic deficiencies were addressed. Growing 
confidence now resulted in the expression of resentment at the systemic 
shortcomings in the realm of consumer provision and economic production.
In Leipzig the weekly ‘Monday demonstrations’ became the barometer for the 
dawning of the revolution. On October 2 20,000 marched through the streets. Two 
weeks later, the numbers had increased to 120,000, followed by 300,000 on October 
23. The civic movements enjoyed growing support. By mid-October, Neues Forum 
already had 25,000 members (Weber 1993:105). On November 4, around one 
million people demonstrated in East Berlin for freedom of speech and press, for the 
easing of travel restrictions but foremost for free elections. With the fall of the Wall 
the peaceful revolution reached its climax. On December 8, Honecker’s successor 
Egon Krenz resigned and the SED dictatorship finally collapsed.
Civic Standards
The implications of forty years of totalitarianism for the civic standards of the 
population were extraordinary. The ambition of the SED to infiltrate all aspects of 
political life resulted in political apathy and passiveness. This was indicated by a 
sample survey in 1967, where 53 per cent of the respondents were not able to answer 
how their parliamentary representative fulfilled his or her responsibilities (Niemann 
1993:229). Moreover in 1987, a representative survey amongst workers of all age 
groups revealed that only 33 per cent had experienced that their opinion had 
influenced a decision within their working environment. The majority of 51 per cent
3 For a gripping account on the mass protests in Leipzig see Helmut Zwahr 1993.
120
totally denied this (Forster and Roski 1990:48). The propagated ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism, of the ‘new Socialist man’ and the ‘Communist utopia’ 
remained shallow dogmatism, their contents did not infiltrate the political conscience 
of the general population. The citizens fulfilled their participative duties, often as in 
the case of elections in a ritualised, dispassionate manner. The people gave the state 
what the state required, but nothing more and hardly anything voluntarily.
Life in the GDR was characterised by a peculiar arrangement between the political 
elites and the population. Over the course of forty years a consensus developed that 
guaranteed the former a certain degree of respect and obedience, and the latter social 
protection and general material benefits (Grunenberg 1988:98). The relationship 
between the totalitarian apparatus and the masses can be described as toleration for 
security. As long as the regime was able to pass on guarantees, the people were 
willing to sustain public order and to accept the political power structures (Rytlewski 
1989:19). Hence, by the late 1960’s economic consolidation and an increased 
provision of consumer goods accounted for a modest contentment with the regime.
However the emotional commitment remained shallow. Official duties and private 
identification with the political system stayed on separate grounds. The people 
accomodated themselves with the state. The fulfilment of duties lacked any idealistic 
notions. They were performed out of material concerns. Ideological conviction was 
missing. Conformity to the principles of society was honoured by the authorities 
with the provision of education, pensions and general social security in a Socialist 
welfare state. Generally speaking, identification with the political principles of a 
society generates a buffer of support which is able to overcome periods of crises. 
This buffer of ideological commitment was absent in the GDR. By the mid 1970’s 
the gap between official promises and reality grew wider. World-wide recession, oil 
shocks and the influence of Euro-Communism ended the short spell of system 
satisfaction. Criticism against the inadequate provision of consumer goods, 
stagnating living standards and the persistent repression of opposition and
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individuality (Weber 1993:87) demonstrated that attitudes towards the political 
system were strictly output-oriented. Clearly, ideological commitment was severely 
lacking in the GDR.
The upheavals of June 1953 vigorously demonstrated to every East German the 
consequences of political activism and opposition: Soviet tanks and political 
repression. The legacy of June 1953 further contributed to the dominating feeling of 
resignation and helplessness, due to the overwhelming power and omnipresence of 
the regime which controlled the entire political process. The SED and its satellite 
block parties and mass organisations, its socialisation and education agencies formed 
a network which had the GDR society under firm control. From kindergarten to 
school to university, from societal organisations to the military, from leisure and 
vacation to education and work, the impact of the regime was felt continuously 
throughout an individual’s life.
To achieve political, professional or societal status, the citizens were required to 
accommodate themselves within the totalitarian system. People had to function, had 
to follow orders. Individualism, creativity and plurality were suppressed which 
resulted in a generalised and streamlined society. Interest aggregation was subject to 
party domination, articulated through state or party institutions, while the 
consideration of particular interests rested upon the exclusive approval of the party. 
The state withdrew any individual political responsibilities from its citizens. It 
interfered in private affairs and lay down the tracks for every individual’s life. The 
people were in fact politically and socially incapacitated.
122
4.3. The Federal Republic
4.3.1. The Era Adenauer
After the collapse of the Third Reich a general disillusionment with politics was 
widespread in the newly established Bonn Republic. The catastrophic experiences of 
Weimar and the Nazi-dictatorship left a deep and traumatic mark on the population, 
where people never again wanted to get involved in politics (Sontheimer 1990:37). 
Over a period of less than thirty years three political systems - the Wilhelmian 
Empire, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich - had failed. Political supporters 
of the previous regimes were often subject to harsh punishment after a new political 
order had been established. The treatment of the political opposition after the rise of 
Hitler and the de-nazification programs in the aftermath of World War II convinced 
many people that politics was a dangerous, unrewarding business.
The tasks of organising the new state, of crafting the new constitution and of 
designing new policies were undertaken with hardly any public participation. 
Participation during the Adenauer era was characterised by a strong representative 
principle. The Grundgesetz showed little trust in the political individual. Based on 
the experiences of Weimar, plebiscitary elements were regarded as a potential danger 
to democracy. For the founding fathers of the Basic Law and for the allied 
authorities the enthusiastic mass support for Hitler represented the critical point of 
departure for the instalment of democracy in Germany. A consensus emerged which 
sought to safeguard the newly democratised citizens from the danger of populist and 
demagogic appeals. Consequently, the active participatory rights of the Weimar 
constitution, such as the direct election of the President or provisions for the 
initiative of referenda were carefully avoided in the Basic Law. Mass political 
participation was ‘simply not encouraged’ (Conradt 1989:238) but instead was 
designed to be guided by parties and interest groups as the main agents for 
articulating political interest.
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Table 4.5. Participation in West German Elections (percentages)













As indicated in Table 4.5. turn-outs at federal and Lander elections already reached 
high standards by 1953. Although generally speaking, participation in elections has 
the tendency to turn into a dutiful habit, the high numbers were particularly 
impressive in light of the absence of a compulsory obligation to cast one’s vote. 
Moreover in international comparison, turn-outs were already higher than in the 
United States or in Great Britain (Dalton 1993:179) and constituted a ‘permanently 
renewed legitimacy for the political system and the political parties’ (Hesse and 
Ellwein 1992:208).
Nevertheless beyond the civic duty of voting, participation remained reluctant and 
by no means active as demonstrated by the total membership figures of all political 
parties which during the 1950’s hardly exceeded one million (Rudzio 1993:465). 
The already existing political infrastructure would have given ample opportunity for 
active participation. However although the formal legislative, executive and 
judicative institutions of democracy, as well as political parties and interest groups 
were well-established, passivity prevailed. The individual kept a suspicious distance
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ffompolitics. It seemed that the intense and often forced political commitment and 
involvement of the Nazi era was followed by a reverse retreat from politics, resulting 
in a ‘detached, practical and almost cynical attitude towards politics’ (Almond and 
Verba 1963:429). For instance in 1955, only nine per cent would have liked to see 
their son holding a political post, while seventy per cent disapproved of the idea 
(Noelle-Neumann 1981:153). The Civic Culture study of Almond and Verba of 1959 
noted the lack ‘of the underlying set of political attitudes that would regulate the 
operation of these [political] institutions in a democratic direction (Almond and 
Verba 1963:496). Instead, attitudes towards the political system and the performance 
of the government were ‘pragmatic’ (Almond and Verba 1963:429) with a 
widespread complacent satisfaction with political output.
The early years of the Bonn Republic until 1960 were characterised by a succession 
of political and economic successes. The new system mastered an economic miracle, 
industrial harmony and the expansion of social services, while also achieving 
membership in NATO and the Common Market, the return of the Saar region by 
France and the restoration of full sovereignty. The young Republic provided the 
framework for a miraculous economic recovery, for growing material wealth, as well 
as for international security during the emerging Cold War. Indeed, the proverb ‘Es 
geht wieder aufwarts ’ (things are looking up again) accurately described the 
Adenauer era. The post-war success story was designed and implemented by 
political and economic elites. The public’s participation in politics until the 1960’s 
however, was characterised by passivity. Formal participatory acts such as voting 
required little commitment. Almond and Verba (1963) described the civic attitude of 
the populace as a ‘passive subject orientation’ which yet had to be balanced by a 
‘participant orientation’. For most West Germans, there was no apparent reason for 
dissent or dissatisfaction with the new system which would have forced him or her 
to seek more active participation and involvement.
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These notions of passivity and obedience strongly reflected the historical German 
etatistic tradition. Since the mid 19th century, German political thinking regarded the 
state as ‘the incarnation of common interest (Sontheimer 1990:36). The state 
represented the guarantor of safety and order. It was not however, perceived as an 
instrument for the political organisation of society. Values of obedience and order 
dominated those of individualism, freedom and opposition. The interest of the state 
as a common and organised entity were paramount to individual aspirations. 
Individual freedom could only be realised within the given structures of the state. 
Consequently, a certain discomfort in accommodating particular manifestations of 
interest developed, since these were regarded as counter-productive to the state as 
the embodiment of the public weal. Instead of embracing reasonable conflict and 
political discourse as means for a productive societal process, the German tradition 
regarded such notions as disturbing factors to harmony (Sontheimer 1990:39).
Despite their discontinuities, the three political systems prior to the Bonn Republic 
had managed to subordinate the public under the power of the state. Their 
governments had always ‘conditioned’ (Dalton 1993:115) or forced the public into 
accepting authority. Democratic standards such as majority rule, minority rights, 
individual liberties and pluralism were alien concepts to most West Germans (Dalton 
1993:125). Stability and order were superior to individual freedom. Political power 
originated from the state and not from the people. This cultural trait fostered the 
establishment of the new political order after the demise of Hitler. As the public was 
used to subordinating individualism, political decisions and directives from the new 
authorities were accepted in a obedient fashion. Paradoxically, the legacy of the 
Obrigkeitsstaat helped to get the new democracy off the ground.
4.3.2. Participation After 1960
By the mid-1960's, the prevalent patterns of passivity, obedience and subservience 
were subject to an impressive transformation. Beginning in 1967, the student
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movement vehemently criticised the modus vivendi of political representation and 
participation. An anti-authoritarian protest swept across the Federal Republic. 
Fostered by leftist intellectuals from the ‘Frankfurt School’, criticism was directed 
against the strictly representative and oligarchic nature of the political system. The 
limited chances of contributing to the political process were judged as an 
authoritarian relic of the past. The absence of a clear break from the Nazi era was 
critisised, arguing that the Bonn Republic had merely been built on economic and 
material wealth, while neglecting a moral resurgence and democratic commitment.
The elitist, strictly representative phase of the early Federal Republic came to a 
gradual end. The symbol of post-war stability, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, had 
already departed in 1963. The rise of Willy Brandt and the SPD to governmental 
power signalled the dawn of a new era. Politik wagen (dare to do politics) the slogan 
of the Social Democrats found a far-reaching echo. Controversial policy innovations 
of the Brandt government of 1969 (in particular Ostpolitik) fostered a widespread 
political discourse which was accompanied by a growing involvement of the 
population in election campaigns (Conradt 1989:248).
These trends combined, elevated West Germany towards a more politicised 
democracy. Although the student movement also brought elements of political 
radicalism, even culminating in terrorism, the cultural and generational clashes of 
the 1960’s and 70’s did not fail to exert a permanent participative impact. The legacy 
of the student movement was represented in the political mobilisation of a formerly 
passive and recipient society. Extra-parliamentary activism, peace initiatives or 
public interest groups were significant approximations to the normative citizenship 
virtues of active, concerned and informed political individuals.
The increase in and growing opportunities for political participation prompted a 
more positive evaluation of the degree of perceived freedom of expression and in 
particular to the more open character of that participation (Conradt 1989:243). West
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German society was now regarded as freer and more inviting for political discourse 
and expression. As shown in Table 4.6. the number of respondents who held the 
opinion that one can freely express oneself politically rose from 55 per cent in 1953 
to a peak in 1971 with 84 per cent. Clearly, by the 1970’s affirmative democratic 
experiences during the Bonn Republic outweighed obedient and subservient notions 
which were generated during the oppressive era of the ‘Third Reich’.
Table 4.6. Attitudes Towards Freedom of Political Expression in West Germany (percentages) 
Question: Do you have the feeling that today in West Germany one can freely state one’s opinion, or 
is it better to be cautious?
1953 1962 1971 1976 (June) 1976 (Dec.)
can speak freely today 55 71 84 78 73
there are limitations, better be careful 35 21 13 18 23
undecided, other 10 8 3 4 4
Source: Institut filr Demoskopie, quoted in Conradt 1989:242.
The reversal trend by 1976 was largely caused by a shift in the attitudes of younger, 
better-educated and politically active citizens. While the aggregate decline between 
June and December 1976 was six per cent, the drop amongst those under thirty was 
15 per cent. Such a decrease within one specific group suggested that political 
experiences since 1971 must have had an inhibitory effect on political expression 
which was specific to this group. Indeed, as demonstrated by Conradt (1989: 243- 
247) the implementation of compulsory security checks for all candidates for public 
employment (including teachers) had the greatest effect on younger, educated 
respondents. It indicated that post-war socialisation - the experience of growing up 
in an open society - created a natural, given standard. For the younger, educated and 
politically active citizens political freedom and expression developed into essential 
norms. Any attacks on these were therefore perceived as threats to individual 
liberties. In contrast older generations were more likely to compare the
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contemporary relative degree of freedom in the Federal Republic to the worse 
conditions as experienced under the Nazi regime. The decline of 1976 therefore also 
indicated a trend towards more critical, confident and politically aware citizenry - 
albeit predominantly amongst the social strata of the younger and educated middle 
class.
Interest in Politics and Active Participation
As shown in Table 4.7. the general interest in politics increased considerably from 
27 per cent in 1952 to 48 per cent in 1980. Although the significance of this data 
may have been limited by the social desirability of a positive answer which could 
have prompted respondents in giving the impression of a politically informed 
individual, the stark differences between 1952 and 1980 nonetheless allow for the 
conclusion of a trend towards a politically more interested citizenry. Undoubtedly, 
interest in politics grew from almost apathetic beginnings to respectable figures.
Table 4.7. Political Interest in West Germany (percentages) 
Question: Are You Interested in Politics?
1952 1960 1969 1973 1980
June Jan. Sep. Feb. Jan.
Yes 27 27 41 49 48
not very much 41 40 44 38 43
not at all 32 33 15 13 9
Source: Noelle-Neumann 1981:150
Although this rather general trend should not be overestimated, other indicators 
supported the pattern of improved participation. The proportion of citizens who 
frequently held political conversations grew from sixty per cent in 1952 to 79 per 
cent in 1979, whereas the most significant advances were made during the late
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1960’s. Accordingly, the number of people who rarely held political conversations 
dropped from forty to 21 per cent (Conradt 1989:248). Active political participation 
took a decisive step forward. Total party membership rose from 1.1 million (1960) to 
over two million (1980). In 1975 membership of unions and other interest groups 
amounted to 59 per cent of the total adult population, as compared to 44 per cent in 
1959 (Rudzio 1993:471).
Suspicion towards politics and the political profession gradually decreased. 
Although in 1976, 43 per cent of the population would still not have liked to see 
their son become a politician, the figures nevertheless improved significantly from 
their former count of 70 per cent in 1955 (Noelle-Neumann 1981:153). Furthermore 
in 1975, 59 per cent of a national survey stated that they were members of at least 
one organisation - a political party, interest group or citizen-initiative - which 
represented a considerable increase from the documented 44 per cent of the Civic 
Culture study. Moreover within this time-frame the number of active participants in 
these organisations rose from seven to 17 per cent (Institut fur Demoskopie 
1980:21).
This trend towards more active political involvement coincided with the growing 
importance of citizen-initiative groups. By the mid-1960’s such public interest 
groups addressed issues as peace, environmental protection, women’s emancipation, 
educational reforms or the prohibition of nuclear plants. The development of these 
new political orientations were analysed by Ronald Inglehart’s theory of value 
change (1977). Within his typology of materialism and postmaterialism, Inglehart 
maintained that in times of depression or civil unrest, economic stability and security 
receive superior attention. After satisfying such needs however, a society may shift 
towards other values, such as individual freedom, participation or equality.
This theoretical background bore great significance to the societal development of 
the Federal Republic. By the mid-1960’s a growing generation gap emerged between
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those who experienced their formative years under the oppressive regime of the 
Third Reich (followed by years of severe economic hardship and material privation) 
and between those who grew up under the influence of an ever increasing prosperity, 
international stability, social security and an open society that fostered political 
involvement and broader cultural experiences. Material values of economic security 
and stability, of law and order collided with postmaterialist notions of freedom of 
expression, participation, gender equality, or environmental protection. The post-war 
consensus of the Adenauer era ceased to exist and was replaced by a growing 
political polarisation.
By the mid 1970’s there were about 3000 such groups with a total membership of 
two million (Ellwein et.al. 1975:136-179). By the 1980’s membership in public 
interest groups had exceeded that of political parties, totalling 13 per cent of the 
adult population in 1985. Most of these initiatives operated at a local level and 
predominantly gathered around one central issue, most notably housing, urban 
development, schools or traffic. On the national level, the Bundesverband 
Burgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (Federal Association of Citizen Initiatives for the 
Environment - BBU) gained central importance. At the high point of its influence, 
the BBU co-ordinated the activities of some 1000 citizen-initiatives with nearly one 
million members (Dalton 1993: 193-94, 260).
This development towards direct citizen participation was complemented by the rise 
of the Greens. The party conquered the political landscape of the Federal Republic 
with an ever increasing, impressive level of support. Founded in March 1979, the 
Greens already had 10,000 registered voters by December - a figure which 
eventually reached its peak at the end of 1987 with 42,000 (Muller-Rommel and 
Poguntke 1992:349).
Also the peace movement did not fail to produce a striking impact on the political 
agenda. The early 1980’s witnessed a mushroom-like growth of peace groups in the
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wake of the planned deployment of NATO Cruise Missiles on West German 
territory. Some demonstrations were amongst the largest in the history of the Federal 
Republic, such as in Bonn on June 10, 1982, which amassed some 300,000 
protesters. With the Bundestag’s decision in favour of deployment in October 1983, 
the movement temporarily lost momentum only to resurface in 1990. In between, 
with the demise of the East-West antagonism and programmatic problems of the 
Greens a sense of disorientation seemed to have prevailed amongst civic movements. 
Saddam’s seizure of Kuwait in 1990 however, revitalised the struggling peace 
movement and resulted in the strongest anti-war demonstrations amongst all western 
nations against ‘Operation Desert Storm’.
Initiatives worked mainly outside of the electoral setting and mostly lacked a party- 
political focus with the exception of some environmental and peace issues. The 
majority of participants were drawn from younger, well-educated, middle-class 
segments of society. Still, during that period surveys indicated that over a third of 
the adult population - though not actively involved - at least considered membership 
in some public-interest group (Ellwein et.al. 1975:139). Citizen-initiative groups 
represented an important advancement for a participative society. The scope of 
political issues broadened significantly. The numbers of politically interested people 
increased considerably. Most importantly, participation in public-interest groups 
demanded a higher level of commitment - intellectually as well as time wise - than 
the simple ritualistic notion of voting.
4.3.3. State-Citizen Relations After 1960
Not surprisingly increased political involvement paved the way for more critical 
attitudes towards political authorities. The notion of subservience gradually 
decreased and resulted in a growing civic confidence - in the belief that citizens can 
influence the course of political decisions. As shown in Table 4.8. more people were 
willing to express their dissatisfaction with an administrative measure. Moreover in
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1978, 76 per cent of people below the age of thirty would have protested, as 
compared to 61 per cent aged sixty and over. It seemed that the formative experience 
of growing up in a free society had an impact on the individual’s willingness to 
address grievances and defects.
Table 4.8. Potential Protest Against Unjust Action In West Germany (percentages)
Question: What would you do if  an administrative agency acted unjustly in a matter that concerns 
you?
1950 (Jan.) 1958 (Nov.) 1964 (Dec.) 1978 (Nov.)
Would Protest 52 53 51 70
No point in protesting 37 33 32 22
Undecided 11 14 17 8
Source: Noelle-Neumann 1981:190
Furthermore the number of people who felt that they could do something against an 
unjust law climbed from 38 per cent (1958) to 59 per cent in 1974. In international 
comparison this subjective perception of one’s participative opportunities was well 
above the respective numbers in Britain (26) and the US(23) (Rudzio 1993:471). 
Hence, the majority of West Germans thought that their participation could influence 
the political process. Such a perception represented a fundamental prerogative of 
democracy: the individuals’ belief that his or her action has the potential to alter the 
course of politics.
Constitutional Consensus
The social upheavals caused by the student revolution and the more critical civic 
confidence however, did not undermine the constitutional consensus. 
Parliamentarism gradually but firmly established itself as the favoured principle of 
political organisation. A guarantor for the success of democracy in the Federal
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Republic was represented in the stability of the party system. While the first federal 
Bundestag consisted of ten parties, the number continuously decreased to six in 1953 
and to four in 1957. The concentration along the political centre was the 
consequence of a variety of post-war developments. With the introduction of the five 
per cent threshold in 1953, smaller parties came increasingly under existential 
pressure. While some groupings joined the Christian Democratic Union others 
failed to establish themselves as significant political forces and hardly achieved 
political mandates on both federal and land levels (Rudzio 1991:119-120). In the 
end, smaller parties all but disappeared from the political scene, resulting in a 
parliamentary concentration on CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP.
In addition, decreasing societal cleavages fostered the further mainstream orientation 
of the voter. The continuing secularisation revoked religions parties such as the 
conservative Zentrum of their electoral bases. Growing economic prosperity and 
social integration undermined the raison d’etre of groupings which catered for the 
rights of refugees and emigrants from pre-war German territories. Prospects for 
regional Sonderwege and separatist tendencies, particularly in Bavaria or the 
Saarland lost in importance as exemplified in the decline of the Saarlandische and 
Christliche Volkspartei, the Bayernpartei or the Deutsche Partei.
The political, social and economic success of the Federal Republic encountered a 
potential resurgence of extremist parties. The strikingly positive performance of 
democracy and the Soziale Marktwirtschaft managed to draw growing support from 
former anti-democratic sympathisers. Although the decline of extremist parties was 
aided by banning the right-wing Soziale Reichs Partei (Social Reichs Party; SRP) in 
1953 and the Communist party (KPD) in 1956, extremist parties nevertheless had 
hardly any impact. Only between 1965 and 1969, did the right-wing ‘National Party’ 
(NPD) gain access to some Lander parliaments, but fell short of entering the 
Bundestag in 1969 with 4.3 per cent of the votes. This moderate success was 
repeated by a further right-wing grouping, the Republikaner (Republicans) which
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emerged on the political scene in the mid-1980’s. The party had several surprising 
successes on local levels and gained access to some Lander parliaments. Its most 
spectacular showing was 10.9 per cent in the Lander elections of Baden- 
Wiirttemberg in 1992. The Republikaner too however, failed to enter the Bundestag. 
In 1990 the party achieved only 2.1 per cent.
Left-extremist parties were also never able to attract a decisive share of the votes. 
After the re-instalment of the Communist party in 1968 under the new name DKP, 
the strongest performance was 1.3 per cent in the European elections of 1984. 
Democratic parties, most importantly, Christian and Social Democrats were able to 
absorb political extremes to the left and right within their party agenda. The Bonn 
Republic therefore succeeded in avoiding the diversion and splintering of political 
groupings which characterised the Weimar Republic and eventually contributed to 
the collapse of the political centre and the rise of the NS regime. Hence, already by 
1961, a three-party system emerged on the federal level, consisting of Christian, 
Social and Free Democrats. In 1983 the ‘Greens’ expanded this prevailing pattern 
with their election to the Bundestag.
The voters’ orientation along a mainstream line can largely be attributed to the 
appeal of the two big parties. Both CDU and SPD established themselves as 
Volksparteien (catch-all parties). The electoral support for the SPD increased 
dramatically, from 29 per cent in 1949 to 46 per cent in 1976 which established the 
party as a viable electoral alternative to the CDU. This success was partially aided 
by societal changes. The share of self-employed people dropped from around thirty 
per cent in 1950 to some 15 per cent twenty years later. Secularisation and a 
reduction in regular church-goers were widespread phenomena, while psychological 
barriers between blue and white collar workers decreased (Rudzio 1991:124).
The Godesberger Programm of 1959 documented the new post-war orientation of 
the SPD. With this programme, the party intended to open avenues towards broader
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segments of society. While formerly the SPD regarded itself as representative of the 
working class, now middle and even upper-middle classes were addressed. In 
addition, the former anti-clerical attitude lost in importance. The program was 
ideologically neutral and shed the former Marxist rhetoric. Although the party had 
fought vehemently against Adenauer’s course of west-integration and re-armament, 
Godesberg acknowledged the post-war development of the Federal Republic as an 
irreversible fact. The programme furthermore acknowledged the superiority of 
market-economic mechanisms over planning procedures and approached the 
Catholic church on the basis of mutual tolerance (Schmitt 1992b: 149). Godesberg 
documented the fundamental point of departure for the SPD towards a mass-oriented 
party that adapted to the changing social, economic and political situation of the 
young republic. After 1959, the party represented itself not as the ideological 
alternative to the CDU but instead as ‘the better party’ (Rudzio 1991:124) - an 
advance rather than a break from conservative politics in an open competition with 
the CDU along the established policy tracks of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft and the 
integration within NATO and the Common Market.
The Christian Democratic Union had been described as the ‘prototype of a 
Volks parted (Haungs 1992:172). After World War II, the party emerged as a cross- 
denominational alliance between Catholics and Protestant liberals and conservatives. 
While during the Weimar Republic the political spectrum around confessional, 
conservative, national and national-liberal forces was heavily fragmented, the post­
war era saw the CDU as the monopoly-like political reservoir at the right of centre. 
The party appealed to civil servants, self employed people and white collar workers, 
albeit from the outset the share of workers reached a respectable one tenth. Although 
the legacy of Weimar with its traditional Catholic dominance continued to prevail in 
the CDU, the Christian Democrats neither represented a Catholic-ideological party 
nor a general Christian movement. Instead, conservative and liberal forces 
influenced the party’s agenda with a tendency towards pragmatic as opposed to 
dogmatic political solutions (Haungs 1992:174).
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Thus in absence of a stark left-right dichotomy, CDU and SPD tried to win voters 
across traditional milieus, by avoiding affiliations along the lines of class, 
profession, religion or material status. The social developments of post- war West 
Germany further fostered the establishment of the all-encompassing Volksparteien. 
The number of social groups which oriented themselves exclusively around one 
political force, such as farmers, workers, Christians, or self-employed people 
decreased. Subcultural cleavages lost in importance. Blue-collar workers enjoyed a 
wider social integration. The landed nobility, as well as the military were not able to 
re-install their pre-war political influence, while the ‘successful integration of over 
10 million refugees from the former eastern territories reduced the importance of 
regional cleavages’ (Conradt 1989:260).
In return, the number of people with only loose party affiliations grew, for whom 
Social and Christian Democrats represented equally viable political solutions. Over 
forty years, SPD and CDU alternately shared the governing responsibility. The third 
force, the Free Democrats (FDP) functioned as a regulating power. With the 
exception of the absolute majority of the CDU between 1957 and 1961 and the 
‘Grand Coalition’ between Social and Christian Democrats (1965 to 1969), neither 
SPD nor CDU were able to form a federal government without including the FDP as 
a coalition partner.
The established party system gave West Germany a remarkable continuity and 
stability. The political rhetoric was spared the ideological division between Left and 
Right. The splintered party politics of the Weimar Republic, traditional conservatism 
with its anti-democratic, nationalistic and confessional cleavages on the one hand 
and anti-clerical, anti-bourgeois Socialism on the other were replaced by centrist 
mass parties. Competition for political responsibilities was a ‘constant battle for the 
centre’ (Mertes 1994:14). After decades of political turmoil and sweeping system 
changes, the West German voter perceived stability as the utmost desire. ‘No
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experiments’, the slogan which brought Adenauer the absolute majority in 1957 
represented the vital denominator in electoral preferences. The parties moved along a 
rather narrow choice of policies within the lines of economic stability, international 
security and social welfare. Politics was characterised by a striving towards harmony 
and peace, both on the domestic as well as on the international level (Mertes 
1994:17). Drastic policy chances occurred only rarely in practice (21s with Willy 
Brandt's Ostpolitik rapprochement with the GDR in 1969), or even in rhetoric (as 
with Helmut Kohl's propagated Wende in 1983).
Major crises, such as the first economic recession in 1966/67, the oil-price shock in 
1973, the subsequent recession of 1974-76, or political terrorism in the 1970's and 
80's did not arouse a reorientation but instead strengthened the already established 
policy principles. Even the emergence of the ‘Greens’ as a leftist addition that 
incorporated alternative forces of the citizen-interest groups and the SPD did not 
constitute a threat to the prevailing system but instead followed along the established 
tracks of party politics through a number of coalition governments with the SPD on 
both local and Lander level.
Over the years, parlamentarism gained a strong support amongst the population. 
While in 1950, 25 per cent favoured a one-party rule and 53 per cent opted for a 
multi-party system, the figures subsequently improved. By 1978, 86 per cent 
approved the multi-party system and only five per cent still perceived the existence 
of one party as the best solution (Institut fur Demoskopie 1979:78). Positive 
attitudes towards the Federal parliament consolidated. In eighteen surveys taken over 
time, respondents had been asked to place their opinions about the Bundestag into 
four categories, ranging from ‘exceptionally good’, to ‘good’, ‘mediocre’ and ‘bad’ 
(Emnid 4-1983:11, 5/6-1983:30). Between 1951 and 1983, the average percentage 
for the top two categories combined was 50.7 per cent, for the remaining two 
categories 40.1 per cent. In 1951, positive answers accounted for 35 per cent. Since
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1965 however, ‘exceptionally good’ and ‘good’ were consistently above average, 
ranging from 52 per cent in January 1965 to 77 per cent in May 1983.
Table 4.9. Attitudes Towards Political Institutions in West Germany (January 1979, percentages) 
Question: Do you tend to think well o f these institutions or are you inclined to think poorly o f  them?
very good good good and bad rather poor very poor no opinion
Federal President 43 39 12 2 1 3
Bundestag 12 38 37 7 1 5
Bundesrat 8 33 39 6 1 13
Federal Government 17 35 35 8 2 3
Government of Lander 8 29 49 5 1 8
Source: Noelle-Neumann 1981:185
The public’s approval of the Bundestag was further documented in Table 4.9. In 
1979, only eight per cent thought of the federal parliament in a negative fashion. 
Additionally, the trust in the competencies of other political institutions and in their 
abilities to solve problems was astonishing. Perceptions towards the federal 
President, the Bundesrat (the second chamber consisting of representatives from the 
Lander), as well as towards the federal and Lander governments were 
overwhelmingly positive. Pride in the political system and institutions rose from 
meagre seven per cent in 1959 to 31 per cent in 1978. For those aged below thirty 
who therefore had their formative experiences in a democratic environment, the 
figures reached 38 per cent (Conradt 1989:230).
Approval for political institutions was complemented by a rise in the general support 
for democracy. In 1967, at the outset of the student protests, one fourth of 
respondents questioned were dissatisfied or undecided as to whether democracy was 
the best form of government. By 1976 the ratio of support had improved to a solid 
ninety per cent (Conradt 1989:234). Moreover, responses showed little differences 
according to party affiliations, and socio-economic or age groups. This trend was
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particularly impressive against the backdrop of the political and economic crises of 
the 1970’s. The oil shock related recession of 1974-76, political terrorism, criticism 
against Ostpolitik and the resignation of Chancellor Brandt did not undermine the 
democratic commitment of the population. The decline in support for the 
‘government of the day’ had little effect on the overall support for liberal democracy 
(Conradt 1989:263). Instead, by the mid 1970’s the political system of the Federal 
Republic could rely on a broad and strong consensus regarding its basic character 
and structure.
In sum, between 1960 and 1990, attitudes towards the state changed significantly. 
Increasingly, traditional expectations of order and security, of economic prosperity 
and social welfare were complemented by a variety of demands which emerged out 
of the growing levels of affluence and stability. The policy agenda of Adenauer, 
including west-integration and soziale Marktwirtschaft, served as a formative focus 
for the young republic. With the emergence of the Cold War, these rock-solid 
stabilisers functioned as cognitive antipodes to the Communist GDR with whom the 
Federal Republic fought a constant battle for the status as legitimate successor to the 
German Reich. Because of this external polarity, it came as no surprise that the 
policy tracks for the FRG were characterised by such a pronounced consensus 
(Smith 1982:216). Adenauer’s rationale for the 1957 election campaign exemplified 
the mind frame of the era. The east-west antagonism gave no room for 
‘experiments’.
After 1960, the increase in political interest, growth in membership in political 
parties and interest groups and the development of grass-roots politics transformed 
West Germany into a new stage. With growing civic confidence, society was 
perceived as more open to political discourse and individual expression. Politics 
were evaluated on a more informed and critical basis. West Germans developed into 
a more active, informed, outgoing and involved citizenry which prompted 
commentators to describe this transformation as a ‘participatory revolution’ (Dalton
140
1993:179). Since West Germans had become accustomed to and increasingly 
approved of the formal institutions of democracy, the time was ripe for a broadening 
of values and standards. The passive and obedient ‘no experiments’ was replaced by 
the active ‘dare to do politics’. Materialism was complemented by Post-materialism. 
Predominately younger, middle-class, educated segments of society initiated the 
transformation. The impact of some of their demands however, such as grass-roots 
participation, peace, environment, nuclear safety or gender equality, fundamentally 
changed the political agenda. State-citizen relations moved from mere recipient and 
obedient attitudes towards a participatory, confident and demanding engagement in 
shaping society.
Rechtsstaat
One traditional trait of German political culture however, continued to maintain a 
staggering influence. As a vital principle of the Basic Law Rechtsstaat does not only 
translate as the rule of law, but furthermore as the just state. The Rechtsstaat of the 
Bonn Republic was based on the establishment of a constitutional court which 
resembled the US American Supreme Court, as well as on the emphasis of the 
constitutional rights of the Grundgesetz. These included liberal protective rights 
against the state (dignity of man, right of privacy, freedom of religion, equality 
before the law, property or citizenship) and democratic participatory rights, 
including freedom of opinion and speech, right to vote, right to petition, and freedom 
of the press. Hence, the Grundgesetz belonged to the liberal-democratic tradition, as 
expressed in the American and French revolutions.
The Constitutional Court was frequently called upon to arbitrate disputes caused by 
governmental policies and the contrasting views of the parliamentary opposition. 
For instance in 1950, the SPD challenged Adenauer’s defence and de-armament 
policies. In 1973, the CSU appealed against the SPD’s Basic Treaty with the GDR. 
Judicial verdicts were subsequently treated as political victories (or losses). The lines
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between law and politics became blurred. The judiciary had the tendency to become 
politicised - a trend which was further enhanced by the appointment of judges by 
either Bundesrat or Bundestag. Nonetheless, although party patronage could not be 
denied, verdicts stayed largely clear of party affiliations.
In return there was enough evidence for a judicialisation of politics. With 
jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court was able to impose conditions on the 
legislature. Hence, while crafting laws parties were careful about their prospective 
implications to avoid a subsequent overruling. In the end, the Court’s position lay 
between the two extremes of party influence and judicial independence. Since its 
establishment in 1951 the Court acquired awareness and sensitivity for the political 
realities, without faltering under political pressure imposed by parties or federal and 
Lander governments (Smith 1982:196).
Generally speaking, constitutional rights and legal regulations provide for one of the 
most essential organising principles of a society. While lawful and organised 
procedures are necessary and common in any society that is based on the rule of law, 
West Germans pushed these notions to the extreme. The traditional German 
obsession with rules and regulations helped to support a society which was 
organised strictly in accordance with legal codes. Law - the respect for, as well as 
the certainty of it - functioned as the superior guideline for both private and public 
life. There was an apparent tendency to discuss political problems in a formal and 
legal manner. In this ‘atmosphere of legalism’ (Smith 1982:188) political conflict 
revolved around the correct interpretation of law while neglecting the search for 
compromise. Even in the private realm, minor disputes were often tackled with 
reference to legal textbooks, disregarding common sense that would have solved the 
conflict.
Legalism and formalism were further stressed by the powerful influence of the legal 
professions on West German public life. Jurists dominated political parties, interest
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groups, as well as administrative bodies, resulting in a code of practice that strictly 
followed along the lines of the established legal patterns. This fixation and obsession 
with formal law had the tendency to distort the view of true problems (Sontheimer 
1990:40). As a consequence, the just state mostly related to the rule of law. ‘Just’ 
was equated with ‘Law’ and justice was sought after more in the legal process and in 
the courts than in the political arena (Muller 1994:40).
Table 4.10. Confidence in the Legal System in West Germany (percentages)
Question: Can we or can we not have complete confidence in German justice, that is the judges and 
the courts?
1964 (Nov.) 1974 (Jan.) 1978 (Nov.)
can have complete confidence 26 32
cannot have complete confidence 28 32
To some extent 30 29
Undecided 16 7
Source: Noelle-Neumann 1981:156
The central position of legalism in the political process, as well as in the private 
sphere was complemented by a solid trust in the judicial system. As shown in Table 
4.10., in 1978 two-thirds of respondents expressed at least some confidence in the 
German justice system. Moreover throughout the years, the Constitutional Court 
acquired a high degree of respect and authority amongst the population. In fact it 
was heralded as the most trusted public institution. In 1990, the levels of confidence 
for the Constitutional Court (84 per cent) were well above those for the federal 
parliament (65 per cent), local authorities (62 cent) or the federal government with 
61 per cent (von Beyme 1991:67).
Although the German party system acquired a high level of stability and although 
parliamentary democracy gave West Germans their most peaceful and successful 
experiences ever, the population still perceived the Constitutional Court as the
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superior achievement. Legalism, the recourse to the clarity, security and certainty of 
the law and consequently to the ultimate and irrevocable decisions of the 
Constitutional Court were still preferred over the confrontational, consensus- 
searching style of parliamentary politics.
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4.4. The New Lander
4.4.1. Participation
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution interest in politics in eastern Germany 
was high. Prior to the first free elections to the Volkskammer in March 1990, 50 per 
cent of respondents had attended several public campaign addresses (Noelle 
Neumann 1991:104). Sensitivity for political matters continued throughout the 
summer. According to Table 4.11., in August 1990 fifty per cent had a strong or very 
strong interest in politics. By the end of the year, these figures had dropped to 45 per 
cent. By 1994, ‘very strong’ and ‘strong’ were further reduced to 36 per cent. A 
certain downward trend in political interest became evident.
This however, came as no surprise against the backdrop of the overwhelming 
importance of unification for the individual’s life, as well as against the extensive 
media coverage of the first months after the upheavals of autumn 1989. Unification 
turned from revolutionary excitement into a daily, routine affair. After five years, the 
effects of novelty, of systemic-democratic changes, or of Stasi allegations began to 
show signs of wear. Lessened interest in politics however, should not be confused 
with a trend towards apathy. Instead, it represented a step towards normalisation - a 
fact which was further supported by the comparison with the western level of 
political interest. According to Politbarometer, east and west showed quite similar 
figures by 1993. The top two categories combined accounted for 44 per cent in the 
west (east 40 per cent), while the two negative answers amounted to 13.5 per cent 
(east 17 per cent). In contrast to the Federal Republic of the immediate post-war era, 
political interest was well-developed in the eastern Lander. Although three years 
after unification, the eastern levels were slightly lower than those of the west, they 
nonetheless were satisfactory.
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Table 4.11. Political Interest in the New Lander (percentages) 
Question: How strongly are you interested in politics?
08-1990 12-1990 1990 (*) 1993 (*) 1994 (*)
very strong 16.3 10.3 13.0 11.1 9.4
strong 34.3 35.4 34.9 29.0 27.1
a little 34.0 43.4 39.2 42.4 45.1
hardly 9.6 7.9 8.7 12.3 14.1
none at all 5.7 3.0 4.2 5.2 4.3
n 967 
(*): cumulated data
1182 2149 5197 6415
Source: Politbarometer
Furthermore, participation in elections initially reached astonishing figures in the 
east. In March 1990, 93.2 per cent cast their votes for the Volkskammer (Forster and 
Roski 1990:133). Hence, the first free elections had a turn-out which was almost as 
high as the forged results of the SED era. Clearly, the run for the ballot was 
prompted by a thirst for participation and for expression of free will after four 
decades of party tutelage. The popular upheavals of autumn 1989 generated a 
momentum in which the political future of the GDR and the prospect of unification 
with the FRG dominated people’s thoughts. Political involvement and consequently 
participation in elections were the logical outcome.
As with political interest, the course of unification demonstrated that these high 
levels of participative euphoria were only short-lived. Elections for the Landtage - 
the parliaments of the Lander - in October 1990 already showed lower turn-outs 
which however still interested a satisfactory number of voters. The same can be said 
for the subsequent election for the federal Bundestag in December 1990, where 
participation in the east was only marginally lower than in the west. Hence over the 
course of one year, voter participation in the new Lander turned from euphoria to 
normalisation.
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Four years onward, electoral participation in the east had yet to equal that of the 
west, although differences remained few. Comparing the elections for the Bundestag 
in 1990 and 1994, the margin between east and west rose from five to eight per cent 
in favour of the west. In addition, voter participation for the eastern Landtage in 
1994 dropped by seven per cent in comparison to 1990. Since Lander elections in 
the west regularly had lower turn-outs than those for the Bundestag, the average 
participation of 62.1 in the east still reached satisfactory numbers, in particular 
against the backdrop of western turn-outs, such as 64 per cent in Northrhine- 
Westfalia in 1995 or 67.8 per cent in Bavaria in 1994. Hence political interest and 
election turn-outs in the east stabilised at acceptable levels. Judging from these basic 
and passive virtues of citizenship, Easterners adapted well to the introduction of 
democracy.
Table 4.12. Participation of East Germans in Elections (percentages)
Bundestag Landtag
1990 1994 1990 1994
Brandenburg 73.8 71.5 67.1 56.3
Mecklenburg-Westpomerania 70.9 72.8 64.7 72.9
Saxony 76.2 72.0 72.8 58.4
Saxony-Anhalt 72.2 70.4 65.1 54.8
Thuringia 76.4 74.9 71.7 74.8
total new Lander * 1 73.3 72.2 69.1 62.1
total old Lander *2 78.5 80.5 — —
* 1: excluding Berlin
*2: including Berlin
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1994:98,100; 1995:91,94.
147
Political Parties
The respectable figures for passive participation however, were not met by active 
participation in political parties. The downward trend was so striking that one could 
suggest a widespread rejection of the party system. Upon unification, the West 
German party system was to a large extent transformed to the east. The major 
political parties quickly sought for partners in the new Lander. Within one year 
following the mass demonstrations of 1989, the party system had consolidated along 
western lines. The DSU (Deutsche Soziale Union, German Social Union) found a 
willing ally in the Bavarian CSU. In February 1990, the party joined forces with the 
former eastern Block party CDU and the civic group DA (Demokratischer Aufbruch, 
Democratic Awakening) to form the electoral Allianz fur Deutschland (Alliance for 
Germany). With the Volkskammer elections in March looming on the horizon the 
western CDU and in particular Chancellor Kohl pushed for a co-operation of centre 
of right forces. Unification with the western CDU followed in October 1990.
In February 1990, an equally streamlining process in the run-up of the Volkskammer 
elections occurred in the liberal democratic camp. The former Block parties LDPD 
and NDPD joined forces with the civic group Deutsche Forum Partei (German 
Forum Party) which in itself was a splinter group from the Neues Forum (New 
Forum), as well as with the eastern Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP, Free 
Democratic Party). Unification with the western FDP followed in August 1990. The 
eastern Social Democrats (SDP) established themselves as an independent party 
from its western counterpart in October 1989. Unification with the western branch 
occurred in September 1990. The SED successor organisation of Honecker’s 
Stalinist party changed its name to SED/PDS in December 1989 only to drop the 
first three letters two months later. The eastern Greens were founded in November
1989. Here, the various Lander organisations joined the corresponding western party 
throughout 1991. The three civic movements Neues Forum, Demokratie Jetzt 
(Democracy Now) and the Initiative fur Frieden und Menschenrechte (Initiative or 
Peace and Human Rights) merged immediately before the Volkskammer elections in
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March 1990 under the name Biindnis 90 (Alliance 90). As the last merger, Bimdnis 
90/Die Grunen had to wait until March 1993.
Table 4.13. The Transformation of the Eastern Party Landscape
Party (East) Founded Merged with(westem party) Date
Block parties
-CDU 06-45 CDU 10-90
- DBD 06-48 CDU 10-90
- LDPD 07-45 FDP 08-90
-NDPD 05-48 FDP 08-90
New Parties
- SDP 10-89 SPD 09-90
- Die Grttnen 11-89 B’90/Die Grtinen 11-93
- DSU none; only regional importance none
Civic Movement
- Demokratischer Aufbruch (DA) 10-89 CDU 10-90
- Neues Forum 09-89 B’90/Die Grilnen 11-93
- Demokratie Jetzt 09-89 B’90/Die GrUnen 11-93
- Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte 10-85 B’90/Die Grttnen 11-93
PDS 02-90 none; successor party to SED none
Source: Press Offices of respective parties
While the PDS was able to fall back on an extensive infrastructure of local and 
regional offices, the eastern branches of SPD, CDU and FDP were guided by their 
western allies in setting up a network of local and regional organisations which 
safeguarded participation in elections and the staffing of political posts. At first 
glance, the system seemed established. Soon however, cracks appeared on the 
surface.
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Table 4.14. Membership in Political Parties in East and West
12-1991 (1000) 12-1992(1000) 12-1994 (1000)
East West East West East West
CDU 111.0(1) 650.0 94.3 619.6 92.5 (2) 578.9 (2)
SPD (3) 27.2 892.6 25.7 860.2 27.7 821.6
FDP (2) 73.9 63.6 41.2 62.0 29.1 58.5
PDS (4) 171.7 0.8 145.8 0.9 119.4 2.3
Btindnis 90/ Grttne (3) 1.3 37.5 0.8 35.4 2.8 41.1
(1): estimates
(2): East: including Berlin. West: excluding Berlin
(3): East: excluding eastern Berlin. West: only old Lander
(4): East: excluding western Berlin. West: including western Berlin 
Source: Press Offices of respective parties
Membership in political parties remained persistently low. In 1990, the Christian 
Democratic membership stood at over 130,000 since the party took over 100,000 
members from the GDR Block-CDU. Four years onwards, the CDU had lost some 
40,000 members in the east. The Social Democrats could not rely on a Blockparty 
organisation and five years after unification, membership had consolidated at low 
levels. The FDP reached its high of 114,000 members in the east in 1990 by 
incorporating the Block parties LDPD and NDPD. Two-thirds of the all-German 
membership came from the new Lander. Subsequently, the downward trend within 
the FDP represented the most radical of all parties. Within four years, the Free 
Democrats lost almost three-fourths of its eastern members. Within Bundnis 90/die 
Grunen the extremely low levels of membership could partially be explained by 
organisational turmoil within the civic movement and the existence of separate 
eastern and western Greens. With the party mergers of 1992 however, membership 
was not given a significant boost. In fact, by 1994 only 2800 members joined their 
ranks. Even the impressive electoral successes of the PDS did not result in more 
party activists. Instead, numbers fell dramatically from 172,000 in 1991 to 122,000 
in 1994.
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The ratio of party membership per capita further accentuated the striking differences 
between east and west. With the eastern population constituting some twenty per 
cent of unified Germany, the ratio in the CDU/CSU was 2 to 1 in favour of the west. 
Within the SPD, the figures were 7 to 1, within Bundnis 90/die Grunen 3.5 to 1. Of 
the established western parties, only the FDP had more members per capita in the 
east with a ratio of 2:1. In contrast, the PDS continued to maintain its almost 
exclusive eastern orientation. Four years after unification, membership in the west 
remained insignificant.
For party officials, the search for candidates and activists to fill various political 
posts represented a frustrating task. For instance, in the communal elections of 
Brandenburg in December 1993, the mighty Volksparteien SPD and CDU failed to 
provide a complete list of candidates for all constituencies. The CDU managed to 
cover only half of the municipalities, while the SPD fared even worse and competed 
for only one-third of the seats (Schmid 1994:797).
Formal ties to the SED or allegations over the involvement in Stasi activities forced 
several leading eastern politicians to resign. Within the CDU, the Block party’s 
long-time leader Gerald Gotting had to step down in November 1989. Lothar de 
Maiziere - the only freely elected Prime Minister of the GDR - resigned from his 
posts as deputy chairman and chairman of Brandenburg in 1991. Other cases 
included the chairman of Saxony, Klaus Reichenbach (1991), the Minister President 
of Thuringia, Josef Duchac (1991), the party chairman and Interior Minister of 
Thuringia, Willibald Bock (1992), the chairman and Minister President of Saxony- 
Anhalt, Gerd Gries (1991), as well as the Minister President of Mecklenburg-West 
Pommerania, Alfred Gomolka (1992). By late 1992, three out of four CDU Minister 
Presidents had been forced to step down. Within the Social Democrats, the leader of 
the eastern SDP, Ibraim Boehme resigned in April 1990. In 1992, Brandenburg’s 
popular Minister President Manfred Stolpe had to face stiff media scrutiny over 
alleged conspiracies with the SED authorities during his time as an Evangelical
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pastor. The charismatic leader of the PDS, Gregor Gysi, had to confront rumours 
over his Stasi involvement as an unofficial informant. By the same token Wolfgang 
Schnur, former chairman of the Demokratischer Aufbruch was forced to appear in 
court in January 1996.
The carrousel of personnel in the political parties resembled the general societal 
process of coming to terms with the past existence during a time of sweeping 
political system changes. The eastern branches of SPD, CDU, and FDP, as well as 
the PDS were tom between reformists and the establishment (Schmid 1994:795). 
The latter led the parties towards unification, held key positions and banked on a 
reservoir of political knowledge and experience. The former criticised the clear 
relationship with the totalitarian authorities, arguing that the systemic involvement 
within the SED-state as members of block parties disqualified any politician from 
seeking political influence in a markedly different political setting.
Involvement in the SED state and Stasi allegations of the old leadership, as well as 
the lack of political expertise of younger recmits forced the political parties to fill 
the void with western staff. This import of politicians caused widespread resentment 
amongst Easterners. It severely hampered the process of establishing trust amongst 
the eastern populace. Most ‘imports’ were of modest or fading political reputation. 
Quite often it seemed that their western careers were about to draw to a close which 
made the new position in the east look like an extension of one’s political fortunes. 
Many refused to take up permanent residence in the east and continued their 
involvement in western politics. The notion of imported political ‘second-hand ware’ 
spread amongst the population.
Also, East Germans were under-represented in the party’s decision-making bodies. 
In the FDP, only 260 out of 626 delegates for the unification congress in August 
1990 came from the east. Of 13 members of the presidium, four were Easterners. 
Only the ratio of deputy chairmen gave the east a proper representation with two out
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of five (Ammer 1992:469). In the CDU, three posts on the 14-member presidium and 
seven on the 26-person executive committee were reserved for Easterners. The 
position of deputy chair was created for de Maiziere. In 1992, his successor Angela 
Merkel won re-election, although the post was expanded to five seats, opened to all 
contenders which then included Saxony’s Interior Minister Heinz Egger. The first 
‘unified’ cabinet of 1991 incorporated only two East Germans, who were both given 
minor portfolios - Transportation to Gunther Krause and Family and Youth to 
Merkel (Clemens 1993:215-217).
Within the SPD, one out of five deputy chairmen came from the east (Wolfgang 
Thierse). The 39-member executive committee consisted of only six Easterners. In 
1995, the committee was expanded to 49 seats. Still, Easterners accounted for only 
seven posts. Only the Greens managed to established a representation according to 
the population ratio between east and west. 150 out of a total of 750 party conference 
delegates, as well as four out of nine federal executives come from the east. In the 
end, some forty per cent of all Lander ministers were from the west. They occupied 
central positions and were supported by top ranking civil servants who also had been 
recruited from the old Lander.
The feeling of a political take-over by the west came therefore as no surprise. In a 
survey in 1993, the strikingly high number of 93 per cent perceived that only those 
who have lived in the east have the right to talk about problems in the east (.Der 
Spiegel 3-1993:56). Clearly, the feeling of mis-representation was widespread. 
Easterners wished for authentic political officials, who if not from the east at least 
were familiar with the eastern situation.
However this did not result in a resentment per se of western politicians. Asked 
whether top political posts should only be filled with eastern politicians, a majority 
of respondents (69 per cent) argued that it depended on the respective person. 27 per 
cent insisted on eastern politicians, while 3.6 per cent favoured a western official
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(Politbarometer). Although one fourth still flatly rejected any Westerners at all, the 
large majority showed a readiness in accepting representation by a western official - 
as long as he or she was willing to further the eastern cause.
This notion became evident in Saxony. After the demise of the Minister President 
Reichenbach (CDU) over alleged Stasi co-operation, the incoming western Kurt 
Biedenkopf - the former CDU chairman for the state of Northrhine-Westfalia - 
managed to acquire the nickname Sachsenkdnig (King of Saxony). With 
compassion, initiative and eagerness, Biedenkopf overcame initial suspicious 
sentiments of ‘yet-another-Wessi’ which subsequently culminated in the absolute 
majority in the land elections of 1994.
Given the prevalence of sentiments of a political take-over, political parties faced 
severe difficulties in establishing electoral loyalties. They were forced to aggregate 
the interests of a population that had just experienced abrupt and severe upheavals in 
their lives. The rapidity of the political, social and economic changes of unification 
could not allow for the emergence and establishment of sound party affiliations. 
‘Roller coaster rides’ of voter support were no exception. For instance in February 
1990, a sample indicated that 48 per cent intended to vote for the SPD in the 
upcoming Lander elections. The numbers fell to 37 per cent in the first week of 
March, while on election day (March 18) only 22 per cent voted for the Social 
Democrats (Noelle-Neumann 1991:103). Voter support for the CDU dropped from 
43 per cent in the federal elections of 1990 to 31 per cent in 1994.
Four years after unification, party affiliations remained persistently weak. The CDU 
stayed at 19 per cent between November 1991 and November 1994. During the same 
time SPD dropped from 24 per cent to 17 per cent. A downward trend also affected 
Biindnis 90/die Grunen with a decline from 5.6 per cent to 2.3 per cent. The FDP 
dropped more drastically from 6.5 per cent to 0.9 per cent {Politbarometer). As 
indicated in Table 4.15. the number of people who did not have any kind of
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orientation towards a political party continued to stay at exceptionally high levels. 
While the identification with fringe parties, such as the right-extremist Republikaner 
paled into insignificance, the established parties of SPD, CDU, FDP and Bundnis 
90/die Grunen were not able to generate sound voter orientations. In contrast, the 
number of people who leaned towards these parties decreased from 48 to 44 per cent. 
Hence nearly half of eastern respondents did not possess a party identification as 
compared to one-third in the west. Even according to age groups the numbers stayed 
at similar levels. Only the younger generations were slightly more hesitant to 
identify themselves with a political party.4
Table 4.15. Party Identification in the New Lander (cumulated data, percentages)
Question: Do you have general leanings toward a particular party?
East West
1992 1993 1994 1994
PDS 5.7 7.0 10.1 0.1
Remaining Parties 48.2 40.8 43.9 26.5
none 46.1 52.2 46.0 32.9
n 11746 11647 11793 11130
Source: Politbarometer
Party identification describes a long-term, stable orientation, a form of 
‘psychological party membership’ (Rattinger 1995:232). One might argue that such 
affiliations were not able to develop given the short time-span since unification. 
However prior to 1989, East Germans by no means lived in a political vacuum. 
Information about the political landscape in West Germany was transmitted through 
the media or visits from friends and relatives (Schmitt 1992a). In a survey taken in 
early 1993, forty per cent of respondents agreed to have had identifications towards a 
western party before the Wende (Rattinger 1995:233). After unification the total
4 In November 1994, 54 per cent below thirty had no party identification as compared to 49.6 per cent 
of the total population.
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number of respondents who developed party affiliations did not increase on a 
substantial level. In fact, until 1993 the number of East Germans who before 1989 
possessed an identification towards a western party but now abandoned it totalled 32 
per cent, while the amount who did not have a party identification but developed one 
after unification was only 28 per cent (Rattinger 1995:236). Thus, in total the 
transformed party landscape of eastern Germany was not able to generate stronger 
affiliations amongst the population. Identification with political parties persistently 
stayed at moderate levels trailing significantly behind western standards.
Multivariate analyses so far had failed to offer cogent insights into the causes for the 
reluctance to form party identifications. Admittedly, these were ‘very hard to 
explain’ (Rattinger 1995:252). However the concept of party identification implies 
the identification not only with political parties but also with their task of generating 
public demands in the process of interest representation. Hence the lack of party 
identification leads towards a general dissatisfaction with the output or with concrete 
political achievements for whom political parties were held responsible. Here a 
variety of factors spring to mind. The stiff economic recession of 1991 to 1993, real 
or feared unemployment, the scrapping of the former all-encompassing welfare state 
all pointed towards the perceived failure of the new system (see Chapter Three). For 
some, unification simply did not pay off. Political parties as the agents who 
administered the change were subsequently blamed for individual financial 
misfortunes and hardship. Kohl’s hasty promise of ‘blossoming landscapes’ failed to 
materialise, while the governing CDU/FDP coalition was held responsible for the 
persistent split between east and west regarding living standard and wages.
The programmatic base of some political parties and the orientation towards 
particular societal segments could not aggregate reliable support. The civic 
movement almost disappeared into oblivion. In the aftermath of unification, the 
agenda which developed in opposition against the SED regime, such as individual 
liberties and human rights was sidelined against the overall importance of material
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issues. Parallel to this, the minor importance of environmental issues rendered 
campaigning problematic for the Greens.
The Liberal Democrats traditionally supported free market mechanisms to support 
small or independent businesses, while stressing Rechtsstaat principles. As with the 
civic movement liberal concerns of freedom and civil liberties had only minor 
significance against the paramount importance of materialist concerns. Also 
independent and small businesses were still few in numbers, while the CDU 
established itself as a strong contender for this subgroup. The SPD still had to carry 
the baggage of its fatal Bundestag campaign of 1990. Arguing for a moderate pace of 
unification, the party was perceived as a traitor to German unity. The initial surplus 
of respect which Brandt’s Ostpolitik generated in the 1970’s melted away over Oskar 
Lafontaine’s approach to handle German unification. Furthermore, the traditional 
orientation of the SPD towards workers and those with lower incomes was obsolete 
in the east. As a promulgated classless society the differences in wages and status - 
excluding party apparatschiks - were minimal in the GDR. With unification, the 
party’s traditional support amongst the less well-off could therefore not materialise 
since a societal rift along the lines of poor versus rich, of blue versus white collar 
was virtually non-existent.
Parteienverdrossenheit (weariness of political parties) aptly summed up the attitudes 
of East Germans towards the political system. Despite high interest in politics, 
despite satisfactory turn-outs at elections, people failed to identify with political 
parties as their agents for interest representation. The political parties were left with 
the daunting task of establishing long-term loyalties. Five years after unification they 
had yet to succeed.
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The PDS
In this atmosphere of disorientation one party made a considerable exception. 
Growing out of the ashes of the Stalinist SED, the PDS (Party of Democratic 
Socialism) turned into an authentic body of interest representation for eastern issues. 
In December 1989, after the ousting of Honecker’s successor Egon Krenz, the party 
re-named itself as SED/PDS and argued for a democratic renewal around the 
reformists Gregor Gysi and Hans Modrow. Two months later, the neo-Communists 
dropped the SED from their name and five years onwards the party continued to 
surprise the political establishment.
In the numerous elections of 1994, the PDS enjoyed surging successes and was able 
to significantly increase its share of votes, as compared to the first free elections in
1990. It drew support from all political comers, notably from the SPD but also to 
some extent from the CDU. In addition, young and first-time voters, as well as 
former non-voters found the party particularly appealing (Bortfeld 1994:1284). 
Beginning with the elections for the European Parliament in June 1994, the PDS did 
surprisingly well in all of the five new Lander. In the eastern part of Berlin, the party 
took forty per cent of the vote and emerged as the strongest party there. The five 
Lander elections of the same year firmly established the party on the political 
agenda. The PDS achieved between 16.6 per cent in Thuringia and 22.7 per cent in 
Mecklenburg-Westpomerania. As shown in Table 4.16., the share of votes increased 
in everyone of the new Lander, between 5.3 per cent in Brandenburg and 7.9 per 
cent in Saxony-Anhalt. In Saxony-Anhalt co-operation with the neo-Communists 
safeguarded the minority coalition of Greens and Social Democrats which was 
subsequently termed as the ‘Magdeburg model of tolerance’ (Der Spiegel 44- 
1995:24). In Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Westpomerania only grand coalitions 
between Social and Christian Democrats prevented the party from assuming 
governmental responsibility.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995:91,94; 1994:98,100.
Particularly on a local level, the PDS was able to achieve some remarkable success. 
In several counties - both urban and rural - the majority of votes went to the neo- 
Communists. As of early 1996, 180 towns and municipalities were governed by PDS 
mayors. Examples include the cities of Rostock, Schwerin, Neubrandenburg, Suhl 
and Halle. The party had 129 seats in the various Lander parliaments and 6000 
parliamentarians in local governments {Der Spiegel 3/1996:40). In the local elections 
of Berlin in November 1995, the neo-Communists emerged as the strongest political 
force, capturing 36.3 per cent. Often only the anonymous co-operation between the 
remaining parties prevented the PDS from capturing further county and city halls 
(Golz 1994b:676). On the federal level, the split between east and west was aptly 
documented by the share of votes for the neo-Communists. Table 4.16. shows the 
striking disparities between the respective percentages. In the east, the PDS further 
manifested its political position, while in the west the party sank into insignificance. 
Still, both in 1990 and in 1994, the PDS entered the German parliament.5
5 In 1990, the Federal Constitutional Court ordered the introduction of separate five per cent 
thresholds for east and west. While in 1994, the all-German threshold was re-instated the peculiarities 
of the German electoral system which combines majority and representative elements gave the PDS 
30 seats in the Bundestag.
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Although the demise of the SED regime resulted in a dramatic drop in membership - 
from 1.8 million in December 1989 to 119,000 in 1994 - the PDS still had by far the 
strongest membership base of all political parties in the new Lander which stood in 
sharp contrast to the west, where the neo-Communists largely failed in attracting 
new members (see Table 4.14.). Nonetheless as relics of the SED past, the PDS 
possessed an extensive network of local offices, solid financial resources, and 
experienced party activists. The party consisted of up to to 95 per cent of former 
members of the SED (Spittmann 1994:673). Only around one fourth were gainfully 
employed (in contrast CDU/CSU 64 per cent, SPD 65 per cent, B’90/Greens 74 per 
cent). Also the PDS recruited heavily amongst older generations. 64 per cent of party 
members were pensioners, 38 per cent over age 65, and only seven per cent were 
between 18 and 34 (in contrast CDU/CSU and SPD 14 per cent, B’90/Greens 32 per 
cent). The average income of PDS members was below that of other political parties. 
Eighty per had a net monthly income below DM 3500 (in contrast CDU/CSU 31 per 
cent, SPD and B’90/Greens 38 per cent). Only two per cent had a net monthly 
income of more than DM 6500 (in contrast CDU/CSU 26 per cent, SPD 17 per cent, 
B’90/Greens 13 per cent; Golz 1994c:903).
The party’s electoral base transcended the broader segments of society, moving 
beyond the traditional support from the old, unemployed and former SED 
functionaries. One fourth of PDS voters were between 18 and 34, and 39 per cent 
between 35 and 54. Apparently, a considerable number of former SED members left 
the party out of perceived employment disadvantages but still upheld their electoral 
preferences (Golz 1994c:903). In the local elections for Berlin in November 1995, 
the PDS was able to attract younger voters, as well as the middle class. While the 
party took 36.3 per cent in the eastern districts, 39 per cent of people aged 18 to 24, 
as well as forty per cent of white collar workers and civil servants gave the party 
their support (Der Spiegel 44/1995:23). In general, PDS voters were slightly more 
affluent than PDS members but still trailed behind voters of other political parties.
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Most strikingly, political interest amongst party members and voters of the PDS was 
particularly well developed (Golz 1994c:904).
The programmatic base suffered from vague explorations of the GDR history. In the 
party programs of 1990 and 1993, the SED past was only addressed in general terms, 
while lacking a critical confrontation with economic and political shortcomings of 
the system. The party obviously tried to distance itself from the SED by drawing a 
final line. The PDS simply rejected the past without interrogating the causes of the 
failure of the Socialist experience (Pfahl-Traughber 1995:28). Further programmatic 
points included a stronger position of the state (promotion of meaningful leisure 
activities, banning of right-extremism) and direct democratic devices (plebiscites, 
extra-parliamentary action, or the incorporation of councils consisting of union 
members, employer’s association, interest groups and parliamentarians in the 
legislative process). Capitalism was largely blamed for social and economic 
shortcomings, culminating in the accusation of having caused an ‘existential crisis of 
civilisation’ in the program of 1993. Andre Brie, head of the program commission, 
admitted that the PDS was lacking a coherent overall concept (Der Spiegel 
3/1996:441). The party was tom between several factions. The realist wing under 
Gysi and party chairman Lothar Bisky promoted a course towards governmental 
responsibility, while fundamentalists embraced notions of extra-parliamentary 
activism, Communism and even eco-fundamentalism.
These programmatic points could not leave the impression of a reformed Socialist 
party. However although the PDS emerged from the Stalinist SED whose totalitarian 
grip on society prompted East Germans to take their anger to the streets, the public 
seemed relaxed about the surging success of the neo-Communists. Gradually, the 
PDS managed to leave the image of the successor party to the SED behind. Gysi’s 
bunte Truppe (colourful troops) - a mixture of former dissidents, intellectuals and 
reformist SED apparatschiks included Bismarck’s great grand nephew Graf 
Einsiedel, the former GDR economics minister Christa Luft and the writers Stefan
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Heym and Gerhard Zwerenz. The tactics of naming prominent people - even without 
party membership - as candidates proved to be a striking success. Despite the ageing 
membership structure and the persistent internal quarrels the party’s image was 
unorthodox, young, uncomplicated and bold.
The predominantly eastern success of the PDS can partly be explained by its 
exclusively eastern orientation. With the exception of Biindnis 90 (the struggling 
successor party of the civic movement) and the DSU (which paled into 
insignificance and remained present only in the local area around Dresden), all other 
political groupings had their origin in the west. This sense of western domination of 
the political process was further highlighted by the vast number of western officials 
who occupied key posts in state and local administrations, as well as by the 
comparatively minor political weight of eastern politicians at the federal level. This 
feeling of mis- and under-representation opened the gates for the spectacular rise of 
the PDS. In July 1994, 62 per cent of respondents in the east declared that the PDS 
was needed in the new Lander to assert east German interests. Consequently, 57 per 
cent wanted to see the PDS in the federal Bundestag (Politbarometer).
In addition, the PDS had the tactical advantage of voicing particularly eastern issues 
and grievances, while being the only party in the east that possessed a strong social, 
locally-oriented network. Political activism include regular talks and discussions, 
communal activities, advice and information on such critical issues as rents or 
pensions. This network did not only operate during the build-up to major elections, 
but instead represented a permanent institution.
Six years after the demise of the GDR dictatorship, the PDS established itself as a 
genuine Volkspartei in the eastern Lander. Accusations over the Stasi activities of 
Gysi and Bisky, internal divisions between reformers and former SED-apparatschiks, 
as well as hostile political rhetoric from established parties and the media could not 
undermine the PDS’s growing success. The aversion of western political elites, most
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notably Chancellor Kohl who labelled the party as red-painted fascists was not 
shared by the eastern public. In 1994, 39 per cent of respondents believed that the 
PDS had parted from its SED past. Relying on this considerable stock of trust, the 
party was taking advantage of the void of affiliation which the Christian, Social and 
Free Democrats failed to fill. In contrast to the traditional western parties, the PDS 
was the sole political agent capable of generating the spirit of solidarity and 
communality in a time of abrupt and sweeping changes to an individual’s life.
The Civic Movement
In contrast, the former power and influence of the civic movement gradually 
decreased. As with the PDS, the civic movement found itself without a powerful ally 
in the west. The ideologically most suitable western counterpart, the Greens were the 
party which most resented unification (Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck 1994:93). 
Additionally, whereas most political groupings supported quick unification and 
consequently geared towards an organisational merger with western parties, the civic 
movement held on to the notion of an independent East Germany, arguing for a 
Socialist alternative with a human face.
From the start the civic movement was organisationally dispersed. The centralised 
and oppressive political regime of the GDR fostered a tendency towards 
decentralised organisational patterns, while the security and surveillance apparatus 
prevented the establishment of cross-organisational communication channels 
(Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck 1994:93). Furthermore, the movement was 
ideologically fragmented. In the revolutionary days of autumn 1989, attitudinal 
differences were only brushed aside by the common goal of achieving political 
freedom. Hence during the popular upheavals of 1989, several opposition 
movements emerged on the political scene. In addition to the Initiative fur Frieden 
und Menschenrechte (founded as early as 1985), Neues Forum and Demokratie Jetzt 
were established in September 1989. In October they were joined by the
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Demokratischer Aufbruch. While the latter merged with the CDU in October 1990, 
the remaining three joined forces in March 1990 under the name of Biindnis 90.
The eastern Green Party which also grew out of the resistance movement against the 
old regime was founded in November 1989. The decision by the Constitutional 
Court to introduce separate five per cent thresholds in the east and west for the 
upcoming federal elections in December 1990, as well as ideological prerogatives of 
a separate East German party identity relieved pressure towards a merger with the 
western Greens until after the election (Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck 1994:94). The 
merger with the western sister party took place over the course of 1991, with 
individual Lander associations joining the merger. Finally, Biindnis 90 and Greens 
joined forces in March 1993.
The first electoral results were depressing. Standing separately in the Volkskammer 
and Lander elections in March 1990, the Greens and the citizen movement trailed far 
behind those parties which had found western allies. In the first all-German elections 
for the federal Bundestag in December 1990 the western Greens failed to cross the 
five per cent threshold. The electoral alliance of eastern Greens and Biindnis 90 sent 
only two representatives of the eastern Greens and six from the citizen movements to 
the Bundestag. The prospect of staying under the all-German threshold in the federal 
elections of 1994 undoubtedly boosted pragmatism towards a unification of the 
Greens and citizen movement (Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck 1994:93) - a move which 
paid off by achieving 6.9 percent. On the Lander level however, the impact of the 
party remained moderate. In 1994, only the parliament of Saxony-Anhalt had 
representatives from Biindnis 90/die Griinen which had received just 5.1 per cent of 
the votes.
Membership participation in the civic movement declined dramatically. In late 1989, 
some 200,000 signed the founding declaration of Neues Forum. This figure however, 
represented more of a protest and rejection vote against the regime than actual
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support for the movement. With western parties appearing on the eastern political 
scene, public interest in Neues Forum and other civic movements decreased. The 
prospect for rapid unification with the west was clearly more appealing to Easterners 
than the persistence of an eastern Socialist alternative. By June 1991, Neues Forum 
had a membership base of 5,000, while Demokratie Jetzt consisted of sixhundred 
and Initiative Frieden of twohundred active participants.
Although the formation of Biindnis 90/die Grunen brought the organisational 
diversification within the civic movement to an end, membership figures did not 
receive a boost. By 1994, Biindnis 90/die Grunen were still largely based in the west 
with some 41,000 supporters as opposed to a mere 2,8000 in the east. In retrospect, 
the role of the civic movement in the eastern Lander became clear. Although their 
activists initiated the downfall of the regime, they were mere ‘catalysts rather than 
leaders of a mass rebellion’ (Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck 1994:94). The movement’s 
programmatic base soon eroded. The quest for freedom, human rights and civic 
liberties was pushed out of the realm of relevance. With unification in October 1990, 
those goals were practically achieved. Other issues, such as unemployment, wages, 
and social security now dominated people’s minds. The civic movement however, 
was left with programmatic problems in attracting post-unification voters. So far, 
environmental and grass-roots politics found it hard to establish themselves in the 
east.
Interest Groups
Not only political parties, but other interest-representing bodies also expanded their 
spheres of influence to the new Lander. Since no free interest aggregation had 
existed in the GDR, a network of groups and organisations had to be established. 
Subsequently, western business and farm organisations, trade unions, the churches, 
or civic groups developed structures in the east.
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The State Treaty of May 1990 called for the adoption of the entire West German 
system of labour organisation and collective bargaining. The Bundesverband der 
deutschen Industrie (BDI - Federation of German Industry), the Bundesvereinigung 
der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande (BDA - Confederation of German Employers’ 
Associations) and the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB - German Federation of 
Trade Unions) quickly set up offices in the new Lander. Various aspects rendered 
their work difficult. With rising unemployment interest organisations were 
confronted with reductions in revenues from membership fees. For the BDA and the 
BDI, the increasing numbers of cases of liquidation and bankruptcy resulted in high 
fluctuation of constituent companies. Also, growing numbers of eastern companies 
refused to join or left the associations to avoid tariff agreements that were negotiated 
with the unions. Instead these firms negotiated directly with the respective factory 
committee. In 1992, the Federal Labour Court intervened ruling that even non­
organised enterprises must pay wages and salaries according to tariff regulations 
(Boll 1994:116).
Table 4.17. Membership in Unions: East Versus West
East West
Year (31.12.) Members (1000) Percentage Work Force Members (1000) Perct
1991 4,158 54.8 7,643 26.4
1992 3,392 50.4 7,624 26.2
1993 2,907 44.6 7,384 25.8
1994 2,589 39.3 7,179 25.4
Source: DGB Bundesvorstand, Statistical Yearbook 1995:105.
Trade Unions had an immediate impact on the political situation in the eastern 
Lander. They emerged as ‘the best advocates for the interests of East Germans’, as 
well as the motor of the ‘equalisation of life conditions’ (von Beyme 1991:163). 
With an aggressive policy of continuous threats of strikes, unions pushed for
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increases in wage levels. Although such action was beyond any economically- 
responsible, inflation-concerned means (see Chapter Three), it helped in return to 
ease social tensions and to avoid political unrest.
The unions achieved high levels of moral credibility and political competence 
(Tiemann 1994:155) amongst Easterners. As shown in Table 4.17. their impressive 
achievements however, were not awarded with an increase in membership. Similar 
to political parties, unions suffered from a dramatic loss in membership. In 1992, 
more than 750,000 or 18 per cent of the total membership in the eastern Lander left 
the DGB. The western branches documented only a minor fall in the ratio of 
organised employees - from 26 per cent to 25 per cent. In the east, the drop was 
staggering. Between 1991 and 1994, more than 1.5 million (or some thirty per cent) 
left the unions. The loss in membership was regarded as a reflex to the economic 
situation in eastern Germany. Redundancies on a massive scale caused by 
restructuring processes resulted in a decreasing base for recruitment of new 
members.
Still, the percentages of employees with a union membership card was considerably 
higher in the east than in the west. This however, was a relic to the artificially high 
level of labour organisation in the GDR. After unification, the virtually compulsory 
membership of the SED-controlled FDGB came to an end. As a result, the number of 
organised employees dropped from 55 to 39 per cent. Against the backdrop of tight 
individual budgets, a considerable number of eastern workers preferred to save 
membership fees by leaving the unions. It remains to be seen, at which state the still 
higher eastern membership will consolidate. Only then can one assess whether it 
represents a dying habit taken over from the GDR past or an affirmative willingness 
to participate in the political process. Until the end of 1994, the dramatic downward 
trend did not come to a close. Declining membership figures were further aggravated 
by severe problems in recruitment of activists (Boll 1994:127). Unions suffered from
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the same phenomena which also rendered the work of political parties difficult: the 
Easterners’ preference o f ‘exit’ over ‘voice’.
In the GDR, environmental politics was channelled through the official Gesellschaft 
fu r Natur und Umwelt (GNU - Society for Nature and Environment), founded in the 
late 1970’s. As an official mass organisation, the GNU was controlled by the state 
with a membership of about 50,000 (Boll 1994:124). Unofficial groups were formed 
by the late 1980’s and were predominately organised in the citizen movements of 
Neues Forum and Demokratie Jetzt. This antagonism between official and unofficial 
groupings, between state control and opposition movement was bound to split the 
ecological political scene after unification. Indeed, civic movement activists often 
refused to co-operate with GNU members.
Hence in the aftermath of 1989, a variety of environmental groups emerged on the 
political scene. Out of the GNU, the Bund fur Natur und Umweltschutz (BNU - 
Association for Nature and Environment) and the Griine Liga (Green League) 
emerged. Additionally, the Naturschutzbund der DDR was established in March 
1990 which subsequently merged with its western counterpart. In October 1990, the 
west German Bund fur Umwelt und Naturschutz (BUND - Association for the 
Environment and Protection of Nature) set up offices in the east and merged with 
several district branches of the BNU. Additionally, Greenpeace set up headquarters 
in Berlin.
Table 4.18. Membership in Civic Groups in 1994
East West
Greenpeace 8,000 499,000




(1) including Berlin (2) excluding Berlin 
Sources: Press Offices of Organisations
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Five years after unification membership remained low. While the Grune Liga could 
count on some 4,000 eastern activists (Boll 1994:124), Table 4.18. shows the 
striking disparities between eastern and western membership figures. Prior to 
unification, ecological groups were vital organisations in the opposition against the 
regime. An entire society was united and determined to bring down the regime. 
Opposition per se to the SED mattered and not the particular content of it. This 
common political focus was lost after 1989. ‘Bread and butter’ issues of 
unemployment and social security, as well as the general task of coming to terms 
with new political and economic structures were more pressing to East Germans. 
Environmental protection took second stage.
To summarise, although the structure of interest representation, including a network 
of political parties, employers associations, trade unions and civic groups was well 
developed in the east, it represented ‘little more than an organisational shell’ (Boll 
1994:114). Although political interest and passive political participation reached 
satisfactory levels that almost equalled those of the west, they did not materialise in 
active political participation.
The Churches
After unification indifference and apathy towards participation in churches remained 
widespread throughout eastern Germany. The differences in general church 
membership between east (fifty per cent) and west (eighty per cent) were profound 
(Eisel 1994:155). The Evangelical church became subject to widespread criticism for 
quickly demanding the introduction of the western state-supported taxation system. 
Allegations over the Stasi involvement of clerics certainly did not help to stop the 
decreasing level of sympathy. The church argued that relations with the security 
apparatus and hence with the state were unavoidable in a totalitarian regime and
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represented part of the arrangement with the authorities which still allowed for a 
respectable degree of independence. The Catholic church defended its close co­
operation with the state security with the same rationale. If it wanted to achieve 
anything within the SED-state the Ministry of Security offered the most influential 
contact (Haese 1994:132). Although the Catholic church maintained that it utilised 
the Stasi as a source of information, for clarification of church-state issues and for 
complaints, Stasi files revealed the considerable material benefits which some clerics 
enjoyed out of their conspiracy (Haese 1994:133).
Such public limitation of damage was faced with severe scepticism. Although in 
March 1992, 58 per cent acknowledged that close contacts with the Stasi were vital 
for church leaders to maintain a modus vivendi with the state, a significant 
proportion of 39 per cent rejected the notion altogether (Politbarometer). Also, the 
prevalent secularisation of the GDR continued to have a persistent legacy in the new 
Lander. For decades religious habits and customs played an ever decreasing role in 
the lives of East Germans. Five years after unification, religious loyalties were still 
moderate. In post-war West Germany, Catholic and Evangelical churches enjoyed a 
phenomenal revival. At that time they provided a mental refuge and source of hope 
and spirit in a depressed and derelict environment. In post-unification eastern 
Germany the churches failed to generate emotional attachments. Despite the 
sweeping system changes, churches were not perceived as institutions to offer 
spiritual and mental support. Forty years of Socialism simply pushed them out of the 
sphere of practical relevance to the individual. In retrospect, the people’s passivity 
towards the churches pointed towards the churches’ function as a hollow protective 
shell for the opposition movement of the GDR. They were welcomed and utilised as 
the only autonomous organisations. The religious content however, left the 
population largely unaffected. As the only political alternative to the streamlined 
SED society of the GDR, the churches were embraced for their participative 
opportunities. Religious belief however was secondary. With unification,
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opportunities for participation increased and the legacy of secularisation in the GDR 
became visible.
4.4.2. State-Citizen Relations
At first glance, East Germans were rather sceptical towards the arrival of democracy 
(see Table 4.19.). Between 1990 and 1994, the figures hardly improved. With only 
around one third of respondents being satisfied with the democratic system and a 
striking two-thirds dissatisfied, the adopted West German political system failed to 
attract a sizeable following. In comparison, the numbers in the west were just the 
opposite. Here, around two-thirds of respondents were content with democracy.6
Table 4.19. Satisfaction with Democracy in East and West (cumulated data, percentages)
Question: Are you satisfied with the democratic system?
East West
1990 1993 1994 1990 1993 1994
satisfied 36.2 31.6 37.8 78.0 57.3 68.6
unsatisfied 63.8 68.4 62.2 22.0 42.7 27.9
n 2052 9419 6324 10671 8643 1038
Source: Politbarometer
However the data requires a more detailed analysis, since attitudes towards the level 
of satisfaction with democracy represent rather broad, generalising statements. For 
East Germans, the arrival of democracy did not only imply pluralism, free elections 
and legitimate interest representation, but furthermore an entire system change. 
When asked about democracy, attitudes towards one’s general situation within 
unified Germany were likely to dilute the picture. This was indicated in the drop of
6 In the east, PDS supporters were particularly critical. In 1994, 89 per cent of respondents with a 
strong PDS identification were dissatisfied with democracy. For those with a moderate or weak PDS 
identification the level of dissatisfaction was still strikingly high at 79 per cent. According to age 
cohorts, respondents under 24 and between age 40 and 49 were slightly more sceptical, while people 
over sixty shared an evaluation which was little above average.
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support in 1993, which coincided with mounting experienced or perceived pressures 
of unification, in particular rising unemployment and the loss of the former financial 
and social security which the SED state was able to offer. Parallel to this, in 1993 the 
west also experienced a drop in satisfaction. Here rising unemployment, the 
economic recession and the realisation of the cost of unification clouded a proper 
assessment of the fundamental characteristics of a democratic system. Hence, a more 
detailed look seemed necessary to assess whether Easterners were indeed that 
sceptical.
Table 4.20. Perceived Personal Freedom in the East (percentages)
Question: Thinking o f your personal freedom, do you fare better or worse as compared to the days o f 
the GDR or is there no difference?
03-1992 1993 (*) 08-1994
better 76.2 69.7 72.2
worse 3.9 6.5 6.1
no difference 19.9 23.8 21.7
n 1079 2053 1059
(*) cumulated data 04,06-1993 
Source: Politbarometer
East Germans generally appreciated the arrival of an open society. Freedom of 
expression, freedom to travel, or to pursue one’s ambition in the sphere of work were 
overwhelmingly approved as a welcomed departure from the rigid, oppressive and 
restrictive life of the GDR. As argued above, the decline of 1993 can largely be 
attributed to the perceived pressures of unification. Still, more than two-thirds of 
respondents were positive about the changes in personal freedom that unification 
brought about. By 1994, the figures had consolidated and approached the levels of 
1992.7 In 1994, the number of respondents who fared better (44 per cent) almost
7 Throughout this period, differences according to age cohorts were marginal. Only PDS supporters 
possessed more sceptical attitudes.
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equalled that of people who fared worse (41 per cent). The relationship of Easterners 
towards their new political system and its implications for the individual were 
therefore not as dismissive as the low approval rates for democracy would have 
suggested.
The Arrival o f New Administrative Structures
The staffing of key positions within the administration was complicated by severe 
limitations to human resources. Because of the hierarchical and oligarchic nature of 
the SED regime, East Germans hardly had opportunities to become accustomed to 
such notions as individual responsibility and decision making. The SED’s 
ideological streamlining infiltrated the intellectual potential with a political 
dogmatism that was hardly apt for the requirements of a modem democratic 
administration. Since administrative institutions in the east were not gradually 
established but instead introduced almost overnight, the demand for efficient, 
experienced and reliable staff was pressing. As a result, western civil servants were 
recruited in large numbers to work in the east.
Western officials predominantly held positions within the higher civil service, as 
well as in finance and justice departments. As of June 1992, 20,000 western civil 
servants worked in eastern administrative bodies (Grundmann 1994:34). In 1991, in 
the state of Brandenburg 52 per cent of officials within the higher civil service came 
from the old Federal Republic (Hansch 1993:291), who worked most notably in the 
state chancellery (72 per cent), the Ministry of Justice (72 per cent) and the Ministry 
of Finance (67 per cent).
Asked in September 1990, the majority of 44 per cent of eastern respondents 
strongly approved of western bureaucrats taking positions in the east. Only 6.7 per 
cent rejected the measure altogether (Grundmann 1994:35). Since the overwhelming 
majority of East Germans had just approved of joining the political, economic, social
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and administrative structures of West Germany, such a largely positive vote came as 
a logical consequence. Supporters of western democratic parties, as well as people 
with secure employment showed stronger approval ratings, as compared to voters for 
the PDS and people who feared for their jobs. Hence, East Germans who favoured 
the implementation of western structures also favoured the transformation of western 
officials who represented the new system. In contrast, people who possessed a 
certain distance to the western system or did not benefit from the unification 
processes showed a more critical attitude.
By 1992, perceptions had changed drastically. In November of that year, only 14 per 
cent of respondents in Saxony-Anhalt and twenty per cent in eastern Berlin 
expressed unanimous approval of western officials. Resentment grew to twenty per 
cent in Saxony-Anhalt and to 13 per cent in eastern Berlin (Grundmann 1994:37). 
Disapproval was particularly prevalent amongst the 18 to 25-year olds and amongst 
those above age 50. Insecurity about employment and job prospects amongst the 
young, as well as a decline in social status caused by redundancies amongst the 
middle generation had a direct impact on the disapproval ratings for western 
officials. Also, supporters of the PDS and non-voters showed lower levels of 
acceptance than those of the CDU. It seemed that the ‘losers’ of unification, such as 
former SED members and people whose material status was particularly threatened 
resented western bureaucrats.
Despite these differences however, the approval of western civil servants was in 
general ‘not very high’ (Grundmann 1994:38). The western official who more or less 
voluntarily worked in the east experienced first-hand the cultural clash between east 
and west. For most civil servants, the east was formerly a distant and unknown 
world. Problems of integration and little interest in familiarising with eastern 
problems were common. The low level of acceptance by Easterners was also caused 
by behaviour and attitudes of the western official. Mentality and living standards, 
were too diverse to allow for a smooth integration of Westerners in the east. Friction
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was hard to avoid. The persistent post-unification rhetoric of denunciation of the 
SED regime - not only of its political failures and shortcomings but in general of 
every aspect of life in the GDR - contributed to the notion of the victorious west in 
the fight for systemic supremacy between capitalism and Communism. As 
representatives of the west, western officials often displayed a rather arrogant, know- 
it-all manner. The civil servant remained within already known and experienced 
administrative structures. He or she was sent to implement those structures in the 
east - as a sort of bureaucratic missionary. Against this backdrop it came as no 
surprise that perceptions of the incompetent Easterner and the arrogant Westerner 
would emerge. As a result, the perception of a political take-over was complemented 
by notions of an administrative subordination of the east.
Table 4.21. Attitudes Towards Public Addministration (percentages)
Question: Do you agree that...
East 1993 West 1990
yes no neutral yes no neutral
public offices do NOT work satisfactorily 43.4 33.3 23.3 23.3 52.5 24.2
public offices work more slowly than necessary 72.9 13.5 13.6 65.9 17.6 16.4
citizens do not have many opportunities to protest 51.6 27.8 20.6 47.1 33.3 19.6
citizens are treated like numbers 50.8 31.3 17.9 45.9 37.0 17.1
civil servants are NOT friendly and helpful 28.8 45.6 25.6 23.9 51.3 24.8
it is better not to argue with the administration 34.0 48.4 17.6 39.9 45.7 14.4
Source: LOwenhaupt 1995:158
In a further survey taken between January and March 1993, around 1500 
respondents in eastern Germany were asked to evaluate orientations towards public 
administration (Lowenhaupt 1995). In comparison with responses by Westerners 
taken in 1990, the public service was perceived in a more critical way. In particular 
attitudes towards the general functioning of public administration (statement 1) were 
markedly different with half of the population in the west being satisfied, as opposed
175
to only one third in the east. When asked specifically about some deficiencies 
(statements 2 to 6) however, the differences between east and west were not as 
drastic although they remained in general more negative in the east. Nonetheless, 73 
per cent of eastern respondents were not satisfied with the speed of work, 52 per cent 
saw little opportunity for protest against administrative action and a considerably 
high 34 per cent thought that it was better to remain quiet and refrain from 
challenging the authorities. Furthermore, the bureaucratic dilemma of being caught 
between the provision of an efficient service and anonymous, impersonal routine 
was perceived in a more pronounced manner in the east than in the west (statement 4 
and 5).
Based on these findings, Lowenhaupt (1995:160) organised the eastern respondents 
into four categories: the confident client (46 per cent), the obedient subject (23 per 
cent), the frustrated (11 per cent) and the dissonant, conflict-ready individual (20 per 
cent). The two former were characterised by a positive orientation towards public 
administration and civil servants, while the two latter shared negative attitudes. The 
confident client, as well as the conflict-ready individual showed a readiness for 
protest which was not evident with the obedient subject and the frustrated individual. 
In a multivariate analysis, satisfaction (69 per cent) or dissatisfaction (31 per cent) 
with public administration strongly correlated with (dis)satisfaction with democracy, 
market economy and the system of social security within unified Germany.
Hence more than two-thirds (69 per cent) of respondents only had minor problems 
with the authorities. The remaining 31 per cent however, showed a specific 
combination of deep dissatisfaction with public offices and a lack of willingness or 
potential to embrace conflict. Also, 34 per cent showed passive characteristics, either 
frustration and resignation or obedience. People might complain in private but they 
did not protest. People might have noticed certain injustices but they did not stand 
up against them. Here, the forty-year old pattern of choosing the path that offered the 
least resistance was still prevalent.
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While such notions ran counter to the ideal of an informed and participative 
citizenry, the dissonant conflict-ready individual posed a greater challenge to state- 
citizen relations. With almost one fifth of the population, this strata was 
characterised by general or specific dissatisfaction with public administration and 
high competence for action combined with lack of knowledge or acceptance for the 
institutionalised mechanism of conflict regulation (Lowenhaupt 1995:168).
Protest
The mass demonstrations during the autumn of 1989 impressively demonstrated the 
capacity for political mobilisation in Eastern Germany. Hundreds of thousands of 
citizens took their anger and frustration to the streets and brought down the SED 
dictatorship. Undoubtedly without this massive public protest, the system 
transformation would not have been possible. With the near eclipse of the civic 
movement as the catalyst of the revolution one has to wonder whether such political 
activism was only short-lived or generated into a prevalent standard within unified 
Germany.
Table 4.22. Political Protest in the New Lander, 1992 (percentages)
have done would do would would n
possibly do never do
approved demonstration 32.2 14.1 17.5 34.5 2090
discussion at public meeting 20.9 17.6 19.5 40.5 2092
sign petition 16.0 18.0 22.8 41.6 2093
participation in citizen initiative 8.1 18.9 26.9 44.4 2090
illegal demonstration 7.6 4.8 16.3 69.6 2089
violence against - police 0.9 4.7 16.8 75.8 2086
- citizens 0.5 6.7 16.2 75.0 2090
- politicians 0.5 4.8 11.7 81.2 2086
damage to property 0.3 2.8 6.9 88.2 2089
take possession of house, 0.3 4.2 13.0 80.7 2086
factory or public office 
Source: Gabriel 1995:180
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Table 4.22. showed that by 1992, the willingness to enforce demands through protest 
had not disappeared. Considerable numbers of respondents had already participated 
in various forms of protest, most notably approved demonstrations. Only between 35 
and 44 per cent flatly denied a general willingness to protest with constitutional 
means. Hence, the protest potential for such activities as approved demonstrations, 
discussion at public meetings, signing of petitions and participation in citizen 
initiatives reached around sixty per cent. Moreover, only a small fraction of 
respondents regarded participation in illegal and violent activities as a possible 
alternative or had already participated in them. The overwhelming majority was 
clearly opposed to such means. Thus, the protest potential in eastern Germany had 
anything but disappeared after the Wende, while the channels for uttering demands 
followed constitutional means.
The Legacy of the Stasi
State-citizen relations were further complicated by the painful task of coming to 
terms with the former totalitarian regime. The unification treaty called for the 
establishment of an independent authority to reveal the extent and activities of the 
state-security apparatus. The ‘Gauck’ office - named after the responsible state 
secretary Joachim Gauck - began its task as early as October 1990 and subsequently 
created a centred archive of all available data from the security apparatus. The 
passing of the Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz (Law on Stasz-documents) in December 1991 
complemented the comprehensive governmental action. As a consequence, eastern 
Germany remained the only country of the former Communist bloc to fully open its 
files for inspection. The disclosure of the archives of a secret service represented a 
unique step - not only in Germany but probably in world history. Anyone who 
worked for the secret police had been barred from public office. This ensured that 
allegations over Stez'-involvement could now be based on fact rather than rumour 
and allowed East Germans to find out who was spying on them for all those years.
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However the ‘Gauck office’ did not offer open access, neither for individuals, nor for 
administrative bodies, research institutions, or intelligence purposes. Instead 
applications had to be filled out and individuals including former Stasi officials were 
then given information for reasons of personal rehabilitation. Public institutions were 
provided with data on the involvement of their employees in the security apparatus 
to assess employment matters. Judicial bodies were given information only in cases 
of the prosecution of grave criminal offences (Strotmann 1995: 808-812).
In addition, the ‘Gauck office’ instated a department for education and research to 
aid research projects with material, advice and information. The department also 
conducted its own studies and organised events (talks, film, etc.) to educate the 
public (Strotmann 1995:821). Until May 1995 the office was flooded with 
applications. 1.6 million requests for information on individual persons were made 
in addition to 950,000 East Germans who asked to inspect their personal files 
(Strotmann 1995:820).
This striking interest documented the sensitive and complicated nature of addressing 
the legacy of the old regime. The official propaganda of the GDR as the first 
Socialist state on German ground proved to be a bitter lie. The revelations of the 
lifestyle of the political elite who owned luxurious mansions, hunting grounds, and 
even private islands turned the proclaimed egalitarian society into a retrospective 
farce. Disappointment and anger was directed particularly against the former 
political elite. The suspension of Erich Honecker’s trial in January 1993 caused 
widespread irritation. Despite the former leader’s incurable cancer 63 per cent were 
still opposed to the proposal of letting Honecker escape without judicial 
consequences (Politbarometer).
The discovery of the extent and practicalities of the Stasi apparatus with a ratio of 
around one informant for 95 citizens (Golz 1994a:343) created a strong sense of 
shock and a ‘retroactive dissolution of trust’ (Stem 1993:115). Subsequently, any
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revealed connection to the repression apparatus caused suspicion. The list of 
prominent public figures who collaborated with the Stasi demonstrated the all- 
encompassing web of surveillance in the GDR. It included intellectuals such as the 
writers Christa Wolff and Heiner Muller, the regime critic Monika Maron, and the 
popular Radio-DJ Lutz Bertram. Even the dissident Robert Havemann, an ardent 
idealist of Communism who vehemently criticised the SED state collaborated with 
the Stasi between 1956 and 1963 (Der Spiegel 21-1995:87). On the private level, 
formerly intact social circles came under stress, with the realisation that one’s 
friends or even family member served as spies.
Table 4.23. Handling the Stasi Past (cumulated data, percentages)
Question: Should more measures be taken in order to work out the Stasi past?
1992 1994
do more 36.4 18.8
same extent 27.8 28.0




These revelations left a decisive mark on the population. Not only the political elite 
but virtually every segment of society from writers, to journalists and even to regime 
critics had its conspirators. Through secret meetings, the state managed to infiltrate 
the most inner life of its citizens to such an extent that privacy was non-existant and 
total surveillance guaranteed. Although all East Germans were quite aware of the 
apparatus, the qualitiative and quantitiative depth of the gathered information came 
as a sudden shock. The feeling of betrayal is indicated in Table 4.23. In 1992, 36 per 
cent favoured increased measures of interrogation in order to work out the Stasi past. 
The discovery of the regime’s suspicion, of surveillance, of voyeurism for the sake 
of political stability, and of distrust sought for an emotional safety valve in order to
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achieve a sense of retrospective justice towards an unjust regime which categorically 
assumed its citizens to be disloyal.
For those who were actively involved in the Stasi - as so-called unofficial informants 
or as permanent members of staff - the demise of the regime left many in a state of 
severe moral crisis. The formerly familiar environment disappeared almost 
overnight. With unification the individual was forced to adapt to new political and 
societal norms. However most informants failed to recognise any moral deficiencies 
on behalf of their former behaviour. As a typical example, Lutz Bertram argued that 
he joined the Stasi without any feeling of injustice and stated that if he had not done 
it, somebody else would have. He never knowingly damaged anyone, adding that he 
merely passed on information while the responsibility of the application of it rested 
with the apparatus (Der Spiegel 22-1995:96).
In retrospect and from a western perspective one would have assumed a conflict 
between the collaboration with an oppressive totalitarian regime and individual 
moral ethics. Such a conflict however, was not necessarily present. Despite a certain 
level of discontent with the SED state, people such as Wolff or Maron nonetheless 
supported the raison d’etre of the GDR. Criticism against the regime and subsequent 
spying for the regime were merely intended to improve the state of Communism in 
Germany. The official rhetoric of the GDR always emphasised the development of 
the Communist man and the evolution of Socialism towards Communism. Despite 
its repressive measures, the Stasi represented a tool for this process as a sort of 
secretive educational agency. Furthermore, the State Security was part of the 
political establishment and represented the political norm. Working with the Stasi 
meant working with the state which fostered a sense of solidarity and togetherness 
amongst individuals who were united for the common goal of establishing a 
Communist society. For the benefit of this society, for the benefit of Socialism, 
informants were willing to spy, even on friends.
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With unification, moral intentions were now judged as moral crimes. The climate of 
democracy, human rights and individual liberties left no space for sentimental 
notions of Communist idealism. The collaboration with the SED regime turned from 
self perceived virtue into publicly perceived reprehension. The sudden system 
changes hardly left time for reflection. New norms required immediate adaptation. 
Hence, the past was repressed, the necessary process of coming to terms with one’s 
action was postponed. For former Stasi informants, the process of acknowledging 
immorality against the former Socialist-idealist conscience remained difficult if not 
impossible.
Nonetheless, a certain level of sympathy and compassion amongst East Germans 
remained. After all, Table 4.23. showed that in 1992, 35 per cent of respondents 
wished the Stasi controversy to come to a close. East Germans experienced first­
hand how hard it was to function within a system of constant surveillance and 
repression. Their own past was now examined along a thin line between ideological 
commitment and existential necessity. Hence as shown in Table 4.24. in 1990 the 
overwhelming majority of two-thirds of respondents supported a limited prosecution 
against only the leading officials of the Stasi. A mere 29 per cent were in favour of 
drastic measures which would have placed the entire surveillance apparatus 
including official staff members and unofficial informants under judicial scrutiny.
Table 4.24. Criminal Prosecution against Stasi Members, 1990 (Cumulated data, percentages) 
Question: Should there be criminal prosecution against former members o f the Stasi?
against all 28.8






Manfred Stolpe, Minister President of Brandenburg served as an archetypal 
example. As a former political activist in the Evangelical church of the GDR, he had 
to confront severe accusations over his role as an informant to the Stasi. Charges 
however, were dropped and Stolpe justified his action by arguing that an albeit 
minimal involvement with the SED regime was necessary in order to achieve 
political influence at all. At the height of the controversy in the autumn of 1992, 39 
per cent in the east believed that the allegations were justified, as opposed to 55 per 
cent who rejected such accusations. Moreover, 63 per cent held the opinion that he 
should remain in office, while 34 per cent preferred his resignation (Politbarometer). 
The entire controversy however, by no means damaged Stolpe’s political career. In 
contrast, his popularity subsequently increased. At the Lander elections for the state 
of Brandenburg in September 1994, Stolpe’s Social Democratic party achieved an 
absolute majority of 54 per cent, up from 38 per cent four years before.
Stolpe incarnated the dilemma that every Easterner had to face: on the one hand the 
co-operation with, or at least the adaptation to the totalitarian state, and on the other, 
the craving for recognition and the adaptation to new societal, political and moral 
standards. The majority of East Germans supported Stolpe in manifesting his 
position as an influential eastern politician against the political take-over of the west. 
This pattern represented an envisaged blueprint of life for Easterners: the struggle in 
the initial aftermath of unification ought to be followed by overcoming the yoke of 
the GDR-past and eventually result in a new status of influence and respect within 
the united Germany.
Thus by 1992, East Germans were divided into three camps which were roughly 
equal in size: those who favoured stronger measures in coming to terms with the 
Stasi past, those who were satisfied with the current modus vivendi and those who 
resented the issue altogether. However two years later, public perceptions performed 
a drastic u-tum. Table 4.23. shows that the number of contented people stayed at 28 
per cent. But now, only 19 per cent favoured an increased discourse, with a majority
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of 52 per cent wanting to finally close the issue. A certain sense of over-saturation 
emerged which resulted from the constant media exposure of such issues. The results 
indicated an attitude that society should go on with life by looking ahead instead of 
interrogating the unpleasant, morally reprehensible and increasingly distant aspects 
of a past existence. For collaborators and sympathisers to the regime, any emerging 
guilt could have been circumvented by avoiding the confrontation with one’s former 
moral deficiencies. Hence, the collective memory of eastern Germany looked for 
convenience and comfort that worked on a selective base which remembered the 
positive and repressed the negative. The Stasi and the involvement of a considerable 
number of GDR citizens certainly belonged to the latter.
8 According to age brackets, the figures offered nearly identical proportions.
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4.5. Conclusion
The basic requirements for political participation were well-established in the new 
Lander. Structurally, a web of interest groups, citizen initiatives and political parties 
were in place to cater for the interest mediation of the newly democratised citizens. 
Moreover, the general interest of the population in politics, as well as electoral turn­
outs already reached satisfactory levels and pointed towards a citizenry that seemed 
to have adapted remarkably quickly to the sudden system transformation. 
Nonetheless, active involvement in politics remained reluctant. In fact, the 
implementation of western structures of interest representation was largely rejected 
by East Germans. Political parties were confronted with declining membership 
figures and were facing difficulties in nominating candidates. Former hierarchies and 
affiliations which had been established during the SED era were completely 
demolished. They have yet to be replaced by new commitments.
Here, the legacy of forty years of totalitarian rule offers cogent explanations. 
Patterns of participation in the GDR and the FRG shared some essential features. 
Both systems encouraged active political participation and offered a variety of 
opportunities for the politically interested. In the west, the rise of the Greens 
broadened the existing party agenda of Christian, Social and Liberal Democrats, 
while trade unions and citizen initiatives offered ample opportunities to voice 
political demands. In East Germany active and informed participation was regarded 
as a vital cornerstone of the official political culture. Individuals were expected to 
participate through membership in mass organisations and cast their votes at election 
time. A considerable number of citizens joined the SED or the Block parties. From a 
quantitiative perspective, East Germans were actually more involved in politics than 
their western counterparts.
However participation in the GDR was streamlined and followed rigid top-down 
patterns. The party did not represent political interest but instead mediated it from
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the Politburo and the Central Committee to the individual. With the exception of 
brief phases in the mid-1950’s and mid-1960’s, internal party democracy and 
factionalisation were virtually impossible. Democratic Centralism ruled the GDR. 
Between 1953 and 1989, the party oligarchy was never severely challenged. Political 
alternatives were rare. Mass organisations and block parties were forced to accept 
the vanguard position of the SED. Elections represented an agitational, 
propagandists mobilisation of society, as a mere reflection of participation instead 
of a conscious choice between alternatives. Involvement in politics was dependent 
on an ideologically-sound performance and conscience. Without voluntary 
participation, university placement, social status and career advancement were 
threatened. Hence, participation was coercive and state-mobilised. Interest 
representation suffered from a paradoxical antagonism. The regime encouraged 
participation but undermined expression of citizens’ interest. Participation was 
welcomed as long as it followed the designed tracks of interest aggregation. 
Involvement in politics was encouraged as long as the citizen accepted the vanguard 
role of the party in policy-making. The dictatorship allowed political activity only in 
those ways that strengthened the citizen’s allegiance to the state but would not 
question its authority.
This infantilisation of the individual, the suppression of individual demands under 
the common goal of society continued to shape political participation after 
unification. The SED regime promoted political activity and fostered political 
knowledge - albeit with strong dogmatic implications - amongst a public that eagerly 
observed West German politics through the help of western TV and visits from 
relatives and friends. With the demise of the GDR these norms of mass participation 
and knowledge did not disappear but instead significantly contributed to the 
strikingly high turn-outs and interest in politics in early 1990. Although the 
participative euphoria was also caused by a thirst for free expression after four 
decades of totalitarian suppression, such astonishing turn outs of more than 90 per 
cent would not have been possible without an already informed citizenry that was
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accustomed to participation. These virtues of information and participation were 
even strong enough to guarantee a stabilisation at a satisfactory level, despite the 
massive over-exposure of unification issues in the media and the general easing of 
the revolutionary and highly politicised climate.
What the GDR failed to teach however, was the substance of democracy. 
Participation was not designed to aggregate individual interest and demands and 
ultimately to influence the government’s course of policies and politics. Instead it 
represented a way for the government to influence its citizens. The rigid top-down 
hierarchy did not allow for the expression of individual concerns.
The development of West Germany after World War II showed that the citizen virtue 
of confidence can be a learning process. With the founding of the Bonn Republic, 
West Germans displayed indifference towards politics. Apart from acceptable 
election turn-outs, active involvement in trade unions or political parties was poor, 
while the general interest in politics was weak. Passivity, subservience and 
obedience to the political authorities dominated. The participatory revolution of the 
1970’s however, dramatically changed the political climate. Since then West 
Germans have developed into a participative, interested and informed citizenry. 
Overall interest and active involvement in politics increased significantly. Public 
interest groups expanded the political agenda to include post-materialist issues. 
Demonstrations, protests and other direct-action methods broadened the array of 
political activities. Political freedom and expression of political will turned into 
standards which were taken for granted.
The West German citizen of the 1980’s was more aware, more confident and critical 
than his or her counterpart of the 1950’s. In contrast to this evolutionary process, 
Easterners were forced to develop their citizenship virtues in a crash course. While it 
took almost twenty years for Westerners to become actively involved in party 
politics and public-initiative groups, the rapid extension of the western structures of
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interest mediation onto the eastern Lander demanded a sudden commitment to active 
participation from the newly democratised citizens of the east. With the coercive 
nature of participation of the SED regime being swept aside, and with only 
rudimentary experience in confidently expressing individual demands it seemed only 
logical that active engagement and participation in politics were underdeveloped in 
the east. Trade unions, civic groups and political parties in eastern Germany quickly 
became aware of this in light of their rapidly declining membership figures. Unified 
Germany therefore faced the challenge of expanding the already existing 
prerequisites of democratic citizenship - political interest and knowledge - into 
active participation. Easterners needed to realise that active involvement in politics 
had its benefits, with individual demands resulting in policy changes and individual 
commitment improving the state of society.
In the first six years since unification however, East Germans had experienced 
exactly the opposite. The revolutionary upheavals during the autumn of 1989, the 
participation in demonstrations and the civic movement represented highly positive 
individual commitments. The Monday marches in Leipzig called for freedom and 
civic liberties, for the individual’s right to determine one’s destiny. One year later, 
people’s destinies lay in the hands of the political elite, most notably from the west. 
The feeling of mis- and under-representation within unified Germany grew. The 
import of western officials and western politicians to occupy key posts in 
administering and governing the new Lander was not flatly resented but the lack of 
personal ties to the east and identification with eastern problems were clearly 
criticised. Easterners sensed a political and administrative colonisation by the west.
The predominantly western parties were logically regarded as the agents of change 
in the new Lander. Social, Christian and to some extent Liberal Democrats designed 
the policies and were responsible for their implementation. The changes brought 
about by unification however, were hard, sometimes devastating for the individual. 
The prospect or experience of unemployment, the loss of financial security and
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social services, or price increases imposed severe cognitive changes and hardship on 
the individual. Since hopes of ‘blossoming landscapes’ did not materialise, criticism 
against - western - political parties increased. They administered the change but the 
change did not live up to its promise.
This negative attitude was further strengthened by the fact that the programmatic 
bases of some political parties were simply out of touch with the fundamental 
concerns of East Germans. The SPD was criticised for its tacit approval of the rapid 
course of unification. The FDP’s concerns over civic liberties and free market were 
not able to strike a chord with East Germans against the backdrop of immediate 
material and existential problems. This also accounted for the marginal popularity of 
Bundnis 90/die Griinen which stressed human rights and ecological ethics.
Inter-party turmoil between renewalists and the establishment, as well as persistent 
revelations of former Stasi ties of top eastern politicians certainly did not promote 
the legitimacy of the party system. It only stressed the sense of a lost cause. While 
the revolution was supposed to mark the dawn of a new era it merely resulted in the 
continued involvement of Communist collaborators within the new western political 
setting. The persistently weak party identification showed that political parties faced 
enormous difficulties in getting accepted as vital agents of political representation. 
Surprisingly, the amount of people who dropped their identification with a western 
party since unification outnumbered those who developed new affiliations. The 
western party system was on the verge of destructive rejection.
Consequently, the PDS was able to cash in on such negative attitudes. Gysi’s Bunte 
Truppe represented a lively contrast to the established party elites of the west. The 
PDS took the role of the advocate of the east and was supported by people with 
wide-ranging societal backgrounds. With local advisory groups, an extensive local 
network and backed by financial resources from its SED past, the party managed to
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stay in touch with the populace and therefore compensated for the problems of 
western parties in establishing sound party affiliations in the east.
By voting for the PDS, East Germans turned the notion of mis-and under­
representation into an affirmative statement. Defamation by western elites (the red- 
painted Fascists) only strengthened support for the party. Despite its legacy as the 
successor organisation of the SED and despite allegations over Stasi involvement of 
some of its leaders, the party was perceived by a considerable number as the only 
viable alternative. The PDS emerged as the catalyst for protest votes, exemplifying 
the discontent with the western party system and the defiance against the perceived 
political colonisation. Seven years after the revolution, the initial euphoria 
surrounding unification, the naive idolising of the west complemented by the 
denunciation and flat rejection of anything that was connected to the GDR was 
replaced by a more realistic and critical understanding of politics. Notions of 
confident pride in the east emerged. As the only exclusively eastern party, the PDS 
served as a vital anchor for this emerging mentality.
Within the near future it remains unlikely that electoral support for the PDS will 
vanish. Although more protest vote than actual political orientation, the mere fact 
that 95 per cent of PDS members used to own a SED party book accounts for an 
electoral potential of at least 15 per cent in the eastern Lander. Unless western 
parties are able to establish more comprehensive affiliations with the eastern 
populace, the PDS will not disappear from the political scene.
The political agenda of the FRG and the GDR was to some extent comparable. 
Despite the system antagonism, concerns about peace or environmental protection 
were shared by East and West Germans. However the economic development of the 
Federal Republic and the resulting affluence, as well as civic freedom and pluralism 
accounted for a fundamentally different outlook on politics. In the west, post­
materialism and ‘New Politics’ emerged by the late 1960’s, embracing a departure
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from such former principles as stability and security, as well as new forms of interest 
representation, for instance extra-parliamentary opposition or citizen initiatives.
In the east, politics was strictly confined to the static patterns of interest aggregation 
which were controlled by the SED. The expression of political opposition was a 
careful undertaking in order not to alienate the authorities. Real dissent however, 
was never tolerated. Only the protective function of the church provided some form 
of autonomy from state and party. Hence, individual expression which lay outside of 
the official agenda bore the potential of system criticism. To argue for peace as a 
private citizen or to point out ecological exploitation represented ultimate challenges 
to the regime.
Hence ‘New politics’ in east and west had fundamentally different prerogatives. In 
the FRG, they were evolutionary, developing out of the gradual maturity of society. 
In the GDR the same principles were revolutionary (Dalton 1993:263). With the 
demise of the regime and the transitional processes within unified Germany, the 
revolution however, gave way to the adaptation to western political, social and 
economic standards. Principles of ‘New Politics’ lost in significance. Materialist 
notions of social and job security, rising prices or wage levels dominated people’s 
thoughts. In the GDR, ‘New Politics’ was a form of protest against the regime. With 
the regime confined to history, ‘New Politics’ ultimately lost its rationale. Thus, 
citizen-initiatives or ecological organisations had to face severe difficulties in 
generating a political impact in the eastern Lander. The churches were confronted 
with additional problems. Their functions as protective umbrellas for opposition and 
interest articulation disappeared after unification. No longer useful as political 
instruments, the true level of secularisation in the east became visible.
Until the 1960’s, behaviour and attitudes of the individual towards the state were to 
some extent comparable between the Federal Republic and the GDR. Out of the 
etatistic tradition of the Wilhelminian monarchy, the Weimar Republic and the Nazi
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dictatorship, the West German society emphasised obedience and order over 
individual freedom and opposition. The interest of the state was still regarded as 
paramount to individual aspirations. In the GDR, the dogmatic prerogative of 
establishing the Communist society in combination with totalitarian oppression 
curtailed the citizens’ liberties for expression of individual demands. Hence, in east 
and west, pre-war history as well as the post-war mode of interest representation, 
conditioned the public in accepting and obeying authority. Obedience and notions of 
the Obrigkeitsstaat heavily contributed to the stability of the two divergent political 
systems. In both societies individual freedom could only be realised within top-down 
structures of interest representation. Conflict and political discourse were regarded 
as disturbing - to political harmony in the FRG and to the goal of creating the 
Communist society in the GDR.
The experiences of the Federal Republic after the mid-1960’s however, resulted in 
dramatically different state-citizen relations between east and west. Apart from the 
participatory revolution and growing interest in politics, West Germans displayed an 
ever increasing civic confidence, indicated by the emergence of citizen-initiative 
groups and the growing readiness to protest or demonstrate against unjust 
administrative actions and policies. In return, the constitutional consensus over 
democracy as the best form of political organisation became solid and unchallenged. 
Declining cleavages along the lines of class, religion or profession accounted for a 
strong centrist drive in politics. Integration within the west, social security, 
economic stability and industrial harmony functioned as stable policy anchors. The 
appeal of the two Volksparteien SPD and CDU stabilised the party system and 
pushed extremism out of the realm of relevance. The approval rate of 
parliamentarism and the institutions of democracy consolidated at high levels which 
provided for a buffer of support in times of economic crises or political terrorism. 
The former recipient and obedient mentality progressed towards an active, 
participative, confident and informed citizenry.
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In contrast, state-citizen relations in the GDR represented a succession of negative 
experiences. The upheavals of 1953 were answered with Soviet tanks and 
imprisonment. Not only was active participation and the expression of individual 
demands crushed to the ground but most importantly the legitimacy of the state was 
fundamentally eroded. After 1953, East Germans came to realise that the propagated 
workers’ and farmers’ paradise was in fact a totalitarian dictatorship which 
persecuted individual liberties and activism as soon as they challenged the authority 
of the ruling elites. The near-perfect surveillance apparatus, political terror, 
imprisonment and expulsion to the FRG suffocated any potential for opposition. 
Together with the limited options for expressing complaints or putting forth 
petitions, the citizen was therefore forced to comply with the system. If one did not 
agree with the modus vivendi of Stalinist principles and policies he or she could only 
choose intellectual, internal emigration and a retreat into the private sphere.
The regime deceived itself into the perception of stability. However infantilising and 
incapacitating citizens does not necessarily result in system conformity. Instead, 
while individual responsibility and maturity were suppressed, a feeling of 
resignation and helplessness against the authorities became widespread. East 
Germans became indifferent towards the political ideology and the political process. 
System-conformist behaviour was required for professional advancement and social 
status, but it hardly emerged out of a conscience which approved of the SED state. 
Only as long as the regime was able to offer a minimum of material benefits and 
social security was the individual willing to obey to totalitarian rules.
Infantilisation of the individual and the general distrust by the authorities towards a 
more participative and politically emancipated role for their citizens finally backfired 
in 1989. Captured by decades of political indifference, East Germans had 
apathetically accepted restrictions imposed on individual liberties. They needed a 
catalyst to transform imminent dissatisfaction with the regime into concrete political 
action. Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika’, the subsequent opening of the Iron Curtain in
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Hungary and the SED’s reactionary response to Tianmen finally got the East 
German revolution off the ground. By 1989, even forged election results - a common 
practise throughout the existence of the GDR - were no longer accepted. 
Demonstrations which involved thousands and thousands of people, the supportive 
climate within the Communist bloc, and the helpless response of Honecker’s 
triumphirat, as well as from their successors made an entire society believe that the 
end of an era was near. The whole of East Germany was in a state of high political 
mobilisation.
The civic movement showed promising democratic virtues. Participation in 
demonstrations and the signing of petitions underlined notions of an actively 
involved citizenry. Demands for open discourse, free elections and human rights 
confidently expressed fundamental democratic principles. The highly charged 
political atmosphere which began in the summer of 1989 continued even after the 
demise of the SED-regime in early 1990. East Germans eagerly followed the 
political campaigns surrounding the Volkskammer elections of March 1990, as well 
as the preceding ‘Round Table’ discussions between representatives of the Civic 
Movement and the government. The optimistic attitude prevailed that the future held 
the prospect of compensating for the wasted years under Communism.
This euphoria however, was only short-lived. Although the arrival of an open society 
with its freedom of expression and freedom to travel was overwhelmingly 
appreciated, the new system of democracy failed to gain unanimous support. A 
variety of factors accounted for the eastern public’s largely sceptical attitude. First, 
hardly any East German - as well as hardly any western politician - could foresee the 
hardship which unification would bring to some citizens. The loss of the all- 
encompassing welfare state, the subsidy system and employment security confronted 
many Easterners with a notion of instability for the first time in their lives. 
Democracy which had caused these ruptures, was consequently perceived in a more 
negative way.
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Secondly, in retrospect the feeling of colonisation by the west turned the people’s 
revolution into an obsolete effort. One superimposed system - although democratic - 
had replaced another superimposed one. For decades Soviet-type Stalinism ruled the 
GDR. Now West German principles of government ruled the eastern Lander. Instead 
of unification, Easterners were annexed. The brave and risky undertaking of ousting 
a totalitarian regime generated hopes of reforming the run-down society. Until the 
end of 1989, unification was only regarded as an eventual step somewhere in the 
not-so-distant future. The emphasis however, was on reforming Socialism. Although 
the ‘Round Table’ talks of early 1990 already addressed the question of unification, 
emphasis was still on reform which was indicated by the lengthy constitutional draft 
for a unified Germany. In the end however, envisaged reform turned into the 
implementation of the western mode of government. Although the overwhelming 
majority of Easterners initially supported quick unification with the west, the 
subsequent experiences of the transition processes showed a severe lack of 
democratic legitimation which consequently weakened the emotional attachment to 
this new-found democratic unity.
Thirdly, although East Germans were rightfully proud to have initiated and 
participated in the only successful revolution ever on German ground, the 
subsequent performance within a new political environment demonstrated that the 
civic democratic virtues of Easterners were only weakly developed as a result of the 
forty year-long oppression of civic liberties. The high levels of participative 
involvement in the SED state was artificial with hardly any cognitive support. After 
unification, the dramatic decline in membership in political parties and interest 
groups showed the hollow mode of participation of the GDR era. For East Germans 
democracy still had to be filled with meaning and content. Although a willingness to 
protest was widespread and although Easterners felt under-represented within the 
post-unification political process, a reluctance to become actively involved was 
nonetheless prevalent. In contrast to the revolution of 1989 which offered a prime
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example of direct citizen action (Dalton 1993:189), East Germans returned to their 
former indifferent and incapacitated attitudes. A recipient mentality re-emerged that 
took life as a given destiny and undermined the confident and self-reliant effort of 
improving one’s situation.
Hence in contrast to the post-war Federal Republic, the new system of democracy 
faced enormous difficulties in generating positive and affirmative orientations 
amongst the population of the eastern Lander. The arrival of democracy was held 
responsible for individual economic and social hardship. The extension of the West 
German form of government ridiculed the revolutionary experience, while the 
subservient and obedient behavioural standards of the GDR era rendered an active 
and confident expression of demands and interests difficult.
Within a relatively short period satisfaction with administrative action reached 
acceptable standards. The large majority of Easterners were content with 
bureaucratic measures which represented a good sign against the backdrop of the 
vast changes in this area. The relatively low proportion of one fifth of citizens who 
shared negative perceptions in combination with a readiness to express resentment 
allowed for moderate optimism. However the critical perceptions towards western 
officials in the new Lander gave reason to worry. Work relations within public 
administration served as telling examples of the persistent mentality clashes between 
east and west. Westerners were perceived as arrogant. Easterners were perceived as 
incompetent. The western missionary collided with the eastern pupil. Diverging 
socialisation and cultural experiences, as well as considerable differences in living 
standards further exemplified the rift between two societies which had not yet 
merged together.
These clashes however, possessed an important buffer that safeguarded the 
democratic development of the eastern Lander. A stable democracy also relies on 
stable institutions. In contrast to other East European societies, the solid and time-
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tested democratic structures of West Germany were implemented in the former 
GDR. The proven ability of the Bom  Republic to defend its system against anti­
democratic principles renders a reversal of the democratic transition difficult. In that 
respect, even if political orientations of East Germans would tend towards a return to 
authoritarian rule, they have less opportunity and chances to do so, in comparison to 
other post-Communist states. Eastern Germany is therefore privileged by being 
exempt from institutional conflicts.
Moreover notions of obedience, subservience and the Obrigkeitsstaat, the 
judicialisation of life in general and politics in particular, as well as the central 
position of law-abiding behaviour as a political standard helped the young West 
German democracy off the ground. Because of the totalitarian and oppressive nature 
of the SED regime these notions were to an even larger extent prevalent in the east. 
Although East Germans had to adapt to democracy with its confrontational style of 
politics and despite the moderate level of satisfaction with democracy, despite 
criticism of an administrative and political take-over and despite the mentality 
clashes between east and west, the traditional willingness of the German citizen to 
obey to authority provides a vital safeguard for system-conform behaviour in the 
aftermath of unification.
These complicated state-citizen relations were further aggravated by revelations of 
the practicalities of the totalitarian elite. The GDR state betrayed its citizens. The 
discovery of the extent of the Stasi apparatus came as a sudden shock and split the 
eastern society. On the one hand, Stasi informants and permanent staff showed 
severe problems in acknowledging their unjust behaviour. There was hardly a feeling 
of guilt since one worked for the Communist cause or left the responsibility with 
higher authorities. On the other hand, anger and bitterness prevailed amongst those 
who perceived themselves as victims of a oppressive regime. Ideological 
commitment or existentialist necessity clashed with indignation and outrage. The 
state - the political system that organises the citizens’ lives - gave the citizen yet
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another reason for caution and scepticism. The state deceived the individual, 
showing disloyalty and indifference towards people’s needs, concerns and demands.
Over the course of the past few years however, this societal rift in eastern Germany 
seemed to have healed. The majority showed sympathy for Stasi collaborators, while 
a desire to close the issue of the Stasi controversy became widespread. Here lies a 
potential danger for leaving permanent scars. Without a confrontation with the Stasi 
past, a mental departure from the GDR will never be possible. Repressing the 
inhuman aspects of the oppressive regime, resulted in a selective memory that 
disproportionally remembered the positive aspects, for instance social welfare or job 
security. For the actual Stasi collaborator, repressing the involvement within the 
apparatus made him or her subject to dependence, threat and blackmail. In post- 
unification Germany, the Stasi legacy affects only the eastern psyche. However 
without a clear working out of the Stasi past in both east and west, Westerners will 
not be capable of understanding the psychological trauma which haunts a large 
numbers of Easterners. Without it, East Germans will not be forced to understand 
and acknowledge past failures and moral shortcomings.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MASS CULTURE
5.1. Conceptualising Mass Culture
As the final anchor of civic identity, a common mass public culture had been defined 
as ‘common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions’, generated by a ‘set 
of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas’ (Smith 1991:11). 
Mass culture however, goes well beyond this conceptualisation. It defines itself not 
merely in reference to the past - from history, myths and symbols - which are then 
expressed in traditions and common understandings, but furthermore refers to a 
society's reaction to modem technological, economic, political, or social 
developments in the process of establishing prevalent attitudes, standards and 
behaviour which fill one’s life with meaning. Meaning in this sense simply implies 
how individuals organise and conceptualise their lives. Where to go on holiday, what 
to do after work, where to live, how to define career, work and social relations or 
what to consume, are questions of mass-cultural relevance which could also be 
described as life-style.
During the five decades before unification, West Germany had established distinctly 
different mass-cultural features in comparison to the GDR. One can argue that after 
World War II, West Germany underwent a transformation into a post-modem 
society. In general, postmodernism indicates the belief that a new age has begun 
which transcends modernity with a distinctly different set of behaviours, experiences 
and attitudes. The postmodern society shows such features as the development of an
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information and consumer society, a conflict between private and public realms, a 
much looser form of organisation and discipline, or new attitudes towards 
expenditure, work and leisure which are fostered by growing levels of consumption, 
affluence and the desire for immediate gratification (Gibbins 1989:15).
Some critics disrespect postmodernism as a fad with limited explanatory power. 
However it is not part of this study to pursue the discussion of whether new 
economic, social, political and societal phenomena justify the promulgation of a new 
age. Nonetheless, postmodernism undoubtedly reflects on developments within 
western industrial societies during the past thirty years. An inclusion of postmodern 
characteristics therefore provides telling insights on how the two merging systems of 
East and West Germany had developed distinctly different mass-cultural standards 
of thought and behaviour. East Germany was thrown into this new age without the 
slow and gradual development that West Germany had experienced since 1945. With 
unification, mass-cultural characteristics which had become standard features of life 
in the Federal Republic splashed over the new Lander in a gigantic wave which 
drastically changed the lives of most individuals and therefore, fundamentally 
shaped people's perceptions towards the unified reality. East Germans opted for the 
social, political and economic order of the Federal Republic but in return, mass 
culture was included in the package when Easterners favoured unification over 
reforming the Socialist GDR.
Three mass-cultural phenomena in particular fundamentally changed the East 
German existence, whereas an adaptation of (or at least a trend towards) their 
standards would indicate the development of a common national identity. They 
include consumerism, life and leisure, and the media. During the first months 
following the opening of several border crossings, scenes of a massive consumer 
migration dominated the news agenda in Germany. On the Autobahn and in 
numerous towns along the border, convoys of East German ‘Trabis’ and
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4 Wart burgs' brought the traffic to a standstill. East Germans were flooding West 
German shops. Supermarkets and departments stores had to close down temporarily 
because of the unpredictable rush for western goods. Ingenious western 
entrepreneurs travelled eastward in trucks packed with oranges and bananas, and 
returned with empty crates and full wallets. The 100 Deutschmark ‘welcome gift’ 
that every Easterner was entitled to collect upon arrival in the west was quickly 
spent on such long wanted consumer products as tropical fruit, jeans or trainers. 
Millions had their first taste of life in the west. The consumer world with its 
affluence and choice was taken as a vital performance indicator for the market 
economy of the Federal Republic. In the eyes of most East Germans consumer 
products manifested the superiority of the west and functioned as focal points for 
own individual needs and desires. After a day-out in the west, the return to the grey 
reality of the GDR came as a shock which drastically highlighted the material 
deficiencies of one’s daily existence.
An analysis of identity-creating processes within the unified Germany has to take 
such a spectacular mass phenomenon into account. The exclusion of an assessment 
of consumer patterns and preferences would mean the exclusion of formative 
experiences of East Germans after the fall of wires and fences. The unexpected 
opening of the Iron Curtain on the evening of November 9, 1989 represented the 
‘true caesura’ (Weber 1993:106) of the East German revolution. Suddenly, people 
were exposed to the vast gaps between the differing consumer societies and their 
respective living standards. It was then that the notion of reforming the old system 
gradually gave way to an anonymous support for a rapid unification. As individuals 
in the hostile consumer environment of the GDR, Easterners voted with force for the 
western consumer society.
Aside from this spectacular mass hysteria, two further mass-cultural phenomena 
shaped East German perceptions towards the unified existence. The admittedly
generalising heading of ‘Life and Leisure’ addresses the fundamental changes 
caused by modernisation, restoration and renovation programmes in eastern cities 
and villages. For years, buildings or road and rail networks in the GDR had been 
largely neglected. After unification, Easterners gradually were able to enjoy the 
comfort and convenience of modem housing and the redevelopment of urban 
landscapes. Unification also brought the highly welcomed freedom to travel. The 
pent-up desire to visit the ‘other Germany’ and to experience foreign countries other 
than those of the Communist bloc resulted in a tourist boom. In addition, the 
increase in leisure opportunities brought Easterners a wider choice of how to spend 
their spare time. The rather limited range of leisure activities in the GDR gave way 
to a wide selection which was capable of satisfying any taste - from eclectic and 
uncensored forms of art to new fashion waves of sport, such as tennis, squash or 
bodybuilding. They exemplified the introduction of new societal standards of 
individuality, independence and free will.
Finally, the extension of the western dual system of private and public media, stood 
in sharp contrast to the parsimonious media diet that was offered by the SED state. 
While the eastern press scene was subject to significant changes which were caused 
by the influx of western publishing houses and new-found eastern papers, in 
particular the new media age of television represented the most dramatic mass- 
cultural change. Despite being able to receive West German television even before 
1990, the eastern consumer could now choose between some 25 channels and was 
exposed to new standards of information, entertainment and presentation which 
redefined his or her viewing preferences.
In short this chapter conceptualises mass culture as a further marker of a national 
identity by analysing the most striking changes to the life-styles of East Germans: 
consumerism (levels of material prosperity, consumer patterns and preferences), life
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and leisure (restoration and renovation programmes, social relations, leisure 
activities, travel), as well as media (in particular television).
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5.2. The German Democratic Republic
Consumerism
Compared to other countries of the Comecon, the GDR was a prosperous and 
successful industrial state. By the mid 1970fs East Germany had established a 
‘functioning economic system’ (Weber, 1993,:83) and showed a respectable growth 
in general living standards. In 1974, industrial production was seven times higher 
than in 1950 and had increased by an impressive thirty per cent as compared to 1970. 
Despite the world-wide recession, the GDR was proud to present full employment, 
stable prices for essential food items, as well as a sizeable growth of the average 
monthly income (from 755 Mark in 1970 to 860 Mark). As shown in Table 5.1, the 
provision of consumer goods grew steadily. The state heavily subsidised basic 
consumer needs, such as dairy products, bread or housing, while poverty, 
unemployment and homelessness were virtually unknown.
Table 5.1. Provision of Consumer Products in the GDR (percentages per household)
1955 1965 1975 1985 1988
Car 0.2 8.2 26.2 48.2 54.7
Refrigerator 0.4 25.9 84.7 137.5 159.6
Washing Machine 0.5 27.7 73.0 99.3 107.3
Television Set 1.2 53.7 87.9 117.6 125.2
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1989: 53
In return, low prices for basic goods were financed through the disproportionate 
costs of luxury items. Prices for cars, refrigerators, washing machines and television 
sets stood in no relation to the average monthly income. The purchase of such 
products was a long-term investment that required years of saving. Moreover, the 
often scarce production of luxury items resulted in long waiting lists which stretched 
out over several years. Eventually, persistence and thriftiness paid off and by the
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1970’s, nearly every household enjoyed the convenience of modem appliances. The 
luxury goods were no longer the exception but became a standard feature - albeit 
with a delay of at least ten years as compared to West Germany.
Despite a period of economic stabilisation and success in the early 1970’s, the gap in 
living standards with the western rival did not decrease but widened. By the late 
1970's, the economic tide turned and living standards began to stagnate (Weber, 
1993:83,91). During the last decade of its existence, the GDR was permanently 
confronted with the prospect of financial bankruptcy. Only substantial loans from 
West Germany kept it alive (see Chapter Three). Hence the shortage of supply and 
often poor quality of consumer goods re-emerged as constant features of life in the 
GDR.
In contrast to common western marketing slogans which confidently praise the 
virtues of a product, East-German goods were presented in a plain matter-of-fact 
style. Both language and design were dull and lacked any appeal (Schmidt 
1994:367). This was all the more logical, since the planned Socialist economy did 
not promote such concepts as advertising, marketing or competition. The GDR 
product was not challenged by the prerogative of any market economy to sell to 
maximum profit. Every article was offered at a fixed price with a fixed quality. 
Production was geared towards the satisfaction of often only basic demands. 
Stimulation of demand was absent, and innovation towards the improvement of 
standard products was severely lacking. Demand for consumption products in the 
GDR quite often exceeded the supply and consequently even the most unattractive 
product eventually found its buyer (Schmidt 1994:367).
As a telling example, shop windows were as dull as the products. The most striking 
characteristic was represented in the massive display of identical consumer goods. 
Within a system of short supply, East German shops built on the ‘magic of
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repetition’ (Schmidt 1994:368), by organising numerous tins or boxed cartons into 
decorative sculptures, pyramids and ornaments, in order to give the impression of 
affluence. Regarding luxury goods or electronic products such tactics only served the 
purpose of mere spectacles in light of the exorbitant prices and shortage in supply. In 
an ambivalent manner, shop windows fostered individual consumer desires which 
the Socialist planned economy was unable to satisfy.
By displaying political slogans, shop windows fulfilled propagandists functions for 
the regime. Messages promulgated Socialism with the usual appraisal of its superior 
capacities and potentialities. This coexistence of consumer products next to 
propagandists messages within a compact space gave shop windows a political 
status (Schmidt 1994:370). The contexts of product and society were interwoven. 
The striking contrast to reality could not have been more cynical. Poor quality and 
lacking diversity of consumer goods, as well as the almost immanent shortage of 
supply outside the realm of daily essential products constituted permanent 
performance indicators for the daily consumer in his or her evaluation of the political 
and economic system.
The public’s experiences of shortages and scarcity were further emphasised by the 
vast affluence and luxury that was prevalent in the west. Western television in 
particular transmitted advertising images of a consumer paradise and generated 
consumer wishes which could by no means be met by the Communist authorities. 
With the easing of restrictions on cross-border travel (see Chapter Two), personal 
hands-on experiences of western life-styles gradually became possible for larger 
segments of society. These occasional western experiences - travel to the west, 
western friends and families staying in the east, the Christmas package filled with 
western goods - were highly appreciated and treasured exceptions from the 
streamlined Socialist consumer reality which drastically revealed the deficiencies of 
the GDR.
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The traumatic reality of the Wall and barbed wires, as well as the complicated and 
time-consuming application procedure to travel to the west gave consumer products 
a powerful position as additional communicators, as ‘ambassadors’ (Diesener and 
Gries 1993:23) of a different and affluent world. Not only were western goods the 
topic of much conversation but furthermore they became relics, while their 
possession quite often meant an elevated social status. West Germany provided an 
immensely important focal point for choice, variety and quality of consumer 
products and for affluent living standards. East Germans were in fact ‘fixated’ 
(Weber, 1993:91) on the more prosperous Federal Republic and the persisting gap 
between east and west.
Thus consumerism generated political attitudes. Since television, 
telecommunications, and the gradual easing of travel restrictions gave East Germans 
increasing opportunities to experience a share of life in the west, western products 
and the western consumer world acquired a normative status. They constantly 
reminded the population of how life could be. During daily shopping trips however, 
East Germans were confronted with the Socialist reality of suppressed consumer 
wishes, lack of choice, shortage of goods and long queues. These deficiencies of the 
planned economy generated into judgmental variables where the gap between 
potentiality - as seen in the west - and reality became increasingly unbearable.
Life and Leisure
In comparison to western societies, life in the GDR was characterised by a distinctly 
slower pace and was visibly less stressful and hectic (Woods 1993: 59-60). With a 
limited choice of leisure activities, people focused on their social environments of 
friends and family. When asked about their priorities in life, respondents mentioned 
‘harmony within the family’ and ‘happy marriages’ as the most important goals 
(Lemke 1989:88).
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At work, permanent gaps in the provision of material allowed for several breaks. 
Attitudes towards time and performance at work were markedly relaxed. In a survey 
by the East German Institut fur Meinungsforschung taken in 1968 amongst several 
industrial co-operatives, an overwhelming majority of 63 per cent felt ‘comfortable’ 
within their general working environment. 34 per cent still felt ‘partially 
comfortable’ (Niemann 1993:339). Apart from its productive function, the Socialist 
collective also had an individual, personality-enhancing ambition (Belwe 1989:97). 
The working environment represented an essential focus for one’s social life. After 
work, colleagues jointly participated in sport, organised picnics and went on 
holidays together. Such tight social networks were widely regarded as highly 
positive achievements of the Socialist society (Belwe 1989:103). Ninety per cent of 
all workers in the GDR thought highly of harmonious working environments, as well 
as of companionable relations to their fellow workers (Sailer 1989:148). Advanced 
social services including guaranteed employment and pensions, subsidised housing, 
child and health care complemented the widespread sense of security.
Cultural exchanges with other societies were hardly possible. While abroad, East 
Germans were only allowed to experience another Socialist reality. On the shores of 
Lake Balaton or the Black Sea, the cultural broadening of horizons was severely 
limited by talking to your East European comrade who lived under similar 
ideological principles, a similar one-party rule and experienced a similar Socialist 
life-style. In addition to being confined to travel only to Socialist countries, the 
regime’s restrictive currency policy further hampered cultural exchanges. East 
Germans were only allowed to buy foreign Socialist currency in such low amounts 
that often even simple hotel expenses could not be paid for. With little money to 
spend, East Germans were regarded as second-class tourists who were only 
reluctantly served. Consequently, Easterners often grouped together at camp grounds 
which represented affordable accommodation. Thus even in a foreign country, 
travellers of the GDR often spent their holidays with their compatriots. Experienced
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cultural differences could be regarded as marginal. They were in fact only shades of 
grey.
The SED understood culture as a high culture of fine arts, represented in classical 
music, literature or pictorial art. In search of a genuine Socialist form of cultural 
entertainment, the party borrowed from humanistic ideas of the German Classic and 
the age of enlightenment, while aspiring to the bourgeois categories of truth and 
beauty in a historical-dialectical manner. Art was instrumentalised as a pedagogic 
means for the general political and social education of the individual (Stiller 
1989:148-150). Artists were obliged to close the gap between ‘art and real life’ 
(Weber 1993:52) by expressing images of Socialist reality. Decadent notions were 
politically unsound, while abstract art opposed the fundamental imperative of 
tangibility. Hence the SED preferred, encouraged and implemented Socialist realism 
as the binding form of artistic expression.
Consequently, the regime did not only criticise the ‘trivial’ art of light entertainment 
but furthermore attacked all forms of capitalist/western art which according to the 
SED rhetoric lacked class consciousness and depicted decadence. After a short-lived 
liberal interregnum during the 1960’s, authorities increasingly arrested artists or 
expelled them to the FRG, cancelled events or censored books, while conjuring up 
morality and tradition (Stiller 1989:148). In the end, theatre, film and literature 
found it increasingly difficult to contribute to a spirit of discourse and confrontation. 
On the contrary, art in East Germany was heavily supervised, controlled and largely 
streamlined.
By 1980, the reservations against western and light entertainment gradually 
decreased. The SED adopted a more pragmatic approach and slowly abandoned its 
idea of establishing a Socialist form of culture. In fact, art and culture turned into 
consumption goods (Stiller 1989:147). To counter the danger of simply copying
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western patterns, the SED fostered its own version of contemporary, mass-oriented 
forms of entertainment by initiating an FDJ chanson-movement and by concentrating 
on German folklore. Eventually, by the mid 1980’s, diversity and quantity of 
entertainment increased. The party finally acknowledged the ‘compensatory 
function’ (Stiller 1989:152) of simple entertainment as a welcomed diversion and 
relief from daily pressures. Still the emphasis on the symbiosis of culture and 
education remained, albeit the former rigid prerogative of a high culture of fine arts 
was significantly softened. Now, even western rock music found its way onto East 
German stages. Between supply and demand however, a gap was still apparent. 
While the high-cultural offerings such as theatre, classical concerts and belleslettres 
literature were quite sufficient, Tower’ forms of entertainment were still 
characterised by a shortage in provision.
In accordance with the SED’s demanding ambition of establishing a Communist 
society, the regime expected from its citizens the pursuit of political activities in 
their spare time and encouraged participation in political parties and mass 
organisations (see Chapter Four). In practice however, leisure preferences differed 
strongly from this theoretical imperative and were instead in line with other 
industrial nations. According to a sociological survey in 1966, 68 per cent chose to 
watch television in their spare time, complemented by walks (50 per cent), reading 
newspapers and magazines (47 per cent) and reading books (42 per cent). 35 per cent 
preferred to spend time with their children, while political activities were only 
attractive to 16 per cent (Weber 1993:65). An additional favourite pastime was sport. 
The membership figures of the ‘German Association for Sport and Gymnastics’ 
grew steadily from 8.4 per cent of the population in 1960 to 21.9 per cent in 1988 
(Statistical Yearbook 1989:330).
Despite the powerful social impact of political parties and mass organisations, East 
Germans showed a strong urge to design their life individually. People looked for a
partial escape from the ever-present and often annoying official political rhetoric by 
retreating into private spheres, into individual, non-political entities, where state and 
party did not exert any influence. Over the years the system fostered a society of 
niches, where five-year plans, the collective, party propaganda and Communist 
rhetoric were left outside. After the military intervention following the Prague 
Spring, party officials became increasingly suspicious of any citizen involvement in 
politics which could have generated criticism of the system and was potentially 
troublesome as a source of dissent. Party pragmatists therefore silently tolerated and 
even welcomed such escapism. It functioned as an important safety valve within the 
closed and totalitarian society (Sontheimer 1990:72) and furthermore represented the 
nucleus of social existence in the GDR: a society of little, unpolitical cells.
A telling indicator for this phenomenon was represented in the figures for the 
solitary sport of fishing. In 1988, 13.9 per cent of all sport enthusiasts spent their 
pastime equipped with rod and hook (Statistical Yearbook 1989:330) which is all the 
more striking in comparison to such popular sports as football (15.3 per cent) or 
gymnastics (10.7 per cent). The most prominent aspect of this retreat was the Lauben 
culture. The idea of a community of small garden lots originated in the German 
industrial revolution of the mid 19th century. The entrepreneur Schreber, a 
protagonist for a more healthy environment offered his employees a parcel of land 
for individual use. Over the years, this concept developed into a vital cornerstone of 
social life, both in West and East Germany. Membership figures for the association 
of allotment-gardeners in the GDR grew from 940,000 in 1965 to 1.5 million in 
1988 (Statistical Yearbook 1989:414). In East Berlin, forty per cent of families 
owned a garden (Rytlewski 1988: 639), most of them equipped with a Laube 
(cottage). Gardeners emerged as a mass organisation and the private entity of the 
Laube transformed into an escape from daily life and represented the focus of leisure 
and activity on the week-end.
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Apart from the Laube, the car constituted the other unofficial ambition of private 
leisure and activity. The demand for individual transportation remained constantly 
high. The annual production of Trabants and Wartburgs increased steadily, from 
64,000 in 1960 to 218,000 in 1988 (Statistical Yearbook 1989:27). But production 
could by no means meet the consistently high demand. The waiting list for a new 
Trabant increased to an impossibly long period of twelve years. It therefore came as 
no surprise that the car acquired the status of a fetish. In 1984, East Germans spent 
an astonishing 28 per cent of their total expenses on items associated with an 
automobile (Rytlewski 1988:639). The car truly represented the most precious 
possession.
Media
After the demise of the Nazi-dictatorship, the Soviet military administration 
gradually passed the authority of the media sector to the East German Communists. 
With the subsequent establishment of a one party rule, the SED enjoyed a ‘monopoly 
on opinion’ (Weber 1993:25) by controlling radio, publishing houses and 
newspapers. Over the years, the regime not only functionalised the media as a 
propagandists means for the political legitimation of its totalitarian rule, but also as 
an instrument for the psychological mobilisation and political indoctrination of the 
population (Meyer 1989:41).
Abstract ideological and political issues were rather under-represented. Instead, the 
media of the GDR focused on the documentation of tangible achievements and 
successes of the system. At the centre stood the general relationship between state 
and citizen which the SED regarded as a mutual contract of service and performance. 
Thus, the media reported on concrete deeds and accomplishments of both the 
population and the Communist authorities (Meyer 1989:41). Society was portrayed 
as a large family where state and party provided security in return for the personal
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commitment of the individual to the goals of Socialism. Particularly before elections, 
party congresses or political holidays, the amount of mobilising campaigns, appeals, 
proclamations and political discussions increased significantly in trying to present 
the image of a united and dynamic society (Meyer 1989:42). But even without such 
events, the political orientation of the GDR media was obvious, by portraying the 
superiority and accomplishments of the Socialist system. The constant exposure to 
the achievements and successes of Socialism in general and the SED state in 
particular constituted a permanent indoctrinary irrigation for the population.
The regime regarded newspapers as articles of daily consumption and heavily 
subsidised their prices. East Germans were amongst the most ardent newspaper 
readers in the world with over 550 daily copies per one thousand inhabitants 
(Grubitzsch 1990:140). Since information was strenously filtered and censored by 
the political authorities, the reader often tried to acquire as much diversity of 
information as possible by buying copies of several different papers. The 39 daily 
newspapers had a total circulation of 9.7 million. Out of these, 16 were published by 
the SED, 18 by block parties, and one each by the GDR trade union FDGB and the 
youth organisation FDJ. The BZ am Abend’ (the Berlin evening news), a sports 
paper and a publication for the ethnic minority of the Sorbs complemented the scene.
The influence of state and party was compelling. SED publications numbered 6.6 
million copies. Block parties which unanimously accepted the vanguard role of the 
SED published 800,000 copies. The 1.9 million copies of Tribune (FDGB), Junge 
Welt (FDJ) and BZ am Abend (Berlin evening news) also remained under the 
auspices of the Communist party. All papers were subject to licensing from the press 
office within the Council of Ministers which also allocated the supply of paper and 
consequently determined the numbers of copies. The key SED publication Neues 
Deutschland was directly supervised by the Central Committee secretary Joachim 
Herrmann who often received specific orders from Honecker. Regional papers were
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directly assigned to the Central Committee, as well as to the regional offices of the 
SED. Through both channels, party executives gave orders regarding form and 
content (Grubitzsch 1990:141). The SED hierarchy even went so far as to declare 
political developments as taboos, as exemplified by the lack of information on the 
historic events in China and Hungary in the summer of 1989. As with all spheres of 
society, the infiltration with official staff and unofficial informants of the Stasi 
further manifested the unchallenged dominance of the Communist party in the media 
sector.
The official news agency ADN (Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst) 
possessed the monopoly on foreign news and represented the main source of 
information for regional papers regarding news from the capital. Apart from ADN, 
only ‘Neues Deutschland’ employed foreign correspondents. As a state agency, 
ADN directly responded to instructions and guidelines of the SED and the Central 
Committee. Hence ‘news’ was often re-formulated, censored, extended or shortened 
by party executives in the Department for Agitation within the Central Committee 
and occasionally directly by the Politburo. Reports which were formulated by radio 
or the TV news broadcast Aktuelle Kamera were strictly ordered to report the ADN 
version of the story which gave the agency the status of the ‘prime collective 
provider of information’ (Olivier 1995:246). According to a former senior employee, 
the overwhelming majority of journalists accepted and adapted to the role of 
functional weapons in establishing the Communist society (Olivier 1995:248) which 
gave ADN the key position as the central henchman for the regime in the process of 
ideologically streamlining the population.
Magazines with high circulation were directly supervised by the Department for 
Agitation within the Central Committee. Smaller publications were subject to direct 
censorship. Trade journals and even the sports press were confronted with 
intervention, as soon as articles fell under the competence of the Ministry for Public
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Education or the SED’s chief ideologist Kurt Hager (Grubitzsch 1990:144). 
Consequently, critical journalism was almost absent. Even without the direct 
intervention of party and state officials, journalists and reporters internalised the 
mere threat of censorship and avoided conflict by circumventing issues and 
interpretations that could have aroused official criticism. After decades of tutelage, 
the ‘scissors in the mind’ (Olivier 1995:250) worked in a pragmatic manner.
In 1988, 99 per cent of households in the GDR possessed a radio and 96 per cent 
owned a television (Statistical Yearbook 1989:291). As indicated in Table 5.2., 
television represented the most important source for information and entertainment. 
With an estimated weekly spare time of some 25 hours devoted to media 
consumption, Easterners spent 13 hours watching television, 10 hours listening to 
the radio and 1.5 hours reading newspapers, magazines or books (Wamecke 
1989:87) which qualitatively and quantitatively placed the GDR in line with other 
European societites.
Table 5.2. Use of Media in the GDR, 1984,
(Blue and White-Collar Households, Minutes per Capita)
Weekday Saturday Sunday
Television MA 75 133 128
SA 16 27 32
Radio MA 2 2 3
SA 74 117 99
Press MA 12 12 12
SA 3 3 2
MA: main activity 
SA: secondary activity 
Source: Wamecke 1989:87
Television, radio and newspapers in the GDR were characterised by a constant flow 
of political messages. While listening to the GDR state-radio, one was permanently
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confronted with such issues as a collective’s overachievement of a production plan 
or the stunning fertility of this year’s potato crop. This impression was supported by 
the statistical shares of the respective programmes as shown in Table 5.3. Since 
‘music’ accounted for roughly half of the output of the five national and twelve 
regional radio stations, it seemed striking that ‘politics and economics’ were 
allocated around 70 per cent of the remaining air time. Consequently, ‘culture, drama 
and entertainment’ achieved only an insignificant status with some five per cent of 
the total broadcast hours.
Table 5.3. Radio Broadcasts in the GDR (percentages)
Year Politics and Sport News Culture, Drama Music
Economics Entertainment
1965 38.8 0.8 5.2 5.7 49.4
1975 38.2 0.9 6.2 5.4 47.8
1980 38.2 1.2 7.0 4.8 47.1
1985 38.3 0.9 6.7 5.0 46.9
1988 34.0 1.2 6.1 5.5 51.1
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1989:325
Unfortunately, the official data on the two television channels was not as telling as 
the one on radio. In particular, the vague category of ‘television-joumalism’ made 
compelling conclusions on the degree of politicisation of East German television 
difficult. Nonetheless between 1965 and 1988, the category ‘informative political 
broadcasts’ combined with the category ‘television-joumalism’ accounted for a 
minimum of 24.1 per cent in 1988, and for a maximum of 29.2 per cent in 1965 
(Statistical Yearbook 1989:325). The largest percentage belonged to ‘drama and 
entertainment’ (between 33.8 and 42.5 per cent) which usually consisted of 
ideologically-correct movies, soaps or theatre productions. Hence, the politicisation 
of television was comparable to that of radio. Both media devoted considerable time 
to light entertainment - music on the radio and film/theatre/soaps on television.
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Political broadcasting however, still exerted a significant impact on the media 
timetables.
Western television and radio represented welcome and widely appreciated changes 
from the streamlined media diet that was offered by the Communist authorities. With 
the exception of the greater area around Dresden1 the two major West German public 
channels at least could be received through standard aerials. According to estimates, 
some 80 per cent of East Germans were able to receive western channels (Wilke 
1989). In the end, the GDR represented a home-turf for West German television, its 
news, political magazines, as well as soaps and game shows. Table 5.4. demonstrates 
the permanent presence of western television. Although the survey was taken 
amongst a small number of emigrants, it still provides a telling look at the western 
penetration of eastern mass culture. All respondents at least watched western news 
programmes sometimes. Moreover, the most popular news broadcast in the west - 
the 'Tagesschau ’ - was watched by two-thirds on a regular base. The entertainment 
sector also enjoyed respectable numbers of followers, since around two-thirds were 
familiar with US-American television series and West German game shows.
Table 5.4. East Germans Watching Western Television
Broadcast regularly sometimes ne\
News Tagesschau (8.00 p.m.) 65 35 —
Tagesthemen (10.30 p.m.) 28 64 8
Heute (7.00 p.m.) 46 64 11
Heute-Joumal (9.45 p.m.) 24 59 17
Soaps Dallas 29 33 38
Dynasty 26 26 48
Game shows Dalli-Dalli 23 44 33
Der Grosse Preis 22 47 31
n = 162 emigrants from the GDR who received West German television 
Source: Hesse 1988: 43
1 Ironically, the SED had to install extra transmitters throughout Saxony to prevent people from 
moving.
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Since the media in the GDR lacked such vital concepts as plurality and diversity, 
West German television provided an important source of information and 
entertainment and furthermore exposed Easterners to the vast differences between 
the two Germanys regarding life-style or political attitudes.
Table 5.5. East Germans Consuming Eastern and Western Media (Young Workers Aged 18 to 25)
GDR media FRG media
Radio TV Radio TV
often daily often daily often daily often daily
1985 76 35 89 47 80 47 77 41
1889 54 34 73 42 85 62 77 55
Source: Zentralinstitut flir Jugendforschung; in Mediaperspektiven 02-90:98.
A further survey by the East German Zentralinstitut fur Jugendforschung (Institute 
for Youth Research) documented the considerable preference for western media. 
Table 5.5. shows that by 1989, twice as many young East German workers timed 
into western radio stations on a daily base. Western television was also more 
attractive with a 13 per cent edge. Moreover between 1985 and 1989, figures for the 
GDR media consistently decreased, while rates for the western media rose 
continuously. In an additional survey, the Institute specifically asked young East 
Germans about their favourite source of political information (see Table 5.6.). 
Between 1976 and 1988, support for the GDR media as the sole source of 
information decreased drastically, while in return trainees, young workers, as well as 
students listened and watched western radio and television in larger numbers. 
Although these surveys only questioned the younger generation, retrospective 
interviews with East Germans after the fall of the Iron Curtain strongly indicated that 
western media became an integral part of daily life in East Germany.
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Table 5.6. Source of Political Information for Young East Germans
mostly GDR and mostly not/ hardly
GDR media FRG media FRG media interested
trainees 1976 38 54 3 5
1985 23 57 17 4
1988 11 62 24 3
young workers 1976 39 46 6 9
1985 22 63 11 4
1988 12 64 23 1
students 1976 55 35 2 7
1985 35 56 8 1
1988 13 70 16 0
Source: Zentralinstitut flir Jugendforschung; in Mediaperspektiven 02-1990:99
Official efforts to stop the downward trend of consumers of eastern media included 
an emphasis on drama and movies which geared for mass tastes, or the launch of the 
youth radio station DT 64. Such efforts however, could only soften the landslide. 
Instead, West German media acquired the status of a normative reference point for 
information, truth and entertainment as an escape from the often monotonous, 
streamlined and propagandist^ SED-recipe.
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5.3. The Federal Republic
Consumerism
The first years after the capitulation of the Third Reich were characterised by severe 
material privation. Towns lay in ruins, food was rationed and energy supplies were 
limited. The daily struggle to survive and to organise bare existential necessities left 
a traumatic mark on most West Germans. For the next two decades, material security 
dominated the public’s consciousness and the gradual improvement of living 
standards was on top of the agenda of every household. By the mid 1950's, the 
booming economy gradually brought prosperity to broader segments of society. A 
wave of gluttony swept over the country and West Germans seemed to compensate 
for years of scarcity and self denial of the preceding decade. To own a * Volkswagen- 
Beetle’ became the aspiration of the common man and the car’s cheap and robust 
design gradually allowed for the motorisation of the entire society. ‘Es geht wieder 
aufwarts ’ (Things are looking up again) - a slogan widely used by media, politicians 
and commentators - aptly characterised the public psyche. ‘Made in West-Germany’ 
was not only a label guaranteeing the quality and endurance of industrial products, 
but furthermore constituted a source of pride in the recently established consumer 
society.
The unprecedented choice and variety of consumer products, and gradually the 
ability to purchase them, became vital agents for the enhancement of low self­
esteem. After the demise of National Socialism and severe material privation, the 
Federal Republic offered West Germans a form of political and economic 
organisation which was able to generate increasing and widespread prosperity, and 
consumerism emerged as a vital systemic bastion for the approval of the young 
democracy.
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By the 1970's and merely 25 years after the total collapse of the Third Reich, West 
Germany developed into a highly affluent society. Widespread prosperity was all too 
obvious. Table 5.7. indicates that nearly every household sported a comprehensive 
range of modem appliances. With 425 cars per 1000 capita in 1988, only the United 
States (561) and Luxembourg (453) fared better in international comparison 
(Statistical Yearbook 1990:685). The GDP per capita increased from 5,466 
Deutschmark in 1960 to 11,141 DM (1970) and to 34,528 DM in 1988 (Statistical 
Yearbook 1990:566). Salaries rose persistently and made the West German labour 
force one of the most expensive in the world. By the mid 1980’s, the 35 hour 
working week was gradually introduced. The number of annual holidays was 
unparalleled and reflected the country’s enormous economic success with the 
average employee being entitled to thirty days on top of eleven to thirteen church or 
public holidays.
Table 5.7. Consumer Products in West German Households (percentages)
1972 1989
Type II Type III Type II Type III
car 65.6 88.0 96.4 99.3
colour TV 9.1 12.9 95.2 93.8
black-white TV 86.8 84.7 30.6 36.5
refrigerator 98.1 99.0 80.6 82.0
freezer 28.2 30.6 74.7 79.9
combined refirigerator-freezer — — 25.3 30.5
dish washer 2.7 18.2 52.6 88.5
Type I (not included): two-person household incl. Pensioners and socialsecurity recipients with 
low income
Type II: four person household, medium income 
Type III: four person household, higher income 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1991:540; 1976:496.
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Life and Leisure
After World War II, the social composition of West Germany underwent radical 
changes. By the mid-1950's the contribution of the agrarian sector to the economy 
began a steady decline. With the Wirtschaftswunder gradually proceeding, the 
industrial sector attracted large numbers of workers. The expansion of the service 
industry resulted in an increase in white-collar jobs and contributed to the 
manifestation of the Mittelstand, a class of independent, small-business owners. The 
vast amounts of refugees became an ‘additional agent of change’ (Mertes 1994:18), 
since twelve million people, mainly from the former eastern territories of the Third 
Reich were confronted with the tasks of finding work and establishing new social 
circles.
These developments largely caused the ‘erosion of traditional political and social 
milieus’ (Rudzio 1991:480). Formerly, people had organised their lives around 
social, political or religious affiliations, such as proletarian-Socialist, Catholic, 
bourgeois-liberal or agrarian-conservative. In post-war West Germany however, 
these formerly strong societal divisions gradually broke down and allowed for the 
emergence of distinctly classless and egalitarian elements. The media bridged 
traditional milieus and catered for broader societal segments. With the exception of 
some Catholic boarding schools, educational affiliations to specific milieus 
disappeared and neighbourhoods gradually had a more mixed social composition. 
Eventually, West Germany became a more flexible and mobile society. Tribal, social 
and religious homogeneity diminished, while the formerly close communal networks 
of family, church and neighbourhood were gradually eroded.
These processes were dramatically boosted by the cultural revolution. By the late 
1960’s, norms of personal and group behaviour became less disciplined and 
authoritarian, as well as visibly more relaxed in comparison to the Adenauer era (see 
Chapter Four). By the mid-1960’s the material orientation to build up one’s life from
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the ruins left behind by World War II were gradually replaced by a consumer 
mentality which forever sought new outlets and satisfactions (Bark and Gress 
1993:70). In particular the younger generations no longer accorded work, career and 
material security the same priority as their parents whose thoughts and behaviour 
were commanded by years of reconstruction. These changing material perceptions, 
combined with the ongoing social developments of urbanisation, increasing personal 
mobility and prosperity drew attention to new issues, including environmental 
concerns and citizenship initiatives, but also leisure and quality of life. The 
generation gap in West Germany was particularly pronounced because of the loss of 
millions of members of the now middle generation who had died during the war. 
Since the young hardly had any recollection of the immediate aftermath of the Third 
Reich, generation differences were more defined than ever before in recent German 
history.
Within these social trends, student radicals were able to set the agenda and 
transformed the political culture. Student revolts rocked the country, arguing that the 
Bonn Republic had been built solely on the prospect of increasing prosperity and 
economic wealth. The student movement critisised the lack of a spiritual and 
intellectual renewal which would have represented a clear break from the Nazi past 
and argued that elitism, obedience and subordination to the political and economic 
establishment had not disappeared, while the restoration of authoritarian structures 
had prevented a thorough establishment of democracy. Subsequently hierarchical 
patterns in schools, universities, at work and in the family were subject to severe 
scrutiny. Notions of ‘independence and free will’ (Mertes 1994: 20) and a general 
objection against authoritarian standards became increasingly popular. The student 
revolts were in fact both cause and consequence (Mertes 1994:20) of a cultural 
revolution that transformed West Germany into a new era and in retrospect 
represented the strongest caesura in the country’s post-war history. Life in West
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Germany became freer and more open, while breaking with the former rigid patterns 
that characterised work, family and leisure.
By the 1980’s accumulated prosperity, short working hours and long holidays 
supported a marked rise in leisure activities, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Between 1980 and 1989, the average four-person household with a medium income 
spent between seven and eight per cent of their net income on costs related to a car, 
between thirteen and fourteen per cent on general leisure activities, and around per 
cent on travel. With increases in the GDP per capita of 31 per cent (1980) and 50 
per cent (1988) as compared to 1970, West Germans were able to spend more money 
in absolute terms on travel, sport or in restaurants.
Throughout the 1980’s the sport industry enjoyed a remarkable boom. Membership 
in the Deutscher Sportbund - the central umbrella organisation for all sports clubs - 
more than doubled from 8.3 million (14 per cent of the total population) in 1970 to 
18.4 million (30 per cent) in 1989 (Statistical Yearbook 1990:394, 1983:375). 
Sporting activities became more diversified. The traditional German passion for 
football and hiking was gradually complemented by more sophisticated physical 
undertakings, such as aerobics, bodybuilding, mountain-climbing, windsurfing and 
foremost by tennis.
Spending on travel increased steadily and destinations became ever more 
extravagant. According to the Deutscher Reisebiiro-Verband (Association of Travel 
Agents) in 1960, 69 per cent of West Germans spend their holidays within Germany. 
By 1989, the figures had reversed and a markedly high 71 per cent preferred to spent 
the most precious weeks of the year abroad. Average spending on holidays increased 
from some 700 Deutschmark per person in 1970 to over 1,300 DM in 1989. As
2 Data according to Statistical Yearbook, 1990:487,1987:472, 1983:453,1990:566.
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demonstrated in Table 5.8., the most popular foreign holiday destinations of 1960, - 
Austria, Switzerland and Italy - combined for a total travel spending of 58 per cent. 
By 1989, the top three countries Austria, Italy and Spain only attracted 43 per cent, 
while the share of countries not listed in the table rose to 25 per cent as compared to 
only six per cent three decades earlier. Clearly, the summer rushes to the Alps and 
the teutonic bathtubs along the Italian coast were eventually regarded as rather 
philistine and West Germans gradually conquered the remaining continents. By 
1989, spending in foreign countries amounted to an astonishing 44 billion 
Deutschmark or some 650 DM per capita.
Table 5.8. Travel Expenses (in DM) and Destinations, West Germany
1960 1970 1980 1989
Austria 560 2206 6183 7123
Italy 467 1930 6417 6533
Spain 67 749 2770 5470
France 207 692 2593 3514
Switzerland 512 1152 2468 3211
Netherlands 228 791 1711 2351
USA 288 640 1050 2070
Great Britain 90 279 906 1276
Yugoslavia 21 409 1055 1038
Belgium-Luxembourg 50 208 469 608
others 161 1174 5849 11086
total 2651 10230 31471 44280
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Press Office, 1995.
Despite these vast changes, some traditional mass-cultural patterns remained 
unchanged. Apart from the family, Vereinsmeierei probably represented the most 
fundamental social structure in West Germany. The term roughly translates as 
‘clubism’ and describes the German habit of organising nearly all social activities in 
clubs; from sport to allotment-gardeners to the keepers of carrier-pigeons. In most 
cases clubs were highly structured, with a proper constitution, accompanied by a 
variety of rules and regulations. Clubs provided a feeling of community and
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solidarity within a stable and secure social environment. Clubism however, also 
indicated the underlying desire for order and organisation, Notions of predictability 
and security lingered on which were generated by the individuals’ readiness to 
oblige to and function within a hierarchical structure of social organisation.
Media
Prior to the founding of the Bonn Republic in 1949, the western occupying forces 
had already established a dual principle of media organisation, consisting of private 
press and public radio and television. The system remained virtually unchanged for 
some three decades.3 West German households received three public television 
channels through traditional terrestrial transmitters. In regions bordering other 
Lander or foreign countries these increased to four to five. Public radio stations 
which roughly followed the federal structure of the Lander broadcast between two 
and four programmes. By the early 1980’s proposals which were largely inspired by 
the CDU/CSU called for radio and television licenses for private operators, arguing 
that more programmes would result in more variety and hence more freedom and 
consumer choice (Schatz et.al. 1990:352).
With the demise of the SPD/FDP coalition in 1982, the media landscape in West 
Germany gradually became subject to massive changes. By 1990, all Lander with 
the exception of Hesse and Bremen had altered legislation to allow for the 
establishment of private radio and television. Aided by the new technical 
infrastructure of cable and satellite, the number of television channels jumped to 
around twenty-five within a period of only five years. In urban areas, numerous 
private radio stations competed with public providers. The former dual principle was
3 Exceptions included Adenauer’s unsuccessful attempt to install a government-run television channel 
in 1961, the launch of a second public TV station a year later, as well as the introduction of ‘Third 
Channels’ operated by the individual corporations of the Lander in the mid-1960’s.
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transformed into a one-and-a-half duality of private press, as well as private and 
public radio and television.
However programme variety turned out to be rather minimal. Supply only multiplied 
quantitatively but not qualitatively. In contrast to public channels which benefited 
from significant licensing fees and tax revenues, private television was solely 
dependent on advertisement revenues. Private stations therefore hardly established 
distinctive profiles, since most geared towards the satisfaction of mainstream tastes. 
Although numerous in numbers, specialised programmes remained surprisingly rare 
and a mediocre mixture of sport, soap operas, game shows and movies which 
totalled some 75 per cent of their output (Schatz et.al 1990:352) emerged as the 
streamlined recipe for attracting consumers. The only exceptions were two sport 
networks, as well as the French-German public co-operation Arte which broadcast a 
high-profile mix of art, culture and documentaries.
Educational and informative programmes however, were notably rare on the new 
television agenda and were neglected in favour of readily consumable simple- 
mindedness and the ‘eternal repetition of sameness4 (Frei 1989:454). As a 
consequence of the free flow of market forces, broadcasting became increasingly 
sensational to gear towards the public’s inherent lust for the digestible extraordinary. 
News programmes adopted a casual style of presentation. Talk-shows which 
formerly addressed political issues now gave centre stage to the ordinary citizen and 
his or her unusual experiences. Clamorous reports about crime and sex, or ‘shocking 
revelations’ from celebrities introduced the West German television public to a new 
form of tabloid-type journalism which was formerly the exclusive terrain of the 
mass-daily ‘Bild
Concentrating processes soon affected the privatised television market. Media 
giants, such as Bertelsmann, Springer, Leo Kirch, Silvio Berlusconi, Holtzbrinck,
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Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, or Burda held shares in the two biggest private 
stations SAT1 and RTL-plus or the second tier consisting of Pro7, Tele 5/DSF or 
Kabelkanal. To a significant degree, the established public stations were forced to 
follow the programme pattern which proved so successful for private operators. With 
increasing numbers of cable households and satellite dishes, more and more West 
Germans turned to private television. In 1990, private providers had a 40 per cent 
share of the national television audience. In households with cable hook-ups the 
figures were even higher at 57 per cent (Humphreys 1994:272). Although partly 
financed by taxes, public channels still depended on advertising revenues to balance 
their budgets. Since the popularity of private stations grew constantly, public 
television tried to regain viewers by providing the same mix. Consequently, the 
number of soaps and sport broadcasts increased, while documentaries and political 
analyses were pushed to late-night slots. Only in the realms of news and information 
was the public sector able to maintain its position as an unsurpassed bastion of 
quality and reliability, although a ‘private* element of info-tainment visibly crept 
into its standard of presentation.
Table 5.9. West Germans Watching Television (minutes per day)




Source: Darschin and Frank 1988: 214-228, 1994:98-110
Hence the argument of variety regarding both programming and providers which 
swung the debate in favour of privatisation in the early 1980’s remained an 
unfulfilled promise. Nonetheless, West Germans did not seem to mind the arrival of 
the new media age. As shown in Table 5.9., West Germans spent more and more 
time in front of their television sets. The downward trend of the early 1980’s clearly
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had been reversed. Over a period of less than ten years, West German television was 
‘Americanised’. More channels offered less variety. Quality standards dropped with 
the emphasis on cheap and quick productions. Deliberate ‘channel surfing’ over 
longer hours replaced selective viewing and the former prerogative of television as a 
source of information and education was undermined by the desire for instant 
gratification of entertainment needs, using low standards as the common 
denominator of mainstream tastes.
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5.4. The New Lander
Consumerism
Despite incredible advances since unification, material preconditions for 
participation in the consumer society were still markedly different between east and 
west. As seen in Chapter Three, general income and living standards were 
improving, but for Easterners they did not reach satisfying levels. An overwhelming 
majority were discontent and expressed widespread bewilderment with the slow 
approximation of living standards between the old and new Lander which was 
caused by the evident gap in salaries and wages. Initially the wealth and prosperity 
on display in shop windows, on television and billboards were answered by the 
shrug of shoulders and the realisation that the consumer illusions that had prospered 
with unification were in sharp contrast to one’s personal financial reality.
Table 5.10. Consumer Products in Households, East and West (percentages)
1991 1993 1994
East West East West East West
Type 11(1)
car 93.8 96.5 96.6 96.4 97.3 95.8
video recorder 39.9 58.5 62.6 71.1 67.7 73.4
video camera 3.3 11.9 16.4 24.0 21.6 26.1
dish washer 1.1 61.8 7.3 64.9 9.3 68.7
micro wave 4.8 49.1 18.7 59.3 25.7 61.6
Type III (2)
car 93.1 98.5 97.3 98.0 97.9 98.0
video recorder 40.2 54.8 60.6 69.5 71.5 72.8
video camera 6.9 14.2 15.6 27.8 25.3 33.7
dish washer 3.1 85.3 4.9 86.0 13.6 85.3
micro wave 11.9 47.7 24.1 58.5 33.8 57.6
Type I (not included): two-person household incl. Pensioners and socialsecurity recipients with 
low income
(1) Type II: four-person household medium income
(2) Type III: four-person household higher income 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995:543,544.
230
Although lower than in the west, income and wages nonetheless offered enough 
financial resources to participate in the free market consumer world. By 1994, east 
German households generated a financial surplus (capital after standing charges) of 
439 Deutschmark per month which represented a significant increase from 304 DM 
three years earlier (Allensbacher Berichte 27/1994:1). Gradually, the gap in wages 
between east and west narrowed, income levels began to rise and people had more 
money to spend. Table 5.10. demonstrates the dramatic rush on consumer products 
between 1991 and 1994. By 1994, car ownership had reached equal levels in east 
and west. Easterners quickly sold Trabants and Wartburgs and invested heavily in 
new automobiles. Between 1991 and 1994, the percentage of ‘type II’ households 
which bought a brand-new car rose from 39 to 43 per cent. The figures of ‘type III’ 
household increased even more from 45 to 54 per cent.
Leaving more basic products, such as washing machines, or television sets out of the 
equation (since their demand had already been satisfied prior to 1989), East Germans 
hardly wasted time in purchasing items which some years earlier were either 
unavailable or outrageously expensive. Gaps between east and west regarding video 
cameras and recorders had largely been closed by 1994. Although equipment levels 
of dish washers and micro waves still showed distinct disparities, the increase in 
purchases of these products was nevertheless striking in both medium and higher 
income households. Hence, five years after unification and despite lower financial 
resources, the trend towards prosperous consumerism was firmly established in the 
new Lander.
Further insights into perceptions towards the arrival of the western consumer culture 
were offered by a closer look at consumer pattern and preferences. By 1991, 
prominent products of the GDR era enjoyed a surprising resurgence. The sweet and 
artificial tasting ‘Rotkappcheri1 sparkling wine re-emerged as a popular item. Prior to 
1989, the company had sold some 15 million bottles annually. By 1991, sales
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dropped to 2.9 million, only to increase dramatically to 5.7 million in 1992 and to 17 
million in 1994. In 1994, only 50,000 bottles were sold in the west. The cigarette 
brand ‘F6' which was exclusively sold in the new Lander established itself as the 
best selling make in eastern Germany with a market share of over 30 per cent (Der 
Spiegel 27/1995:59).
The initial consumer orientation after the Wende however, offered no indication for 
such a revival. After the currency union in July 1990, western products 
overwhelmingly dominated the eastern market (Gries 1994:1044). Years of material 
scarcity, limited choice and often questionable quality, as well as pent-up consumer 
wishes now found their expression in an unequivocal thirst for western products. In 
particular, established and comparatively expensive brand products benefited from 
this trend (Diesener and Gries 1993:21). It was not the no-name product that 
attracted the consumer but in contrast, the brand that was already familiar to most 
Easterners. Over the years, advertisement on western television generated a product 
socialisation which now provided for the competitive edge in the newly liberalised 
consumer market. Despite often limited financial resources, Easterners followed the 
promising yet costly advertising messages, while showing ‘a lack of consumer 
competence’ (Diesener and Gries 1993:21) that otherwise would have properly 
evaluated the products’ value for money.
During this consumer euphoria, eastern products hardly stood a chance against their 
western rivals. They were stigmatised as representatives of an inefficient economy of 
short supply: outdated, unaesthetic and unattractive. Gradually, eastern products 
vanished from the shelves of supermarkets and shop owners were eager to sell the 
remaining stock by dumping price levels. As far as East Germans had access to 
them, west German goods were for decades almost worshipped in the east which 
now lead to a nearly total boycott of eastern products (Schmidt 1994:371).
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Nonetheless, Easterners increasingly had their first unpleasant experiences with the 
new consumer society. Dubious western business opportunists claimed the east as 
the new frontier of capitalism and Easterners made the acquaintance of credit sharks, 
overpriced used cars or disproportionate insurance policies. The markets of eastern 
towns were packed with stands, offering clothes and food products whose value-for- 
money ratings were all too often simply ridiculous. The appreciation of and curiosity 
towards western consumer products and the often sheer helplessness when 
confronted with the new-found choice and diversity gradually turned into 
bewilderment and scepticism. For some, these first approaches to westem-style 
consumerism left a bitter aftertaste which further determined their future consumer 
preferences.
Soon a clear reversal trend towards the appreciation of eastern products became 
visible. In December 1991, almost three-quarters out of a total of one hundred 
surveyed households deliberately preferred eastern over western products which 
represented a sharp rise from fifty per cent in December 1990 and 65 per cent in mid 
1991 (Gries 1994:1045). By the end of 1993, 82 per cent of surveyed consumers 
stated that they preferred eastern over western products {Der Spiegel 52/1993:46). 
Furthermore, in a survey taken in February 1993, respondents had been asked, 
whether they buy eastern products during their regular shopping trips. 65 per cent 
answered with ‘often’, 31 per cent with ‘sometimes’ and only three per cent replied 
with ‘hardly’ or ‘never’ (Gries 1994:1045).
Western advertising images, language and symbols faced increasing difficulties in 
reaching the eastern consumer. Uniformed marketing campaigns which simply 
transferred western slogans to the east failed to generate a successful impact. Also, 
East Germans simply did not always appreciate the taste, style or character of certain 
western products. Surveys by the eastern Institut fur Marktforschung showed that in 
particular eastern dairy products, meat, bread, as well as eastern cigarettes and beer
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had a better reputation regarding taste when compared to their western counterparts 
(Gries 1994:1048,1050). Market strategists were forced to respond to this new 
consumer orientation and began to design specifically eastern strategies. Former 
GDR products underwent rapid transformations regarding design, quality and 
presentation but kept the brand name of the former Socialist article. Labels and 
stickers, such as ‘fabricated in Thuringia’, ‘brewed in the VogtlancT or ‘fresh from 
our Heimat\ as well as the display of the emblems of the new Lander acknowledged 
local and regional loyalties.
The cigarette market served as an intriguing example. After unification, the tobacco 
giant Philip Morris incorporated the Dresdner Tabakwerke with their brands ‘Fd’, 
‘JuweV and ‘Karo’ into its corporate structure. The western strategists at Philip 
Morris in Munich managed to run a strikingly successful campaign. ‘Fd’ was 
advertised as a product that stood for the good and the familiar, as a symbol of 
tradition and persistence in a time of sweeping changes and as a vital representative 
of East German cultural history.4 ‘Fd’ declined to change its design and the 
distinctively strong taste which differed strikingly from the much preferred ‘ light’- 
types of the west remained. Philip Morris avoided western advertising cliches, such 
as sophistication and affluence and instead stressed tradition and authenticity which 
gave the impression that valuable achievements of the GDR still had a right to exist. 
Slogans such as ‘the taste stays the same’, ‘the original from Dresden’, or ‘our 
classic’ paid further reference to the era prior to unification. The strategy had a 
remarkable success. At the end of 1989, ‘Fd’ already possessed a dominant market 
share of thirteen per cent. A year later the make reached a peak at 33 per cent which 
subsequently only dropped slightly to 31.3 per cent at the end of 1994.
4 Information according to the Press Office at Philip Morris, March 1995.
2 3 4
‘Karo\ formerly nicknamed the ‘Gauloise of the East’ went even further in 
emphasising GDR references and pronounced an aggressive ‘attack against the 
Einheitssgeschmack\ 5 The advertisement for the cigarette ‘JuweV trumpeted: ‘I 
smoke Juwel because I already tasted the West’.6 In contrast, ‘Cabinet’, a cigarette 
brand that belonged to the West German company Reemtsma performed a U-turn 
regarding its marketing strategy. After a disastrous campaign which tried to establish 
the make amongst other western counterparts by using western language and design, 
sales plummeted which forced Reemtsma to praise the taste of ‘Cabinet’ as 
‘unperfumed and unadulterated’ (Gries 1994:1049-51).
Other market segments had equally successful advertising campaigns by following 
the same prerogative of designing a uniquely eastern strategy. The former GDR cola 
'Club' trumpeted: ‘Hooray, I’m still alive. Club Cola - our Cola’. ‘Burger Knacke a 
crispbread from Saxony-Anhalt achieved an astonishing market share of 65 per cent 
in the east by 1993 (in contrast to 15 per cent in the west). An essential product to 
the GDR diet, ‘Burger Knacke ’ ran a successful campaign, promoting the product as 
a ‘crispy piece of Heimaf (Gries 1994:1052-3).
Life and Leisure
When wandering through the towns of eastern Germany only a few years after 
unification, the visible changes in the cityscapes were striking. The vast difference to 
the grey and dull impression which was so prevalent during the Communist era 
became even more breath-taking by comparing the advances of eastern Germany to 
those of other post-Communist societies. Even the more prosperous Hungary or the
5 The term has a double meaning which can be translated as the taste of unification, as well as 
streamlined and indifferent taste.
6 The campaign built on a double meaning, since ‘the West’ also stood for a West German cigarette 
brand. By 1989, its prominent slogan ‘Test the West’ became a symbolic stimulus for freed East 
Germans.
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Czech Republic represented no comparison to the already accomplished massive 
transformation processes in the former GDR. The entire region resembled one 
gigantic construction site. Roads were being modernised, traffic by-passes built, 
historic buildings and entire blocks of houses restored or renovated. In particular in 
the centre of towns, a difference between east and west became hard to depict. The 
western corporate culture, including shops and advertisement quickly established 
itself and eventually represented an almost perfect mirror image of the west. Even 
small businesses like cafes, restaurants or pubs showed a striking similarity to 
western standards.
Away from the city centres however, eastern towns entered a process of turning into 
archetypal US-American commercial suburbia with gigantic shopping malls and the 
conglomeration of such services as petrol stations, furniture outlets, or car dealers. 
According to Die Zeit (September 2, 1994: 23), shopping malls in suburban districts 
already accounted for an astonishing 55 per cent of the turn-over in retail in 1994, 
which was in sharp contrast to the west (25 per cent) where space in the hinterlands 
of urban concentrations were not that readily available anymore.
The consequences were alarming. Inner cities had to face the prospect of turning into 
deserted areas, while the newly emerging ‘Mittelstand’ which was just about to 
establish itself and to profit from the market transition was confronted with severe 
losses in revenue. A reversal of this trend was nowhere in sight. Instead, by 1994 
fifteen giant shopping malls were already in operation in the east, complemented by 
a further 27 which opened their doors in 1995.
Despite these trends and the presence of horrific satellite towns which continued to 
dominate the outskirts of every urban area, the Communist period offered a 
paradoxical, yet highly potential chance for urban and architectural improvement. 
For decades, urban planning and modernisation was almost absent because of the
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lack of financial resources and commitment which left historic buildings and entire 
towns at the status quo of 1945. In return, eastern Germany was spared the 
modernising sins of the post-war era which western communities now struggle with. 
In the east, historic lines of streets remained intact and life in inner cities was still 
relatively unaffected by four-lane highways, inhospitable ‘match-box’ apartments 
and large office complexes. Federal, Lander and local authorities in eastern Germany 
seized this unique opportunity and began a wide range of restoration programmes 
which had the potential of establishing highly satisfying urban landscapes, not only 
regarding their historical aesthetics but also in terms of maintaining and fostering a 
socially advantageous neighbourhood community.
But how did East Germans respond to these developments? When queried about 
beauty within one’s general living environment, different conceptualisations 
between east and west prevailed. As shown in Table 5.11. modernity, affluence and 
technical innovation were on top of the eastern agenda which indicated that the 
recent arrival of the western consumer society was largely appreciated. Bom out of 
decades of material scarcity and consumer privation, Easterners envisioned their 
living environments with shop window displays, expensive cars and modem houses.
Table 5.11. Attitudes Towards Beauty, East and West 1991 (percentages)
Question: On this list (presentation o f options) are there certain items which you have recently 
noticed and which you find beautiful? (Multiple answers possible).
East West
shop window displays 49 30
modem houses and office complexes 37 15
expensive cars 34 17
old houses 29 36
neon advertising 18 6
bunch of flowers 36 32
nice gardens 35 36
tall old trees 25 36
sunset, sunrise 24 33
Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 5059, December 1991.
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In sharp contrast, Westerners favoured idyllic and romantic things. On top of their 
agenda were such antipodes to modernity and technological progress as old houses, 
gardens and trees. Forty years of diverging experiences therefore generated 
fundamentally different aesthetics. In the east, modernity was embraced. The west 
however, had already experienced the downside of modernity, with inhospitable city 
centres, traffic congestion or urban alienation and instead favoured a retreat into the 
idyllic as an escape from Chaplin’s vision of ‘Modem Times’. While West Germans 
might have despised shopping malls as ugly and anonymous architectural 
monstrosities, East Germans appreciated their convenience and vast display of 
choice and affluence.
Also, while west German observers were enchanted by the restoration of medieval 
towns, Easterners placed more emphasis on the provision of central heating or well 
functioning plumbing. This seemed only a logical reaction since the state of housing 
in the old GDR left much to be desired. Half of all houses were built before 1945. In 
early 1990, the average apartment size comprised only 61 square metres as compared 
to 84 in the FRG. Forty per cent had grave structural deficiencies. Eleven per cent 
were completely unsuitable for housing and a further forty per cent had minor 
defects. Only ten per cent of apartments in the GDR were in a satisfactory condition. 
The provision of heating, hot water, interior WC, bathroom and kitchen reached 75 
per cent in new apartments, but only a mere 30 per cent in old houses (Crow and 
Hennig 1995:101,102). Hence after four decades of Communist parsimony, East 
Germans eagerly absorbed ‘modernity’ with such notions as convenience, comfort, 
change, progress and innovation. In this respect, they displayed comparable 
intentions to their western counterparts in the immediate post-war era. The 
retroactive distancing from modernity with the contemplation of such notions as 
tranquillity, sensuality or peacefulness had yet to reach the new Lander.
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Table 5.12. Attitudes Towards Social Relations in the East (percentages)
Question: Are relations to your fellow neighbours better, worse or is there no difference in 
comparison to the GDR?
March 1992 June 1993 August 1994
better 4.9 4.2 5.7
worse 43.8 49.7 56.7
no difference 51.3 46.1 37.6
n 1078 996 1062
Source: Politbarometer.
Life in general became harder and faster in eastern Germany. Working environments 
and requirements changed. Progressive social services were abolished and old 
routines broke down. The individual was asked to adjust and comply to new 
economic, political and social principles, since the transformation stressed notions of 
initiative, individuality and independence which were in marked contrast to the old 
totalitarian system that had nurtured obedience, hierarchy and apathy (see Chapter 
Three). These pressures had a profound impact on every individual’s life and East 
Germans evaluated the new social climate in a strongly negative fashion. Table 5.12. 
showed that nearly half of the respondent’s social relations had worsened since 
1989. By 1994 the figure had increased to a staggering 57 per cent. The middle 
generation (people aged 40 to 49) was particularly disillusioned with numbers 
reaching 69 per cent.
These strikingly negative perceptions showed the level of security - both mentally 
and materially - that the Communist system was able to offer its citizens. These 
figures also demonstrate the vast social ruptures since unification which will require 
years of adjustment. Despite improved material conditions, despite increased 
comfort, convenience and choice, people were ill-prepared for the sudden arrival of 
‘consumer paradise’ and found it hard to adopt the underlying prerogatives of 
prosperity and affluence within a market economy: competition, performance and 
individual responsibility.
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Table 5.13. Leisure Opportunities, East and West 16-29 years (percentages)
East West
sports club, sports ground 65 89
swimming pool 44 73
parks 46 63
disco 63 55
youth clubs 29 57
clubs, unions etc. 16 55
fitness gym 36 59
cinemas 37 59
Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 5070, October 1992.
Although East Germans were all too aware of the negative side-effects of prosperity, 
they nonetheless showed a confident demand towards their positive connotations. 
Hence, the choice of leisure activities could not keep pace with people’s 
expectations. In early 1993, only eight per cent of Easterners were satisfied with the 
variety of leisure opportunities in their neighbourhood or close by, as compared to 
57 per cent in the west (Der Spiegel January 18,1993:56). More specifically, the 
Allensbacher Institut fur Demoskopie queried people aged 16 to 29 about leisure 
choices. Table 5.13. shows the drastic disparities between east and west in almost 
every leisure sector.
In particular, the western structure of clubs had yet to fully replace the former 
comprehensive social network of party and mass organisations or worker collectives. 
In 1991, the number of registered eastern sports clubs within the Deutscher 
Sportbund (the national association of sports clubs) reached only some 9,000 or a 
mere 12 per cent of the national total. Regarding membership, only 6.9 per cent of 
Easterners were members of a sport club which was in striking disparity to the west 
with 30 per cent (Statistical Yearbook 1995:429). Three years later the figures had 
improved slightly but nonetheless documented the tacit extension of the western club 
system. Now, 14 per cent of all clubs were based in the new Lander but still only 8.9 
per cent of the population were members (Statistical Yearbook 1992:453). The
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Deutscher Sangerbund (the national association of singing clubs) had to face similar 
problems. In 1991, only 2.2 per cent of clubs and less than one per cent of members 
came from the east. By 1994, although eastern clubs accounted for ten per cent, 
eastern membership figures did not exceed five per cent of the national total 
(Statistical Yearbook 1992:447; 1995:423).
Table 5.14. Leisure Activities, East and West, 1994 (percentages)
Activity Frequency West East
Movies at least once a month 15.1 11.9
rarely 34.2 28.7
never 50.5 59.1
Theatre, Concerts at least once a month 12.9 7.9
rarely 41.4 37.2
never 45.5 54.7
DIY at least once a month 35.1 35.5
rarely 26.1 22.7
never 38.5 41.4
Sport at least once a month 43.5 32.0
rarely 15.8 22.9
never 40.4 44.8
Hiking at least once a month 24.3 26.7
rarely 36.9 39.0
never 38.4 39.9
Going out (restaurants, clubs etc.) at least once a month 64.7 43.2
rarely 25.0 33.7
never 10.1 23.0
Source: Mediaanalyse; in Baldauf and Klingler 1994:414
Apart from the diverging leisure infrastructures, the prevalent economic disparities 
which affected broad societal segments in the new Lander accounted for different 
leisure preferences and activities for East and West Germans. A survey amongst 
some 51,000 respondents (Baldauf and Klingler 1994:409) showed that DIY, hiking,
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as well as sport received almost identical responses. However clubbing and eating 
out, as well as going to theatres, concerts and movies were markedly more common 
on the leisure agenda of West Germans, while more East Germans never participated 
in such activities at all.
The persistent economic instability made inexpensive leisure activities ever more 
attractive to most Easterners. Affluent leisure pursuits, such as clubbing or theatre 
were regarded as expensive extravaganzas. The drastic price increases in restaurants 
and for theatre, concert and cinema tickets further contributed to the reluctant 
acceptance of western patterns of leisure consumption. While these were 
substantially subsidised in the old GDR, the sudden introduction of market 
principles prompted many East Germans to simply erase them from their leisure 
agenda.
Shortly after unification, East Germans showed a marked interest in travel. This 
came as no surprise since in the autumn of 1989, demands for the lifting of travel 
restrictions were prominent features of various demonstrations. Banners even 
depicted ‘DDR ’ (the German abbreviation for GDR) as ‘die dauernde Reiselust’ 
(persistent desire to travel). By 1991, average daily travel expenses per capita had 
reached 787 DM. The figure trailed significantly behind the western level of 1468 
DM, but nonetheless represented a sixty per cent increase in comparison to 1990 
(Deutscher Reisebiiro-Verband 1995). Against the backdrop of considerable 
economic disparities between east and west and the substantial material insecurity of 
East Germans, most Easterners preferred to spend their holidays in Germany. Travel 
to the old Lander satisfied a pent-up desire to experience life on the other side of the 
former ‘Iron Curtain’. Table 5.15. also shows the marked lack of interest of West 
Germans in visiting the new Lander. Although the data only referred to main 
holidays (usually in the summer), the meagre shares of 2.5 and 2.7 per cent stood 
neither in relation to the attractive tourist offerings of eastern Germany, nor the
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opportunity to freely visit a part of the country without the former hassles of border 
controls or visa restrictions. Even the often rudimentary state of eastern tourist 
facilities at the outset of unification could not explain such indifference on behalf of 
West Germans.
Table 5.15. Destination of Main Holiday, East and West Germans (percentages)
East West
1990 1991 1990 1991
Germany old Lander 31.9 33.4 27.2 27.9
Germany new Lander 43.4 20.8 2.5 2.7
foreign countries total 24.8 45.5 70.3 69.4
Spain 3.0 7.4 13.0 13.7
Italy 2.5 4.9 10.2 10.5
Austria 4.3 9.7 7.0 8.8
France 1.4 2.2 5.9 5.8
Eastern Europe 9.6 10.8 3.8 3.4
Non-European 0.5 3.0 9.8 10.3
Others 3.5 7.5 20.6 16.9
total 100 100 100 100
Source: Deutscher Reisebtiro-Verband, Press Office 1995.
As with the west, Spain, Austria and Italy emerged as popular foreign holiday spots. 
When looking only at foreign destinations, 40 per cent of East Germans in 1990 and 
49 per cent in 1991 travelled to these three countries. The figures were in marked 
similarity to the west with 43 per cent in 1990 and 48 per cent in 1991. The former 
6 Comecon-bathtubs’ in Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria still featured prominently on 
the East German travel agenda. In 1990, 39 per cent of all foreign holidays did not 
take advantage of the new freedom to experience other countries which was largely 
prompted by attractive low prices levels and currency advantages in eastern Europe. 
The often reported indifference towards new and more exotic holiday experiences 
however, represented a false conclusion. By 1991, only 24 per cent of foreign
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holidays were spent in the former Communist states and more and more East 
Germans travelled to southern, western, northern and non-European countries.
Media
With unification, political authorities wasted no time in radically transforming the 
eastern media landscape along the lines of the established West German system. The 
Hamburg-based Norddeutscher Rundfunk expanded to Mecklenburg- 
Westpomerania. The Sender Freies Berlin now catered also for the eastern part of 
the city. Two further public stations, the Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (covering 
Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia) and the Ostdeutscher Rundfunk 
Brandenburg filled the void left behind by the demise of the state-owned radio and 
television network of the GDR.
Private television stations highly welcomed the arrival of millions of new customers. 
By 1993, 93 per cent of all households in Germany were able to receive more than 
four channels. 60 per cent could choose between 16 or more stations and only seven 
per cent were still limited to the public television diet. While in the west, most 
households had already been connected to the cable system, eastern viewers installed 
satellite dishes until their neighbourhood was connected. Differences between east 
and west regarding the reception of private stations were therefore only marginal 
(Darschin and Frank 1994:98).
Patterns of media consumption displayed marked differences between east and west. 
Although television viewing softly increased between 1991 and 1994 in both the old 
and new Lander, Easterners spent significantly more time in front of the ‘box’. As 
shown in Table 5.16. adults over the age of fourteen watched some twenty per cent 
more, children occasionally (1991) even forty per cent more which was largely the
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result of increased consumption of light entertainment programmes (Darschin and 
Frank 1995:160).
Table 5.16. Television Consumption, East and West (minutes per day)
East West
Adults Children 6-13 years Adults Children 6-
1991 189 132 160 93
1992 199 124 160 97
1993 209 125 168 100
1994 207 114 170 95
Source: Darschin and Frank. 1995:154,1994:98
While western viewers continued to prefer the two public channels ARD and ZDF, 
Easterners showed a marked preference for private stations. In 1994, viewing shares 
for ARD and ZDF in the west totalled 17.5 and 18 per cent respectively. In the east 
however, numbers amounted to only 12.5 and 13.5 per cent. In contrast, viewing 
shares for SAT. 1 were 14 per cent in the west and 17 per cent in the east, while RTL- 
plus pocketed 16.5 per cent of western and 20 per cent of eastern air time (Darschin 
and Frank 1995:156). The figures for 1994 were thereby only marginally different 
from 1993 which indicated a consolidation of differing consumer behaviour.
In particular, the eastern television audience was more receptive for the 
sensationalist news journalism of private channels. While in 1994, the most popular 
news show Tagesschau (from the public ARD) was watched by 15 per cent of West 
Germans, it only interested a total of eleven per cent in the east. In contrast RTL 
Aktuell reached four per cent of Westerners and eight per cent of Easterners. Also, 
public news magazines attracted far less viewers than their private counterparts. The 
most popular ZDF show Bonn direkt was watched by eleven per cent in the west and 
by ten per cent in the east. However 19 per cent of Easterners tuned in to the RTL
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infotainment-show Explosiv, as compared to only nine per cent of Westerners 
(Darschin and Frank 1995:162). It seemed that the casual, tabloid-type of 
presentation struck a popular cord with East Germans. More than in the west, 
informative broadcasts fulfilled additional functions as sources of entertainment and 
diversion.
Radio was more popular and more widely used in the east than in the west. As 
shown in Table 5.17. on an average weekday Easterners had a higher consumption 
of some thirty minutes. Private radio had an increasing impact on consumer 
preferences in eastern Germany. In 1993, the market shares for private stations 
totalled between ten and fifteen per cent in Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg- 
Westpomerania and Saxony. Brandenburg was already the beneficiary of numerous 
private stations from Berlin which increased the total to some forty per cent.
Table 5.17. Radio Consumption, East and West (weekly averages)
West East
Listeners Minutes Listeners Minutes
(percentages) (per day) (percentages) (per day)
1991/92 80.6 163 86.8 189
1993 80.9 169 87.0 192
1994 79.9 168 86.2 192
Source: Baldauf and Klingler 1994:413, Franz and Klingler 1992:450.
A year and various launches of new private stations later, growth rates for market 
shares reached between 24 per cent (Mecklenburg-Westpomerania) and thirteen per 
cent (Thuringia) which positioned the new Lander amongst such western states as 
Saarland, Baden-Wiirttemberg or Lower Saxony (Baldauf and Klingler 1994:418). 
These figures demonstrated that with increased coverage by private stations, 
Easterners did not show any signs of reluctance in embracing the new private media.
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The market for magazines also displayed sharply diverging reading preferences 
between Easterners and Westerners. As with television, eastern readers remained 
rather sceptical towards serious news journalism. As seen in Table 5.18., the two 
main news magazines, Der Spiegel and Focus found it hard to establish loyal 
readerships in the east. Stern, the Hamburg-based info-tainment magazine shared the 
same problem and could only attract meagre numbers of East Germans. Of the most 
popular western papers only the tabloid Bild achieved respectable figures.
Table 5.18. Print Media Preferences 1995, East and West (percentages)
West East
Der Spiegel 12.7 4.4
Focus 8.8 3.7
Stem 17.4 3.5
Super Illu 0.8 16.1
Bild am Sonntag 20.1 13.3
n 6013 1532
Source: Gruner und Jahr 1995:548
In contrast, Super Illu enjoyed a remarkable success. Articles in the magazine were 
exclusively devoted to eastern issues, problems and concerns. Stories, for instance 
included an analysis of the success of GDR actors in post unification Germany, 
exclusives of eastern celebrities or reports on governmental scams with the average 
East German as the victim. The figures indicated not only the preference for light 
entertainment over serious political discourse but furthermore the existence of a 
considerable market niche which cashed in on feelings of resentment and anger.
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5.5. Conclusion
Despite the persistent disparities regarding prosperity between east and west, East 
Germans generated enough money to participate in the westem-style consumer 
society. Immediately after unification, a rush on consumer goods emerged, where in 
particular formerly overpriced or unavailable items, such as cars and electronic 
goods were quickly purchased. Within a short period, the western consumer world 
was embraced by Easterners. These first consumer experiences within unified 
Germany were in marked resemblance to the West German economic boom of the 
1950’s where a wave of gluttony and consumerism compensated for years of 
material privation. The Bonn Republic’s consumer society offered its citizens 
affirmative experiences within the recently established free market economy which 
persistently generated widespread prosperity, higher wages, longer holidays and 
shorter working hours.
In the seven years since unification, the consumer euphoria in the new Lander 
exemplified similar positive orientations towards the arrival of westem-style 
consumerism. Participation in and approval of it served as a buffer of support within 
the general and often demanding and unsettling transformation processes. These 
positive orientations were boosted by drastically different consumer experiences in 
the old GDR. Despite being a - for Comecon standards - relatively successful 
economy, shortage of supply and poor quality of products were frequent. A distorted 
consumer system subsidised basic needs but overpriced fundamental consumer 
desires. Since images of the western consumer society were transmitted through 
television and tourism, the comparative material privation of the GDR fostered the 
population’s fixation on the west, as well as the fetishisation of its products which 
subsequently functioned as systemic de-stabilisers for the SED regime during times 
when the gap to the more prosperous western counterpart increasingly widened. 
Western consumer products served as cultural ambassadors of a normative consumer
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paradise which eventually paved the way for unification. By 1989, pent-up consumer 
desires exploded and almost overnight, western consumerism with its images of 
affluence and choice became a firmly established part of the eastern psyche.
This initial open embracing however, transformed into a unique consumer mentality. 
Although affluence and choice as offered by the new market economy were not 
rejected, Easterners defined them differently and filled consumerism with political 
meaning. The product of consumption thereby acquired the status of a miniature 
plebiscite that reflected on the general transformation processes in the aftermath of 
unification. As argued in Chapters Three and Four, attitudes prevailed that 
unification merely represented a corporate take-over and colonisation by the west 
since the political, economic, social and administrative structures of the Bonn 
Republic were simply extended to the eastern Lander. Initial hopes of a literal 
unification, of merging eastern and western assets in establishing a better society 
were crushed to the ground and gave way to the realisation that the uprising against 
the SED regime had ended in the superimposition of western norms and standards.
In the realm of consumerism, the resurgence of eastern products - whether newly 
introduced or rejuvenated from the GDR past - expressed the widespread resentment 
against these developments. In buying ‘east’, Easterners articulated notions of 
defiance against the general eradicating processes of unification which perceived 
anything East German as unsuitable for the new system of democracy and 
capitalism. East Germans sensed that the west was not always the best, while the east 
had achieved and produced worthy assets as well.
Defiance was furthered by growing scepticism and bewilderment. The initial rush 
towards western products which was largely caused by the product socialisation of 
western television during the SED era, as well as by the poor standards of GDR 
products gradually cooled down. As one of the first lessons of market economics,
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Easterners realised that glamorous and polished products did not always keep their 
advertised promises. Subsequently, the normative consumer paradise of the west 
which had prevailed in the parsimonious days of the GDR was de-mystified. 
Overpriced articles, alien tastes and artificially-created demands fostered a re­
orientation towards eastern products. Whether as cause or as reinforcing 
consequence, marketing and advertising exerted a profound impact. Western images, 
language and symbols found it increasingly hard to impress eastern consumers. Old 
GDR-brands were re-launched with improved design and quality. Prevalent western 
advertising cliches of sophistication and luxury were pushed aside by images of 
honesty, authenticity and tradition. Coded political messages such as ‘I am still 
alive’ or ‘Against the taste of unification’ captured the Zeitgeist of the eastern 
Lander.
The orientation towards eastern consumer goods also became an indicator for 
emerging regional pride. Once spotted, differences in consumer behaviour and 
preferences between east and west were cultivated and turned into relics of self­
esteem. Marketing strategies connected mass products to sentiments of the east 
German Heimat. New brands with an emphasis on regional/eastern affiliations 
emerged. Easterners responded to the streamlining processes of transition and the 
perceptions of a second-class citizenry by proudly heralding the quality, beauty or 
performance of ‘their’ products. Eastern goods were attributed with highly positive 
characteristics, such as value for money, trust, integrity or honesty which confidently 
expressed the difference to the presumably untrustworthy and sleazy west and 
thereby acquired a vital identity-creating function.
In addition, notions of escapism and nostalgia became apparent. The rapid 
unification process brought profound and abrupt changes to East Germans. For some 
the sheer size, speed and depth of the post-Communist transition were hard to grasp 
and digest. During these massive transformations people were longing for a piece of
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familiarity, for a stable constant in a time of sweeping changes. Such emotional 
cosiness was offered by former GDR products which had kept their old brand names. 
They reminded East Germans of the past prior to unification - not necessarily of its 
totalitarian implication but simply of a time when life was not as complicated and 
demanding. Idyllic advertising images, such as a river valley in the Vogtland 
mountains, the Isle of Riigen with dunes and fields, or a mountain range in the 
Thuringian forest represented a further retreat from the stress and demands of the 
reality of unification and modem civilisation. They stood in sharp contrast to the 
daily experiences of post-unification, including job insecurity or challenged social 
status. Such advertised romanticism provided an easy escape from reality, away from 
the grave changes and the urgency to adapt to new social, political and economic 
demands.
The drastic infrastructural changes of living environments were largely approved by 
East Germans. Extensive renovation and building programmes, the arrival of the 
western corporate culture, shopping centres, road and rail networks, or modem 
housing were highly welcomed. After decades of lacking innovation and investment, 
the SED had left Eastern Germany in a run-down state. Crumbling balconies in 
uninhabitable houses, collapsing roofs or pot holes in pre-war cobbled stoned roads 
exemplified the parsimonious nature of life in the GDR. Not surprisingly, the 
incoming convenience, comfort and progress brought about by unification were 
therefore perceived as the long-awaited arrival of modernity. Like their western 
countrymen in the 1950’s and 1960’s, ideal living environments were conceptualised 
as new, bright, clean and prosperous. Unlike their countrymen of the 1990’s a notion 
of a backlash on modernity and an emphasis on tranquillity, serenity or romanticism 
only had minor importance.
‘Catching-up’ with the reference culture of the old Lander was on the mind of many 
Easterners. As an indication for the much desired approximation to the west,
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Easterners complained about the still insufficient provision of leisure choices. The 
marked interest in travel and in particular holiday destinations which largely 
resembled those of the west furthermore pointed towards the internalisation of 
western mass-cultural standards. Differences regarding the pursuit of leisure 
activities or travel patterns were not the result of different preferences but instead 
were caused by the still existing gaps in the material standards between east and 
west. For years, the normative mass-cultural proposal of the FRG built up strong 
desires to equally experience the good sides of life. Western travel and leisure 
patterns were therefore embraced as fundamental currents of a western life-style.
However certain diverging conceptualisations of life and leisure remained. East 
Germans overwhelmingly complained about the deteriorating social climate. The 
pressures of transition, the urge to perform at work, the stress on social circles 
caused by material insecurity and changing social status, as well as the general speed 
and depth of the massive system transformations left many in a state of imbalance. 
For most East Germans and despite the welcomed arrival of modernity, life became 
harder. When looking at the tight-knit social environments of the GDR, the 
unsettling consequences of such changes became even more transparent. Life in the 
GDR followed a slower pace. Performance at work was less demanding. Amiable 
social relations, a certain lack of competitiveness and a strong feeling of security and 
safety characterised one’s social relations.
In return, the incoming western culture emphasised fundamentally different notions. 
With the erosion of traditional social and political milieus and the break-down of 
formerly strong societal divisions, life in the Bonn Republic gradually had become 
freer, more mobile and more flexible. The cultural revolution of the 1960’s resulted 
in considerably less disciplined and authoritarian attitudes, while notions of 
independence, individuality, and free will fundamentally altered West Germany. The 
single-mindedness of the Adenauer-era with its orientation towards stability and
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material security gave way to a desire for new outlets of satisfaction. The corrupting 
influence of affluence sought for ever increasing and ever changing material and 
spiritual gratification. Growing material prosperity allowed for increased and 
diversified spending. Leisure activities grew in qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Affluent travel became a common feature, while life in general became faster and 
more complex.
Easterners had yet to accommodate these cultural standards. The former stable and 
foreseeable patterns and circles of life became subject to sudden changes. In the 
realm of work, growing demands and pressures had to be met. Increased horizontal 
and vertical mobility accounted for flexible and unstable social environments of 
friends and colleagues. The former collective solidarity spirit at home and at work 
was replaced by the competitive elbow-mentality of a free society. Former rigid 
regulators of life, such as state, party and ideology disappeared and a complex web 
of multiple determinants emerged. Suddenly the individual was confronted with 
freedom of choice. Questions such as ‘where to go on holiday’, ‘what consumer 
goods to buy’, or ‘what to do after work’ were enriched by vastly increasing 
opportunities. The freedom to choose and to freely determine one’s life however, did 
not always constitute a positive asset, but instead often a confusing and demanding 
imperative. Life in a freer, faster, more complex and less anchored society was 
sometimes daunting. This sudden flexibility and fluidity of life made Easterners 
pessimistic about the state of their rapidly altered social climate.
Indeed, change and flexibility were hardly imperatives during the Communist era. 
Severe travel restrictions - mostly limited to Socialist countries - allowed for only 
marginal cultural exposure or the experience of cultural differences. Limited choice 
of leisure activities made the individual concentrate on one’s immediate environment 
of work, friends and family. However the society of niches which was so prevalent 
in the GDR had a comparable equivalent in West Germany. While in the east, the
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retreat into the private, unpolitical sphere of the Lauben culture fostered an intimate 
atmosphere of social harmony, the same can be said about the western social 
organisation of clubs. This structured and secure environment which offered a strong 
sense of community and solidarity had the potential to compensate for the lacking 
social stability in a climate of constant and sweeping changes. With clubs slowly but 
steadily entering the social agenda in the new Lander, clubism provided much 
needed oases of tranquillity and security.
Media consumption in the new Lander strongly accommodated western mass- 
cultural standards, and western radio and television hardly met any resistance from 
Easterners. Television and radio were more consumed in the east, while in particular 
private TV channels enjoyed higher viewing figures than in the west. The strong 
attractiveness of private television was further documented by the exorbitant number 
of satellite dishes. Since the provision of cable in the new Lander remained patchy, 
consumers heavily invested in electronic equipment to receive more than the 
standard public media diet.
Despite the radical extension of the western media system after 1990, the arrival and 
subsequent extensive use of private radio and television did not represent a caesura, 
but instead a continuation of consumption patterns of the GDR era. Before 
unification, western radio and in particular western television constituted integral 
parts of life in eastern Germany as normative references of information, truth and 
entertainment and were widely used as alternatives to the politicised eastern media. 
Some were even able to watch the new private television channels in particular 
around Berlin and in regions close to the border. East Germans were therefore quite 
familiar with the new developments in the media sector of the Federal Republic in 
the 1980’s.
254
In the west, the arrival of the new media age brought an unprecedented choice of 
channels but only minimal programming variety. Private stations offered a mediocre 
mix of soap operas, sports, game shows and movies. Education and informative 
programmes surrendered to low standards of presentation and content. Forced by the 
huge success of this recipe, public stations were forced to follow to some extent the 
private footsteps, resulting in the ‘Americanisation’ of West German television. The 
enthusiastic response of East Germans to these trends had its roots in the GDR past 
and in the regime’s dissatisfying offerings in the entertainment sector. Television 
and radio were politicised and functioned as propaganda tools, as well as means of 
political indoctrination. While the SED understood culture as a high culture of fine 
arts and despite a gradual liberalisation which allowed for more trivial, lower or 
western forms of entertainment, the demand for light entertainment by far exceeded 
supply. The function of simple entertainment as a compensation for daily pressures 
although was acknowledged by the SED, but nonetheless never accordingly acted 
upon.
With unification, this ‘vacuum of fun’ could suddenly be filled. More than their 
western compatriots, East Germans watched more television and in particular 
preferred the light forms of entertainment which were offered by ‘SATV or ‘RTL- 
plus Sensationalist news reports, banal stories and in general a distinctively casual 
form of presentation answered a need for easy entertainment. With other 
entertainment sources, such as cinema, theatre or books suffering from drastic price 
increases, and leisure opportunities still relatively underdeveloped, television 
acquired to an even greater extent the escapist function of a retreat into the private 





Anthony Smith (1991:20) describes an ethnic group as
a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasises the role of myths of 
descent and historical memories, and that is recognised by one or more 
cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions.
In this respect, not only objective factors of laws, regulations and civic standards, of 
economic resources and practises, of borders and territorial properties constitute vital 
anchors for a national identity. Moreover, subjective factors, ‘permanent cultural 
attributes of memory, value, myth and symbolism’ (Smith 1986:3), the historic glory 
of a nation, legends, historical figures and events or a mythical homeland shape the 
emotional attachments of members of a community. Although ethnic identities are 
generated by objective indicators, such as language, religion, customs or skin colour 
they are also derived from meanings which developed over generations on ‘cultural, 
spatial and temporal properties’ (Smith 1986:22). Smith terms this ethnic conception 
of the nation as non-western (1991:11). Whereas most western nations emphasise a 
historic territory, a legal-political community, the legal-political equality of members 
and a common civic culture and ideology, the ethnic conception is grounded in the 
belief that the nation has its roots in a common ancestry, therefore stressing notions 
of a community based on birth and a shared native culture.
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Against this theoretical backdrop, Germany represented a highly peculiar case. By 
the mid 19th century, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s political slogan of ‘Deutschland, 
Deutschland iiber alles ’ which subsequently became the first strophe of the national 
anthem suggested the paramount goal of uniting the several kingdoms and duchies 
into one coherent nation. Germans were scattered out over various states, while the 
envisaged unification found its rationale in fostering ethnic-national loyalties to a 
common nation. With the first unification of 1871 the united Germany found its 
identity in shared cultural heritage, in a common language and in common descent, 
while other nations, such as Britain or France had already developed a sense of 
common citizenship in the western terminology as applied by Smith. As a reminder 
of the past, even today German citizenship is still granted on the principles of jus 
sanguinis (citizenship based on descent) rather than on jus soli (country of birth).
The rhetoric of the Third Reich perverted such loyalties. ‘Deutschland, Deutschland 
iiber alles’ now implied German racial, political and military supremacy. Ethnic 
attributes of Aryan glorification were complemented by digging deep into historical 
myths of the ‘Roman Reich of German Nations’. Against this vigorous and fanatical 
over-emphasis of ethnic components, the civic-western conception of a national 
identity hardly stood a chance. With the demise of Hitler and the country’s division, 
the ethnic element radically disappeared from the public psyche. In the west, any 
expressions of pride in being German were seen to have ethnic connotation and were 
regarded as anti-democratic or even Fascist. The legacy of the Third Reich gave 
German ethnicity an almost immoral attribute. Indeed German ethnicity largely 
vanished from the political rhetoric. ‘Verfassungspatriotismus’ (Stemberger 1979), 
namely civic loyalties to the new system of democracy and 
‘Deutschmarknationalismus’ (Habermas 1990), the emerging pride in economic 
achievements served as an additional antipode to the Third Reich.
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For the young GDR, the raison d’etre lay in the state’s postulated identity as the 
Socialist alternative within the German nation. Fundamentally different modes of 
politics, of economics and of citizen’s responsibilities pushed the ethnic component 
into oblivion. Under Ulbricht, the regime drew its legitimacy from the establishment 
of Socialism in the sovereign Socialist German state. Although unification was still 
perceived as an eventual political goal - albeit under the Communist guidance of the 
SED - ethnic orientations to the common German nation were nonetheless 
superseded by orientations to Socialism and the state which culminated in the 
doctrine of the peaceful co-existence of two states within one nation. Under 
Honecker, modest attempts to integrate German ethnicity to further the new 
officially-propagated notion of two German nations were often awkward. Although 
German ethnicity, history and myths were addressed in memorials, speeches and in 
school curricula, the dogmatic Socialist reading of the past was one-dimensional and 
failed to generate significant emotional attachments amongst the population.
The Cold War antagonism emphasised political-ideological differences between 
Communism and democracy. Caught between these systemic rivalries, the identity 
markers for the young Federal Republic and the GDR lay in spheres others than 
ethnicity. Both states placed considerable effort on integration within their respective 
political and economic camps. NATO and Warsaw Pact, market economy and 
Socialism, Democracy and Communism dominated the public psyche and further 
blocked any notions of addressing ethnic factors. Hence both the GDR and the FRG 
were what Max Weber (1958) had termed ‘incomplete nations’. Ethnic pride was 
absent from the official rhetoric, as well as from the public psyche. Over forty years 
ethnic loyalties failed to re-emerge in East and West Germany. The dark shadow of 
the NS-past in the FRG and the novelty of the concept of the new Socialist Germany 
in the GDR proved too high as obstacles.
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Given this striking insignificance of ethnic identities prior to 1989, one could have 
assumed that unification would have provided ample opportunity for demonstrating 
ethnic loyalties. After all, the German ethnicity in the FRG and the GDR was finally 
re-united and neither the Cold War nor the systemic antagonism stood in the way of 
expressing references to historical memories and myths, or ethnic attributes such as 
common language or common descent. However forty years of neglecting ethnic 
identities - of repression in the FRG and of one-dimensional distortion in the east - 
did not fail to exert a considerable impact. When visiting the united Germany on the 
third of October (the country’s national holiday) foreign observers were amazed by 
the distinct absence of a festive mood. Hardly any flags, public speeches or rallies 
(with the notable exception of Berlin) were visible as reminders of the presumably 
glorious day in 1990 when the nation was finally reunited. At major sport events, the 
reluctance of the crowds to join in singing the national anthem stood in sharp 
contrast to such occasions held in France, the United States, Great Britain or Italy. It 
took the persuasive power of the national football team and the likes of such sports 
heroes as Klinsmann, Beckenbauer or Matthaus to introduce the public to the 
concept of singing ‘Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit’. The obvious discomfort of 
some team members strongly reflected the awkwardness which most Germans felt 
during the occasion. Until the end of 1995 and six years after the fall of the Wall, 
cultural attributes to German history, myths, symbols, ancestry or descent did all but 
constitute significant identity markers for the recently unified nation.1
1 In striking contrast, during the European Football Championships of June 1996, German games were 
preceded by a vibrant and noisy chorus of thousands of fans who filled stadia, such as Wembley or 
Old Trafford with ‘Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit’. The German Football Cup Final in Berlin a 
month earlier, had already witnessed the participation of the large majority of the crowd in singing the 
national anthem. These incidents could mark the start of a new era, where such ethnic-cultural 
expressions will indeed enter the public agenda in a more widespread and common fashion. This study 
however, is forced to exclude them, since the possible consolidation of this very recent trend has yet to 
be seen.
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Such reluctance in expressing ethnic loyalties renders an analysis on diverging ethnic 
identities between east and west difficult. Against this background, Fredrik Barth’s 
typology of internal and external boundaries (1969) offers a cogent approach. As 
seen in Chapter One, the mechanisms of boundary creation are used as the overall 
theoretical framework for this study in order to analyse the existence of common 
and/or diverging identities in east and west towards the unified nation. Apart from 
this broad perspective, the typology is also able to shed light on the nature of ethnic 
identities. In general, ethnic boundaries canalise social life and organise inter-ethnic 
relations. Internal boundaries serve the purpose of identifying others as members, 
while external boundaries dichotomise others as strangers. ’Prescriptions’ govern 
and ‘proscriptions’ prevent inter-ethnic interaction.
The post-unification period offered plenty of evidence for Barth’s conceptualisation. 
‘Prescriptions’ - the positive expression of ethnic loyalties to the nation remained 
almost absent. ‘Proscriptions’ - the establishment of external boundaries, whereas 
the individual was denied access to the ethnic community were widely documented. 
Germans demonstrated to ethnic outsiders - to foreigners, immigrants or refugees - 
that a dividing line still existed between Germans and non-Germans. By 1991, the 
international media reported various incidents of violent attacks on hostels for 
asylum applicants. Documentaries on the neo-Nazi scenes in both eastern and 
western Germany stirred up emotions and raised parallels to the Third Reich. 
Bewildered politicians urged tolerance and civility, fearing xenophobia and violence 
against foreigners.
This chapter therefore addresses ethnicity in its negative understanding. An 
interrogation into ethnic markers of identity leaves positive, prescriptive expressions 
aside and analyses negative, proscriptive notions, asking why and to what extent did 
East and West Germans establish ethnic external boundaries. Hence, the emphasis
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lies on xenophobia, on racial intolerance and ethnic chauvinism as distinct 
characteristics of preserving an ethnic identity by preventing outsiders from entering 
the German ethnic community. These notions have to be viewed in a wider historical 
context in order to assess contemporary attitudes in the post-unification era. 
Throughout its history, Germany never experienced a multi-cultural society. The 
short period of colonisation prior to World War I had hardly any cultural or social 
impact on the Wilhelminian Reich. In the aftermath of 1918, other nations such as 
Britain or France maintained their colonial ties which even after the de-colonisation 
waves of the 1950’s and 1960’s granted them a better exposition to, and 
understanding of foreign cultures and customs. In contrast, from Bismarck to Hitler 
and to the FRG and GDR, German societies remained truly homogeneous. After 
unification such multi-culturalism - appreciation of cultural diversity, as well as 
ethnic tolerance - could have provided for a regulating mechanism in a time when 
growing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers altered the modus vivendi of social 
relations.
The moral and political legacies of the Third Reich were handled in a fundamentally 
different manner in East and West Germany. The Bonn Republic accepted 
responsibility for the genocide and pogroms of the Nazi era. A confrontation with 
the past, with Auschwitz or the Reichskristallnacht was reluctantly but nonetheless 
painstakingly pursued. In contrast, the SED regime avoided a thorough interrogation 
into National Socialism. Anti-Fascism emerged as a state doctrine without 
addressing the moral failures of Hitler’s regime but by merely offering political and 
economic antipodes to capitalism. While Auschwitz remained an essential part of the 
political conscience of West Germans, East Germans were given absolution from the 
crimes of the Third Reich.
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Finally, the old FRG and the GDR acknowledged the divided nation in a 
fundamentally different manner (see Chapter Two). In the west, the division was 
largely accepted as a irrevocable fact. West integration, democracy and economic 
achievements compensated for the cognitive void caused by the division and the 
separated eastern part of the nation gradually disappeared from the public’s 
conscience. In contrast, East Germans continued to uphold the notion of one 
common nation. Marxism, Communist brotherhood and Socialist internationalism 
could not provide the identity markers as envisaged by the regime. Instead, the 
prospect of re-unification maintained the status of a powerful source of emotional 
attachments. Hence, this chapter explains the establishment of ethnic external 
boundaries not merely out of their political, economic, or social contemporary 
context. Instead, it traces the historical-cultural timelines of these attitudes by 
analysing differences in east and west regarding the legacy of the Third Reich, the 
different accommodation of the fact of the division in the understanding of German 
ethnicity, as well as implications for post-unification Germany caused by the 
prevalent cultural homogeneity of the GDR and the Bonn Republic.
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6.2. The German Democratic Republic
Distorted German Ethnicity
Despite the liberal intentions of the 1949-constitutiton, the official political rhetoric 
of the SED focused on the ideological notion of the creation of a Marxist-Leninist 
state. Intentions to propagate a national identity which incorporated German 
ethnicity and heritage were largely ignored. Nonetheless unification was still 
regarded as an essential political undertaking. For the SED and the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, the German question remained open to negotiation, albeit under 
the condition of preserving the established political system of the GDR (Meuschel 
1992:144). The ‘Stalin-note’ of 1952 offered unification to the Germanys under the 
condition of political neutrality and even guaranteed free elections on Communist 
territory. The political consultations however, never actually materialised, since 
Bonn regarded Stalin’s move as an attempt to prevent further integration of the FRG 
into the west. For Ulbricht, the progressive development of the GDR would have 
eventually resulted in the establishment of a superior system that was highly 
attractive to the workers, farmers and intelligentsia of West Germany (Meuschel 
1992:145). In 1954, he therefore referred to German unification as an ‘incontestable 
inherent law’ (Weber 1993:44).
However the FRG’s accession to NATO, the subsequent incorporation of the GDR 
into the Warsaw Pact, as well as its sovereign status by 1954 drastically reduced the 
importance of German unification on the political agenda. By 1955, unification was 
finally laid to rest by Khrushchev’s insistence on the maintenance of two separate 
German states. It now became clear that the Soviet Union would never allow its 
westernmost Communist bastion to depart from its hegemonial sphere of influence. 
Unification was only possible, if Socialist principles and Soviet influence were 
safeguarded (Weber 1993:45).
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In the processes of the growing systemic antagonism of the Cold War, the GDR 
gradually emerged from the shadow of the divided nation and subsequently stressed 
its status as a sovereign state. Its identity and legitimacy were now represented in the 
doctrine of two states within one nation. The development of two antagonistic 
systems which were firmly rooted within their respective ideological camps was 
confidently acknowledged by stressing peaceful co-existence with the FRG. 
Consequently, Article 1 of the constitution promulgated that ‘the GDR is a Socialist 
state of the German nation’. With the replacement of Walter Ulbricht in 1971, the 
self perception of the GDR took a decisive turn. Ulbricht’s successor Erich Honecker 
manifested the notion of two separate German nations, while propagating the 
Socialist German nation state. At the VIII. party congress in 1971, Honecker argued 
that the Socialist society, the Socialist state, the Socialist personality, and the 
Socialist culture formed the Socialist nation (Meuschel 1992:279). From this 
perspective, two different German identities were the logical consequence. The 
revised constitution of 1974 therefore stated that ‘the GDR is a Socialist state of 
workers and farmers’, while all references to German unification were eliminated. 
The SED therefore emphasised the GDR’s right of self-determination; not only 
regarding the state’s sovereignty and its particular social-economic organisation, but 
furthermore regarding the self-determination of the Socialist nation.
This growing confidence allowed for a gradual recall of the German past. Interpreted 
under the Communist dialectic, German history was resumed and incorporated into 
the official political rhetoric. National identity, national community and national 
history of the GDR and its citizens and not the history of Germans (Meuschel 
1992:285) stood at the centre of historical analyses. From the peasant uprising in 
1525 to the war of liberation against Napoleon in 1813, from the history of the 
German labour movement to the proletarian resistance against Hitler, history was
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reconstructed in a patriotic fashion (Meuschel 1992:68) along the progressive lines 
of the Communist dialectic. 1983 was declared the ‘Luther year’ and Honecker 
explicitly honoured the religious reformer as a role model. The regime also paid 
respect to Frederick the Great and even Bismarck (Weber 1993:96). In combining 
two principles, the GDR tried to implement a Communist-national conscience by 
emphasising its German heritage and emergence out of German history, as well as 
the notion of a Socialist state with the ideological concept of the establishment of a 
utopian Communist society.
The regime’s aspiration to artificially create a new legitimacy as a German nation 
state was not convincingly adopted by the population. As seen in Chapter Two, 
notions of the GDR and the whole of Germany as one’s ‘fatherland’ existed side by 
side. The same applied to emotional orientations of being German and being a GDR 
citizen. The overwhelming majority in 1984 was still in line with Ulbricht’s 
dogmatism who regarded the FRG and the GDR as two separate states. East 
Germans however, could not follow Honecker’s dictum of two separate nations. 
Instead, eighty per cent upheld the notion of one common people (Kohler 1992:76). 
The official rhetoric of a separate German ethnicity - of the capitalist West German 
and the Socialist East German - was far from corresponding to real attitudes amongst 
the people.
Anti-Fascist legitimacy
The GDR considered itself as a genuinely new German Socialist and anti-Fascist 
state. In line with the declaration of the Komintem in 1937, the SED defined 
Fascism as the terrorist dictatorship of reactionary, chauvinist and imperialist 
elements of the finance capital. National Socialism was merely regarded as the 
utmost form of Fascism. From this generalising perspective, the SED perceived
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Fascism as an anti-Socialist counter-revolution which had its roots in the imperialist 
bourgeoisie of capitalist societies. The SED’s interpretation of historical events prior 
to World War II addressed the destruction of the labour movement, concentration 
camps or the war against the USSR. Anti-Semitism, racial supremacy and the 
systematic extermination of Jews however, were only minor parts of the official 
political rhetoric and even disappeared as soon as the SED joined the East bloc 
campaigns against Zionism (Meuschel 1992:30).
From the beginning, anti-Fascism became an alternative form of politics and 
constituted a fundamental raison d’etre for the young GDR. The failures and 
shortcomings of the past provided the moral and political legitimation for the new 
regime. Anti-Fascism offered a political and moral integrity that represented a 
radical departure from National Socialism. Unity of the working class, peace and co­
operation with the Soviet Union, land reform, equality and the destruction of the 
political power and influence of finance capital represented decisive markers for the 
dawn of a new era, where the GDR offered those who had resisted National 
Socialism a spiritual home. Hence the official interpretation of anti-Fascism offered 
the convenient political and moral advantages of presenting the GDR and its citizens 
as victims of and winners over National Socialism. They were victims of a Nazi- 
regime that had ultimately emerged as the logical consequence of a capitalist society. 
They were winners out of the GDR’s legitimacy as a workers’ and peasants’ state 
that overcame the exploitation of the masses and the imperialist expansion of 
capitalism in its quest to create the Communist society. From this understanding, the 
Federal Republic represented a mere restoration of a bourgeois-capitalist society. As 
with National Socialism, the suppression of the working class, the power of the 
bourgeoisie, of the land-owning class and of capital continued to represent 
fundamental characteristics of the Bonn Republic. According to the official rhetoric 
of the SED, the imperialist bourgeoisie maintained its grip on power in West
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Germany. In sharp contrast to the GDR, a departure from the Nazi-past was absent. 
Hence, the SED perceived the NS regime as an exclusively West German issue and 
problem.
Prior to the founding of the GDR in 1949, the Soviet military administration 
implemented a thorough de-nazification programme in its zone of occupation. 
During the first two years after the capitulation of 1945, 520,000 people lost their 
jobs, most notably in the public sector. 16,000 former members of the NSDAP, the 
SS or the Gestapo were put on trial. 28,000 teachers who had been members of the 
NSDAP were gradually replaced by quickly trained personnel (Weber 1993:10,14). 
From a practical point of view this action allowed the Soviet authorities to fill the 
existing gaps with German Communists, in particular in such sectors as the police, 
justice, administration and education. This move considerably strengthened the 
political power and influence of the Soviet Union over its new satellite state. 
Moreover, Soviet de-nazification was the most profound amongst the four occupying 
forces. While the western zones increasingly re-installed former civil servants within 
the administrative or judicial systems, the eastern zone in comparison was given the 
cleanest break with the Nazi past.
In contrast to this promising point of departure, the forty-year long history of the 
GDR largely refrained from any historic debate about guilt and responsibility for the 
crimes of the Hitler-era. Issues connected to the Third Reich almost represented 
taboos (Schulz 1994:408). Instead, from early on there was an institutionalised - yet 
selective - form of historical remembrance. According to the SED paper Neues 
Deutschland the GDR had 411 memorials relating to the anti-Fascist resistance, 
while 217 schools and 4377 worker collectives bore the name of resistance fighters 
(Kleftmann 1993:198). The GDR developed a cult of anti-Fascism. It uncritically 
hero-worshipped the Communist resistance, while avoiding a discourse on the
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historic background of Nazism, its cause and consequences. Such a handling of the 
past was one-dimensional and very convenient. It circumvented any personal 
confrontation or responsibility with German National Socialism. The silent majority 
that experienced and sustained the Third Reich was not forced to work out its past. 
As Christoph KleBmann (1993:198) noted,
‘there was never a comprehensive biography of Hitler in the GDR - nor 
were the millions of his followers, not least among the workers, ever 
subjected to close scrutiny’.
Nor was there a historic or political analysis of Fascism or National Socialism. An 
interrogation into the modus vivendi of Hitler’s dictatorship ultimately would have 
resulted in the condemnation of the Fiihrer principle, the one-party system, blind 
obedience, violence against and repression of citizens. Such underlying 
characteristics of the NS-regime however, bore a direct significance to the 
established political status quo of the totalitarian, Communist dictatorship of the 
GDR. The Ministry for State Security, judicial arbitrariness, the monolithic power of 
the SED, as well as the party’s tutelage in all economic, political and societal aspects 
would have made coherent parallels to the NS regime all too obvious. From this 
perspective it therefore came as no surprise that Fascism and National Socialism 
were addressed in such generalised terms.
Any critical confrontation with the Third Reich ought to have differentiated between 
the totalitarian, anti-democratic structures of the NS-regime and the totalitarian, anti­
democratic attitudes of the people who supported Hitler and brought him to power in 
the first place. This vital difference however, between personal guilt and 
involvement and the unjust structures of the NS-regime was avoided. In line with the 
Communist dialectic, the capitalist system, the bourgeoisie, the capital-owning 
classes merely deceived and exploited the working class. The rise of and support for
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National Socialism was not a problem of individual behaviour and attitudes but 
instead of the inherent failures and shortcomings of the general capitalist system. 
Hence East Germans were able to quickly move on in their daily lives. A critical and 
probably painful confrontation with an immoral past was suppressed by giving 
absolution and a collective psychological guilt-free stamp to the population.
The rather limited importance of the Nazi past to the collective perceptions was 
documented in a survey by the western Institut fur Demoskopie. In December 1990, 
people were questioned as to whether German history possessed unique features that 
were particularly German and which distinguished Germany from other nations. An 
overwhelming majority of 67 per cent answered positively. Out of these, only four 
per cent mentioned the Third Reich. Only one per cent named Nazi crimes. These 
answers were markedly different from the western survey, where responses totalled 
52 per cent for the Third Reich and 13 per cent for Nazi crimes (Noelle-Neumann 
1991:203).
A further survey by the East German Institut fur Meinungsforschung asked whether 
a statutory period of limitation should apply to Nazi crimes. In 1965, out of over 
1000 respondents a staggering 89 per cent answered ‘never’, only 3.3 per cent agreed 
(Niemann 1993:103). In contrast, in the same year in the west, the Institut fur 
Demoskopie recorded an approval of 57 per cent as opposed to 32 per cent who 
rejected this idea. Clearly, the absence of an official discourse on individual 
involvement in the Third Reich had a massive effect on East Germans. Anti-Fascism 
represented part of the political psyche. Since state and party continuously 
condemned Fascism (and thus at least implicitly the Hitler-regime), the documented 
public outrage about the horrors of the Nazi era did not come as a surprise. However 
the strikingly high numbers offered a telling insight into the psychological 
mechanism of the official guilt-free stamp. Since no personal working out of the past
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was demanded from the authorities, the past could conveniently be repressed. In line 
with the official rhetoric, the individual could perceive him or herself purely as a 
victim to the NS regime. Victims however, often demand revenge which explained 
the astonishingly high numbers of respondents who did not express any mercy for 
Nazi collaborators.
In the Federal Republic, the more serious and more frequent debate about the past 
did not provide such an absolution. Despite the re-instalment of civil servants in the 
administrative and judicial sectors, revelations or allegations about former Nazi 
affiliations continued to sweep through the media, affecting top-ranking officials, 
such as the former Minister President of Baden Wiirttemberg Filbinger or even the 
former Federal President Carstens. In the FRG, repression of personal involvement 
in the Third Reich was fundamentally more complicated than in the GDR. Every 
now and then, a public discourse, a movie, a television documentary or a judicial 
trial confronted West Germans with their past. Thus, a statutory period of limitation 
for Nazi crimes could have offered a ‘breather’ in the persistent psychological battle 
to justify one’s past.
Homogeneity of Society
The GDR committed itself to internationalism, yet it did not allow its citizens to 
cross its own western border. Apart from highly restricted visits to West Germany, 
the experiences of East Germans in getting to know foreign cultures and peoples 
were limited to visits to other Socialist states. Even then, tourist stays were a 
tiresome and complicated undertaking with time-consuming application procedures 
and restrictions on the amount of East German money to be spent abroad. The 
official ideology promulgated international friendship and understanding, while 
supporting emancipatory ambitions within the Third World. However the regime’s
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cosmopolitan rhetoric did not correspond to the attitudes of the population. Instead, a 
broadening of horizons and fostering of understanding was almost impossible in the 
‘ghetto-situation’ (KleBmann 1993:207) of East Germany. When talking to 
Easterners in the aftermath of unification, the former feeling of superiority over other 
East bloc countries, based on the - for Communist standards - GDR’s respectable 
material wealth, economic performance and social welfare standards became quite 
obvious. The notions that their own economic achievements were largely passed on 
to the Soviet Union or used to sustain other Communist countries were widespread. 
The officially imposed friendship with Communist Poland never reached beyond the 
status of artificiality. Cognitive reconciliation along the officially declared ‘peace 
border’ was a myth. In 1973, an open-border experiment had to be terminated after a 
few months, since resentment grew to dangerous proportions. Suspicion and 
arrogance towards the ‘lazy Poles, who buy up all our meat’ prevailed and were 
highlighted by the territorial loss of Silesia after World War II.
Only one per cent of the population of the GDR was foreign (Der Spiegel August 31, 
1992:21) mostly students and workers from various Socialist countries. As many as
90,000 employees worked in the GDR as parts of bilateral agreements (Golz 
1995:7). East Germans however, maintained a profound indifference towards foreign 
cultures and peoples. Relationships towards fellow workers from Vietnam, Angola, 
Mozambique or Cuba were frosty. Foreign students were housed in special hostels 
and therefore tightly separated. Cultural approximation stopped short outside of 
factory and classroom, while foreigners in the GDR were isolated and excluded from 
socialisation, culminating in the widespread racist jargon of Fijis' which referred to 
people with a differently coloured skin.
Fundamental characteristics of the Nazi-era were by no means given a clean break in 
the GDR. The prevalent ethnocentrism of National Socialism was able to flourish in
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East Germany because of a lack of multi-cultural exposures, as well as because of 
the impact of a combined 55 years of totalitarian rule which suppressed open- 
mindedness. Since the SED regime avoided a foil exploration of the genocide of the 
Third Reich, the ethnic jingoism of German Fascism silently continued. The 
regime’s official rhetoric treated National Socialism as a political-economic 
phenomenon. Capitalism - and not racism and xenophobia - was blamed for the 
disastrous German past. In a frightening continuation of the ethnic chauvinism of the 
Third Reich, foreigners, from the Soviet soldier to the Polish worker to the 
Vietnamese engineer were exposed to indifference and intolerance. Multi- 
culturalism, the interest in and appreciation of foreign cultures was stifled by the 
overemphasis o f ‘Germanness’ regarding race, customs and virtues. School curricula 
failed to address such issues as anti-Semitism, racism or hostility towards other 
nations. In short, education in tolerance was absent.
Overt racial violence was only suppressed by the totalitarian nature of the GDR with 
its rigid judicial and surveillance apparatus. Nonetheless, by the 1980's the first signs 
of Skinhead and neo-Nazi movements became visible. A hard core of some 1500 
neo-Nazis was already active prior to unification. By 1988, elite cadre parties, such 
as the Nationale Alternative, the Freiheitliche Arbeiter Partei (Free Workers Party), 
the Deutsche Alternative or the Nationale Front had been organised (Merkl 
1995:434). Football hooligans increasingly became a common feature. Centres of 
organisations were typically larger cities. Most often, alienated teenagers looked for 
an escape from the total control of one’s professional and private life by state and 
party. Reasons for joining right extremist movements were predominantly apolitical 
and often represented a mere rebellion against ‘authority’. By the late 1980's the 
regime answered with increasing repression (Merkl 1995:435). Although still 
officially denied or at least bagatellicised, the police and the Stasi lay siege to rock 
concerts and meetings and issued penalties and prison sentences. However instead of
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looking inwards in order to analyse the causes which prompted juveniles to turn their 
backs on Socialism, the regime merely attributed their actions to seduction by the 
deranged west.
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6.3. The Federal Republic
The Legacy of the Third Reich
The collaboration with or at least the silent approval of the Nazi regime and the 
denial to take action against the genocidal barbarism, drastically formed the West 
German psyche after the demise of the dictatorship. From the outset, the Bonn 
Republic was morally handicapped by the collective guilt of its people. The FRG 
and its newly democratic citizens carried the burden of succeeding from a political 
system which trampled upon humanity and morality and which abandoned tolerance, 
respect and intellectual enlightenment for the cause of racial supremacy and military 
superiority. School curricula, literature, film and political rhetoric reflected on this 
consciousness and persistently had the Third Reich as an issue. Even forty years into 
the existence of the Bonn Republic, it was virtually impossible for West Germans to 
escape a confrontation with the past.
Nonetheless confrontation with National Socialism was marked by four distinctly 
different phases. In the immediate aftermath of the capitulation, the occupying 
powers arranged compulsory tours of concentration camps in several towns and 
municipalities. De-nazification programmes were implemented to screen the 
population of Nazi supporters and collaborators. Lectures and films represented 
further attempts to educate the public about the horrors caused by the Hitler regime. 
Most notably, in the immediate post-war years, the Numberg trials of 1945/46 
dominated the political discourse.
However the controversy surrounding war crimes and anti-Semitism were 
undertaken in a generalising and abstract fashion (Wilenga 1994:1060). Apart from 
Nurnberg, criminal charges against Nazis were hardly put forward. The de­
nazification processes turned into the cunning attempt to outwit allied authorities.
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The public was placed into five categories according to their alleged involvement in 
the NS-regime, ranging from ‘highly guilty’ to ‘unincriminated’. Category IV termed 
Mitlaufer (follower) was the threshold for moral re-instalment and employment 
within the public service. Hence, de-nazification was termed the ‘Persil permit’ - a 
proverb which drew parallels to the detergent that washes everything whiter. Instead 
of a coherent confrontation with the past, de-nazification turned into repression. 
Although the collective guilt of Nazi Germany was accepted by West Germans 
(Wilenga 1994:1060) the mental process of acknowledging one’s personal 
involvement in the unjust NS-regime faded against the task of proving that one 
complied with the new moral standards of a political system that advocated 
Rechtsstaat principles and human rights.
Moreover, in the chaotic first years after 1945, the public was pre-occupied with 
mere survival. Emigration, expulsion, food or housing dominated peoples’ thoughts. 
Against these material and political insecurities, the mental and moral confrontation 
with the past only had secondary importance. Instead of confrontation, West 
Germans looked for relief; from material hardship, as well as from former moral 
deficiencies.
Repression was even further accentuated in the Adenauer era. West integration, 
economic resurgence and increased material standards pushed the past further away 
from the realm of relevance. The initial discourse over guilt, war crimes and de­
nazification came to a gradual close. Between 1945 and 1950 some 5000 verdicts 
had been passed in relation to Nazi crimes. Between 1950 and 1955 the number 
dropped to twenty per annum (Wilenga 1994:1062). Despite growing approval for 
democracy and its institutions, which indicated a departure from the political values 
of National Socialism the 1950’s were nonetheless characterised by denial. The 
focus was on the present: re-building devastated towns, producing the economic
2 7 5
miracle, or safeguarding international stability, whereas West Germans gradually got 
accustomed to the new principles of democracy and the social market economy. A 
confrontation with the past would have been only a disturbing backlash to these new 
affirmative processes.
A thorough confrontation with National Socialism had to wait until the 1960’s. The 
wave of anti-authoritarianism generated by the student revolts, accompanied by 
growing civic confidence allowed for a critical interrogation into personal 
responsibilities for contributing to the moral barbarism of the Nazi regime. The 
personal backgrounds of the protest generation were free from guilt, participation in 
or approval of the NS regime which made the confrontation with the Hitler-era such 
a colossal burden for their parents. In addition, growing interest in politics, the 
participatory revolution of the 1960’s, as well as a more open political discourse 
contributed in paving the way for an uninhibited and unbiased mental confrontation 
with National Socialism.
The judicial system increasingly tackled Nazi matters. Between 1961 and 1965, the 
number of trials related to the NS regime doubled in comparison to the period from 
1951 to 1960 (Wilenga 1994:1062). Gunther Grass’s novel die Blechtrommel (the 
Tin Drum) , published in 1959 sparked a wide-ranging public discourse. The 
Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961/62 drew further attention. On several occasions, 
the Bundestag extended the statutory period of limitation for murder until it was 
finally scrapped in 1979.
By the end of the 1980’s the governments of Schmidt and Kohl had attempted a 
moderate return to normality. The ‘moralising impulse of the 1960’s’ (Wilenga 
1994:1064) was followed by a consciousness that confidently expressed the 
democratic achievements of the Federal Republic. Nonetheless, the horrors of the
276
Nazi era continued to form the West German psyche. Numerous public 
commemorations (fifty years since the rise of Hitler in 1983, forty years since the 
end of World War II in 1985, fifty years since the Reichskristallnacht in 1988) kept 
historical memories of the Third Reich on the political agenda. In contrast to the 
1950’s, denial or repression were no longer possible. Instead, the barbarism of 
National Socialism, the moral failures to stop genocide and other war crimes 
continued to form an integral part of the Federal Republic’s identity.
Repressing German Ethnicity
The close mental link of ‘Germanness’ to Nazi Germany resulted in the almost 
complete absence of an affective orientation towards the nation. Even the simple 
intention of expressing one's pride to be German was labelled as Fascist or right- 
extremist. For the public, national symbols had a minor if not repressed importance. 
In 1961, 38 per cent could not remember to have heard the national anthem since 
1945. Furthermore, in 1961, as well as in 1981, roughly one fifth did not know the 
first line of the anthem ( ‘Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit*), while 46 per cent in 
1961 and still 37 per cent in 1981 referred to ‘Deutschland, Deutschland iiber alles ’ 
(Noelle-Neumann 1991:29,42).
West Germans developed an ‘anti-German’ identity. In the 1950’s the country’s 
strong drive towards integration within the west (NATO, the Common Market), as 
well as emerging pride in economic achievements served as new anchors for a 
national identity during a time when national pride was crushed due to the traumatic 
legacy of the Third Reich. By the 1970’s these were complemented by those 
principles that the Nazi dictatorship denounced in such a fierce manner: democracy, 
humanity and morality. Such values and orientations served as ‘a counterpoint to 
Auschwitz ’(Le Gloannec 1994:137). These notions however, did not relate to
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German ethnicity. Instead, they were cognitive principles of citizenship virtues. 
Since ‘German’ still bore the attribute of the Nazi past, the denial of ‘German’ could 
easily be accommodated into this new agenda of national identity. Paradoxically, a 
good West German, therefore, was the individual who denounced anything 
‘German’. The new patriot for humanity, morality, co-operation and democracy 
represented an antipode to the past, in fact an anti-German patriot. Sidelining 
German ethnicity, West Germans assumed a new ‘patriotism for the constitution’ 
(Stemberger 1979), deriving from the remarkable performance of the ‘Basic Law’ in 
establishing and securing democracy.
This schizophrenic attitude towards one’s own country led to the description of West 
Germany as ‘the world’s most dialectical nation’ (Ash 1994:75). On the one hand, 
the Federal Republic established itself as a stable democracy, with a high degree of 
harmony, inner peace, openness and civility, complemented by a firm and secure 
anchoring in the west. Out of the ruins of World War II a ‘post-national democracy’ 
(Ash 1994:66) emerged, with a strong constitutional consensus that had replaced 
traditional notions of nationalism and diverted state sovereignty upward to Europe 
and downward to the federal states. On the other hand however, the traumatic past of 
the NS regime continued to haunt West Germans, resulting in insecurity and guilt 
when dealing with other nations and their people.
The evident rejection of any ethnic-nationalist notions was even further accentuated 
by the fact of the division. As seen in Chapter Two, West Germans became 
accustomed to the divided nation and the acceptance of the post-war status quo was 
widespread. With diminishing knowledge of and interest in the other Germany, the 
fact of the division increasingly possessed only a subordinate position in the West 
German psyche. Moreover, with Europe and the west serving as new anchors, the
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division was accepted almost as an irrevocable political fact and was therefore 
pushed even further out of the realm of relevance.
Ethno Centrism
West Germany, like most European states had traditionally been a country of net 
emigration. Despite being an attractive magnet for foreign populations which 
resulted from her economic prosperity, high wages and comprehensive social 
services, post-war governments therefore paid little attention to ethnic integration or 
arising demographic pressures (Chandler 1995:344). In sharp difference to the utter 
racism of National Socialism the Basic Law was characterised by a highly liberal 
protection from political persecution. Article 16(2) gave ‘every politically persecuted 
person ... the right to asylum’. Article 16(1) guaranteed the right of return for ethnic 
Germans who after 1945 found themselves outside the now reduced German 
territory. The provision was later extended to include ethnic Germans under 
Communist rule. A rather broad interpretation of the Basic Law asked for only vague 
German ancestry which effectively opened the doors for hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants from Eastern Europe (Marshall 1992:247). Within the first ten years 
after the founding of the Federal Republic, some nine million refugees and expellees 
moved to West Germany, most notably from Silesia, East Prussia and the 
Sudetenland. Between 1950 and 1991, some 2.6 million ethnic Germans outside of 
pre-war German territory (mainly the Soviet Union and Romania) migrated into the 
Federal Republic (Fijalkowski 1993:851).
Despite the constitutional provisions, West Germany remained a largely 
homogenous society. Jus sanguinis (citizenship based on blood) made it difficult if 
not impossible for immigrants to gain German citizenship. To receive German 
citizenship was a time-consuming undertaking. Naturalisation was only possible
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after a permanent residence of at least ten years. A legal claim for naturalisation was 
only granted after fifteen years, as long as financial security was safeguarded. 16 to 
23 year-olds could apply after eight years of residence in addition to at least six years 
of German schooling (Golz 1995:4).
A notable exception however, was represented in the cases of the vast numbers of 
Gastarbeiter (guest workers). After the economic boom of the 1950’s, a shortage of 
labour endangered economic prosperity. The Gastarbeiter of the 1960’s were seen as 
temporary remedies. Beginning in 1955 various bilateral agreements between Bonn 
and several southern European states allowed for the recruitment of workers on 
limited term contracts. West Germany highly welcomed the foreign influx of 
workers who supplied cheap, un-unionized, and easily exploitable labour (Fulbrook 
1994:226) to fill semi-skilled and unskilled positions. Italians were followed by 
Turks and guest workers from the former Yugoslavia. Millions of Gastarbeiter took 
up permanent residence. For the first time, West Germans were exposed to foreign 
cultures on a wide scale which brought with them different traditions and religious 
practises.
Gastarbeiter were perceived as economic solutions to the lack of manpower. The 
government however, failed to recognise the human aspect of this massive 
transformation of labour. The fact that migrants would eventually seek to establish 
social and family roots in their host country was not given much attention. Until the 
late 1980's, the established principles of the Adenauer era towards Gastarbeiter 
remained virtually unchallenged. Successive governments did not perceive the 
Federal Republic as a land of immigration. Politics of guest workers were politics of 
employment, while labour migration was regarded as a temporary phenomenon 
(Leenen 1995:605). By 1977 however, net immigration became a political reality but 
neither in rhetoric nor in policies did the authorities tackle the problem. Only
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occasionally did the matter of foreign ethnicities enter the political agenda, most 
likely in the run-up to elections where the CDU tried to bind its right-wing political 
spectrum. Most often, SPD/FDP governments of the 1970's, as well as incoming 
CDU/FDP governments of the 1980's treated it as a non-issue.
With the oil crises and subsequent recessions of the 1970's, the former shortage of 
labour increasingly turned into severe unemployment problems. Incentives to 
persuade Italians, Portuguese, Greeks, Spaniards or Turks to return to their home 
countries were introduced. In 1973, the SPD/FDP coalition issued a ban on further 
recruitment. Nonetheless, the number of foreigners in West Germany continued to 
increase since many who were bom or had been living in West Germany for many 
years decided to stay, partially out of economic reasons, but also because of the 
continuing social integrative processes within their new environments. Family 
members arrived and the second generation of guest workers was bom. As a result, 
by the late 1980’s the percentage had reached some eight per cent (see Table 6.1.).







Italy Greece Spain Portugal Turkey Yugosl. Pola
1961 686.2 1.2 28.7 6.1 6.4 0.1 1.0 2.4 -
1970 2600.6 4.3 20.3 11.7 9.2 1.8 16.5 15.8 0.7
1987 4240.5 6.9 11.8 6.0 3.0 1.6 34.3 13.2 1.8
1990 5342.5 8.4 10.3 6.0 2.5 1.6 31.7 12.4 4.5
countries: percentages of total foreigners
1990: only old Lander
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995:67
The nature of migration changed fundamentally, while the share of asylum 
applicants increased considerably. In 1977, the authorities received only some
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16.000 applications. Three years later, numbers had risen to 108,000. In particular, 
Turkish migrants came in higher numbers. Their figures rose from 7,900 in 1979 to
58.000 in 1980 (Leenen 1995:606). By 1990, Turks represented one third of all 
foreigners living in West Germany. With the demise of the Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, mass immigration of ethnic Germans reached 
considerable numbers. In 1990, some 400,000 arrived, mainly from the USSR, 
Poland and Romania (Braunthal 1995:211). As with guest workers, these ethnicities 
which originally had emigrated from Germany as early as the 18th century faced 
similar problems as Gastarbeiter. Few and low-skilled jobs, hostility and social 
isolation which were further accentuated by cultural (if not religious) backgrounds 
that were in marked difference to the prevalent customs of their host country.
By the 1980's, Gastarbeiter were no longer welcomed. In 1982, 62 per cent agreed 
that there were too many foreigners in the country, while a further fifty per cent 
argued that they should be forced to go back to their home country (Fulbrook 
1994:227). Against the backdrop of persistent inequality in employment 
opportunities, few foreigners had been able to rise into professional or managerial 
positions. Some opened small enterprises, such as restaurants or grocery shops. 
Nonetheless foreign workers contributed considerably to West Germany’s 
impressive GDP and economic strength (Braunthal 1995:207), but few West 
Germans acknowledged this achievement. Many complained about guest workers 
and their spouses who received equally comprehensive social benefits as West 
Germans, including social and unemployment insurance, or subsidised housing. 
Often guest workers, immigrants or refugees were confronted with a wall of social 
isolation, resulting in prejudice, rejection and discrimination.
Heightened economic pressure and instability looked for a safety valve. Twenty 
years after the moderate successes of the right wing Nationale Demokratische Partei
282
Deutschlands (NPD) between 1966 and 1968, a further right wing grouping shocked 
the political establishment. By the late 1980's, the Republikaner enjoyed increasing 
support. The party made asylum and foreigners its central campaign motives. Racist 
television adverts and a polemical political rhetoric finally woke up the established 
parties and firmly placed immigration and ethnocentrism on the political agenda. 
The Republikaner - founded by dissident members of the CDU/CSU - consisted 
largely of younger supporters: right-wing, racist, anti-democratic and disillusioned 
with contemporary political institutions and practises. After initial successes in 1989 
(7.5 per cent in Berlin, 7.1 per cent in the elections for the European parliament) the 
Republikaner suffered a temporary electoral setback in 1990. In the Landtag 
elections in the Saarland, in Lower Saxony and in Northrhine-Westphalia the party 
failed to cross the five per cent threshold. The 1991 elections in Bremen (7.7 per cent 
together with a further extremist grouping; the DVU) and in Schleswig-Holstein (7.7 
per cent), as well as in Baden-Wiirttemberg (10.9 per cent) in 1992 however, gave 
ample evidence that the Republikaner had hit an electoral nerve. Apart from the 
decreasing support of the Volksparteien and growing numbers of non-voters, 
analysts reckoned there was a strong potential for political protest. The Landtage 
elections of that period demonstrated the voter’s readiness to express dissatisfaction 
with the political establishment. Political asylum and immigration as issues of 
controversy functioned as focal points for heightened discontent which extremist 
parties such as the Republikaner were able to capitalise on (Leenen 1992:1042).
Despite a wave of tourism (see Chapter Five) that exposed West Germans to foreign 
cultures, and despite an increasing hands-on experience within their own country, 
multi-culturalism remained an alien concept to most West Germans. Although 
Politbarometer noted in 1988 that 25 per cent of respondents had personal contacts 
with foreigners through friends or acquaintances and 46 per cent stated that
283
foreigners lived in their neighbourhoods, the appreciation of foreign cultures hardly 
went beyond culinary delicatessen or tourist sights.
Table 6.2. Rejecting Attitudes Towards Guest Workers in West Germany (percentages)
Year Adaptation Sent Back Political Abstinence Endogamy
1980 66 52 51 44
1984 61 42 47 34
1988 57 36 38 33
1990 51 31 36 24
difference 1980-1990 -15 -21 -15 -20
Source: Allbus (Allgemeine Bevdlkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften); in Leenen 1992: 1049.
Foreigners were tolerated but not accepted. As shown in Table 6.2., Allbus survey 
data analysed critical attitudes towards foreigners in West Germany between 1980 
and 1990. Response categories included ‘Gastarbeiter should adapt their lifestyles 
to German standards’ (adaptation), ‘Gastarbeiter should be sent back’, ‘Gastarbeiter 
should be denied any political activity’ (political abstinence), as well as 
‘Gastarbeiter should marry only within their ethnic group’ (endogamy).
Throughout the 1980’s, support for all four categories decreased considerably. 
According to age, younger respondents displayed significantly higher levels of 
tolerance (Kuhnel and Terwey 1994:76) which was attributed to differing 
socialisation experiences. Also, the participatory revolution of the 1960’s and 
1970’s brought with it growing political interest and civic confidence (see Chapter 
Four). Younger generations in the Federal Republic were less likely to adopt 
nationalistic and conservative values and standards of the Third Reich or the early
2 Generally speaking, elder generations are more likely to evaluate general problems in a more 
sceptical manner, since idealistic and over-optimistic outlooks on the future mature with age and life 
experience.
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Adenauer era. A further correlation was documented between tolerance towards 
guest workers and the level of education (Ktihnel and Terwey 1994:78). With more 
years spent at school, individuals were more likely to become exposed to such ideals 
as equality, justice and tolerance. Here, sociological changes in the Federal Republic 
fostered liberal attitudes towards guest workers. The share of West Germans with an 
Abitur (the entry qualification for university) rose from 14 per cent in 1980 to 27 per 
cent in 1990.
However multi-cultural attitudes developed only reluctantly. Although the racist 
notion of ‘endogamy’ dropped from 44 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent ten years 
later, a majority continued to insist on the cultural adaptation of lifestyles. Attitudes 
in this category improved the least (together with ‘political abstinence’). While in 
1980, most foreigners in West Germany came largely from southem-European 
countries, the influx of large numbers of Turks who shared distinctly different, non- 
western customs and religious practises made the cultural clash of immigrants and 
native West Germans more obvious than the preceding contacts with Italians or 
Spaniards. The persistent support for ‘cultural adaptation’ which was prevalent in 
spite of the growing levels of tolerance in the remaining three categories indicated 
that multi-cultural experiences were welcomed only as long as they did not threaten 
or undermine prevalent German customs and traditions. Interestingly, from a 
semantic point of view, guest workers or asylum seekers are referred to as Auslander 
(foreigners) rather than Einwanderer (immigrants; Chandler 1995:354) which shows 
an emphasis on exclusion over integration.
In addition, foreigners were occasionally victims of violent attacks. Limited 
outbreaks of foreign hostility first occurred during the first post-war recession of 
1966/67 with the parallel success of the neo-Nazi NPD in several Lander 
parliaments. The 1970’s saw some violence particularly against Turks in context
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with economic slow-down and growing unemployment. Between 1983 and 1990, the 
number of violent legal offences (homicide, arson and explosive attacks, bodily 
harm, damage to property with use of heavy violence) with a right-extremist 
background rose from 76 to 306 (Bundesministerium des Inneren 1993:71). Still, 
xenophobic incidents were only ‘sporadic’ (Chandler 1995:351). Despite the 
resentment in accommodating foreign cultures and customs, the prevalent 
ethnocentrism in the Bonn Republic ought therefore not to be confused with 
xenophobia. Many West Germans may have disapproved of the growing number of 
foreigners, but nevertheless rejected the idea of racial violence. In fact, regarding 
foreign hostility, West Germany ranked amongst such presumably tolerant nations as 
Denmark or the Netherlands (von Beyme 1991:72). The Sinus study of 1980 
determined a share of 13 per cent of the electorate with right-extremist attitudes. In 
European comparison, this figure was by no means exceptional (Sinus 1981). Further 
research revealed that right-extremism in West Germany was not much different 
from its counterparts in other EC-countries regarding quantity, socio-economic 
correlates, or concentration in political parties (Bauer and Niedermayer 1990: 15- 
26). Throughout western Europe, xenophobic violence emerged as a worrying 
phenomenon in the 1980’s. West Germany made no exception to this trend, but it 
was also not at the forefront of a new extremist movement.
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6.4. The New Lander
A Multi-Cultural Society?
Table 6.3. shows that by the end of 1993, the number of foreigners living in 
Germany had increased to some 6.9 million as compared to 5.9 million two years 
earlier. In international comparison, the ratio of foreigners of 8.5 per cent of the total 
population ranked well above that of France (6.3 per cent), the Netherlands (5 per 
cent), or Great Britain (4.3 per cent; Golz 1995:4). Only 22 per cent were citizens of 
EU member states. Turks by far constituted the largest foreign ethnicity, representing 
some thirty per cent of the overall foreign population.
Table 6.3. Foreigners in the Federal Republic (1990-1993)
total share Italy Greece
number popul.
(1000) (%)
1990 5342.5 8.4 10.3 6.0
1991 5882.2 7.3 9.5 5.7
1992 6495.8 8.0 8.6 5.3
1993 6878.1 8.5 8.2 5.1
countries: percentages of total foreigners
1990: only old Lander
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995:67
Spain Portugal Turkey former Poland
Yugosl.
2.5 1.6 31.7 12.4 4.5
2.3 1.6 30.3 13.2 4.6
2.1 1.5 28.6 15.7 4.4
1.9 1.5 27.9 18.0 3.8
As shown in Table 6.4., the share of foreigners varied dramatically according to 
regions. In 1992, 97 per cent lived in the old Lander and in the western part of 
Berlin. Western cities like Frankfurt (28 per cent), Stuttgart (23 per cent), Munich 
(22 per cent) or Cologne (18 per cent) accommodated significantly higher numbers 
of foreigners than their eastern counterparts. For instance, in Leipzig, Rostock, 
Dresden and Halle the percentage of foreigners was under two per cent (Golz 
1995:4).
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Table 6.4. Foreigners in the Federal Republic, East and West, 1993 (in 1000)
total
number
Italy Greece Spain Portugal Turkey former
Yugosl.
Polarn
East(l) 212.4 1.0 2.1 0.1 0.9 3.3 16.3 1.9
West(2) 6665.8 562.0 349.9 133.1 104.7 1915.1 1222.7 258.6
total 6878.2 563.0 352.0 133.2 105.6 1918.4 1239.0 260.5
(1): excluding Berlin
(2): including Berlin
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995:67
The considerable increase was largely caused by the dramatic transformation 
processes in Eastern Europe, as well as the civil war in Yugoslavia. Between 1989 
and 1992, the number of applicants for asylum rose from 121,000 to 450,000. The 
vast numbers of asylum applications resulted in a tremendous administrative 
backlog. In 1992, the number had swollen to 400,000 cases. Including incoming 
applications, authorities were asked to process some 950,000 cases (Fijalkowski 
1993:858). In addition, ethnic Germans from eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union came in increasing numbers. In 1989, 377,000 moved to Germany, followed 
by 397,000 in 1990 and 220,000 in both 1991 and 1992.
The demand for legislative modification became pressing. After lengthy negotiations 
between CDU, CSU, SPD and FDP a constitutional compromise emerged which 
stated that the asylum title of the German constitution may not refer to those who 
enter German territory from another EC or third country. Legislative organs now 
determined the countries where political and inhuman treatment or punishment were 
excluded from domestic political life. Hence, applications originating in these 
countries could be recognised as unfounded and immediate expulsion could be 
ordered. The constitutional changes took effect in July 1993. Since then, the number
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of asylum applicants decreased drastically. In the first six months of 1994, the 
authorities registered only 62,000 cases (Golz 1995:6). In addition, the active citizen 
right to be elected, as well as the passive right to vote remained highly restrictive. 
The former only applied to the election to work committees, while the Federal 
Constitutional Court declared the right to vote in communal elections as 
unconstitutional.
Table 6.5. shows the public’s response to the growing numbers of immigrants. In 
1992, the overwhelming majority of both Easterners and Westerners supported 
restrictions on immigration regardless of the cause or the country of origin. Germans 
in east and west differentiated between different groups of foreigners. Ethnic 
Germans faced the least and non-EU citizens the most criticism which had to be 
interpreted as a reaction to the highly publicised wave of political refugees and 
asylum applicants and the subsequent heated debate over the reform of immigration 
laws in 1992. It showed that liberal attitudes towards foreigners did not disappear but 
were significantly influenced by the prospect of immigrants seeking economic and 
material advantages by taking up residence in Germany.
Table 6.5. Attitudes Towards Immigration, East and West, 1992 (percentages)
Ethnic Germans Asylum Applicants EU-Citizens Non EU-Citizens
West East West East West East West East
free immigration 19 15 12 15 35 13 10 5
restricted 71 74 64 67 56 63 62 59
immigration 
no immigration 10 11 24 18 9 24 29 36
Source: Allbus; in Ktihnel and Terwey 1994:89.
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The relatively small numbers of respondents in the old Lander who completely 
rejected immigration continued the positive trend which had started in the mid- 
1980’s with increasing tolerance towards guest workers. Between 1990 and 1992 
rejecting percentages dropped from 20 to 10 for ethnic Germans, from 30 to 24 for 
asylum applicants, from 13 to 9 for EU citizens and from 34 to 29 for non-EU 
citizens (Kuhnel and Terwey 1994:89).
In eastern Germany, attitudes towards immigration were not necessarily more 
negative. Disapproval of ethnic Germans showed similar levels between east and 
west, while immigration of asylum applicants faced even less criticism. Attitudes 
towards immigrants from EU and non-EU countries however, displayed marked 
differences. EU citizens were significantly more accepted in the west which 
represented a reflex to the fundamentally different experiences within Europe. 
Indeed, some fifty years of West German European integration were hardly 
comparable to the short period since unification in which Easterners were exposed to 
the concept of Europe as a spiritual home. Finally, the rejection of non-EU 
immigrants was more pronounced in the east. It seemed that insecurity over 
employment and material status further accentuated resentment against foreigners 
who merely entered Germany in the hope of benefiting from its high economic 
standards and social security.
Spreading Xenophobia
Right-wing extremism emerged as a worrying phenomenon. Racist violence by neo- 
nazi splinter groups was widely documented in the media. Subsequently, the 
Deutsche Alternative and the Nationalistische Front were banned. The 
Verfassungsschutz (Germany’s intelligence agency) spoke of a right-extremist 
potential of 32,000 in 1990 and of 40,000 in 1991 with a peak of 41,000 in 1993.
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Only in 1994 did the figure drop to 36,000. The numbers did not even include the 
Republikaner with some 20,000 members. Membership in militant right-extremist 
groups (in particular Skinheads) rose from 4,200 in 1991 to 6,400 a year later and 
consolidated with 5,400 in 1994 (Bundesministerium des Inneren 1995:77).3
As shown in Table 6.6. the number of violent legal offences with right-extremist 
backgrounds doubled between 1991 and 1992. With one fifth of the population, one 
third of such offences occurred in the new Lander. In international comparison, this 
amount of xenophobic acts did not represent an outstandingly high figure. The state 
of New Jersey alone regularly reported some one thousand crimes every year. In 
France, 722 racist incidents were recorded in 1991. In the same year, an 
astonishingly high 7780 racial hate crimes were committed in England and Wales 
(Merkl 1995:430). Nonetheless, the dramatic rise in xenophobic acts in Germany 
over the course of just two years was without any parallel in the country’s post-war 
history.
Table 6.6. Violent Legal Offences with Right-Extremist Background, East and West
1990 (*) 1991 1992
West East West East
Homicide 2 3 1 8 7
Arson/ Explosive Attacks 47 260 123 500 222
Bodily Harm 102 251 198 418 307
damage to property with use of heavy violence 119 477 171 793 329
total 270 990 493 1719 865
(*) only old Lander
Source: Bundesministerium des Inneren 1993:70,1992:76
3 Unfortunately, the official statistics on membership in right-extremist organisations did not 
differentiate between old and new Lander. However in 1991, the Ministry of the Interior estimated the 
number of Skinheads with 3,000 in the old and 1,2000 in the new Lander (Leenen 1992:1044).
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After 1992, the potential for violence further increased. Although official statistics 
now only documented general anti-foreign legal offences without elaborating on 
violent attacks in east and west, Table 6.7. demonstrates the drastic jump from 2426 
cases in 1991 to 6721 in 1993. By 1994, tension decreased significantly with a 
reported number of only 3491 cases (a drop of 52 per cent). Regarding offences per 
capita, the east stayed markedly behind western levels. With one fifth of the 
population, the number of cases in the east amounted to one twelfth in 1993 and one 
sixth in 1994.
Table 6.7. Legal Offences with Anti-Foreign Motivation, East and West
1991 (3) 1992(3) 1993 1994
West (1) 6181 2970




(3) no separate statistic for east and west
Source: Bundesministerium des Inneren 1995:85, 1994:101
6721 3491
Not only the active potential for violence, but also the passive approval,of it were 
pronounced. According to a survey by the Institut fur Demoskopie in late 1992, 17 
per cent of eastern males below age thirty stated that they support violence (seven 
per cent in the west). Out of the total population, eight per cent in the east and four 
per cent in the west approved of violence (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
November 12, 1992:5). Hence, within three years after unification, xenophobia had 
reached a dramatic climax in Germany. According to statistics, racial violence in 
1991 and 1992 was more widespread in the new Lander. However as the data on 
general anti-foreign offences indicated, xenophobia did not represent an exclusively 
eastern problem.
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Four key events shaped the political psyche of Germany. Over five days in 
September 1991, rioting youth firebombed a hostel for asylum applicants in the 
north-saxonian town of Hoyerswerda. Several hundreds of people - mostly local 
residents of the area - openly declared their solidarity with the delinquents by 
disrupting police forces in their attempts to calm the situation. Since their safety 
could no longer be safeguarded, hostel residents had to be transferred to other towns. 
During the same week, some twenty asylum hostels came under attack elsewhere, 
half of them with incendiary devices and about half of them in eastern Germany 
(Merkl 1995:443). In August 1992, the north-eastern town of Rostock witnessed the 
worst outbreak of racist violence. Over six days, some one thousand young 
extremists attacked another hostel for asylum applicants, while a crowd of thousands 
of spectators - young and old - were unwilling to interfere. They watched 
enthusiastically and applauded every detonation of a Molotov cocktail, cheered 
every further attack and booed the rescuing police and fire brigade forces. The 
international public was frighteningly reminded of Germany in the 1930’s. Shortly 
after that on November 25, 1992, public attention shifted to the west where three 
Turkish nationals were murdered in a firebombed private house in the town of 
Moelln near Hamburg. The attack prompted even further perplexity since the victims 
were neither refugees nor lived in a hostel. The same was true for the incident in the 
westphalian town of Solingen, where in May 1993, five Turks died in an arson attack 
on a family home.
Public attitudes towards foreigners were largely influenced by these four incidents. 
As indicated by Table 6.8. the level of acceptance towards foreigners were markedly 
different between east and west. In the aftermath of the riots in Rostock (August 28, 
1992) more than half of respondents in eastern Germany disapproved of the many 
foreigners living in Germany. A year later and against the backdrop of the arson
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attack in Solingen (May 29, 1993) attitudes were considerably more positive but still 
remained significantly behind western levels.
Table 6.8. Attitudes Towards Foreigners in Germany, East and West 
Question: Many Foreigners live in Germany. Do you think this is...
October 1992 July 1993
East West East West
all right 39.8 60.1 56.9 70.1
not all right 59.5 34.9 42.6 26.8
do not know 0.7 5.0 0.5 3.1
Source: Politbarometer.
Moreover attitudes in the east were consistently less tolerant throughout the period 
between 1991 and 1993. Before the riots in Hoyerswerda (September 22, 1991) 
support was slightly below 40 per cent (west: slightly below 50 per cent). In the run­
up to the events of Rostock support dropped from a high of 58 per cent down to 35 
per cent (west: consistently around 60 per cent). Rostock actually had a re-enforcing 
effect on those who shared anti-foreign attitudes. Immediately after the riots, 
disapproval rates of foreigners increased to an all-time high of sixty per cent. 
Between Rostock and Moelln (November 23, 1992) support in the east recovered to 
over 50 per cent (west: over 70 per cent), while between Moelln and Solingen 
acceptance of foreigners in the east ranged between 60 and 45 per cent (west around 
70 per cent).
The new legislation which came in effect in July 1993 undoubtedly had a calming 
effect. With fewer foreigners and in particular asylum applicants, the political 
controversy lost a vital edge, media presentation decreased and tension amongst the 
population eased. Moreover, public counter-demonstrations against racial hatred 
sparked a profound re-orientation. Political commentators drew parallels to the
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xenophobia of the Third Reich. In particular the incidents in Moelln and Solingen 
functioned as moral wake-up calls. Subsequently, public initiatives and solidarity 
committees were founded. Candle marches were organised by unions, churches or 
schools and held in hundreds of towns. Between November 1992 (Moelln) and 
January 1993 some three million people participated in such demonstrations (Leenen 
1995:623). Dismay, compassion and solidarity grew.
By 1994 political discourse, solidarity marches and public appeals showed moderate 
educative effects on the population. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 6.9., differences 
between east and west regarding foreign tolerance prevailed. 18 months after the 
series of shocking xenophobic attacks in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Moelln and 
Solingen came to a close, only 17 per cent of the eastern respondents categorised 
‘more understanding for foreigners’ as a very important priority. Here, the west was 
considerably more sensitised with 27 per cent. The difference between old and new 
Lander became more visible when looking at the top two response categories. 
Although in both east and west the majority regarded understanding for foreigners at 
least as a ‘fairly important’ issue, the numbers in the west (72 per cent) were 
considerably higher than those in the east (61 per cent).
Table 6.9. Attitudes Towards International Understanding Regarding Their Importance for Society,
East and West (1994)
more understanding stop further immigration dual citizenship for foreigners who
for foreigners in our of non EU-foreigners have been living in Germany for a
society (percentages) long time
(percentages) (percentages)
East West East West East West
very important 17 27 32 37 9 14
fairly important 44 45 34 30 28 30
little importance 31 24 26 23 38 32
not important 7 5 8 10 24 23
n: 1532 (east)
6013 (west)
Source: Gruner und Jahr 1995:54-58.
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This moderate ethnic tolerance however, did not imply that Germany should 
continue to open its gates to foreign cultures. Both eastern and western respondents 
agreed on the importance to prevent further immigration from non-EU citizens. The 
margins between east and west showed only little differences. In the west, 67 per 
cent agreed to the top two response categories in comparison to 64 per cent in the 
east. Such pronounced rejection of a multi-ethnic society was further documented by 
the very low numbers of respondents who regarded dual citizenship for foreigners as 
a pressing concern. In the west, the top two categories attracted 44 per cent, while 
Easterners were even more reluctant with 37 per cent.
Reasons for Xenophobia:
Foreigners were not resented per se. The American tourist or the Japanese business 
man were hardly confronted with racist rhetoric let alone violence. Television 
celebrities in particular from the Netherlands or Pop-stars from Italy or Greece 
enjoyed widespread popularity. Instead, resentment was directed against migrants 
and refugees from eastern Europe and the Third World. Such a selectively sceptical 
attitude towards foreigners was not an exclusively German phenomenon. A study on 
ethnocentrism in the twelve member states of the EU showed that resentment was 
most widespread in centres of foreign migration, such as in parts of Belgium, France 
or Germany. The project also revealed that public opinion was related to the speed of 
immigration. Thus, strong resentment was particularly prevalent in states like Italy 
and Greece which had recently turned from emigration into immigration countries 
(Fuchs et.al. 1993:238-53).
Although the number of foreigners in the east was quite limited, xenophobia 
nonetheless emerged as a worrying phenomenon. Some analysts even concluded that 
foreign hostility almost occurred without foreigners (Golz 1995:7). From an
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organisational point of view, the eastern Lander were simply not prepared to provide 
accommodation for thousands of refugees and asylum applicants. After unification, 
the federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schauble decided that accommodation 
had to follow strictly according to the population ratio between east and west. 
Hence, the five new Lander were asked to provide housing for some twenty per cent 
of the incoming refugees. Local councils had to provide shelter for asylum applicants 
against the backdrop of precarious housing markets. Occasionally sports complexes, 
school yards and youth centres were transformed into provisional hostels. Local 
councils often were unable - if not unwilling - to convince the public of the political 
necessity and moral obligation of such measures out of financial, attitudinal or time
4reasons.
For East Germans, this situation represented a sharp difference from the limited 
experiences with foreigners under the SED-regime. Foreigners who constituted a 
mere one per cent of the total population were barely a social feature of life in the 
GDR. After unification, Schauble’s decision resulted in a significant concentration 
of foreigners in one area, since asylum applicants were housed together in large 
shelters. With the precarious housing conditions in overcrowded hostels, the sudden 
exposure to foreigners had a distinctly negative undertone. The first-hand experience 
of foreign cultures was accompanied by the sight of filth and overcrowding. For such 
a sudden confrontation with foreign ethnicities, most people were overstrained in 
accommodating notions of compassion or understanding. Clearly, the speed of 
immigration which happened almost overnight, as well as the density of foreigners in 
one area were too much to bear for many East Germans.
4 In Rostock, asylum hostels were heavily overcrowded which forced some applicants to camp 
outside or on balconies. Subsequently, allegations arose that local politicians did everything to 
increase public outrage in order to draw attention to the scandalous state of affairs which in their view 
was caused by unsuitable federal and Lander regulations (Leenen 1995:615).
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Research also pointed towards correlation based on levels of education and security 
of employment (Leenen 1995:609), whereas longer and higher education foster a 
certain degree of tolerance towards foreigners. Additionally, those with a secure 
material status were less likely to feel threatened in conflicts of distribution over 
social services, such as housing or unemployment benefits. Higher education 
furthermore resulted in better job prospects and consequently in higher social and 
material status. Those people however, belong to a segment of society that did not 
necessarily share their private and professional environments with migrants. In 
contrast, lower classes were more affected by such cultural clashes on a daily basis. 
Lower professional qualification and lower income provided for direct competition 
for jobs and direct collision in one's living environment. The perception of an 
existential threat was therefore more pronounced amongst the socially and materially 
challenged.
Such socio-economic explanations were particularly apt in the new Lander. The 
anticipation of mass unemployment increased dramatically by mid-1991; just some 
weeks before the riots in Rostock. High unemployment rates (in Rostock- 
Lichtenhagen some 17 per cent), the loss of the former all-encompassing welfare 
state and the subsidy system significantly affected the material situation of large 
segments of society (see Chapter Three). In conflicts of distribution over scarce jobs, 
affordable housing or unemployment benefits, the abstract political issue of asylum 
application and migration turned into a concrete phenomenon of practical 
xenophobia. While East Germans had to struggle to come to terms with the new 
realities of the market economy and a competitive labour market, asylum applicants 
were perceived as free-riders and even economic parasites, who were instantly given 
accommodation and a weekly allowance. Dissolution and uncertainty over the future 
lead to insecurity and aggression which occasionally erupted in hatred or violence. 
People, marginalised out of material disadvantages projected their own inadequate
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status on the foreigner, while claiming a lack of solidarity amongst fellow Germans 
and criticising the preferential treatment of foreigners. These crises of self-esteem 
caused many to adopt a racist rhetoric or even to commit xenophobic attacks. 
Suddenly, foreigners were utilised by both Easterners and Westerners as convenient 
scapegoats for the economic malaise. Against the backdrop of the raging civil war in 
Yugoslavia and the political upheavals in eastern Europe, such generalisations 
revealed weak civic virtues of compassion and tolerance, which were clearly 
sidelined by the prevalent material concerns over one's immediate future.
A further explanation was offered by general modernisation processes within 
society. Indeed, xenophobia also originated in social milieus which were not 
characterised by economic hardship or low levels of education. Commentators 
(Merkl 1995:454, Fijalkowski 1993:856) therefore referred to the crisis of the 
family, including the deterioration of civic values or the break-up of supportive and 
integrative social ties which result in general disorientation, individualisation, a 
feeling of social exclusion, as well as a ‘sociopathic inability to feel remorse or 
compassion’ (Merkl 1995:454) particularly amongst the young.
After unification, social relations in eastern Germany were subject to fundamental 
transformations. Although ideologically streamlined, mass organisations and work 
co-operatives provided a tight social net. The individual was integrated and taken 
care of; both at work and during leisure activities. After 1990, growing competition 
for jobs, closure of leisure facilities which formerly had belonged to co-operatives, 
or unemployment represented strong social ruptures. The former highly 
emancipatory role of women in society was subject to a radical change. After the 
demise of the GDR, child care facilities closed, financial support for families 
dropped, while women were over-proportionally affected by unemployment. Many 
were forced to return to the traditional role of housewives, leaving behind the former
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double challenges of work and family (see Chapter Three). In short, life was off- 
balance in the new Lander. The break-down of former patterns of a regulated and 
organised life became threatening to those who were unable to replace them with 
new contents. The young generation was particularly affected by these changes. In 
general, people in their teens and early twenties go through affirmative processes, 
where values and standards develop and consolidate. On top of these, the systemic 
transformation of an entire society added an additional source of unpredictability and 
insecurity to many young East Germans.
At this point one should keep in mind that xenophobia was not exclusively prevalent 
amongst the young. Although 75 per cent of criminal offenders with foreigners as 
their victims were under age twenty and 95 per cent were male (Fijalkowski 
1993:856), surveys indicated that negative attitudes towards foreigners were also 
common amongst elder generations. The cheering, if not enthusiastic approval of by­
standers in Rostock or Hoyerswerda indicated that the criminal action against asylum 
hostels struck a chord not only with the young. When talking about the rioting youth, 
‘adults’ never explicitly or unanimously distanced themselves. Although they did not 
excuse the action, they nonetheless failed to condemn it (Klinger 1994:150).
The young often functioned as mouthpieces for the frustration and dissatisfaction of 
larger segments of society. Not only juveniles had severe difficulties in adapting to 
the transformation processes. The new political, social and economic standards of 
unified Germany were also felt by those generations who experienced their 
formative years under the SED regime. In particular unemployment had a more 
devastating effect on the middle generation, since future re-employment became 
increasingly difficult with rising age. Being young however, furthered passionate 
and emotional reactions. In a generational cycle, the streamlining socialisation 
effects at work or as parents resulted in a more sedate, sober and responsible
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approach to life. Civic values and standards consolidate out of social interactions 
with fellow employees and friends. The ‘rebel’ however, can predominately be 
found amongst the young. Therefore one should not conclude that anti-foreign 
resentment generally softened with rising age out of maturing experiences in the 
economic and social sphere. Quite often, the scope of resentment merely altered: 
from active readiness for violence to passive tolerance of it.
Within the general modernisation processes, the impact of the media, its 
sensationalism and exaggeration, as well as its voyeuristic tendency towards 
shocking news had its fair share in mobilising public attitudes on foreigners. By 
1991, press and television widely reported on the dramatic increase in asylum 
applications. Metaphors of a ‘tidal wave of free-riders’ or a ‘full boat which cannot 
carry further passengers’ entered the public arena. After the arson attack in Moelln, 
the Presserat (the commission safeguarding ethical standards within the media) 
revealed the existence of an unofficial tariff system for posing in front of cameras 
with swastika or Nazi salute. In the immediate aftermath of Hoyerswerda, Rostock, 
Moelln and Solingen, the number of xenophobic crimes increased drastically 
(Leenen 1995:619). Hence, media presentation of these incidents did not only foster 
a public discourse and moral re-consideration. Instead, it also generated violence 
from segments of society who were in need of a catalyst, whereby the media offered 
a ready blueprint for action.
All these explanations however, were either of political-organisational, economic or 
sociological nature. Nonetheless political shortcomings, the ‘frustration theory’ 
(Fijalkowski 1993:855) of a hostile social environment and collapsing family 
structures, economic hardship or media sensationalism could not fully explain the 
level of aggression. The violent potential did not suddenly emerge after unification. 
It was already present in the GDR. Violence and hooliganism however, did not reach
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the surface of public attention because of the strong repression apparatus of police 
and state security.
Surveillance and repression in the totalitarian system generated notions of 
helplessness and renunciation towards state authority and its monopoly on political 
power. The state and in particular the police and the Stasi entailed a historically 
negative image amongst Easterners. After unification, the potential for violence 
however, was given ample opportunity to erupt. Repression and surveillance, as well 
as the official rhetoric of internationalism and Socialist brotherhood became notions 
of the past. The re-organised police forces of the new Lander were often under­
staffed and lacking in experience in handling incidents of such dimensions as 
Rostock or Hoyerswerda. These organisational deficiencies were regarded by the 
rioters as a welcomed weakness of the ‘enemy’. Therefore, the violent clashes with 
the police in Hoyerswerda and Rostock also represented moments of reckoning with 
the totalitarian past, where a mixture of a ‘continuity of violence and a distance to 
the state’ (Klinger 1994:151) fuelled the riots.
Despite the significant level of extremist violence, the political influence of the neo- 
Nazi movement remained very moderate. Only four per cent of perpetrators of right- 
extremist attacks were members of right-extremist organisations (Klinger 1994:157). 
Only ten to 15 per cent were politically right-wing motivated (Fijalkowski 
1993:856). The scene was highly fragmented. Six years into German unification, 
neo-Nazi groups and parties had failed to function as a forum for hopes and needs of 
societal segments. Despite some occasional successes at Lander or local elections, 
the Republikaner never emerged as the sole political representative of the far right. 
The party found it impossible to take over its competitors, such as the Deutsche 
Volksunion (German People's Union; DVU), the Nationale Partei Deutschlands 
(National Party; NPD), or the Freiheitliche Arbeiter Partei (Free Workers Party;
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FAP). Neo-Nazism had virtually no impact on the academic or intellectual scene. As 
a political programme, the resurgence of Nazi-ideology, Nazi-symbolism, or the 
revision of the 4Auschwitz lie’ were restricted to a highly limited number of 
followers. This political de-ideologisation of xenophobia was further documented by 
the spontaneous nature of Rostock or Hoyerswerda, where even weak traces of 
organised right-extremism could not be identified (Klinger 1994:152).
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6.5. Conclusion
In establishing a concrete external boundary, the overwhelming majority of Germans 
in both east and west supported restrictions on immigration. In particular the 
presence of asylum applicants and non-EU citizens faced strong criticism, while 
most people remained sceptical towards dual citizenship. With the exception of 
immigrants from EU countries - an idea to which East Germans were still largely 
underexposed - differences between east and west were only marginal. In light of 
these surveys the public outcry over the four key racist incidents did not represent a 
demolition of such external barriers. Instead, they were statements of morality and 
civility which condemned violent racism. The underlying intention of preserving an 
ethnic integrity however, constituted a completely different matter. The attempt to 
maintain ethnic homogeneity was further boosted by the restrictive citizenship laws. 
In regard to the growing percentages of foreigners - at least in the western part of 
Germany - homogeneity however, was a mythical idea which did not correspond to 
reality.
The racist attacks on asylum hostels in Hoyerswerda and Rostock, as well as the 
arson attacks on family homes in Moelln and Solingen represented the highly 
noticed tips of an iceberg in a series of racist, anti-foreign incidents which rose 
sharply between 1990 and 1993. Racist violence in 1991 and 1992 was 
proportionally more prevalent in the east but the data on general anti-foreign 
offences suggested that xenophobia was not an exclusively eastern phenomenon. In 
addition, although only a minority was involved in xenophobic violence - 
predominantly young, economically and educationally challenged males - the 
resentment against asylum applicants, against incoming ethnic Germans and against 
political refugees covered the whole of Germany. Nonetheless despite equal support 
for restricted immigration and despite the large numbers of racist legal offences in
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the west, resentment against foreigners was significantly more common in eastern 
Germany. Opinion polls demonstrated that fewer Easterners approved of foreigners 
living in Germany, while understanding for foreigners was also significantly and 
consistently less prevalent. Leaving racist violence and legal offences aside (since 
these were committed by a very small minority) the attitudes of the general public in 
east and west towards foreigners and consequently towards notions of tolerance and 
of respect for foreign cultures and customs showed considerable disparities.
A coherent national identity which incorporated German ethnicity would have been 
able to provide a buffer of tolerance for the influx of foreigners. A confident notion 
of ‘Germanness’ established over decades would not have seen the increasing 
numbers of foreigners as a threat but as a challenge and enrichment to the national 
identity. In fact, the cultural impact of the incoming wave of foreigners of the 1990’s 
was very limited. Ethnic Germans from the Volga or the Danube hardly introduced 
their customs and traditions to the German folklore. Political refugees and asylum 
applicants stayed segregated in hostels and shelters until they were returned to their 
countries or given permission to settle in Germany. In either case, the German way 
of life hardly came under attack. However no political system can for a long period 
sustain schizophrenic policies. Both the FRG and the GDR compromised the very 
notion of the nation. In West Germany, ethnicity was ignored out of the shameful, 
genocidal legacy of the Third Reich. The general acceptance of the division further 
weakened the ethnic factor of the Bonn identity. Instead, Wirtschaftswunder, soziale 
Marktwirtschaft, west integration and democracy served as new principles for 
establishing emotional attachments amongst the population.
In the GDR, the official doctrine of the German Socialist nation did not infiltrate the 
hearts and souls of the population. German ethnicity was further undermined by the 
regime’s propaganda of internationalism and Socialist brotherhood which
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streamlined the peoples of the Communist bloc into an ideological fraternity without 
paying respect to ethnic differences. Officially promulgated international 
understanding, cultural tolerance and co-operation were mere hypocrisies in the eyes 
of most East Germans. Instead, Easterners continued to uphold the notion of one 
common nation and possessed a strong will for German unity (see Chapter Two). 
The official political culture however, left no room for such intentions. Hence the 
post-war experiences in East and West Germany revealed that notions of an ethnic 
identity were largely marginalised.
Intolerance towards foreigners was further enhanced by deficient multi-cultural 
experiences. Although West Germans developed a supportive civic identity to the 
Federal Republic (a strong constitutional consensus, citizenship virtues of 
participation, interest and tolerance, accompanied by affirmative experiences in the 
sphere of economics), the political system never demanded that this civic identity 
had to accommodate multi-culturalism. Multi-cultural exposure at home remained 
limited and selective. Governmental authorities failed to provide coherent 
integrationist policies in social and economic environments. Despite highly liberal 
constitutional provisions that provided for the generous immigration of ethnic 
Germans and political refugees and despite the growing influx of Gastarbeiter, West 
Germany remained a largely homogenous society. Jus sanguinis did not only rule 
German citizenship law it also ruled the attitudes of most West Germans. Unless one 
was of German descent, neither tax and insurance contributions, nor professional 
status or lengthy residence could offer comprehensive integration into society.
Through guest workers, West Germans often experienced their first exposure to 
foreign cultures. However appreciation of foreign cultures was limited to occasional 
personal contacts, a wider choice of restaurants and increasingly by the 1960’s 
tourism. During the 1980’s, the rise of the Republikaner highlighted West German
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ethnocentrism. While the integration of the first generation of foreigners (mainly 
Southern Europeans from Italy, Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia) went comparatively 
smoothly, the growing influx of Turks prompted widespread resentment partially 
caused by the perceived economic threat to jobs, but also caused by marked cultural, 
religious - non western - characteristics. It showed that by and large, multi- 
culturalism remained an alien concept to most West Germans.
In the GDR, severe travel restrictions and a very limited number of foreigners 
accounted for an even more restricted multi-cultural exposure. Ethnic chauvinism 
against Russians, Poles or Czechs was widespread. Foreign workers and students 
remained segregated and socially isolated. In a society whose regime coerced its 
citizens into obedience and infantilised the individual for the intellectual supremacy 
of state and party, notions of tolerance and respect found an inhospitable 
environment. As a result, the ethnic jingoism of the Third Reich was never given a 
clean break and was able to continue to flourish throughout the existence of the 
GDR.
Against these historical developments, the organisational failures of the political 
authorities after 1989 represented disastrous mistakes. The federal government in 
Bonn, as well as local and Lander executive bodies ignored the writing on the wall. 
Neo-Nazis and Skinheads had already emerged in both east and west by the 1980’s 
and had been surveyed by police and intelligence services. Racist violence was 
already on the political agenda in such countries as France or Great Britain which 
would have given ample opportunity to further study the cause of xenophobia. 
Nonetheless, the distribution of asylum applicants in strict accordance to east-west 
population quotas displayed a profound incompetence. Not only the almost complete 
absence of multi-cultural experiences, but foremost the speed and extent with which 
asylum applicants were sheltered in the new Lander, provided for a logical hotbed
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for racism. Neither were the political and sociological causes for xenophobia 
addressed, nor were the actual outbreaks of violence handled in an organisationally 
satisfying manner. The long overdue reform of the immigration law resulted in a 
rapid decrease in racist attacks. It demonstrated the potential of political action in 
preventing social unrest. Unfortunately, measures were implemented after 
Hoyerswerda and Rostock had already shocked the public in Germany and abroad.
Overt racism could also have been reduced by coherent educational policies. 
Although the growing numbers of Gastarbeiter and refugees outnumbered emigrants 
by 1977, the Bonn Republic never considered itself as a country of immigration. 
Guest workers were regarded as temporary economic remedies. The social challenge 
of integrating foreign ethnicities was simply ignored. After unification, ignorance 
prevailed. School curricula did not give much attention to the history and culture of 
ethnic minorities within Germany - a telling example of how jus sanguinis 
dominated the mind. In the media, foreigner related issues were still treated with an 
aura of exceptionality over matter-of-fact presentation which was hardly apt in a 
country, where almost one of ten residents was foreign. Temples and synagogues 
were still not perceived as common features of cityscapes, but as cultural oddities. 
Educational enlightenment was badly needed; a challenge which politicians failed to 
address.
Although the outlined reasons for the establishment of external boundaries were 
shared by Easterners and Westerners, fundamentally different experiences and 
historic legacies account for the markedly more rigid boundary creation by East 
Germans. Firstly, civic values were less developed in the east. In the old Federal 
Republic, there was no escape from the traumatic past of the Third Reich. Auschwitz 
and Nazi-barbarism had a profound impact on the psyche of politicians and citizens. 
Faced with the collective guilt of the entire society, West Germans agreed that
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genocide and racial jingoism should never again originate from German soil. As a 
consequence, virtues of civility and morality emerged, enhanced by successful 
democratic experiences which stressed discourse, reason and rationality over 
simplification, generalisation and vulgarism. Although West Germans did not 
develop into utmost tolerant, multi-culture embracing cosmopolitans, forty years of 
democracy and increasing travel opportunities at least implemented a certain respect 
for foreign customs, traditions and ethnicities. West Germans did not necessarily 
assimilate foreign cultural standards but they tolerated them, as long as these did not 
fundamentally challenge the German way of life.
In the east, the totalitarian regime generated fundamentally different experiences. 
The GDR’s raison d’etre as an anti-Fascist state was a mere political and economic 
departure from National Socialism which gave East Germans the questionable moral 
opportunity to perceive themselves as both victims of, and ultimate winners over 
Fascism. Anti-Fascism in the GDR represented an uncritical worshipping of 
resistance fighters, while avoiding an analysis of the historical background of the 
Third Reich. By denying a thorough interrogation into the past which could have 
raised obvious parallels to the SED regime’s dictatorial nature, the population was 
given a convenient moral guilt-free stamp. A public discourse on the moral 
shortcomings of the Third Reich, on genocide and ethnic jingoism was never 
encouraged.
In addition, the very nature of the totalitarian SED state further undermined notions 
of civility and morality. East Germans were never treated as responsible, mature 
citizens. In a society where the authority of state and party was never questioned, the 
relationship between ruler and ruled was strictly hierarchical. The state generated a 
negative, oppressive and dictatorial image amongst the population. Citizens were 
degraded to mere tools in the overall process of manifesting the SED’s supremacy
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and were never given the opportunity to freely express their will in the political, 
economic or social spheres. Civic values did not emerge out of affirmative 
experiences in a process of interdependence and trust between state and citizen, but 
were simply delegated from above. Socialism as interpreted by the SED provided the 
GDR with a moral order, with a set of values to which people were forced to adjust 
to. With unification, this regulatory role of state and party vanished. In contrast to 
the west, the acquired civic virtues of tolerance and respect were weak. They were 
neither fostered nor part of the moral code of the GDR. Instead, after 1989 ethnic 
chauvinism and cultural indifference were free to roam.
Aggressive ethnocentrism and xenophobia also had their roots in internal aspects of 
society. As seen in the preceding chapters, the transformation processes of 
unification had a dramatic impact on the new Lander. With the demise of the GDR, 
social networks which formerly provided for stability, security and emotional shelter 
were subject to severe pressure. Unemployment was widespread. Reduction in social 
services affected many. The demise of the extensive network of societal organisation 
fundamentally altered daily life in eastern Germany. A society which for decades 
emphasised communitarian principles was now forced to accept individuality and 
self-responsibility. The experienced economic insecurity and social imbalance were 
aggravated by a generalising, irresponsible and insensitive media which further 
spread fear and discontent and which depicted a convenient emotional safety valve: 
asylum seekers in hostels and non-European foreigners in general were convenient 
scapegoats in a world of economic struggles and social re-orientation. The painful 
perception of most East Germans that they were years away from harvesting the 
promised benefits of the transition made it all the more easy to project inferiority, 
anger and disappointment on foreigners. While in the west, media reports aroused 
anger against foreigners, they prompted mass hysteria in the east. Journalistic
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sensationalism and voyeurism were treated at face value in an attempt to find 
answers in the complex and complicated world of unified Germany.
The young in particular violently expressed their frustration. Growing 
individualisation of society and the dissolution of traditional milieus of friends and 
family accounted for a severe lack of orientation and support. Faced with material 
pressure, unemployment and a general societal drive towards performance and 
competition, the simplistic scapegoating of foreigners who were held responsible for 
individual economic and social shortcomings provided a convenient solution for 
one’s mental balance. ‘Simplistic rules of violence and simplistic reasoning of cause 
and effect’ (Leenen 1992:1045) tempted many into racial hatred. The evaluation of 
one’s deprived material and social status resulted in overt aggression against ethnic 
minorities as a reflection of the growing antagonisms within society.
Ethnic exclusion in the new Lander emerged as a result of the continuous decline of 
other identities. Economically, unemployment, financial insecurity and material gaps 
between east and west gave Easterners a sense of inferiority. Perceptions of political 
colonisation by the arrogant and condescending west resulted in feelings of being 
second-class citizens. With these identity markers under attack, the vigorous defence 
of ethnicity provided an obvious solution for East Germans in their search for ego- 
boosting affirmative orientations. Ethnicity represented a ready repository of 
identity that was not directly challenged by the processes of unification. Attacking 
foreign elements compensated for the weak and hurt self-esteem of Easterners in an 
attempt to safeguard German ethnicity as one of the last remainders for one’s 
emotional attachments. One solution would have been to rejuvenate the ethnic factor 
from within. But the distorted notion of German ethnicity of the SED regime and the 
prevalent neglect of positive prescriptions in unified Germany gave way to a morally 
questionable remedy: the rigid establishment of external barriers against foreigners.
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Germans in general, but Easterners in particular have to come to terms with the fact 
that the influx of foreigners cannot solely be held responsible for the limited 
importance of ethnicity in public life. Despite the significant waves of immigrants, 
their social, economic and cultural impact was too limited to pose a severe threat to 
the integrity of German cultural values and traditions, language or blood. Instead, 
German ethnicity was undermined by an overemphasis on other identity markers. In 
the old Federal Republic, growing prosperity, social security, consumerism, west 
integration and the remarkable performance of the Grundgesetz served as new 
formative anchors for the Bonn Republic’s consciousness. In the GDR, the SED 
tried to generate loyalties through the envisaged establishment of a Socialist society 
which would offer equal chances to all citizens, complemented by notions of 
Communist brotherhood and internationalism. Both civic identities however, were 
too weak in coping with the increasing ethnic variety of post-unification Germany. 
Ethnic identity markers in the FRG and GDR were largely ignored in the quest for 
establishing new civic identities in the aftermath of National Socialism. By 1989, 
German ethnicity therefore already represented an ailing patient that blamed the 
incoming waves of foreigners as culprits for its identity deficiencies.
Hence the problem lay within the self-perception of the nation. With the end of the 
systemic antagonism of the Cold War and fifty years after Auschwitz, the world’s 
most dialectical nation still had to find a coherent balance, where ethnic pride was 
re-integrated properly into a national identity. Germany ought to establish 
‘prescriptions’; to fill the empty shell of German ethnicity with meaning by carefully 
addressing the German ethnic heritage without falling back on the ethnic chauvinism 
of the Third Reich.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
With this century drawing to a close, images of Berliners chiselling away 
pieces of the Wall, tearful people embracing each other and partying together 
in the streets until the early hours, ‘Trabis’ making their way from the 
wasteland of the Potsdamer Platz through a provisional hole in the soon to be 
dismantled Iron Curtain and onto the Kurfurstendamm represent some of the 
most vivid and moving memories of recent history. These days in November 
1989 highlighted the end of an era that had dominated world politics for over 
four decades: the systemic antagonism of the Cold War with the divided 
German nation as one of its most prominent victims. The subsequent years 
witnessed formerly unimaginable transformation processes and the successful 
structural integration of a former Communist society into a stable democracy. 
However was the structural unification of the Bonn Republic and the GDR 
followed by the cognitive and emotional unification of Easterners and 
Westerners? Did Germans follow former Chancellor Willy Brandt’s call who 
on November 10th stated ‘what belongs together has to grow together now’? 
Or were Germans more likely to adhere to Peter Schneider’s image of the 
‘Wall in the mind’ (1983:119)?
Shared Boundaries
At first glance, various identity markers shared by both East and West 
Germans pointed towards the establishment of a common national identity. 
‘Affirmative economics’ which were introduced by the west implied a 
positive orientation towards economics based on the successful experiences 
of the Bonn Republic; in particular high productivity, industrial harmony,
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growth in living standards and widespread prosperity. In the initial aftermath 
of unification, Easterners were shocked by the run-down state of the GDR 
economy. Overstaffed and inefficient companies and a deficient 
infrastructure resulted in low productivity. Businesses closed down and 
unemployment spread. Gradually however, East Germans made their first 
positive experiences within the newly introduced market economy. For those 
with jobs, the financial situation improved significantly. The individual had 
more money to spend as a result of the generous conversion rate and 
advantageous wage negotiations by the trade unions which allowed for the 
participation in the consumer society. Hence East Germans were allowed to 
share this western standard.
The standard of ‘active economics’ also made advances in the new Lander. 
Virtues of initiative, self-reliance and responsibility which represent vital 
qualities of any market economy were gradually adopted by many East 
Germans. This cognitive transition became even more impressive when 
looking at the economic legacy of the GDR whose planned, centralised and 
outdated economy generated such attitudes as apathy, lethargy and 
indifference. After 1989, many Easterners were confronted with the prospect 
of unemployment and limited job opportunities. The significant numbers 
which migrated or commuted to the west to find work however, indicated an 
adaptive capacity to take matters in one’s own hands. Whether out of 
personal ambition to succeed within the market economy or out of existential 
necessity, the formerly neglected virtues of initiative and self-reliance 
became widely established in the new Lander.
On a mass-cultural level, the arrival of the western consumer society, its 
choice and variety of goods was largely approved by East Germans. From 
early on there was a rush on consumer products, in particular those that were 
formerly unavailable or overpriced, such as cars, electronics or household 
appliances. Prior to 1989 the penetrative power of the western media
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established the Federal Republic as a reference consumer culture that was in 
stark contrast to the parsimonious reality of the GDR. With unification East 
Germans did not waste any time in following in the footsteps of their western 
compatriots who had experienced a similar wave of consumption in the 
1950’s that had made up for years of material and consumer privation of the 
immediate post-war era. With the money surplus to participate, this 
embracing of the western consumer world by East Germans represented a 
vital buffer of support for the challenges and hardship caused by the massive 
transformation processes. This corrupting influence of affluence convinced 
many Easterners that unification indeed had worthwhile and comforting 
assets to offer. Hence the western standard of consumerism was 
overwhelmingly adopted by the east.
‘Convenience and comfort’ which implied modem housing, improved 
infrastructure, as well as western consumer outlets were highly appreciated. 
The arrival of these western expressions of modernity hardly met any 
resistance against the formerly experienced run-down state of the GDR 
including inhospitable housing, poor maintenance work and repressed 
consumer wishes. Catching-up with the western levels of comfort and 
convenience stood on the agenda of many East German households. 
Regarding leisure and in particular travel, qualitative and quantitative 
increases followed established western standards. This came as no surprise 
against the backdrop of pent-up desires during the SED regime which had 
effectively locked up its citizens from any non-Communist experiences and 
offered rather spartan leisure opportunities that stood in stark contrast to the 
sophisticated life-styles as shown on (western) television. Quantitative and 
qualitative differences between east and west nonetheless remained which 
were largely caused by the still evident material gaps between the old and 
new Lander. The trend towards western patterns of leisure however, was 
undoubtedly present.
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In a similar vein, Easterners overwhelmingly adopted and even expanded 
western patterns of media consumption. Easterners watched more television 
than their western counterparts and showed no signs of hesitation in 
consuming the increasingly Americanised programme structures. Post­
unification viewing patterns represented the continuation of media 
consumption during the GDR era. The ‘vacuum of fun’ and the politically 
distorted broadcast of the SED media diet was filled with western television 
as a normative reference of truth and entertainment. After 1989 the already 
conditioned consumers of the new Lander saw no reason in breaking with 
their existing habits. On the contrary, television provided a cheap and ready 
form of entertainment that provided a welcomed leisure activity in a time of 
economic instability and financial insecurity.
In the civic-political sphere, the positive reception of the arrival of an open 
and free society represented a vital stabiliser for the recently introduced 
democratic structures. Easterners welcomed highly the departure of 
despotism and suppression, and the arrival of free expression and justice. In 
addition, the large majority of the eastern vote was given to established 
democratic western parties. From a behavioural perspective, this indicated a 
promising level of integration into the Federal Republic’s system of political 
representation. As with the Bonn Republic in the 1950's the introduction of 
democracy was fostered by traditional law-abiding and subservient standards 
that remained as a legacy of the SED regime. While the sound and time- 
tested western democratic structures provided an effective barrier against a 
potential return to totalitarian rule, the traditional system-conformist 
behaviour of the Obrigkeitsstaat further facilitated the introduction of 
democracy.
In addition, the democratic transition from the Communist dictatorship was 
aided by the eastern public’s considerable interest in politics, as well as by 
satisfactory levels of electoral participation. Regarding these crucial
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democratic virtues, Easterners adapted thoroughly to western standards. 
However such fundamental basics of democratic citizenship - participation in 
elections and political interest - were already promoted by the SED regime 
which had possessed high norms of political participation and had fostered 
political knowledge, albeit in an ideologically streamlined manner. Political 
interest was further boosted by the highly politicised climate of the 
immediate months before and after November 1989. Broad segments of the 
eastern society were involved in mass demonstrations and the political, social 
and economic future of eastern Germany were the central topics of much 
private and public conversation. The repressive and coercive nature of 
political participation under the SED regime resulted in a thirst for free 
expression in the aftermath of 1989. These highly positive democratic virtues 
significantly contributed to the relatively smooth and rapid introduction of 
western democratic structures of political representation.
Western External Boundaries
Apart from these mutually agreed standards which supported the 
establishment of common national identities shared by East and West 
Germans, a variety of exclusive barriers emerged that gave ample testimonies 
to the emerging ‘Wall in the mind’. Territorially, Easterners had remained 
fixated on the Federal Republic throughout the existence of the GDR. While 
West Germans had largely accepted the fact of the division and found a new 
spiritual home within the community of western states, Easterners continued 
to perceive of the unification of the nation as a political goal that would offer 
them freedom and prosperity. While for West Germans unification came as a 
welcomed but not desperately pursued political opportunity, it was the 
fulfilment of a life-long ambition for most Easterners.
From this ambivalent point of departure, a tidal wave of dividing experiences 
followed. Economically, the prospect and experience of unemployment came
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as a sudden shock for many East Germans. In sharp contrast to the GDR 
which gave the constitutional right of work to every citizen, the transition to 
a market economy resulted in an ever decreasing work force. Unemployment 
became a widespread phenomenon and by far the issue of most concern to 
Easterners. Socialism had hardly prepared East Germans for this abrupt 
transformation. Over night, work turned from a given without any particular 
financial or social value into one of the fundamental requisites of one’s 
existence on which social and financial status depended upon. 
Unemployment turned into a decisive barrier that separated east from west. 
The revolutionary upheavals of 1989 left many Easterners with the belief that 
years of consumer privation and lower living standards in comparison to the 
west would finally come to an end. On the contrary however, many found 
themselves excluded from the material benefits which unification had 
promised initially. A two-tier society emerged in the new Lander. On the one 
hand those who regularly received their pay cheques which offered satisfying 
participation in the newly-established consumer society, as well as the 
pursuit of individual career ambitions; on the other hand those who were 
excluded from the benefits of market economics. But even for those with 
employment, the prosperity gap between east and west represented an issue 
of much dissatisfaction. Although the large majority fared better 
economically than in the days of the old GDR, the advances after 1990 were 
regarded as insufficient. Images of the rich west and the poor east persisted 
and were counter-productive to the establishment of common economic 
identities of a unified nation based on material equality.
The formerly wide ranging network of social services became subject to 
significant cuts. While the GDR comprehensively took care of its citizens, 
the West German Sozialstaat was tied to the country’s economic 
competitiveness. East Germans now had to accommodate the fact that social 
security did not constitute an automatic given for individual demands. Hence 
for most Easterners, living circumstances became unstable. The incoming
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western culture stressed notions of individuality, performance, flexibility and 
mobility. These stood in marked contrast to the slower pace of life in the 
GDR with the pronounced emphasis on amiable and harmonious social 
relations, as well as state-guaranteed material and social safety. After 1990 
tough competition for limited number of jobs, the decline in rent and food 
subsidies or family allowances combined in a widespread feeling of 
insecurity. The vast demographic pressures, including the dramatic drop in 
marriage, divorce and birth rates, the continuous support for the idea of 
Socialism, as well as the declining approval of Capitalism represented telling 
indicators for a feeling of dissatisfaction with and confusion about the speed 
and extent of the economic transformation processes.
Such deep-felt ruptures to one's existence required a safety valve of 
aggression. The scapegoat was a conspiratorial apparatus of western 
managers, western politicians and foremost the Treuhand which were blamed 
for the economic malaise. East Germans hereby revealed a characteristic that 
represented a legacy of the SED regime. In the GDR, the individual was the 
passive recipient of guaranteed work and social security. Notions of self­
responsibility, independence and initiative hardly stood a chance against 
powerful and centralised administrative apparatuses which organised 
virtually every aspect of life. Despite increased pressure to perform at work 
and to compete for jobs, economics continued to inhabit a passive and 
recipient undertone after unification. One super-imposed system (West 
German Capitalism) had replaced another (Soviet-type Socialism). The 
generous currency conversion, as well as highly advantageous wage and 
pension levels lulled Easterners into a subsidised prosperity. The individual 
was therefore often not forced to accept responsibility for the economic 
decline and to confront personal shortcomings and deficiencies. Instead, as 
with the old system of centralism and planning, people blamed abstract 
political and economic hierarchies that had caused such hardship. Notions of 
‘exploitative* economics, of a colonisation by the west became widespread.
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Opportunistic western managers degraded the individual to a mere 
production tool, and enterprises to investment opportunities. Merciless 
Capitalism fought property battles, made jobs redundant and threatened 
social safety. These perceptions of western economic opportunism and 
superiority marked a further severe dividing line between east and west. 
Within such an atmosphere, East Germans felt reluctant to identify with the 
unified nation under western economic leadership.
The frustration, shock and anger caused by widespread unemployment, the 
decline of the former all-encompassing welfare state and ‘exploitative’ 
economics were further aggravated by alarming developments in the civic- 
political sphere. A paradoxical situation emerged. On the one hand, East 
Germans continued to give the large majority of their votes to western 
parties. On the other hand however, throughout the first four years after 
unification, around fifty per cent could not identify with any western political 
party. Easterners began to perceive unification as the political take-over by 
western parties and politicians. For many people, attitudes prevailed that the 
formidable effort of ousting a totalitarian regime merely resulted in the super­
imposition of another political system without any appropriate popular 
involvement. Indeed, with the exception of the PDS and the Bundnis 90, 
political parties which had their origins in the west took control of the eastern 
Lander. The import of western politicians and civil servants, as well as the 
limited impact of eastern politicians on the national political scene further 
nurtured emerging attitudes of a western political colonisation and gave the 
political transformation processes a distinctly illegitimate characteristic. For 
many, political choices were limited and unsatisfactory. Western parties did 
not represent properly eastern interests. The PDS still had the stigma of the 
successor party of the SED. Bundnis 90 turned from a civic movement into a 
fringe party on the edge of the political agenda. As a consequence, active 
participation in politics, such as membership in political parties or trade 
unions decreased consistently. Interest in politics - although still at
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respectable levels - nonetheless had dropped significantly since 1990. A 
growing indifference towards the political process emerged which regarded 
the newly-introduced mode of interest aggregation and representation as an 
alien western system.
Revelations on the extent of the state security system and the astonishingly 
high numbers of private individuals and public officials who worked for the 
Stasi left a further dividing mark between east and west. The initial pride in 
the successful mass revolution was gradually replaced by a widespread 
feeling of disgrace. The imposition of western economic, political, and social 
structures, the complete demolition of the entire GDR state and its particular 
way of life, and finally the scrutiny with which the Stasi past was 
interrogated, represented humiliating experiences for many East Germans. 
People were forced to justify their survival strategies of accommodating and 
adapting to a totalitarian regime to which many felt hardly any loyalty to.
The Stasi legacy divided the public psyche of the nation. Western-dominated 
media, western laws and the western ‘Gauck-office’ called for an 
uncompromising interrogation. West Germany's own reluctance in 
confronting the people's involvement in the Nazi regime should not be 
repeated in the east. The west ordered utmost scrutiny. Not surprisingly, 
against this condescending western standard, the east responded with 
escapism. Gradually, perceptions dominated which repressed the Stasi 
controversy and intended to draw the matter to a close. Understanding and 
compassion amongst West Germans for this complex and complicated issue 
however, were severely lacking. After all, not every citizen of the GDR was 
either an ardent Communist supporter or involved in spy-activities. Many 
were forced to collaborate out of coercion and existential necessity. The 
frantic and unrelenting manner with which media and public officials 
handled the matter pushed East Germans into an uncomfortable comer. 
Repression and denial were the only options for exiting this dilemma which
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prevented a thorough working out of the past. Instead excluding barriers 
developed between western plaintiffs and eastern defendants, between those 
who accused and those who justified their actions.
With these developments in mind, Easterners over-emphasised the one 
remaining identity marker that was still shared by east and west: ethnicity. 
Throughout the existence of the GDR, East Germans never surrendered to the 
officially propagated notion of two German nations. In the Federal Republic 
the shameful legacy of Auschwitz and the gradual confrontation with the Nazi 
past resulted in a distinctly un-ethnic identity, while the widespread 
accommodation of the fact of the division further weakened any potential 
ethnic identity markers. However national unity and the goal of the unified 
nation which offered freedom and prosperity were firmly on the eastern 
public's mind. Indeed the desire for unification with the west was largely 
based on ethnicity. East Germany could very well have remained a separate 
state. A democratised GDR would have been possible, just like the 
democratised Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia emerged out of the ashes 
of Communism. However the common German ethnic identity tipped the 
balance in favour of unification within a single German state.
While Communism had stressed internationalism and Socialist brotherhood, 
unification brought a political system which - although not expressively 
encouraged - but nonetheless allowed the identification with ethnic elements. 
With the continuous decline of other identity markers, ethnicity for East 
Germans represented one of the last remaining bastions to generate self­
esteem. Xenophobia and ethnic-chauvinism offered the ready compensation 
for widespread feelings of frustration and inferiority. Although the desire to 
preserve the German ethnic homogeneity was also undoubtedly present in the 
old Lander, the higher degrees of racist violence and general resentment 
against foreigners in the east pointed towards the functionalisation of ethnic- 
chauvinism and xenophobia as pressure valves. Condescending attitudes
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towards foreigners, foreign cultures and customs offered a considerable boost 
to one’s badly-hurt self-esteem in a time of severe pressures to one’s 
existence.
Eastern External Boundaries
Against these dividing barriers, East Germans soon began to establish their 
own excluding boundaries which marked their identities off from that of 
western Germany. These new boundaries overcame the strong sense of 
inferiority and instilled desperately needed pride. As the widely noticed 
marker of this new found self-esteem, the PDS enjoyed spectacular success. 
Votes for, as well as party identification with the neo-Communists increased 
continuously. As the advocate of the east, the party represented the catalyst 
for the eastern defiant protest vote against the political and economic 
colonisation by the west. The PDS was able to instil a sense of community 
and emerged as a regional identity party that attracted support not necessarily 
for its programmes and ideas but moreover for its defiance against the 
political - western - establishment.
The PDS was also able to benefit from an increasing nostalgic and selective 
reference to the GDR. As the successor party to the SED, East Germans 
related the party to a past (the so-called ‘Friedenszeiten'; time of peace) that 
offered more stability, more security and more harmony; when life was not 
subject to such sudden and colossal changes. While in the first year after 
unification, the political and economic rhetoric of the elites and the media 
denounced practically all economic, political and cultural developments that 
had ever emerged from the east as unworthy, the reversal trend became more 
and more evident by 1992. Now, Easterners put the past into a selective 
perspective. Although hardly any East German wanted a return to totalitarian 
rule, certain routines and life-styles of the GDR era were now fondly 
treasured. ‘Trabis’ were restored and driven with pride. GDR consumer
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products such as ‘Rotkappcherf or iF6'> enjoyed an astonishing resurgence. 
Saluting the past represented miniature plebiscites against the speed and 
extent of the general transformation processes. They expressed one’s 
defiance against the western take-over, as well pride in one’s achievements 
and personal history. The transition with its sudden changes implicitly 
expected East Germans to start a new existence and to accommodate to new 
values, standards and demands. Nostalgia however, proudly stated that life 
did not simply start in 1990 but had its worthwhile and memorable assets 
before the time when the Wall came down. Here was the confident resistance 
against the streamlining processes of unification that had initially threatened 
to suffocate any particularly eastern cultural, political, social and economic 
expressions. Nostalgia was the proud establishment of an external boundary 
which no Westerner was able to cross. It was an exclusively eastern standard 
which formed a distinct ‘Us-against-them’ attitude in the entire region of the 
new Lander.
The dramatic responses of East Germans to the transformation processes, 
including growing indifference to the political process, the attempts to 
preserve ethnic homogeneity, the rising popularity of the neo-Communists, 
the consumer preference of eastern products pointed towards the conclusion 
that people reacted out of self-defence. The speed and extent of the transition, 
the imposition of new standards and the subsequent adaptation to them did 
not allow any time for reflection. In 1989 East Germans possessed clearly 
defined aspirations: civic liberties, freedom and material prosperity. After 
unification, a confused storage of Communist experiences, new demands and 
expectations emerged. The past had just been invalidated by the nature of the 
transition which despised all former hierarchies, structures and emotional 
anchors to one’s past existence. With one sweep, unification sought to erase 
eastern identities and streamline them into common all-German identities of 
western origin. This however, was not an acceptable option for most East 
Germans. Confused standards of a fondly remembered past (which also held
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traumatic experiences of repression and curtailed liberties) and a complicated 
and demanding present full of abrupt cognitive changes left the individual 
struggling to find his or her place within the radically changed environment.
The Future of German Identity
The acceptance by East Germans of numerous western standards offered 
plentiful evidence for the emergence of common national identities. 
‘Affirmative’ and ‘active economics’, the establishment of the western 
consumer society, media consumption, leisure and travel patterns, the 
approval of the arrival of a free and open society, as well as the basic civic 
virtues of participation and political interest had all reached comparable 
levels in east and west.
Nonetheless, unification never constituted a project for both east and west. 
The transformation processes were implemented with hardly any public 
involvement. Westerners had no choice but to accept the incorporation of the 
eastern Lander into the Federal Republic. Tax burdens, solidarity tokens and 
a spreading economic recession gave the euphoric days of 1989 a sour 
aftertaste. In the east, the cognitive discrepancy between the active mass 
involvement of 1989, as well as the confident constitutional proposals of the 
‘Round Table’ discussions on the one hand, and the economic and political 
super-imposition of western structures on the other could not have been more 
drastic. Many Easterners felt betrayed twice. First by the totalitarian lie of 
‘real-existing Socialism’ and now by the hasty promises of ‘blossoming 
landscapes’. In the end the imposed unity, its speed and extent represented a 
burden which often threatened to undermine the public’s psychological 
balance in both east and west. Sharing and growing together turned out to be 
more complicated than the preceding decades of co-existence. Inner unity 
often was a mere utopia. The establishment of which was hampered by a 
yoke of scepticism and intolerance.
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Numerous excluding boundaries whether of eastern or western origin 
severely disturbed communication and reconciliation between the two 
German societies and continued to drive Germans apart. Instead of focusing 
on common grounds, Easterners and Westerners built new loyalties around 
excluding standards and only very reluctantly attempted to integrate the 
compatriots across the former demarcation line into one’s identity. Instead, 
the development of post-unification national identities in east and west often 
represented the psychological exclusion of the other German part which 
potentially bears grave consequences.
Although living standards and wage levels continued to approximate and 
although the generous conversion rate and advantageous wage negotiations 
allowed for an immediate participation in the consumer society, the 
persistence of widespread unemployment imposes a considerable threat to the 
country’s political stability. Although so far no major civil unrest had been 
reported, this does not guarantee that there will not be any in the near future. 
Employment not only offers the financial means to participate in the 
consumer society but foremost affects one’s self-respect and self-esteem. 
Political and economic authorities have to realise that the western levels of 
prosperity and consumption were one of the decisive raisons d’etre of the 
revolution. To reach the ‘promised land’ of the west gave the Wende a 
different direction and called for the unification with the Federal Republic. 
These fundamental motivations ultimately have to be met by the unified 
Germany. Otherwise, perceptions of a two-class society, of Westerners 
exploiting Easterners will continue to haunt inner unity.
Social safety and security go hand in hand with employment. With a secured 
job, stability and predictability could again re-emerge as patterns of life for 
East Germans. The dramatic demographic pressures in the east not only 
showed a remarkable adaptability to the sudden and abrupt changes that
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affected one’s existence but also indicated a widespread feeling of insecurity 
of what the future might bring. To develop affirmative loyalties to unified 
Germany, people at least have to be given the prospect of re-establishing a 
sound balance in their lives.
When looking at empirical evidences, the Easterners’ inferior perception of a 
political take-over by the west was certainly justified. The feeling of mis­
representation and prevailing attitudes of the illegitimate nature of the 
transformation processes have to be addressed to avoid further disintegration 
which could possibly lead to separation. Although inexperience and 
involvement with the SED regime represented a severe obstacle in the 
recruitment of East Germans to public appointments, political parties, public 
administration and private enterprises are well-advised to deliberately 
employ Easterners in particular in senior posts that carry responsibility and 
publicity. East and west have to realise that they share a common political 
destiny. In this respect, sharing a nations’ destiny implies sharing 
responsibility. As a vital step in this direction, the impact of Easterners on the 
national public agenda - within the media, within political parties, within 
political and economic decision making processes has to be increased. Only 
then can East Germans come to the conclusion that they are contributing to 
the processes of shaping the nation’s future.
Such developments would undermine the most important reason for voting 
for the neo-Communists. The PDS so far did not challenge the democratic 
political structures of the Federal Republic and it remains unlikely that the 
party will do so in the future. Instead the PDS represented a lively 
contribution to the existing party landscape as an alternative on the political 
left, as well as a vital agent of political representation in the new Lander. 
Nonetheless, the party constituted a reservoir for the anti-western protest 
vote. The continuous support for the neo-Communists in the east and their 
almost complete lack of status in the west symbolised the split between the
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eastern and western psyche. For East Germans, the PDS formed a vital 
excluding identity marker which raised the eastern public’s self-esteem as a 
defiant, special and different community. The need to define the party and its 
voters on difference and exclusion resulted from the eastern impression of a 
second-class and colonised eastern citizenry. The above described integration 
processes however, would significantly soften the motivation to vote for the 
PDS.
The legacy of the Stasi added further bricks to the ‘Wall in the mind’. In 
rhetoric, the entire eastern society was put on trial over the alleged 
collaboration with the totalitarian SED regime. Western accusations were 
complemented by eastern suspicions as to whether one’s friend or even 
family member had been a spy. In the east, repression and denial emerged 
which intended to close an unpleasant and tormenting chapter in one’s 
personal history. Nonetheless, only a full address of the £te/-practicalities, 
of personal involvement and guilt is able to overcome denial and repression. 
This however, should be undertaken without the condescending arrogance 
that divided the nation into western prosecutors and eastern criminals. The 
discourse should also include references to West Germany’s failures in 
properly addressing the Third Reich in the immediate post-war era. Stasi 
informants might be the most recent immoral villains, but this collaboration 
with an unjust regime was certainly not unique to German history. From this 
perspective, Westerners have no right to judge Easterners on their moral 
deficiencies.
Despite the presence of the basic civic standards of participation and political 
interest, Easterners showed considerable deficiencies in the civic-political 
sphere. All too often the blame for economic or political shortcomings was 
simply directed against abstract elites; predominantly from the west. This 
tendency to look for scapegoats survived as a legacy of the GDR era. 
Communism and totalitarianism did not prepare the individual for
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competition in a democratic, pluralistic and market-oriented environment. 
People longed for the former guardianship of the state that had organised 
their lives. The urge and necessity to make decisions and to accept 
responsibility for them however, was perceived by many as a great burden. 
Not surprisingly, the six year crash-course in citizenship left much to be 
desired. People found it difficult to re-define their relationship to the state 
when they consistently used to be against it. This ‘deficit of trust’ (Stem 
1993:124) bom out of repression and curtailed liberties during the GDR era 
represents a severe danger to democracy.
East Germans have to internalise citizenship virtues of democratic rights and 
democratic responsibilities. The structures of political parties, interest 
groups, or federal and Lander parliaments had been recognised and used as 
agents of individual demands. Nonetheless democratic stability in the new 
Lander relied on the implementation of sound political western structures and 
satisfactory levels of material prosperity. These have yet to be complemented 
by affirmative orientations. Democracy in the east needs to be filled with 
meaning. People obeyed democratic rules as organising principles of society. 
However East Germans have to internalise that democracy not only offers 
such givens as freedom and justice but furthermore offers opportunities to 
participate and to influence. As seen in West Germany, fostering civic virtues 
demands time. In the Bonn Republic it took some twenty years for a 
confident citizenry to emerge that expressed and pursued democratic rights 
and civic opportunities. This however, should not prevent the agents of 
political education, such as political parties, the media or schools from 
placing deliberate efforts on overcoming the existing gap in citizenship 
virtues.
Such affirmative and confident developments in the economic and civic 
spheres have the potential to encounter the resurgence of ethnic-chauvinism 
and xenophobia in the new Lander. The over-emphasis on ethnicity would
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lose its ultimate edge as the last bastion of self-esteem since other identity 
markers are able to compensate for it. Nonetheless the establishment of such 
standards as multi-culturalism and ethnic tolerance was complicated by 
confused ethnic standards in the old GDR. The official political culture 
propagated internationalism and Socialist brotherhood, yet ethnic chauvinism 
against Poles or Czechs was widespread and strict travel restrictions hindered 
the appreciation of foreign cultures and customs. Additionally, the ethnic 
homogeneity and the political climate of the GDR did not foster tolerance or 
respect, while the SED never properly addressed the genocide and moral 
barbarism of the Third Reich. Civic values of tolerance and respect did not 
develop naturally but instead were delegated from above with the state as the 
regulator of moral codes. With unification, this watchdog function of the 
state disappeared and ethnic chauvinism was given the opportunity to freely 
develop. In the west, tolerance and civility were more advanced. Yet the 
xenophobic violence between 1991 and 1993 was not an exclusively eastern 
phenomenon. The political system of the Bonn Republic was never forced to 
accommodate multi-culturalism. Despite granting political asylum and 
immigration to ethnic Germans, and despite incoming guest workers, West 
Germany remained a largely homogenous society.
Half a century after Auschwitz, ethnic identities are likely to appear more 
pronounced in the German public psyche. In the west, the third post-war 
generation does not so readily accept the collective shame and responsibility 
as their parents had done. In the east, the demise of the Communist bloc 
gives ethnic identities the chance to re-emerge after decades of officially 
propagated Socialist internationalism. The united Germany therefore faces 
the challenge of giving emerging ethnic identities a positive direction. Both 
West and East Germans still have to develop a proper balance in their ethnic 
identities; one which is proudly aware of the culture, customs and traditions 
of the German nation combined with tolerance for and appreciation of 
cultural difference and diversity.
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Nostalgia and the sentimental longing for a secure past provided an 
emotional anchor of orientation for many East Germans. Values and 
standards which were generated by forty years of Socialism and 
totalitarianism could not easily be left behind or replaced by orientations to 
the unified nation. Subsequently, Easterners started to place their past into a 
selective perspective. This longing for safety, stability and familiarity 
indicated a fear of failing within the new societal, economic and political 
systems. Nobody wanted the GDR back, but also nobody wanted it to be 
taken away from them. This virtual GDR-reality imposed a significant threat 
to inner unification. Germany’s democratic stability could be in danger when 
people selectively and affectionately remember the totalitarian past and 
disproportional criticise the present.
Germany therefore ought to establish an environment that gives eastern 
identities enough room to flourish. In the first years after unification, 
Easterners were streamlined into second-class Westerners. But with only six 
years of adapting to a vastly different form of life, East Germans still possess 
emotional attachments and loyalties that are linked to the GDR past. After 
1989 the transformation processes heavily condemned all former experiences 
and formative orientations. However identities are not only embedded in the 
present but also in the past. The specific form of life under the SED regime 
will for some time feature as an identity marker in particular for those who 
found it difficult to succeed under the new political, economic and societal 
rules. It therefore remains crucial to allow for the continued existence of a 
particular East German identity that gives reference to past experiences and 
orientations. Only then can alienating attitudes to the unified nation be 
avoided. Dual identities based on the vastly different eastern experiences 
under totalitarian rule should develop alongside supportive orientations to the 
unified nation. The GDR era has to be integrated into the public psyche of 
both east and west. Education authorities, the media and the general public
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discourse ought to give marked attention to East German life prior to 1989 - 
not the current selective nostalgic expression but instead the conscious 
address of all positive and negative aspects of it. Germans in east and west 
now share a common political destiny but as yet they do not share a common 
mental base on which to build the future on. Furthering knowledge of, as 
well as fostering interest in the respective other German part however, could 
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